INTERVENTION 

AND 

COLONIZATION 
IN  AFRICA 

v 

NORMAN  DWIGHT  HARRIS 


LIBRARY 

UNIVERSITY  OF 
CALIFORNIA 

SAN  DIEGO 


WOULD  DIPLOMACY 

VOLUME  ONE 


INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION 
IN  AFRICA 

BY 

NORMAN  D  WIGHT  HARRIS 

Professor  of  European  Diplomatic  History,  Northwestern  University 

WITH  AN  INTRODUCTION  BY 
JAMES   T.    SHOTWELL, 

Professor  of  History,  Columbia  University 


BOSTON    NEW  YORK    CHICAGO 

HOUGHTON  MIFFLIN  COMPANY 
<$frt  ttitoewi&e  $««£  Cambribge 


COPYRIGHT,    1914,    BY   NORMAN  DWIGHT  HARRIS 
ALL  RIGHTS   RESERVBD 


CAMBRIDGE  .  MASSACHUSETTS 
U   .    S   .    A 


TO 
JOHN  R.  HEGEMAN 

THIS  WORK  IS 

RESPECTFULLY  AND  AFFECTIONATELY 
DEDICATED 


PREFACE 

EMPEEOR  WILLIAM  II  is  fond  of  quoting  the  remark  of 
Prince  von  Biilow  that  Germany  must  have  "  a  place  in  the 
sun."  By  this  he  means  that  the  Empire  has  joined  the  ex- 
pansion movement  in  which  all  the  leading  nations  are  par- 
ticipating, and  intends  to  take  a  prominent  part  in  it.  She 
desires,  not  only  to  develop  her  national  resources,  trade,  and 
colonies,  but  also  to  secure  a  place  of  influence  and  of  power. 
Great  Britain  and  France,  by  reason  of  their  history,  their 
commerce,  and  their  colonies,  have  a  recognized  position  to- 
day in  the  forefront  of  the  world's  activities.  And  Germany 
must  have  a  place  of  equal  advantage.  The  expansion  of 
nations  in  recent  years  has  been  an  attempt  of  the  Euro- 
pean states  to  secure  territory  and  economic  concessions, 
in  order  that  they  may  provide  adequately  for  the  future  de- 
velopment of  their  respective  countries,  and  that  they  may 
maintain  their  present  prominent  positions  in  the  family  of 
nations.  It  is  a  contest  for  power  and  privilege. 

In  the  following  pages  the  author  has  attempted  to  trace, 
chiefly  from  official  sources,  the  origin  and  development  of 
this  movement  in  its  main  features  during  the  past  forty 
years.  To  avoid  confusion,  which  is  certain  to  arise  with 
the  presentation  of  a  multiplicity  of  facts  and  events,  no 
mention  has  been  made  of  the  smaller  colonial  developments 
that  have  had  little  bearing  upon  the  general  issue.  Great 
Britain  has  four  valuable  colonies  on  the  west  coast  of 
Africa:  Gambia,  Sierra  Leone,  the  Gold  Coast,  and  Ni- 
geria ;  but  the  history  of  one  —  Nigeria  —  has  been  given 
in  detail.  The  story  of  this  colony  furnishes  an  excellent 
example  of  the  British  colonial  methods  and  policy  on  the 


vi  PREFACE 

West  Coast,  and  is  the  only  one  specially  connected  with 
the  general  contest  for  territory  in  that  part  of  Africa. 
Portugal  has  extensive  possessions  in  Portuguese  Angola 
and  East  Africa,  but  thus  far  the  development  of  these 
territories  has  not  been  materially  affected  by  the  general 
competition  for  land  in  Africa.  Therefore  they  have  not 
been  dealt  with  extensively  in  this  volume.  And  for  simi- 
lar reasons  descriptions  of  the  French  colony  of  Madagas- 
car, of  Italian  Eritrea,  and  of  British,  French,  and  Italian 
Somaliland  have  been  omitted. 

The  author  hopes  to  complete  this  study  of  European 
Expansion  and  World  Politics  in  a  second  volume  on  Euro- 
pean Intervention  and  Competition  in  Asia.  And  he  wishes 
to  acknowledge  his  indebtedness  to  his  colleague,  Dr.  Ben- 
jamin B.  Wallace,  who  has  read  the  proofs,  prepared  the 
third  appendix  and  the  index,  and  given  valuable  assist- 
ance in  the  collection  of  material. 
EVANSTON,  May,  1914. 


CONTENTS 

INTRODUCTION.    BY  JAMES  T.  SHOTWELL       ....    XT 

I.  EUROPEAN  EXPANSION  AND  WORLD  POLITICS      1 

Character  and  causes  of  European  expansion  in  the  nine- 
teenth and  twentieth  centuries  —  Industrial  and  financial 
revolution  —  Changes  in  colonial  ideals  and  methods  —  In- 
fluence of  the  popular  will  on  foreign  policy  —  Effect  of 
the  increase  of  population  and  emigration  —  Motives  for 
expansion  and  imperialism  —  Colonial  possessions  of  Euro- 
pean states  in  Africa  in  1870  —  The  great  explorations. 

II.  THE  FOUNDING  OF  THE  CONGO  INDEPENDENT 
STATE 20 

The  Brussels  Conference  and  the  International  African 
Association  —  Stanley's  discoveries  and  state-building — 
Portugal  and  Great  Britain  —  Bismarck  and  the  West 
African  Conference  —  Recognition  of  the  Congo  Independ- 
ent State  —  Free-trade  zone  —  Spirits  and  the  slave  trade  — 
Conference  of  Brussels  —  Administrative  development  of 
the  Congo  State  —  Destruction  of  the  Arab  slavers  —  The 
Lado  Enclave  —  Grenf ell's  explorations  —  Exploitation  of 
the  natives  —  Concessionaire  companies  and  atrocities  — 
Defects  of  administration  —  Illusory  free  trade. 

III.  TRANSITION  TO  THE  BELGIAN  CONGO  ...    47 

Increasing  complaints  of  misgovernment  —  Outside  pres- 
sure —  Investigation  —  Leopold's  will  —  Report  of  the  Spe- 
cial Commission  —  The  new  Colonial  Law  —  Cession  of 
the  Crown  Domain — Belgium  as  a  colonial  power  —  Re- 
forms of  1910  —  Results  and  prospects. 

IV.  GERMAN  COLONIZATION   IN  SOUTHWEST  AF- 
RICA      . 65 

Bismarck  and  colonization  —  British  and  German  missions 
and  traders  in  Hereroland  and  Namaqualand  —  Attitude  of 
England  toward  Great  Namaqualand  —  German  request  for 
protection  —  British  hesitation  —  Expedition  of  Herr  Lii- 


viii  CONTENTS 

deritz  —  The  Anglo-German  correspondence  —  Germany 
extends  her  protection  to  the  Southwest  Coast  —  Creation 
of  German  Southwest  Africa — Beginnings  of  German  colo- 
nial expansion  —  Bismarck's  policy  —  Occupation  of  Togo- 
land  and  the  Cameroon:)  —  Organization  and  development 
of  the  German  colonies  in  West  and  Southwest  Africa. 

V.  BRITISH    AND    GERMAN    EAST   AFRICA,  AND 
UGANDA 81 

The  Sultanate  of  Zanzibar  —  German  treaties  with  na- 
tives —  Delimitation  of  Zanzibar's  continental  claims  — 
German  and  British  spheres  —  Work  of  the  Imperial  Brit- 
ish and  German  East  African  Companies  —  Anglo-Ger- 
man treaty  of  1890  —  Italian  Somaliland  —  Carl  Peters 
in  Uganda — Missions  and  civil  war  —  Expedition  of  Lu- 
^gard  —  Rule  of  the  British  East  African  Company  in 
Uganda  —  The  Uganda  railway  —  Native  troubles  — 
Weakness  and  dissolution  of  the  Company — Establish- 
ment of  the  British  Protectorates  of  East  Africa  and 
Uganda  —  The  new  administration  —  Land  Grants  —  Fi- 
nance —  The  promise  of  Somaliland  —  The  government 
and  development  of  German  East  Africa. 

VI.  FRENCH    COLONIAL    EXPANSION    IN    WEST 

AFRICA,  THE  SUDAN  AND  THE  SAHARA    .      .  108 

Explorations  and  early  settlements  —  French  dreams  — 
Conquest  of  the  Ahmadu  and  Samory  —  Senegal  united 
with  the  Ivory  Coast  and  Dahomey  —  The  Nigerian  border 
—  Competition  and  treaties  with  Great  Britain  —  Exten- 
sion of  the  Sudan  and  the  French  Congo  —  The  Fashoda 
incident  —  Treaty  of  1899  —  Expansion  in  Guinea,  the 
Ivory  Coast,  Mauretania,  and  the  Sahara  —  Unification 
of  French  Africa  —  Colonial  consolidation  and  adminis- 
tration. 

VII.  NIGERIAN  ENTERPRISE     .      .      .      .      .      .      .131 

Exploration  —  Commercial  development  —  The  Royal 
Niger  Company  and  its  administration  —  Competition  for 
territory  —  Order  established  —  Transfer  of  country  to 
the  British  Government  —  The  new  administration  — 
Native  policy  —  Finance  —  Conquest  of  Bida,  Yola,  and 
Bornu  —  Of  Kano  and  Sokoto  —  Ruling  through  native 


CONTENTS  a 

chiefs — Administration  and  communication  —  Taxation — 
Native  law  and  courts  —  Land  policy  —  Unification  of 
Northern  and  Southern  Nigeria. 

VIH.  SOUTH  AFRICAN  EXPANSION  AND  UNION      .  1(0 

Definition  of  term  "  South  Africa  "  —  British  occupa- 
tion and  attitude  toward  Dutch  and  natives  —  The  Great 
Trek  —  British  expansion  —  Founding  of  the  South  Af- 
rican Republic  and  Orange  Free  State  —  Grey's  attempt 
at  union  —  Discovery  of  diamonds  and  immigration  — 
Lord  Carnarvon  fails  to  secure  union  —  Annexation  of  the 
Transvaal  —  Shepstone's  failure  —  Defeats  of  British  by 
Cetywayo  and  Boers  —  Establishment  of  the  Transvaal 
Republic  —  Three  factors  in  the  changed  situation  in 
South  Africa  • —  Causes  of  the  Anglo-Boer  controversy  — 
Irritating  incidents  and  Boer  ambition  —  Efforts  to  se- 
cure protection  for  British  citizens  and  interests  —  The 
Jameson  "  Raid  "  —  Effects  —  Attempts  at  reconciliation 

—  The  Boer  War  —  Readjustment  and  reorganization  — 
Self-government  for  the  Boer  communities  —  Steps  toward 
Colonial  union  —  Union  of  South  Africa  —  Expansion  in 
Rhodesia  and  Nyasaland  —  Development   of  Rhodesia — 
Recent  progress. 

IX.  THE  REOCCUPATION  OF  NORTHERN  AFRICA : 

ALGERIA,  ORAN,  AND  CONSTANTINE    ...  214 

The  Arab  states  of  North  Africa  —  Location,  govern- 
ment and  relations  with  European  powers  —  French  in- 
tervention in  Algeria  —  Cause  —  First  expedition  —  Ex- 
pansion and  conflict  with  Abd-el-Kader  —  Conquest  of 
Constantino  —  Defeat  of  Abd-el-Kader  and  subjugation  of 
Algeria  and  Oran  —  French  mistakes  —  Transition  period 

—  Conquest  of  Berbers  and  Kabyles  —  Land  policy  —  Re- 
forms in  administration  and  justice  —  Present  condition 
and  government  —  Occupation  of  Southern  Algeria — Con- 
solidation with  Sahara  territories. 

X.  THE  REOCCUPATION  OF  NORTHERN  AFRICA  : 
TUNISIA 230 

Early  relations  of  France  and  Tunis  —  Border  troubles 

—  Weakness  of  the  Tunisian  government  —  Reasons  for 
French  intervention  —  Italian  competition  —  Campaign  of 


i  CONTENTS 

•  / 

1881  —  Treaty  of  Kasr-es-Said  —  Pacification  of  the  coun- 
try —  Establishment  of  a  French  protectorate  —  Treaty 
of  1883  —  Position  and  powers  of  the  Resident-General  — 
Reforms  in  administration,  justice,  finance,  and  taxation  — 
Results. 

XL  THE  REOCCUPATION  OF  NORTHERN  AFRICA  : 

MOROCCO .243 

j,  European  interests  in  Morocco  —  Topography  and  local 
conditions  —  Royal  family  —  Government  —  Importance 
to  France  of  possession  of  Morocco  —  European  treaties 
affecting  North  Africa  —  France  and  Morocco  —  Border 
troubles  —  Treaty  of  1901  —  First  appearance  of  Ger- 
many—  Her  "coup"  of  1905  —  Algeciras  Conference  — 
The  outbreak  against  foreigners  —  Character  of  Abd-el- 
Aziz  —  Civil  war  —  Triumph  of  Mulai-el-Hafid  —  Cor- 
respondence concerning  his  recognition  by  Europe  —  French 
efforts  for  a  treaty  with  Mulai  —  Franco-German  treaty 

'  of  1909  — The  French  and  Spanish  treaties  of  1910  with 
Morocco  —  The  uprisings  of  1911  —  Siege  of  Fez  —  French 
relief  expedition — The  Agadir  incident — The  Franco- 
German  "  Conversations  "  —  Treaty  of  November  4,  1911 
— Reception  in  the  Reichstag  —  Debate  in  the  French  Leg- 
islature —  The  Franco-Spanish  "  Conversations  "  — Treaty 

.  of  October  25,  1912  —  Negotiations  with  Morocco  —  Pro- 
tectorate treaty  of  March,  1912 — Lyauty  French  Resident- 
General  —  Abdication  of  Mulai-el-Hafid  and  accession  of 
Yusef  —  Character  of  the  French  control  —  Present  pol- 
icy and  progress. 

XII.  THE  REOCCUPATION  OF  NORTHERN  AFRICA  : 

TRIPOLITANIA 290 

Physical  characteristics  of  Tripolitania  —  Early  his- 
tory —  Government  under  the  Turks  —  Relation  of  Italy 
to  Tripolitania  —  Development  of  Italian  interests  and 
ambitions  —  Turco-Italian  difficulties  —  Insults  to  Italian 
national  honor  —  Necessity  of  a  solution  —  Procrastination 
of  Turkey  —  Italian  ultimatum  —  Invasion  and  conquest  — 
,  .  ,  Efforts  to  secure  peace  —  Declaration  of  Italian  sover- 
eignty —  Unofficial  negotiations  for  settlement  —  Treaty 
of  Lausanne  —  Last  imperial  firman  —  Occupation  of  the 
"  Hinterland  "  —  Reform  and  Progress. 


CONTENTS  ri 

XHI.  THE  REOCCUPATION  OF  NORTHERN  AFRICA 

EGYPT 308 

Rule  of  Mehemet  Ali  and  his  successors  —  Failure  of 
the  administration  —  Bankruptcy  and  corruption  —  Appeal 
to  England  —  Mission  of  Stephen  Cave  —  Rivers  Wilson 
financial  adviser  —  Attempts  at  reform  —  Cooperation  of 
Great  Britain  and  France  —  Native  opposition  —  Cabinet 
difficulties  —  Resignation  of  Ismail  Pasha  —  England  and 
intervention  —  Efforts  at  financial  control  and  reform  — 
Intrigues  —  Rise  of  the  military  party  of  Ahmed  Arabi  — 
Opposition  to  foreign  interference  —  Failure  of  Khedival 
reforms  —  Reasons  for  armed  intervention  —  France  de- 
clines to  join  movement  —  Admiral  Seymour  at  Alexan- 
dria —  Campaign  of  General  Wolseley  and  defeat  of 
Arabi  —  End  of  the  "  Dual  Control  "  —  Reforms  of  Lord 
Dufferin  and  Colvin  —  Arrival  of  Lord  Cromer —  His  ad- 
ministration and  the  development  of  Egypt  —  British  suc- 
cesses and  mistakes  —  Political  parties  —  Natives  in  gov- 
ernment service — Organic  law  of  1913  —  Need  of  peace  — 
Present  situation. 

XIV.  THE  REOCCUPATION  OF  NORTHERN  AFRICA  : 

THE  SUDAN 330 

Subjugation  of  Equatorial  Africa  by  Baker  and  Gor- 
don —  Establishment  of  Egyptian  administration  in  Dar- 
Fur,  Bahr-el-Ghazal  and  Equatoria  —  Suppression  of  the 
slave  trade  —  Successes  of  Gessi  —  Abdication  of  Ismail 
Pasha  and  resignation  of  Gordon  —  Misrule  and  corrup- 
tion — Mahdi  uprising  —  Defeat  of  General  Hicks  —  Other 
risings  —  Gordon  recalled  —  Instructions  and  position  — • 
Attempt  to  extricate  garrisons  —  Zubeir's  aid  asked  —  Po- 
sition of  the  British  Government  —  Siege  of  Khartoum  — 
British  expedition  of  1884  —  Failure  to  reach  Khartoum  — 
Responsibility  —  Advance  of  Dervishes  stopped  —  Anar- 
chy in  the  Sudan  —  Need  of  reconquest  —  Change  in  po- 
sition of  Great  Britain  —  Kitchener's  campaigns  —  Sub- 
jugation completed  —  Convention  of  1899  —  The  new 
administration  —  Recent  developments  and  progress. 

APPENDICES 367 

INDEX  .  375 


LIST  OF  MAPS 

AFBICA  IN  1870  (colored) facing    16 

THE  GREAT  EXPLORATIONS 19 

THE  BELGIAN  CONGO,  1908 29 

GERMAN  SOUTHWEST  AFRICA 66 

BRITISH  AND  GERMAN  EAST  AFRICA  AND  UGANDA  ...  86 
WEST  COAST  OF  AFRICA,  1870  (colored)  ....  facing  108 
WEST  COAST  OF  AFRICA,  1882  (colored)  ....  facing  110 
WEST  COAST  OF  AFRICA,  1889-1891  (colored) .  .  .  facing  112 
WEST  AND  NORTH  AFRICA,  1898-1899  (colored)  .  .  facing  116 

NIGERIA 151 

BRITISH  SOUTH  AFRICA 164 

FRENCH  EXPANSION  IN  ALGERIA 218 

NORTHWEST  AFRICA 246 

TRIPOLTTANIA 291 

ANGLO-EGYPTIAN  SUDAN  IN  1899  . 333 

AFRICA  IN  1914  (double-paget  colored)  .      .      .        between  356,  357 


INTRODUCTION 

THERE  is  a  tradition  among  historians  that,  since  history 
deals  with  the  past,  the  further  a  subject  is  removed  from 
the  present,  the  more  historical  it  is.  School-books  and  lec- 
tures often  reflect  this  point  of  view.  The  Peloponnesian 
War  was  forced  upon  the  innocent  children  of  the  nine- 
teenth century  in  all  its  wearisome  detail,  while  the  pages 
of  the  history  manuals  closed  either  with  Napoleon  in  exile 
or  at  most  with  Bismarck  dictating  terms  of  peace.  Just 
across  the  threshold  of  the  world  of  to-day  one  read  the 
word  "  finis."  It  was  the  close  of  the  world's  story ! 

The  exclusion  of  recent  events  from  the  field  of  history 
was  justified  by  the  historians  upon  the  plea  that  only  as 
events  receded  into  the  past  could  their  proper  perspective 
be  seen.  Often  what  seems  of  most  moment  at  the  time 
proves  to  be  but  temporary  and  local  in  importance.  The 
Reign  of  Terror  in  the  French  Revolution,  for  example,  is 
now  seen  to  have  been  an  incident  of  less  importance  than 
the  relatively  unknown  social  revolution  of  1789,  which 
destroyed  the  remnants  of  medieval  feudalism  in  France. 
The  dramatic  interest  of  the  tragedy  led  those  closest  to  it 
to  concentrate  unduly  upon  the  story  of  mobs  and  guillotine, 
and  only  the  sober  historian  of  a  later  day  could  correct 
the  perspective,  after  the  issues  involved  had  ceased  to 
arouse  the  passions  of  the  investigator.  Warned  by  such 
experiences,  scientific  historians  of  the  last  century  accepted 
it  as  a  canon,  that  one  could  write  accurately  and  intelli- 
gently only  of  things  that  happened  before  one's  time. 

There  is  much  force  in  this  contention,  but  if  carried  out 
to  its  logical  conclusion, — that  one  must  wait  for  facts  to 


xvi  INTRODUCTION 

be  dead  before  the  historian  can  deal  with  them,  —  history 
would  cease  to  have  interest  or  value  for  any  but  antiqua- 
rians. There  is  fortunately  no  need  to  accept  such  a  con- 
clusion. The  history  of  one's  own  time  is  as  proper  a  theme 
for  the  modern  historian  as  it  was  for  Thucydides  or  Po- 
lybius.  Whatever  future  historians  may  recast  of  what  we 
write  or  teach,  if  we  bring  to  the  task  the  scientific  temper 
and  the  patient  labor  of  scholarship,  we  need  not  hesitate 
to  correct  that  worst  blunder  in  education,  which,  by  cutting 
off  the  past  from  the  present,  made  the  one  unreal  and 
robbed  the  other  of  its  truer  meaning. 

The  last  thirty  years  have  witnessed  two  of  the  greatest 
changes  in  all  the  varied  history  of  European  civilization. 
On  the  one  hand,  the  rise  of  capitalized  industry  has  reached 
such  a  point  that  it  has  practically  remade  the  Old  World, 
destroying  and  rebuilding  out- worn,  medieval  cities,  plant- 
ing factories  and  awakening  democracy.  On  the  other  hand, 
and  largely  as  a  result  of  the  new  economic  and  social  forces, 
this  European  society  has  expanded  throughout  the  world. 
This  expansion  has  come  both  by  way  of  the  enterprise  of 
adventurous  traders  pushing  their  wares  and  gathering  in 
the  rich  natural  treasures  of  s^avage  lands,  and  through 
formal  conquest  by  imperialistic  governments.  In  the  years 
of  peace  which  followed  the  attainment  by  Germany  and 
Italy  of  national  unity,  and  more  especially  in  the  thirty 
years  from  1884  to  1914,  the  main  problems  confronting 
statesmen  were  bound  up  with  either  of  these  two  policies : 
the  adjustment  of  the  nation  to  the  changing  conditions  of 
life  at  home,  and  expansion,  for  markets  or  colonies,  abroad. 

Naturally,  this  story  of  expansion  cannot  be  properly 
understood  when  divorced  from  that  of  the  affairs  at  home. 
But,  if  we  keep  the  thread  of  connection  in  our  minds,  and 
from  time  to  time  refresh  our  memories  with  statistics  of 
stock  markets  and  parliamentary  debates,  we  can  follow 


INTRODUCTION  xvii 

here  a  theme  which  should  appeal  to  the  imagination,  like 
a  tale  from  an  Elizabethan  romance.  In  the  twentieth  cen- 
tury, conquistadors,  clad  in  khaki  or  glittering  in  helmeted 
display,  have  proclaimed  to  most  of  the  savages  of  the  globe 
that  they  belong  henceforth  to  European  nations.  On  the 
wharves  of  London  there  are  goods  from  German  work- 
shops for  the  merchant  adventurers  of  to-day  to  carry  off 
to  Bantus  or  Negritos.  Piles  of  coal  from  Cardiff  lie  inside 
the  coral  reefs  of  Australasian  islands,  for  the  ships  which 
come  to  break  the  silence  of  farther  Hebrides  than  Words- 
worth dreamed  of.  But  for  the  historian  there  is  more  sig- 
nificance than  romance  in  such  events.  The  men  whom  Jo- 
seph Conrad  and  Kipling  describe  are  responsible  for  the 
transformation  of  Africa  and  Asia.  And  that  transforms 
tion  in  its  turn  is  mainly  responsible  for  those  policies  ol 
imperial  expansion,  of  commercial  and  colonial  rivalries 
which  underlie  the  causes  of  the  present  war. 

The  partitioning  of  Africa  and  the  penetration  of  Asia 
are  thus  chapters  of  the  history  of  European  civilization. 
But  they  are  of  vital  interest  to  more  than  historians.  They 
furnish  as  well  the  data  for  a  survey  of  economic  and  polit- 
ical forces  to-day.  The  partitioning  and  penetrating  are  still 
going  on :  the  war  itself  is  part  of  the  process.  They  will  go 
on  when  the  war  is  over,  though  perhaps  with  crippled  pace 
from  the  destruction  of  resources.  And  in  that  vast  world- 
movement  of  the  coming  years,  the  United  States  is  bound 
to  have  a  growing  interest  as  it  develops  the  way  of  other 
industrial  nations.  So  far  we  have  lacked  the  capital  for 
any  serious  expansion  of  business  —  except  in  one  or  two 
branches  —  outside  the  limits  of  the  country,  and  we  con- 
tinue to  use  foreign  capital  to  help  us  out  at  home.  But 
the  time  is  coming  rapidly  when  the  American  capitalist 
will  be  turning  his  attention  elsewhere,  and  mainly  toward 
exploiting  whatever  is  left  to  exploit  in  the  great  world  out- 


rviii  INTRODUCTION 

side.  When  that  time  does  come,  old  ideals  of  national 
seclusion  will  be  rudely  shattered.  Whatever  policies  we 
may  accept  as  a  nation  —  and  in  the  light  of  recent  events 
it  is  impossible  to  forecast  what  they  will  be — the  lessons 
of  statecraft  should  be  learned  from  those  whose  enterprise 
and  whose  blunderings  have  given  us  this  page  of  history 
—  now  blurred  and  stained  with  the  blood  of  the  vastest 
tragedy  in  the  history  of  civilization. 

We  have,  therefore,  more  than  a  passing  interest  in  the 
account  here  given  of  the  various  types  of  European  civil- 
ization in  Africa.  The  fine  and  heroic  work  of  British  resi- 
dents in  the  Niger  region,  for  instance,  thrown  into  con- 
trast with  the  sordid,  cruel  methods  employed  in  other 
parts  of  the  continent,  the  battle  with  disease  and  the  con- 
quest of  natural  obstacles  —  desert  and  tropical  jungles  — 
are  all  parts  of  a  common  heritage  in  the  new  world-history 
which  the  age  of  the  industrial  revolution  has  opened  up. 
It  is  not  simply  that  we  are  affected  by  such  things  as  the 
increased  output  of  African  gold,  which  helps  to  raise  the 
price  of  all  we  buy  and  sell,  but  that  with  the  emergence 
of  world-politics,  we  inherit  something  of  the  result  of  other 
nations'  achievements  and  so  make  their  past  our  own  as 
well.  It  is  sincerely  to  be  hoped  that,  in  this  transforma- 
tion of  our  outlook,  this  book  may  contribute  helpfully  its 
wealth  of  fact  and  breadth  of  view. 

J.  T.  SHOTWELL. 

COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY. 


INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION 
IN  AFRICA 


INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION 
IN  AFRICA 

CHAPTER  I 

EUROPEAN   EXPANSION   AND   WORLD   POLITICS 

DURING  the  last  quarter  of  the  nineteenth  century,  the 
leading  nations  of  the  world  engaged  in  a  remarkable 
territorial  expansion,  —  an  expansion  with  an  imperialistic 
tendency.  The  age  of  exploration  and  discovery  which  pro- 
duced a  Columbus  and  a  Cortez  was  reproduced  again  in 
an  era  which  gave  forth  a  Stanley  and  a  King  Leopold  II. 
Africa  was  to  be  to  the  nineteenth  and  twentieth  centuries 
what  the  Americas  had  been  to  the  fifteenth  and  sixteenth 
centuries.  Between  the  years  1884  and  1900,  France  and 
Great  Britain  each  acquired  over  3,500,000  square  miles 
of  territory  in  the  Dark  Continent  —  an  amount  equal  to 
the  whole  of  the  United  States  including  Alaska,  —  while 
the  Kaiser  and  the  King  of  Belgium  were  marking  out 
1,000,000  and  900,000  square  miles  respectively  for  them- 
selves. 

This  expansion,  however,  was  not  confined  to  Africa ;  it 
spread  to  Central  Asia,  to  the  Far  East,  to  the  Philippines 
and  the  distant  isles  of  the  Pacific.  There  was  an  intimate 
connection  running  through  the  whole  movement ;  and  the 
activities  of  Russia  in  Turkestan  and  Manchuria,  of  France 
in  the  Sudan  and  Madagascar,  of  England  in  Nigeria  and 
South  Africa,  and  of  Germany  in  East  Africa  and  Samoa, 


2        INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

must  be  carefully  studied  in  order  to  grasp  its  real  signifi- 
cance. At  first,  the  European  states  directed  their  efforts 
towards  the  acquisition  of  territory  and  the  founding  of 
colonial  empires,  in  order  to  secure  commercial  power  and 
the  control  of  trade  centers.  As  time  went  on,  however, 
their  point  of  view  changed ;  and  the  movement,  within  the 
last  decade,  has  become  economic  and  commercial,  rather 
than  territorial.  Narrow  and  selfish  ideas  of  colonial  poli- 
tics and  economics  have  given  place  to  broader  and  saner 
conceptions  of  the  relations  of  the  mother  countries  to  their 
offspring  and  to  one  another.  The  European  powers  have 
realized  that  the  acquisition  of  vast  territories  is  not  in 
itself  genuine  national  expansion,  and  that  these  great  pos- 
sessions cannot  be  maintained  without  a  scientific  study  of 
their  peoples,  customs,  and  institutions,  and  the  proper  de- 
velopment of  their  governments  and  natural  resources.  This 
places  a  great  burden  upon  the  home  country,  as  it  involves 
the  expenditure  of  immense  sums  of  money  and  the  employ- 
ment of  hundreds  of  its  best  citizens.  And  the  nations  have 
learned  that,  after  all,  the  world  is  a  small  place  where  the 
interests  of  all  constantly  overlap,  and  where  it  is  no  longer 
wise  or  possible  to  maintain  exclusive  trade  monopolies. 

Previous  to  1880,  the  European  governments  were  too 
much  occupied  with  local  affairs,  and  too  weak  financially 
and  economically,  to  think  seriously  of  colonial  empires. 
When  the  smoke  of  those  vital  conflicts  of  the  nineteenth 
century — the  Franco -Prussian  War  and  the  Russo  -Turkish 
struggle  of  1877-78  —  had  cleared  away,  and  the  map  of 
Europe  had  been  adjusted  for  a  time  with  a  fair  degree  of 
satisfaction,  the  statesmen  were  able  to  rise  above  the  petty 
strife  for  military  glory  and  local  territorial  aggrandize- 
ment, and  to  take  a  saner,  broader  view  of  a  nation's  des- 
tiny. And  a  transformation  was  begun  which  was  to  lift 
European  diplomacy  out  of  its  Mediterranean  leading-strings 


EUROPEAN  EXPANSION  AND  WORLD  POLITICS          3 

and  place  it  upon  a  plane  as  wide  as  the  world.  Man's  po- 
litical horizon  was  elevated  until  European  and  American 
politics  became  world  politics,  embracing  every  state  and 
every  land. 

Fortunately,  during  the  years  1870  to  1890  the  world 
was  undergoing  a  remarkable  financial  and  economic  de- 
velopment that  would  make  possible  this  world  diplomacy 
of  the  future.  In  Germany  an  industrial  revolution  took 
place,  which  dotted  the  land  with  factories  and  increased 
its  trade  to  over  $1,700,000,000  in  1890.  France  paid  off 
her  $1,000,000,000  war  indemnity  within  two  years  ;  and 
she  underwent  an  equally  astonishing  development,  loaned 
Germany  $250,000,000  for  industrial  improvements,  and 
became  the  banker  of  Europe.  The  extensive  British  trade 
grew  from  £547,000,000  in  1870  to  £749,000,000  by 
1890,  and  the  production  of  manufactured  goods  in  the 
United  States  from  $3,000,000,000  to  $9,000,000,000  in 
the  same  period. 

The  total  output  of  gold  increased  from  $477,000,000 
to  $836,000,000  during  the  same  time ;  and  the  yearly 
product  of  silver  grew  from  $39,000,000  in  1850  to  $135,- 
000,000  in  1885,  and  reached  $217,700,000  by  1904.  By 
1900  the  wealth  of  European  states  was  reputed  to  be 
approximately  $246,600,000,000 ;  and  private  resources 
were  accumulating  with  equal  rapidity.  In  1870  the  Bank 
of  England,  the  Bank  of  France,  and  a  few  private  institu- 
tions in  the  capitals  of  those  states  and  in  New  York  City, 
were  furnishing  most  of  the  capital  for  foreign  investment ; 
but  by  1907  there  were  twenty-one  private  banks  in  Eng- 
land, France,  Germany,  Italy,  and  the  United  States,  which 
possessed  a  total  of  over  $2,480,000,000  of  capital,  sur- 
plus and  deposits.  In  December  of  1909,  the  Comptroller 
of  the  Treasury  reported  that  the  total  resources  of  the 
banks  of  the  United  States  reached  the  stupendous  sum  of 


4       INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

$21,100,000,000.  To  grasp  the  value  and  significance  of 
this  marvelous  growth  in  capital,  one  has  only  to  recall 
the  rapid  development  of  the  multitude  of  rich  and  power- 
ful corporations  both  in  this  country  and  abroad  during 
the  last  quarter  of  a  century. 

This  astonishing  increase  in  capital  and  industry  was  ac- 
companied by  an  equally  remarkable  development  in  methods 
of  production  and  transportation.  Machinery  replaced  hand 
labor  in  the  shop  and  on  the  farm,  — on  the  latter  to  such  an 
extent  that  in  twenty  years'  time  600  men  were  doing  the 
work  formerly  requiring  2145.  Steam,  extensively  employed 
in  manufacturing  only  since  1865,  has  more  than  doubled 
man's  productive  power,  and  electricity  has  increased  it 
still  more.  The  steamboat  and  the  railway  displaced  the 
sailing-vessel  and  the  horse,  while  at  the  same  time  the 
cost  of  transportation  was  greatly  reduced.  In  1860  to  1870 
wheat  could  hardly  be  moved  150  to  200  miles  in  Europe 
without  losing  its  value.  Now  it  can  be  transported  halfway 
round  the  world  for  a  fraction  of  its  price. 

Thus,  through  a  wonderful  material  development  in  in- 
dustry, capital,  and  transportation  facilities,  the  way  was 
prepared  for  a  world- wide  colonial  expansion.  In  the  polit- 
ical field,  also,  new  movements  were  taking  place.  Govern- 
ments were  growing  in  resources,  in  wealth,  in  effectiveness, 
and  in  concentration  of  power.  The  France,  which  with 
dignity,  firmness,  and  skill  incorporated  Tunis  and  entered 
with  determined  tread  the  jungles  of  the  Sudan  in  the  early 
eighties,  was  not  the  prostrate  and  divided  nation  of  the 
seventies.  The  British  lion,  which  with  a  calm  forcefulness 
insisted  upon  its  share  of  Africa  in  the  eighties  and  nine- 
ties, was  not  the  vacillating,  meek  creature  of  the  sixties  and 
seventies.  The  masterful,  united  Germany,  backed  by  a 
Triple  Alliance,  interfering  in  Southwest  Africa  and  Mo- 
rocco, was  no  longer  the  jealous  group  of  mediocre  states, 


EUROPEAN  EXPANSION  AND  WORLD  POLITICS         5 

cajoled  into  a  union  by  the  exigencies  of  war  and  the  per- 
suasion of  a  Bismarck. 

This  development  has  been  accompanied  in  nearly  every 
state  by  a  growth  in  the  power  of  the  Federal  or  Central 
authority  and  by  a  thorough  organization  of  the  work  of 
the  executive.  Within  the  United  States,  where  the  labors 
of  the  cabinet  departments  have  been  so  carefully  and  sys- 
tematically developed,  the  Federal  Government  has  been 
steadily  taking  unto  itself  duties  and  responsibilities  of 
which  none  would  have  dreamed  fifty  years  ago.  In  Germany 
the  Imperial  Government  has  increased  steadily  in  strength 
since  its  organization  in  1871,  while  its  ruler  has  elaborated 
his  theory  of  divine  right.  In  France  the  growth  of  the 
Central  Government  in  power  and  efficiency  has  been  steady, 
until  French  premiers  and  cabinets  are  able  to  direct  the 
affairs  of  state  with  a  firmness  and  decision  unknown  in  the 
days  of  Guizot  and  Thiers.  And  in  England  the  strength 
of  the  cabinet,  which  became  a  fixture  under  Queen  Victoria, 
has  increased  until  it  has  now  secured  a  control  over  the 
House  of  Lords  nearly  equal  to  that  which  it  enjoys  in  the 
House  of  Commons. 

Equally  important  changes  were  taking  place  in  the  colo- 
nial activities  of  European  states,  as  well  as  in  their  general 
attitude  towards  colonization.  By  1830  the  old  "mercantile 
system  "  had  served  its  day ;  and  the  powers  realized  that 
colonial  monopolies  and  the  uncontrolled  rule  of  governors 
from  the  home  country  were  no  longer  an  unmixed  blessing, 
either  for  the  colonies  or  for  the  mother  country.  Great 
Britain  —  the  greatest  of  the  colonial  states  —  was  the  first 
to  move ;  and  between  1830  and  1860  a  complete  reversal 
of  her  whole  colonial  policy  took  place.  The  adoption  of  the 
free-trade  policy  at  home  brought  about  the  emancipation 
of  the  colonies,  and  was  the  source  of  as  much  benefit  abroad 
as  it  was  to  the  British  Isles  themselves.  This  was  accom- 


6        INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

panied,  through  the  influence  of  Mr.  Wakefield  and  of  the 
Colonization  Society  founded  in  1830,  by  the  granting  of 
home  rule  to  the  colonies.  Up  to  that  time  the  bureaucratic 
system  of  colonial  rule  employed  by  England,  where  every- 
thing—  even  to  unimportant  details  —  was  controlled  from 
Downing  Street,  had  proved  highly  detrimental  to  the  de- 
velopment and  progress  of  the  colonies.  Not  even  the  strong 
hand  of  a  Lord  Stanley  or  a  Lord  Grey,  now  and  then  in 
control  of  the  Colonial  Office,  was  sufficient  to  redeem  the 
system. 

"  In  some  back  room,"  wrote  Mr.  C.  Buller, "  you  will  find 
all  the  Mother  Country  which  really  exercises  supremacy, 
and  really  maintains  connection  with  the  vast  and  widely 
scattered  Colonies  of  Britain.  We  know  not  the  name,  the 
history,  or  the  functions  of  the  individual,  into  the  nar- 
row limits  of  whose  person  we  find  the  Mother  Country 
shrunk. 

"  There  are  rooms  in  the  Colonial  Office  with  old  and 
meager  furniture,  bookcases  crammed  with  colonial  gazettes 
and  newspapers,  tables  covered  with  baize,  and  some  old 
and  faded  chairs  scattered  about,  in  which  those  who  have 
personal  applications  to  make  are  doomed  to  wait  until  the 
interview  can  be  obtained.  Here,  if  perchance  you  shall 
some  day  be  forced  to  tarry,  you  will  find  strange,  anxious- 
looking  beings,  who  pace  to  and  fro  in  feverish  impatience 
or  sit  dejected  at  the  table,  unable  in  the  agitation  of  their 
thoughts  to  find  any  occupation  to  while  away  their  hours, 
and  starting  every  time  the  doors  open,  in  hopes  that  the 
messenger  is  come  to  announce  that  their  turn  is  ar- 
rived. Those  are  men  with  colonial  grievances.  .  .  .  One 
is  a  recalled  governor,  boiling  over  with  a  sense  of  morti- 
fied pride  and  frustrated  policy ;  another  a  judge,  recalled 
for  daring  to  resist  the  compact  of  his  Colony ;  another  a 
merchant,  whose  whole  property  has  been  destroyed  by 


EUROPEAN  EXPANSION  AND  WORLD  POLITICS        7 

some  job  or  oversight ;  another  the  organ  of  the  remon- 
strances of  some  colonial  Parliament;  another  a  widow 
struggling  for  some  pension  on  which  her  hopes  of  existence 
hang  ;  and  perhaps  another  is  a  man,  whose  project  is  under 
consideration.  Every  one  has  passed  hours  in  that  dull  but 
anxious  attendance.  .  .  .  After  a  short  conference  you  will 
generally  see  him  return,  with  disappointment  stamped  on 
his  brow,  and,  quitting  the  Office,  wend  his  lonely  way  home 
to  despair,  or  perhaps  to  return  to  his  Colony  and  rebel." 

These  are  the  words  of  a  partisan,  but  they  convey  a 
reasonably  accurate  picture  of  the  actual  condition  of  affairs 
at  the  time. 

It  was  from  such  leading-strings  that  the  colonies  were 
gradually  emancipated.  Beginning  with  Canada  in  1840, 
where  colonial  home  rule  and  union  originated  through  the 
activities  of  Lord  Durham  in  1839  and  1840,  responsible 
government  was  introduced  into  New  South  Wales  in  1843, 
South  Australia  in  1844,  Victoria  and  Tasmania  in  1851, 
New  Zealand  in  1852,  Cape  Colony  in  1854,  and  into 
Queensland  in  1859.  By  1870  the  new  system  was  thor- 
oughly developed  and  in  good  working  order  in  all  these 
typical  British  colonies. 

While  this  was  going  on,  the  old  wasteful  system  of  free 
land  grants  was  abolished,  and  the  Government  undertook 
to  regulate  the  sale  of  the  crown  lands  on  an  equitable  and 
scientific  basis.  The  discussions  of  party  politics  in  Great 
Britain  were  greatly  relieved  by  the  removal  of  numerous 
petty  questions  of  colonial  life  and  policy  from  the  field  of 
Parliament's  activities.  And  the  imperial  forces  were  gradu- 
ally withdrawn  from  the  self-supporting  colonies,  until  the 
Colonial  Secretary  reported,  in  1873,  that  the  military 
expenses  for  the  colonies  were  confined  almost  entirely  to 
the  necessities  of  imperial  defense. 

During  this  period  territorial  expansion  was  not  popular 


8        INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

with  the  Colonial  Office.  Lord  Derby,  Lord  Granville,  and 
Lord  Blachford  —  all  pupils  of  the  Manchester  School  of 
Bright  and  Cobden  —  had  no  faith  in  a  "  Greater  Britain  " 
or  confidence  in  the  policy  of  responsible  government.  Lord 
Blachford,  who  was  a  leading  factor  in  directing  the  colonial 
policy  from  1860  to  1870,  wrote,  "I  have  always  believed 
—  and  the  belief  has  so  confirmed  and  consolidated  itself 
that  I  can  hardly  realize  the  possibility  of  any  one  seriously 
thinking  the  contrary  —  that  the  destiny  of  our  Colonies  is 
independence ;  and  that  in  this  point  of  view  the  function 
of  the  Colonial  Office  is  to  secure  that  our  connection,  while 
it  lasts,  shall  be  as  profitable  as  possible." 

Some  acquisitions,  like  New  Zealand  in  1840,  Natal  in 
1843,  the  Transvaal  in  1852,  Basutoland  in  1871,  and  the 
Fiji  Islands  in  1874,  were  forced  upon  Great  Britain  by 
unexpected  and  serious  developments.  But  in  no  case  was 
the  extension  of  territory  due  to  any  preconceived  policy  of 
expansion.  The  almost  universal  sentiment  of  the  British 
statesmen  was  that  none  of  the  new  acquisitions  would  in  any 
way  fairly  compensate  the  Home  Government  for  the  ex- 
pense and  trouble  of  caring  for  them.  It  was  felt  that  there 
should  be  no  further  expansion  except  through  commercial 
enterprises.  By  1860  Parliament  had  entered  upon  a  policy 
of  retrenchment ;  and  in  1865  a  Committee  of  the  House  of 
Commons  composed  of  Cardwell,  C.  Fortescue,  Lord  Stanley, 
Adderley,  and  W.  E.  Forster,  recommended  that  any  fur- 
ther extension  of  territory  was  inexpedient  and  that  England 
should  withdraw  as  rapidly  as  possible  from  all  her  holdings 
on  the  west  coast  of  Africa,  except  Sierra  Leone. 

Moreover,  Great  Britain  was  too  poor  to  embark  seri- 
ously upon  great  colonial  undertakings.  In  the  majority  of 
cases  where  she  was  compelled  by  force  of  circumstances  to 
take  over  new  lands,  financial  reasons  forced  her  to  entrust 
the  development  and  control  of  those  countries  to  commer- 


EUROPEAN  EXPANSION  AND  WORLD  POLITICS         9 

cial  companies,  such  as  the  New  Zealand  Company  from 
1835  to  1850,  the  South  Australian  Company  from  1835, 
and  the  Kiver  Niger  Navigation  Company  in  1864.  This 
practice  of  utilizing  the  services  of  great  trading  companies 
was  taken  up  later  as  a  regular  method  of  colonial  expan- 
sion by  Lord  Granville,  when  he  chartered  the  British  North 
Borneo  Company  in  1882. 

Through  the  whole  period  from  1830  to  1880,  the  spirit 
of  conservatism  and  hesitation  was  triumphant.  The  British 
Colonial  Office  seemed  to  know  its  own  mind ;  but  it  was 
"  afraid  to  take  in  hand  any  definite  policy."  It  was  afraid 
of  the  expense,  of  the  jealousy  of  other  nations,  and  of  the 
new  responsibilities  that  every  change  of  policy  or  accession 
of  territory  involved.  But  more  than  these  was  the  serious 
handicap  of  a  procession  of  colonial  ministers  and  secre- 
taries, each  with  his  own  policy  and  theories  as  to  colonial 
rule  and  colonial  expansion  or  regression.  In  the  fifty-five 
years,  extending  from  1830  to  1885,  there  were  thirty  colo- 
nial secretaries,1  of  whom  six  served  from  four  to  six  years, 
but  the  other  twenty-four  averaged  scarcely  a  year  and  one 
fifth  apiece. 

Tendencies  were  at  work  as  early  as  the  sixties,  which 
promised  to  bring  to  an  end  this  period  of  uncertainty,  and 
to  create  a  new  conception  of  the  colonial  relations  and 
colonial  activities  of  the  British  Empire.  About  1885  the 
change  in  the  policy  and  position  of  the  Colonial  Office  was 
complete.  The  move  for  South  African  Confederation  from 
1874  to  1885  and  the  Colonial  Conferences  of  1883  and 
1887  mark  the  beginning  of  a  new  era  in  the  life  of  the 
British  Empire.  The  "  Imperial  Federation  Leagues "  of 
Lord  Rosebery  and  the  colonial  tariff  union  of  Mr.  Cham- 

1  The  office  of  Secretary  of  State  for  the  Colonies  was  not  created  nntil 
1854,  the  work  of  this  department  being  combined  with  the  Department 
of  War  under  one  portfolio  from  1801  to  1854. 


10       INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

berlain  were  the  first  suggestions  of  the  movement  for  im- 
perial federation  now  so  popular.  One  of  the  most  impor- 
tant factors  in  this  transformation  was  the  influence  of  the 
people  upon  the  British  foreign  policy.  The  franchise,  which 
had  been  placed  on  a  sound  basis  by  the  reforms  of  1832, 
was  enlarged  by  the  laws  of  1867  and  1884;  and  thereafter 
the  effect  of  public  opinion  upon  the  conduct  of  British  for- 
eign affairs  was  distinctly  noticeable.  Disraeli,  one  of  the 
first  modern  statesmen  to  undertake  an  aggressive  foreign 
policy,  was  put  out  of  office  in  1880  because  his  acts  failed 
to  meet  with  popular  favor ;  and  the  Gladstone  ministry 
which  succeeded  him  fell  five  years  later,  on  account  of  the 
public  disapproval  of  its  vacillating  conduct  of  foreign  affairs. 
But  it  is  safe  to  say  that,  when  the  British  Government 
took  a  prominent  and  dignified  part  in  the  forward  move- 
ment for  territory  during  the  last  fifteen  years  of  the  nine- 
teenth century,  it  had  the  support  of  the  people  behind  it. 
The  same  lethargy  and  indecision  prevailed  in  the  direc- 
tion of  French  foreign  policy.  No  one  took  much  interest 
in  colonial  affairs.  To  the  majority  of  French  statesmen, 
colonies  were  as  useless  and  unjustifiable  an  expense  as 
"poids  mort  a  trainer  "  and  "  une  loge  a  1'Opera."  Officials 
appointed  to  the  colonial  service  considered  themselves 
exiled ;  and  public  men  generally  considered  colonial  posses- 
sions as  places  fit  only  for  the  training  of  soldiers  and  sail- 
ors, for  the  harboring  of  criminals,  and  for  the  dissipation 
of  the  wealth  and  blood  of  the  French  nation.  There  was 
little  or  no  public  discussion  of  the  question ;  and  the  masses 
were  totally  ignorant  of,  and  indifferent  to,  the  success  or 
failure  of  the  national  colonial  policy.  Between  1815  and 
1870  France  more  than  doubled  her  territorial  possessions 
outside  of  Europe,  securing  a  firm  foothold  in  Indo-China, 
Algeria,  and  Senegal ;  but  this  was  not  the  result  of  any 
preconceived  or  aggressive  forward  policy.  These  annex- 


EUROPEAN  EXPANSION  AND  WORLD  POLITICS       11 

ations  were  largely  accidental  —  the  result  of  the  sudden 
desire  of  a  few  prominent  officials  to  gain  glory  or  popular- 
ity. In  fact,  the  movement  was  so  ill-conceived  and  so  care- 
lessly undertaken,  while  the  greatest  ignorance  prevailed 
as  to  local  conditions,  that  in  both  the  Tonquin  and  the  Al- 
gerian campaigns  there  was  a  great  waste  of  life  and  money ; 
and  it  was  many  years  before  the  French  reaped  any  benefits 
from  their  new  possessions. 

For  a  decade  after  the  Franco-Prussian  War,  all  colonial 
progress  was  stopped  by  the  weakness  and  poverty  of  the 
Government,  by  the  long  strife  between  the  political  par- 
ties which  more  than  once  brought  the  country  to  the  verge 
of  war  or  disrupture,  and  by  the  lack  of  scientific  knowl- 
edge and  modern  methods  of  managing  colonies.  The  sys- 
tem of  home  rule  accompanied  by  universal  suffrage  and 
representation  in  the  French  Parliament,  which  had  been 
given  to  the  colonies  by  the  First  and  Second  Republics,  and 
which  had  been  the  source  of  endless  troubles,  particularly 
in  the  Antilles,  was  replaced,  from  1854  to  1866,  by  the 
more  efficient  rule  of  governors  with  almost  full  powers 
and  supported  by  troops.  Yet  the  service  in  many  places 
remained  so  inefficient  and  slovenly  that  the  French  earned 
the  reputation  of  poor  colonizers. 

It  remained  for  Jules  Ferry  to  stir  his  compatriots  to 
an  active  and  sane  participation  in  foreign  politics,  and  to 
arouse  a  genuine  interest  and  national  pride  in  colonial 
undertakings,  through  the  Tunis  episode.  It  was  in  the 
eighties  before  France  had  scientific  and  popular  colonial 
organizations  of  sufficient  importance  and  backing  to  pre- 
pare the  way  for  the  creation  of  a  genuine  colonial  empire. 
Then,  for  the  first  time,  was  the  study  of  colonial  methods 
and  the  customs,  conditions,  and  peoples  of  the  new  lands 
entered  upon  with  intelligence,  seriousness,  and  enthusiasm. 
The  whole  system  of  colonial  administration,  from  the  Colo- 


12      INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

nial  Office  down  to  the  management  of  the  smallest  colony, 
was  gradually  but  thoroughly  reorganized  and  readjusted, 
until  now  it  is  as  efficient  as  any  in  the  world.  While  this 
was  going  on,  the  French  Government  had  grown  in  strength 
and  stability  until  it  had  won  the  confidence  of  the  Euro- 
pean states  and  Russia  was  convinced  of  the  value  of  a 
French  alliance.  This  was  agreed  upon  in  1891 ; l  and  in 
the  following  year  France  rendered  secure  her  finances, 
and  her  position  as  a  self-sustaining  and  progressive  nation, 
by  the  adoption  of  a  protective  tariff  system. 

Here,  also,  one  must  not  overlook  the  influence  of  the 
popular  will  upon  French  colonial  policy.  From  1880  on, 
this  is  distinctly  noticeable ;  and  the  enterprising,  progres- 
sive spirit  of  the  new  Republic,  resulting  from  the  healthy 
development  of  democratic  institutions  and  ideals,  showed 
itself  immediately  in  the  field  of  colonial  adventure  and 
enterprise.  The  active  promoters  of  French  expansion  in 
Africa  were  again  and  again  supported  and  encouraged  by 
private  funds  and  popular  approval ;  and  it  is  exceedingly 
doubtful  if  the  great  undertakings  would  have  succeeded 
but  for  the  financial  and  political  support  afforded  them 
by  the  French  Chamber. 

The  industrial  revolution  which  took  place  in  all  the 
European  states,  from  1870  to  1900,  was  sure  to  result  in 
overproduction  —  at  least  in  a  production  that  far  exceeded 
the  needs  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  several  states.  Wider 
markets  were,  therefore,  soon  in  demand ;  and  the  leading 
powers  quickly  found  themselves  embarked  upon  a  silent 
contest  for  the  unoccupied  trade  centers.  Commercial  monop- 
olies were  greatly  in  favor,  and  were  applied  wherever  pos- 
sible. The  increased  transportation  facilities  and  methods 
were  rapidly  bringing  large  fields  of  trade  into  the  general 
market,  which  previously  had  been  unapproachable.  In 
1800,  judging  from  the  limited  statistics  then  collected, 
1  Apparently,  and  apparently  made  more  formal  in  1894. 


EUROPEAN  EXPANSION  AND  WORLD  POLITICS       13 

there  were  about  355  to  360  million  people  who  were 
reached  by  the  trade  of  Europe.  But  by  1900,  the  sum  of 
those  affected  had  attained  the  enormous  total  of  1,579,- 
825,000,  or  an  increase  of  1,220,000,000  in  round  num- 
bers during  the  one  hundred  years.  Of  course,  a  goodly 
proportion  of  this  increase  is  due  to  the  remarkable  growth 
of  the  population  of  all  the  European  and  American  states  ; 
but  the  largest  share  must  be  attributed  to  the  opening  of 
vast  regions  in  Asia  and  Africa. 

In  this  connection,  it  is  to  be  noted  that,  after  1880, 
nearly  all  the  European  governments  became  alarmed  at 
the  conditions  arising  in  their  several  states,  due  to  this 
steady  and  astounding  increase  of  population.  In  the  ten 
years  from  1885  to  1895  the  population  of  Germany 
increased  approximately  540,000  per  year,  Italy  300,000, 
Austria-Hungary,  350,000,  Great  Britain,  318,000,  and 
Russia  (European),  1,350,000.  And  in  1895  the  density 
of  the  population  in  Germany  reached  250.5  per  square 
mile,  in  Great  Britain,  326,  in  Italy,  280,  and  in  Austria, 
180.  At  the  same  time,  emigration  from  these  countries 
was  assuming  equally  alarming  proportions.  In  the  ten 
years  from  1878  to  1887  over  2,311,400  persons  emigrated 
from  Great  Britain,  1,171,800  from  Germany,  and  609,- 
300  from  Italy;  and  the  European  governments  became 
anxious  to  keep  this  moving  population  under  their  own  flags 
and  their  own  control.  The  only  way  this  could  be  done 
was  through  providing  colonial  centers  to  which  they  could 
direct  their  ambitious  and  increasing  generations.  No  wonder 
that  the  Continental  states  looked  with  envy  upon  England 
with  her  extensive  colonial  empire,  and  were  anxious  to  share 
in  the  creation  of  new  fields  of  colonial  activity  and  in  the 
opening  of  great  world  markets.  But  they  were  slow  in 
recognizing  the  real  significance  of  the  great  transforma- 
tion that  was  in  progress ;  and,  fearing  international  com- 


14       INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

plications  and  doubting  their  ability  to  meet  successfully 
the  demands  of  such  far-reaching  enterprises,  they  hesitated 
to  push  their  domains  beyond  the  seas.  "  I  approached  the 
matter  with  some  reluctance,"  said  Bismarck.  "  I  asked  my- 
self, How  could  I  justify  it  if  I  said  to  these  enterprising 
men  [Bremen  merchants  with  interests  in  South  Africa] ,  that 
is  all  very  well,  but  the  German  Empire  is  not  strong  enough  ? 
It  would  attract  the  ill-will  of  other  states."  "  We  wished 
to  hold  ourselves  free,"  wrote  Lord  Granville  on  May  8, 
1882,  to  Lyons  (British  Minister  to  France),  concerning  the 
proposed  occupation  of  Egypt, "  if  necessity  arose,  to  consider 
all  possible  forms  of  intervention,  and  to  choose  that  which 
was  accompanied  by  the  fewest  inconveniences  and  risks." 
Motives  sufficiently  powerful  to  overcome  this  timidity 
were  soon  forthcoming.  In  the  name  of  humanity  it  was 
urged  that  it  was  the  duty  of  the  Christian  powers  to  pen- 
etrate the  wilds  of  Africa,  in  order  to  suppress  the  slave 
trade  and  to  bring  the  blessings  of  good  government  and 
of  civilization  to  the  natives.  In  practically  every  treaty 
from  1815  to  1900  affecting  Africa,  slavery  and  the  slave 
trade  are  mentioned.  And  King  Leopold,  speaking  of  the 
work  of  the  Congo  Association,  said:  "  Our  only  program  is 
that  of  the  moral  and  material  regeneration  of  the  country." 
Again,  it  was  argued  that  for  humanity's  sake  the  Christian 
nations  should  intervene  in  states  where  the  peoples  were  op- 
pressed by  the  misrule  of  incapable  despots  or  suffered  from 
endless  internecine  wars,  until  there  was  no  longer  any  pro- 
tection for  life  and  property  or  hope  of  freedom  for  the 
masses.  Lord  Granville  wrote  to  Lord  Dufferin  (British 
political  agent  in  Egypt)  on  October  5,  1882,  that  since 
the  rebellion  was  overthrown,  it  remained  for  them  "  to 
establish  on  a  firm  basis  the  authority  of  the  Khedive,  and 
to  make  provision  for  the  future  wellbeing  of  all  classes  of 
the  Egyptian  people." 


EUROPEAN  EXPANSION  AND  WORLD  POLITICS       15 

Again,  it  was  claimed  that  an  inexorable  law  of  the  uni- 
verse had  predestined  the  great  nations  to  occupy  the  earth, 
and  thus  to  bring  peace,  justice,  security,  and  a  beneficent 
rule  to  all  lands  and  people.  "The  Anglo-Saxon  race," 
said  Mr.  Chamberlain,  "  is  infallibly  destined  to  be  the  pre- 
dominant force  in  the  history  and  civilization  of  the  world." 
"  Non,  France,"  cried  Victor  Hugo  in  his  inimitable  way, 
"  1'univers  a  besoin  que  tu  vives !  Je  le  redis,  la  France  est 
un  besoin  des  hommes."  As  a  corollary  to  this,  the  seizure 
of  large  areas  of  uncontrolled  and  undeveloped  territories 
was  a  necessity,  if  the  blessings  of  good  government  and 
of  our  Christian  civilization  were  to  be  brought  to  the  less 
fortunate  and  the  half -civilized  peoples  of  other  lands.  And 
any  state  that  failed  to  occupy  its  share  was  neglecting  an 
imperative  call  of  Divine  Providence.  The  Russians  pene- 
trating the  wastes  of  Turkestan  and  Central  Asia,  the 
French  fighting  their  way  into  the  jungles  of  West  Africa, 
and  the  Germans  forcing  treaties  from  the  chiefs  of  East 
Africa,  were  answering  this  call.  "  The  Britons  are  a  race  en- 
dowed like  the  Romans  with  a  genius  for  government,"  said 
Sir  Wilfrid  Laurier ;  "  their  colonial  and  imperial  policy 
is  animated  by  a  resolve  to  spread  throughout  the  world 
the  arts  of  free  self-government  which  they  enjoy  at  home. 
And  they  are  in  truth  accomplishing  this  work." 

Without  doubt  the  most  vital  motives  for  expansion  are 
to  be  found  in  the  political  and  economic  needs  of  the  time. 
To  protect  the  commercial  and  financial  interests  of  their 
citizens  in  foreign  lands  was  a  good  and  sufficient  reason 
for  intervention  to  most  of  the  powers.  And  France  and 
Great  Britain  entered  Algiers,  Tunis,  and  Egypt  to  safe- 
guard the  interests  of  the  French,  British,  and  other  Euro- 
pean creditors.  But  the  economic  factor  was  the  most  press- 
ing. "  Colonization  is  for  France  a  question  of  life  or 
death,"  wrote  Leroy-Beaulieu.  "  Either  France  will  become 


16       INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

a  great  African  state,  or  she  will  be  in  a  century  or  two 
but  a  second-rate  power."  Russia  undertook  a  remarkable 
colonial  expansion  in  Central  Asia  to  secure  control  of  the 
trade  and  the  trade  routes  there.  Japan  fought  a  great  war 
to  insure  the  fulfillment  of  her  economic  destiny  in  Korea 
and  on  the  Chinese  mainland.  And  in  Germany,  where 
Bismarck  had  successfully  introduced  a  policy  of  protec- 
tion, because  "  under  free  trade  we  were  gradually  bleeding 
to  death,"  colonization  was  determined  upon  definitely  in 
1884,  as  necessary  to  insure  the  economic  independence 
and  future  of  the  Empire. 

The  African  possessions  of  European  states  in  1870  were 
neither  extensive  nor  particularly  valuable.  For  the  most 
part  they  were  confined  to  seaport  towns  and  the  adjacent 
territory,  which  were  being  used  as  ports  of  call  and  trad- 
ing centers,  rather  than  as  bases  for  colonial  expansion. 
There  had  been  no  attempt  to  mark  definitely  the  bound- 
aries of  any  of  these  colonies  or  to  stake  out  special  claims. 
The  different  nations  had  merely  built  forts  and  trading 
factories  at  certain  favorable  points  and  permitted  their  in- 
fluence to  extend  gradually  into  the  interior  without  any  defi- 
nite purpose  or  plan  of  expansion.  An  exception  was  made 
in  Algeria  and  Cape  Colony;  but,  before  1870,  none  of 
the  European  powers  had  seriously  considered  the  founding 
of  great  colonial  states  in  Africa. 

The  French  possessed  a  strong  hold  on  Algeria  at  the 
north  and  had  established  along  the  west  side  three  small 
colonies,  on  the  Senegal  River,  at  Mellicouri,  and  on  the 
Ivory  Coast.  In  addition  they  had  begun  explorations  on 
the  Gaboon  River  and  started  a  settlement  at  Obock  on  the 
East  Coast.  The  British  controlled  a  struggling  colony  at 
the  Cape  of  Good  Hope,  had  secured  substantial  holdings 
and  openings  for  trade  at  Gambia,  Sierra  Leone,  the  Gold 
Coast,  and  Lagos  on  the  west  side,  and  had  pushed  up  the 


Longitude  West  0°       Longitude       20°      East     from       40°    Greenwich 


EUROPEAN  EXPANSION  AND  WORLD  POLITICS       17 

Niger  River  to  the  Benue.  The  Portuguese  claimed  exten- 
sive but  indefinite  tracts  of  land  on  the  West  Coast,  ex- 
tending from  the  mouth  of  the  Congo  to  a  point  some  dis- 
tance south  of  Benguella,  and  in  Mozambique,  on  the  East 
Coast,  reaching  for  a  considerable  number  of  miles  north 
and  south  of  the  Zambesi  River.  But  their  settlements  and 
trading  posts  were  few  and  widely  scattered.  In  addition, 
they  had  a  small  colony  on  the  Guinea  Coast  and  the  islands 
of  Principe  and  Sao  Thome  in  the  Gulf  of  Guinea.  The 
Spaniards  had  extended  their  sway  over  an  indefinite  area, 
known  as  Rio  de  Oro,  on  the  West  Coast,  nearly  opposite 
the  Canary  Islands,  and  had  occupied  a  small  strip  of  the 
Guinea  Coast  just  north  of  the  Gaboon  country  and  the 
island  of  Fernando  Po.  None  of  the  other  European  coun- 
tries owned  any  territory  in  the  Dark  Continent,  Holland 
having  lost  or  sold  hers  to  Great  Britain,  and  Germany  and 
Italy  not  having  made  as  yet  a  start  towards  the  establish- 
ment of  colonies. 

Fortunately,  at  the  time  when  the  European  states  be- 
gan to  think  seriously  of  colonial  expansion,  the  interest  of 
Europe  in  the  Dark  Continent,  as  a  field  for  commercial 
and  economic  activity,  was  aroused  to  a  degree  never  be- 
fore known.  Considerable  information  existed  concerning 
certain  portions  of  Africa  and  its  general  contour,  for,  in 
the  forty  years  prior  to  1870,  a  large  part  of  the  continent 
had  been  explored ;  but  few  persons,  except  scholars  and 
geographers,  had  taken  particular  notice  of  it.  Before  1880, 
indeed,  Mungo  Park,  Major  Laing,  and  M.  Caille  had  gone 
from  the  West  Coast  up  the  Gambia  and  Senegal  Rivers, 
found  the  upper  waters  of  the  Niger  and  Timbuctu  and 
crossed  the  Sahara  to  Tangier  and  Tripoli,  while  Clapper- 
ton  and  Denham  were  exploring  the  Central  Sudan  from 
Lake  Chad  to  the  Niger  River,  and  the  brothers  Lander 
down  that  stream  to  its  mouth-  Dr,  Henry  Barth  spent 


18      INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

the  years  1850  to  1855  in  the  scientific  study  of  the  lan- 
guages, peoples,  and  geography  of  the  region  just  mentioned 
(west  of  Lake  Chad)  including  the  kingdom  of  Sokoto. 
Farther  south,  on  the  East  Coast,  Paul  du  Chaillu  traveled 
over  the  Gaboon  River  district  between  1856  and  1868 ; 
and,  in  the  interior,  David  Livingstone  explored  the  Zam- 
besi River,  the  region  about  Lakes  Nyasa  and  Tanganyika, 
and  crossed  the  continent  to  Benguella  during  the  eighteen 
years  following  1851.  Meanwhile,  Burton,  Speke,  and 
Grant,  coming  up  from  the  East  Coast,  had  discovered  Lake 
Victoria  Nyanza  and  the  headwaters  of  the  Nile ;  and  Sir 
Samuel  Baker,  traversing  the  whole  of  that  river  from  the 
north  to  south,  found  its  other  source  in  Albert  Nyanza. 

But  it  was  the  work  of  Dr.  Nachtigal,  who  in  1869  to 
1871  studied  carefully  the  Eastern  Sahara  and  Sudan ;  of 
Cameron,  who  crossed  the  whole  continent  from  the  Zan- 
zibar Coast  to  Benguella  between  1873  and  1875  ;  of 
Savorgnan  de  Brazza,  who  explored  scientifically  the  whole 
region  between  Libreville  on  the  Gaboon  and  the  north 
banks  of  the  Congo  and  Ubangi  Rivers  from  1874  to  1884 ; 
and  of  Henry  M.  Stanley,  who  found  Livingstone  in  1873, 
that  drew  the  attention  of  the  general  public  to  Africa. 
Books  were  written,  money  raised,  and  colonial  societies 
formed  with  the  purpose  of  inducing  people  to  study  Afri- 
can conditions  and  to  start  colonies.  By  the  time  Stanley 
returned  from  his  second  journey  in  1877,  with  the  news 
of  the  discovery  of  the  great  Congo  River  and  its  tribu- 
taries, the  statesmen  and  the  intelligent  public  of  Europe 
were  taking  a  very  considerable  interest  in  African  affairs. 
The  general  topography  of  the  continent  had  been  mapped, 
—  in  outline,  at  least,  —  the  location  of  all  the  important 
lakes  arid  waterways  pointed  out,  and  the  possibilities  of 
the  different  sections  as  sources  of  wealth  and  trade  for 
Europe  ascertained  with  a  fair  degree  of  accuracy. 


Longitude       West         0°      Longitude       Eut        20°      from       Greenwich       40° 


3CHE  GREAT  EXPLORATIONS 

EXPLORERS  BEFORE  STANLEY 

DavJd  •Uvmgetono  .........  Park,  Lalng   end   Caille. 

Burton,  Speko ;  Grant  and   Baker  '}^X-X-XX  Du  Challlu  and   Oe  Brazza 

Clapporton,  penham,  Bartfi  and  the  Landers ,____.— .Dr.  (taohtlgal 

•— ^Explorations  of  tlenry  M.  Stanley 


CHAPTER  II 

THE  FOUNDING  OF  THE  CONGO  INDEPENDENT  STATE 

THE  time  was  propitious.  Europe  was  at  peace  and  the 
leading  states  were  growing  steadily  in  stability  and  strength. 
The  way  and  the  means  had  been  gradually  preparing  along 
every  line.  The  field  lay  ready  and  open  to  all  comers. 
Nothing  further  was  needed  to  set  in  motion  a  widespread 
movement  for  colonies  than  some  powerful  motive,  some 
aggressive  act,  that  would  arouse  the  jealousy,  the  ambition, 
or  the  cupidity  of  nations.  Such  a  determining  impulse  was 
not  long  in  coming.  The  organization  and  activities  of  the 
Independent  Congo  Association  and  the  entrance  of  Ger- 
many into  Southwest  Africa  stimulated  the  interest  of  Great 
Britain  and  France  in  African  colonization,  and  brought 
on  a  general  forward  movement  for  territory  in  the  Dark 
Continent. 

In  September,  1876,  King  Leopold  II  of  Belgium,  then 
forty  years  of  age,  presided  over  a  conference  at  Brussels, 
for  the  purpose  of  founding  an  international  society  which 
should  promote  the  exploration  of  Central  Africa.  Some 
forty  representative  scientists,  diplomats,  and  publicists 
from  Great  Britain,  Belgium,  Austria,  France,  Germany, 
Italy,  and  Russia  were  present,  and  the  question  was  dis- 
cussed with  considerable  enthusiasm.  It  was  planned  to 
equip  expeditions  which  should  explore  scientifically  the 
great  unknown  region  lying  between  the  Zambesi  River  and 
the  Sudan,  and  extending  from  ocean  to  ocean,  to  suppress 
the  slave  trade  and  to  introduce  Western  civilization  there. 
An  organization  called  "  L' Association  Internationale  pour 


FOUNDING  OF  THE  CONGO  INDEPENDENT  STATE    21 

1'Exploration  et  la  Civilisation  de  1'Afrique  Centrale,"  but 
better  known  as  the  "  International  African  Association," 
was  formed,  with  headquarters  at  Brussels  under  the  im- 
mediate direction  of  Leopold,  and  with  national  committees 
in  practically  all  the  European  countries  and  in  the  United 
States,  whose  business  it  was  to  arouse  interest  in  the 
movement  and  to  raise  funds. 

During  the  years  1876  and  1877,  Henry  M.  Stanley  had 
returned  to  Zanzibar,  crossed  with  great  difficulty  the  des- 
erts and  forests  to  the  headwaters  of  the  Congo,  via  Lakes 
Victoria  Nyanza  and  Tanganyika,  and  descended  the  river 
some  two  thousand  miles,  amid  dangers  and  adventures,  to 
its  mouth.  On  his  return  he  was  met  at  Marseilles  by  two 
of  Leopold's  agents,  and  later  summoned  to  Brussels,  where 
he  gave  to  King  Leopold  and  the  chief  promoters  of  the 
International  African  Association  an  impressive  account  of 
his  discoveries  and  of  the  wonderful  natural  wealth  of  the 
Congo  region.  The  result  was  that  the  "  Committee  for  the 
Study  and  Investigation  of  the  Upper  Congo"  (Comite 
d'£tudes),  appointed  in  November,  1878,  became  a  definite 
organization  under  the  chairmanship  of  Colonel  Strauch, 
and  assumed  the  direction  of  all  the  activities  of  the  Asso- 
ciation after  January,  1879. 

The  services  of  Stanley  were  secured,  and  in  August  of 
the  year  1879,  he  had  begun  his  mission,  —  to  explore  the 
Congo  carefully,  to  make  treaties  with  the  native  chiefs,  to 
establish  stations  along  the  river  for  the  advancement  of 
trade  and  the  protection  of  the  natives,  and  to  exert  every 
effort  to  end  the  interior  slave  trade.  So  skillfully  and  ener- 
getically did  the  great  explorer  carry  out  this  work  that, 
when  he  returned  to  Europe  in  June,  1884,  a  vast  area 
of  900,000  square  miles,  with  an  estimated  population  of 
15,000,000,  had  been  mapped  out  for  the  Association.  In 
its  early  stages  this  enterprise  was  intended  to  be  as  philan- 


22      INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

thropic  as  it  was  commercial.  Leopold  hoped  to  found  a 
great  negro  state  in  the  basin  of  the  Congo,  which  would 
afford  adequate  protection  to  the  harassed  and  weaker  ele- 
ments of  the  population,  suppress  such  vicious  and  barbaric 
customs  as  cannibalism,  and  open  the  country  to  mission- 
aries, to  trade,  and  to  European  civilization.  The  first  Com- 
missioner, appointed  in  July,  1883,  to  rule  the  district  was 
the  liberal-minded  Sir  Frederic  Goldsmid.  If  it  had  not 
been  for  the  imperative  call  of  Egypt,  General  Gordon  would 
have  succeeded  him  in  1884 ;  but  his  place  was  taken  by 
another  able  British  officer,  Sir  Francis  de  Winton,  who 
served  as  the  first  Administrator-General  of  the  Congo 
State  from  June,  1884,  to  December,  1885. 

It  was  not  to  be  expected  that  this  undertaking —  so  vast 
and  so  costly  —  could  long  remain  solely  upon  a  philan- 
thropic basis.  The  sum  raised  by  the  Comite  d'i^tudes  was 
insignificant;  and  King  Leopold  himself  was  forced,  not 
only  to  carry  a  large  part  of  the  expense  from  1879  to  1890, 
furnishing  from  $100,000  to  $200,000  yearly,  but  to  con- 
tinue his  support  thereafter  until  he  had  contributed  ap- 
proximately $5,000,000.  To  make  the  enterprise  really  pay 
its  way,  it  was  therefore  necessary  to  fall  back  upon  certain 
commercial  features  which  were  inseparably  connected  with 
the  progress  of  the  whole  undertaking.  In  1882  the  Associa- 
tion was  transformed  into  a  corporation  called  the  "  Inter- 
national Association  of  the  Congo,"  with  King  Leopold  as 
president ;  an  Association  flag  was  adopted  ;  and  an  ener- 
getic and  systematic  attempt  was  made  to  develop  the  trade 
of  the  Congo  Basin.  "  I  have  never  ceased  to  call  the  atten- 
tion of  my  countrymen  to  the  necessity  of  turning  their  at- 
tention to  countries  across  the  seas,"  wrote  King  Leopold 
to  M.  Beernaert  in  1889.  "  It  is  in  serving  the  cause  of 
humanity  and  progress  that  peoples  of  the  second  class  ap- 
pear useful  members  of  the  great  family  of  nations.  More 


FOUNDING  OF  THE  CONGO  INDEPENDENT  STATE    23 

than  any  other,  a  manufacturing  and  commercial  nation 
like  ours  should  endeavor  to  assure  outlets  for  all  its  work- 
men, —  thinkers,  capitalists,  and  laborers.  These  patriotic 
considerations  have  dominated  my  life.  They  decided  the 
creation  of  the  African  work."  "  I  was  firmly  convinced," 
wrote  George  Grenfell,  speaking  of  the  period  from  1884 
to  1894,  "that  if  His  Majesty  sought  anything  beyond  the 
advantage  of  the  Congo  people,  it  was  but  the  benefit  of  his 
Belgian  subjects,  whose  great  need,  like  the  Briton's,  is  an 
open  market  for  their  labor."  *  It  was  soon  noted  that  the 
region  was  rich  in  ivory  and  rubber ;  and  various  sections 
of  the  country  were  parceled  out  ere  long  to  trading  com- 
panies. The  Anglo-Belgian  Indiarubber  Company  was  the 
first  and  the  most  powerful  of  these ;  but  it  was  followed 
gradually  by  others,  until  there  were  some  ten  "  concession- 
naire  "  companies  in  the  field. 

The  International  Association  of  the  Congo  had  not  been 
recognized  by  the  powers  and  had  therefore  no  assured  ter- 
ritorial existence.  A  charter  from  Europe,  said  Stanley  in 
1882,  was  necessary  to  make  it  worth  a  two-shilling  piece. 
Doubtless  Leopold  would  have  gladly  postponed  this  issue 
indefinitely  while  consolidating  the  new  state,  but  French 
ambitions  made  it  impossible.  However,  by  a  fortunate  com- 
bination of  circumstances,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  rising 
Congo  State  was  most  seriously  threatened  by  French  ex- 
pansion, and  that  this  in  turn  caused  Portugal  to  reassert 
her  claims  to  the  most  essential  part  of  the  new  state,  Leo- 
pold was  able  to  get  the  support  of  Europe  and  to  over- 
throw his  enemies  in  detail. 

For  centuries  Portugal  had  claimed  the  West  Coast  of 
Africa  at  least  fromlat.  5°  12'  S.  to  lat.  18°  S.,  and  an  in- 
definite amount  inland.  No  country  disputed  the  claim  be- 
low lat.  8°  S.,  but  neither  had  any  country  explicitly  recog- 

1  Sir  Harry  Johnston,  George  Grenfell  and  the  Congo,  vol.  i,  p.  377. 


24       INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

nized  the  claim  to  the  important  northern  strip,  which  in- 
cluded the  mouth  of  the  Congo.  France,  by  the  Convention 
of  1786,  neither  contested  nor  recognized  Portuguese  sover- 
eignty there,  but  agreed  not  to  occupy  any  of  that  terri- 
tory herself,  which  perhaps  might  be  said  to  be  a  recognition 
of  it  as  a  sphere  of  interest.  Great  Britain  steadfastly  re- 
fused to  recognize  Portuguese  jurisdiction,  though  the  Lis- 
bon Government  initiated  negotiations  for  such  recognition 
every  few  years  from  1846.  Portugal  had  never  been  able 
to  enforce  with  any  regularity  her  commercial  monopoly  on 
the  Congo,  and  a  complete  freedom  of  trade  had  been  con- 
firmed to  France  by  the  Convention  just  mentioned,  and 
was  equally  enjoyed  by  other  countries,  with  or  without 
treaty  rights. 

The  rapid  success  of  Stanley,  the  penetration  of  M.  Sa- 
vorgnan  de  Brazza  to  the  Upper  Congo,  and  the  occur- 
rence of  several  violent  conflicts  between  natives  and  traders, 
which  again  raised  the  question  of  jurisdiction,  once  more 
compelled  Portugal  to  open  negotiations  for  the  recognition 
of  her  "  sovereignty."  Accordingly,  early  in  November, 

1882,  both  France  and  Great  Britain  were  approached. 
France  gave  assurances  that  De  Brazza's  third  expedition, 
then  in  preparation,  was  merely  scientific;  that  she  would 
not  encroach  on  the  territories  south  of  lat.  5°  12' ;  and  that 
she  was  prepared  to  join  in  the  delimitation  of  West  African 
boundaries.  The  correspondence  continued  until  January, 

1883,  and  was  renewed  in  the  summer,  but  nothing  came 
of  it.  The  French  Government  was  friendly,  but  apparently 
wished  to  postpone  the  delimitation  till  De  Brazza  had  had 
time  to  consolidate  their  holdings  along  the  Congo.    In 
February,  1883,  he  was  given  the  powers  of  a  colonial  gov- 
ernor and  authorized  to  make  such  treaties  with  the  native 
chiefs  as  were  necessary  to  advance  the  French  influence. 
His  studies  of  the  country  and  its  resources  were  to  be  ac- 


FOUNDING  OF  THE  CONGO  INDEPENDENT  STATE    25 

companied  by  serious  efforts  to  accustom  the  natives  to  the 
idea  of  putting  themselves  under  French  protection. 

With  Great  Britain,  Portugal  was  more  successful.  For- 
eigners were  largely  shut  out  from  the  French  colonial 
markets,  and  Great  Britain  did  not  wish  these  preserves 
enlarged.  It  was  hardly  feasible  to  take  the  territory  her- 
self;  but  Portugal  had  claims  to  it,  she  professed  con- 
version to  the  most  liberal  principles  of  colonial  admin- 
istration, and  was  weak  enough  to  be  easily  held  to  them. 
In  his  first  despatch  De  Serpa  wrote :  "  Portugal  does  not 
wish  to  close  Africa,  but  on  the  contrary  to  open  it  to  the 
colonization  and  the  commerce  of  the  world,  and  to  facili- 
tate access  to  it  from  the  coasts  she  occupies."  She  would 
suppress  the  slave  trade  there,  define  the  boundaries  in 
West  Africa,  and  cooperate  with  her  neighbors  in  main- 
taining order  and  security  on  the  Congo.  Lord  Granville 
recognized  that  conditions  had  changed  since  the  Portu- 
guese advances  of  1877  had  been  repelled,  and  on  December 
15  he  proposed  as  bases  for  a  treaty:  the  recognition  of 
the  Portuguese  boundaries  at  lat.  5°  12'  S.  and  18°  S. ; 
unrestricted  commerce  on  the  Congo  and  the  Zambesi ;  low 
tariffs  in  all  the  African  possessions  of  Portugal ;  the  equal- 
ity of  British  and  Portuguese  subjects  in  matters  of  land, 
leases,  religion,  and  taxes ;  and  the  cession  of  Portuguese 
claims  between  long.  5°  W.  and  5°  E.,  i.e.,  the  fort  of  St. 
John  the  Baptist  of  A juda.  A  lively  correspondence,  lasting 
till  February,  1884,  led  to  the  signing  of  a  treaty  along  the 
lines  suggested,  but  with  the  rights  of  foreigners  much  more 
thoroughly  safeguarded.  The  equality  of  treatment  was  care- 
fully defined,  elaborated,  and  extended  to  all  foreigners; 
freedom  of  navigation  on  the  Congo  was  guaranteed  ;  the 
duties  levied  in  the  Congo  territory  might  not  for  ten  years 
exceed  those  of  the  Mozambique  tariff  of  1877,  and  might 
then  be  revised  only  by  consent  of  Great  Britain ;  and  Portu- 


26       INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

guese  sovereignty  on  the  Congo  was  recognized  only  to  Noki. 
This  last  provision  shows  Granville's  friendliness  for  the 
Congo  Association,  but  many  feared  that  the  cutting-off  of 
the  new  state  from  the  sea  would  kill  Leopold's  beneficent 
enterprise. 

Almost  instantly  serious  opposition  arose  to  this  treaty, 
not  only  in  the  Cortes  and  in  Parliament,  but  also  on  the 
Continent.  France  knew  the  treaty  was  directed  against 
her;  and  in  Germany  a  score  of  chambers  of  commerce 
appealed  to  Bismarck  for  aid.  The  Woermann  Line  had  a 
monthly  service  to  the  Congo  and  from  January,  1883,  to 
March,  1884,  inclusive,  had  sold  there  1,029,904  pounds  of 
powder,  2452  tons  of  liquor,  and  555  tons  of  weapons  and 
rice  ;  and  the  traffic  in  intoxicants  alone  had  increased  from 
76  tons  in  January,  1883,  to  502  tons  in  March,  1884. 
There  were  also  many  sailing-vessels  that  visited  these  re- 
gions. Bismarck  imagined  that  this  trade  was  threatened. 

The  French  and  German  Governments  approached  each 
other  at  almost  the  same  time  —  April  17  to  19  —  to 
ascertain  one  another's  views ;  and  Count  Hatzfeldt,  Ger- 
man Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  wrote  likewise  to  Hol- 
land, Spain,  Italy,  and  the  United  States,  while  vigor- 
ously protesting  against  the  treaty  in  Lisbon  and  London. 
Granville  had  long  recognized  the  necessity  of  Continental 
recognition  if  the  treaty  were  to  accomplish  its  purpose  ;  and, 
when  Bismarck  said  that  it  would  not  be  accepted  even  if 
Portugal  made  further  concessions  as  to  the  tariff  and  sub- 
stituted an  international  for  the  dual  commission  Cwhich 
was  to  regulate  the  navigation  of  the  Congo),  Granville 
announced  that  his  Government  had  abandoned  the  treaty. 
However,  negotiations  were  to  be  continued.  Portugal  had 
already  made  the  suggestion  of  an  international  conference, 
without  apparent  response.  But  Bismarck  took  up  the  idea 
—  if,  indeed,  he  had  not  already  thought  of  it ;  and,  in  order 


FOUNDING  OF  THE  CONGO  INDEPENDENT  STATE    27 

to  get  ahead  of  Great  Britain,  the  natural  power  to  call 
such  a  conference,  and  to  secure  a  prominent  place  for  Ger- 
many in  colonial  affairs,  in  which  she  had  had  almost  no  share 
heretofore,  he  pressed  France  to  unite  with  him  in  issuing 
the  invitations.  Granville  was  reassured  by  such  state- 
ments as  that  Bismarck  would  be  glad  to  name  a  plenipo- 
tentiary to  the  conference  suggested  by  Portugal,  while  the 
French  and  German  Governments,  from  May  to  October, 
were  coming  to  an  agreement  on  the  scope  of  the  conference 
and  on  their  joint  policy. 

On  October  8,  they  issued  invitations  for  a  conference 
to  meet  at  Berlin,  within  the  month,  if  possible,  to  discuss 
"  freedom  of  commerce  in  the  basin  and  mouths  of  the 
Congo ;  application  to  the  Congo  and  Niger  of  the  princi- 
ples adopted  at  the  Congress  of  Vienna  with  a  view  to  pre- 
serve freedom  of  navigation  on  certain  international  rivers 
.  .  .  and  a  definition  of  formalities  to  be  observed  so  that 
new  occupations  on  the  African  coasts  shall  be  deemed  effec- 
tive." Great  Britain,  Belgium,  Holland,  Portugal,  Spain, 
and  the  United  States  received  invitations  at  this  time,  and 
a  little  later,  Russia,  Austria-Hungary,  Italy,  Turkey,  and 
the  Scandinavian  states  were  included. 

Most  of  the  powers  accepted  promptly ;  but  Granville 
did  so  only  "  in  principle  "  until  he  had  received  explana- 
tions as  to  the  scope,  interpretation,  and  manner  of  discus- 
sion of  the  three  points  mentioned  in  the  invitation.  At 
length  it  was  determined  that,  while  all  accepted  the  prin- 
ciple of  free  trade  on  the  African  rivers,  the  regulation  of 
the  navigation  and  commerce  of  the  Niger  should  be  left 
to  the  powers  controlling  that  river,  —  Great  Britain  and 
France ;  that  the  Upper  Congo  should  be  included  in  the 
discussions  ;  that  the  term  "  newly  acquired  territory " 
should  not  include  lands  under  the  protection  of  any  Euro- 
pean state  when  the  conference  was  called ;  and  that  the 


28       INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

"  status  and  proceedings  of  the  International  Association 
of  the  Congo  "  should  "  not  come  within  the  compass  "  of 
the  deliberations.  England  thereupon  gave  her  approval 
and  designated  Sir  Edward  Malet  as  her  representative. 
The  conference  began  its  sittings  on  November  15,  1884, 
with  Bismarck  in  the  chair,  and  concluded  them  on  February 
26, 1885,  when  the  "  General  Act  of  the  West  African  Con- 
ference "  was  duly  signed  by  all  the  representatives  present. 
The  conference  officially  ignored  the  International  Asso- 
ciation until  its  last  session,  at  which  the  Independent  State 
of  the  Congo  (or,  as  it  is  better  known,  the  "  Congo  Free 
State  ")  was  formally  welcomed  into  the  family  of  nations ; 
for  many  members  of  the  conference,  in  behalf  of  their  re- 
spective governments,  had  been  busy  making  treaties  which 
established  its  position  as  a  state  and  defined  its  territory. 
The  United  States  had,  indeed,  recognized  it  as  a  "  friendly 
government "  in  the  preceding  April,  but  Germany,  the  first 
of  the  European  nations,  did  not  recognize  it  till  Novem- 
ber 8,  and  the  other  states  followed  between  December  16 
(Great  Britain)  and  February  23  (Belgium).  Bismarck 
saw  in  this  a  means  of  preventing  armed  conflict  over  the 
Congo  Basin,  of  restricting  the  Portuguese  advance,  and  of 
preserving  the  region  to  free  trade.  The  Association  agreed 
not  to  levy  import  duties  on  goods  brought  into  its  terri- 
tory and  to  accord  to  German  subjects  all  rights  granted 
to  the  subjects  of  the  most  favored  nation.  On  her  side, 
Germany  recognized  the  flag  and  the  boundaries  of  the  In- 
dependent State  to  be  formed  by  the  Association,  as  given 
in  a  map  appended  to  the  treaty.  The  treaties  signed  by 
the  other  powers  were  very  similar,  though  much  European 
pressure  was  required  to  compel  Portugal  to  recognize  the 
north  bank  of  the  Congo  as  belonging  to  the  new  state 
(February  14,  1885).  The  south  bank  as  far  as  Noki  was 
relinquished  to  Portugal,  and  the  coast  province  of  Cabinda. 


FOUNDING  OF  THE  CONGO  INDEPENDENT  STATE    29 


o       100     200     300    -too  „  600  :~~" 

20  Loncitude  East  from  Greenwich 


THE  BELGIAN  CONGO  In  1908 

The  Congo  territory  on  the  north  bank  was  only  a  narrow 
strip  west  of  Manyanga,  while  to  the  east  of  that  point  France 
insisted  on  the  Congo  and  the  Ubangi  as  boundaries. 

The  Association  gave  its  adhesion  to  the  Act  of  1885, 
and  proclaimed  the  neutralization  of  its  territory.  The  Bel- 
gian Legislature  granted  Leopold  II  permission  to  become 
sovereign  of  the  new  state ;  and  the  transformation  of  the 
Association  into  the  Independent  State  of  the  Congo  was 
officially  proclaimed  in  the  summer  of  1885.1 

The  new  state  came  into  existence  with  a  territory  of 

1  The  independence  and  new  constitution  were  proclaimed  at  Banana,  on 
the  Congo,  by  Sir  Francis  de  Winton,  the  first  Governor-General,  on  July 
19,  1885. 


80      INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

about  900,000  square  miles  and  a  population  of  approxi- 
mately 15,000,000,  chiefly  Bantus.  The  Association  had 
been  rewarded  for  its  remarkable  explorations  by  being 
entrusted  with  the  government  of  this  vast  region  with 
nearly  three  times  the  population  of  Belgium  (5,500,000 
in  1880)  and  80  times  its  area  (11,343  square  miles).  It 
had  access  to  the  Atlantic  and  possessed  practically  all 
of  the  vast  drainage  basin  of  the  Congo,  from  the  Kwango 
River  to  Lake  Tanganyika,  and  from  the  Ubangi  to  the 
Upper  Luapula,  at  lat.  12°  S. 

The  primary  purpose,  both  of  the  International  Associa- 
tion and  of  the  promoters  of  the  Berlin  Conference,  was  to 
secure  free  navigation  and  free  trade  on  the  Congo  and  its 
tributaries,  and  to  have  the  development  of  the  region,  as 
well  as  the  protection  of  the  natives,  placed  in  the  hands 
of  some  responsible  but  independent  organization.  To  this 
end  the  Congo  Independent  State,  joined  to  Belgium  only 
through  a  personal  union,  was  created.  And  the  Confer- 
ence marked  off  for  free  trade  the  entire  region  between 
the  Atlantic  and  Indian  Oceans  lying  between  lat.  2°  30'  S. 
and  the  Loji  River  (lat.  7°  50'  S.)  on  the  West  Coast  and 
lat.  5°  N.  and  the  mouth  of  the  Zambesi  on  the  East 
Coast,  including  all  the  territory  drained  by  the  Congo  and 
its  branches.  Navigation  of  every  foot  of  the  Congo  and  its 
tributaries  was  to  be  free ;  and  an  international  commission, 
composed  of  representatives  of  states  signing  the  act,  was  to 
supervise  the  navigation  of  the  river,  the  levying  of  river 
tolls  and  pilotage  dues,  the  surveillance  of  quarantine  sta- 
tions, and  all  matters  necessary  for  the  upkeep  of  the  river. 

Conditions  on  the  Congo  were  well  known  to  many  mem- 
bers of  the  conference  ;  and  Stanley  was  present  to  explain 
both  the  claims  of  the  Association  and  the  needs  of  the  na- 
tives, with  whom  he  was  deeply  in  sympathy.  The  ravages 
and  suffering  caused  by  the  slave  trade  in  Central  Africa 


FOUNDING  OP  THE  CONGO  INDEPENDENT  STATE    31 

were  thoroughly  established  facts  and  carefully  considered 
by  the  conference.  Nor  were  its  members  ignorant  of  the 
other  barbarous  customs,  such  as  cannibalism,  the  burial 
sacrifices  upon  the  death  of  chieftains,  and  the  killing  of 
persons  for  witchcraft,  which  George  Grenfell  and  other 
missionaries  have  so  vividly  described.  It  was  therefore 
provided  in  the  act  that  all  the  powers  should  cooperate  to 
put  an  end  to  the  slave  trade ;  and  it  was  understood  that  all 
were  to  support  the  Independent  State  in  its  efforts  to  stop 
these  atrocities  and  to  care  for  the  welfare  of  the  natives. 

It  was  confidently  expected  that  the  creation  of  the  Congo 
State  would  be  the  greatest  philanthropic  movement  of  the 
time ;  and  all  the  promoters  of  the  conference  —  including 
King  Leopold  —  seem  to  have  been  largely  actuated  by  mo- 
tives of  humanity.  Stanley  wrote :  "  All  men  who  sympathize 
with  good  and  noble  works,  and  this  has  been  one  of  un- 
paralleled munificence  and  grandeur  of  ideas,  will  unite  in 
hoping  that  King  Leopold  II,  the  royal  Founder  of  this  unique 
humanitarian  and  political  enterprise  (whose  wisdom  rightly 
guided  it  and  whose  moral  courage  bravely  sustained  it  to  a 
successful  issue),  will  live  long  to  behold  his  Free  State  ex- 
pand and  flourish  to  be  a  fruitful  blessing  to  a  region  that 
was  until  lately  as  dark  as  its  own  deep  sunless  forest  shades." 
England  shared  Stanley's  view  that  humanity  and  politics 
should  go  hand  in  hand  on  the  Congo.  Lord  Granville,  in  his 
official  instructions  to  Sir  E.  Malet  (British  representative 
at  the  conference)  on  November  7, 1884,  wrote :  "  While  the 
opening  of  the  Congo  markets  is  to  be  desired,  the  welfare 
of  the  natives  should  not  be  neglected ;  to  them  it  would  be 
of  no  benefit,  but  the  reverse,  if  freedom  of  commerce,  un- 
checked by  reasonable  control,  should  degenerate  into  license. 
.  .  .  The  principle  which  will  command  the  sympathy  and 
the  support  of  Her  Majesty's  Government  will  be  that 
of  the  advancement  of  legitimate  commerce,  with  security 


32      INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

for  the  equality  of  treatment  of  all  nations,  and  for  the  well- 
being  of  the  native  races."  In  a  further  letter  of  instructions, 
dated  November  12,  he  adds  that  there  was  "  a  very  strong 
feeling  in  this  country  for  the  abolition  of  the  slave  trade 
and  the  restriction  of  the  importation  of  spirituous  liquors." 
The  powers,  indeed,  bound  themselves  to  suppress  the 
slave  trade ;  but  by  far  the  greater  portion  of  their  discus- 
sions was  devoted  to  the  commercial  and  political  questions 
involved.  In  the  "  General  Act "  itself,  only  TWO  out  of 
thirty-eight  articles  dealt  with  the  humanitarian  interests. 
In  Article  VI  the  powers  agreed  "  to  protect  the  natives 
in  their  moral  and  material  well-being,  to  cooperate  in  the 
suppression  of  slavery  and  the  slave  trade;  to  further  the 
education  and  civilization  of  the  natives ;  to  protect  mission- 
aries, scientists  and  explorers  " ;  and  to  preserve  freedom  of 
religion.  Article  XIX  reiterates  the  intention  of  the  Euro- 
pean states  to  abolish  the  slave  trade.  Sir  E.  Malet,  in 
three  long  letters  to  Granville  on  the  work  and  results  of 
the  conference,  devotes  only  a  few  sentences  to  its  philan- 
thropic achievements.  In  the  third  epistle,  dated  February 
21,  1885,  in  answer  to  the  criticism  that  more  time  had 
been  given  to  the  interests  of  commerce  than  to  the  inter- 
ests of  the  natives,  he  says :  "  I  venture  to  say  that,  if  this 
objection  is  sound,  the  work  of  the  conference  has  not  ful- 
filled its  intentions.  But  to  meet  it  I  would  point  to  the 
Slave-Trade  Declaration.  .  .  .  The  slave  dealer's  trade  will 
be,  in  the  Congo  regions  at,  it  may  be  hoped,  no  distant 
date,  as  effectually  extinguished  on  land  as  it  has  been  on 
the  sea.  .  .  .  The  powers  have  further,  by  their  Neutrality 
Declaration,  engaged  to  endeavor  to  preserve  these  regions 
from  the  evils  of  war.  If  considerations  of  material  inter- 
ests and  economic  motives  have  prevented  the  approval  of 
measures  for  the  prevention  of  the  introduction  of  spirits 
[and  he  should  have  added  firearms] ,  a  step  has  been  taken 


FOUNDING  OF  THE  CONGO  INDEPENDENT  STATE    33 

in  that  direction  by  the  expression  of  a  general  wish  in  favor 
of  the  control  of  the  traffic." 

In  order  to  prevent  conflicts  between  European  states 
and  to  provide  for  the  proper  and  regular  extension  of 
colonial  possessions  in  Africa,  it  was  agreed  that  the  mark- 
ing-out of  all  new  protectorates  must  be  preceded  by  due 
notification  to  the  powers ;  that  to  retain  titles  to  lands  the 
occupation  must  be  effective  ;  and  that  recourse  would  be 
had  to  arbitration  in  case  of  differences.  This  was  all  excel- 
lent, and  as  desirable  as  the  regulations  on  freedom  of  trade ; 
but  nowhere  do  we  find  any  attempt  to  provide  in  a  sys- 
tematic and  effectual  manner  for  the  vital  interests  of  the 
natives.  The  statement  that  such  things  ought  to  be  done 
for  them  was  not  sufficient.  Some  machinery  ought  to  have 
been  devised  whereby  the  wishes  of  the  powers  could  have 
been  carried  out.  The  natives  should  not  only  have  been 
securely  protected  against  themselves  and  the  slave-hunters, 
but  also  shielded  from  the  sale  of  firearms,  the  evils  of  the 
rum  traffic,  and  other  dangers  attendant  upon  the  coming 
of  European  civilization  to  Central  Africa.  It  was  evidently 
and  confidently  expected  that  all  these  matters  would  be 
carefully  and  promptly  regulated  by  all  the  states  individ- 
ually, including  the  Congo  Independent  State.  This  was  a 
grave  blunder,  as  it  left  the  natives  completely  at  the  mercy 
of  individual  governments  and  irresponsible  trading  com- 
panies to  whom  they  might  let  out  the  country  in  conces- 
sions. It  provided  no  check  against  the  aggression  of  states 
like  Germany  and  Holland,  when  forced  into  unfortunate 
and  harmful  colonial  enterprises  by  the  rapacity  of  their 
great  commercial  organizations.1 

1  The  influence  of  the  German  trading  companies  prevented  the  abolition 
of  the  sale  of  liquors  and  firearms  on  the  Congo  in  1885 ;  and  the  Act  of 
July  2, 1890,  was  not  put  into  force  till  1902  owing  to  the  opposition  of  Hol- 
land, whose  Government  feared  the  new  regulations  would  seriously  affect 
the  Dutch  trade  on  the  Upper  Congo. 


84       INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

It  was  not  until  the  Conference  of  Brussels  in  1890  that 
any  serious  attempt  was  made  to  provide  adequately  for  the 
care  and  protection  of  the  native  population.  In  the  "  Gen- 
eral Act,"  signed  July  2  of  that  year,  the  system  was  out- 
lined, by  which  the  interior  slave  trade  was  to  be  successfully 
exterminated  within  the  next  few  years.  It  included  the 
institution  of  an  active  military  administration  with  a  series 
of  fortified  stations  and  flying  columns,  and  the  establish- 
ment of  effective  means  of  communication  and  transporta- 
tion such  as  telegraph  lines  and  post-routes,  roads,  railways, 
and  steamboat  lines.  The  sale  of  firearms,  except  at  some 
central  public  warehouse  under  the  control  of  one  of  the 
signatory  powers,  in  the  region  between  lat.  20°  N.  and  lat. 
22°  S.,  and  reaching  from  the  Atlantic  to  the  Indian  Ocean, 
was  strictly  forbidden  for  twelve  years.  In  the  same  zone  the 
manufacture  and  sale  of  spirituous  liquors  were  prohibited 
in  districts  "  where  —  either  on  account  of  religious  belief 
or  from  some  other  causes  —  the  use  of  distilled  liquors 
does  not  exist  or  has  not  been  developed."  Those  states, 
having  possessions  within  this  region  not  coming  under  the 
prohibition  clause,  were  required  to  levy  an  import  duty  on 
liquors  of  15  francs  per  hectolitre,  at  50°  C.,  with  the  option 
of  raising  it  to  25  francs  at  the  end  of  three  years.  This 
was  raised  to  70  francs  per  hectolitre  for  six  years  by  the 
Brussels  Convention  of  June  8, 1899.  Yet  the  enforcement 
of  all  these  regulations  was  left  to  the  discretion  and  in- 
telligence of  the  individual  states,  with  no  other  incentive 
to  obedience  than  the  code  of  national  honor  and  the  pres- 
sure of  public  opinion.  In  the  protectorates  of  states  like 
England,  Germany,  and  France,  whose  governments  pos- 
sessed a  recognized  and  forceful  organization  and  where 
public  sentiment  was  more  or  less  of  a  factor  in  national 
affairs,  such  a  scheme  worked  fairly  well;  although  it  is 
well  known  that  the  officials  and  subjects  of  all  three  of  these 


FOUNDING  OF  THE  CONGO  INDEPENDENT  STATE    35 

nations  broke  the  stipulations  of  both  these  conferences  on 
more  than  one  occasion.  But  in  such  a  case  as  that  of  the 
Congo  Independent  State,  outside  the  control  of  any  estab- 
lished state  and  utterly  indifferent  to  public  opinion  any- 
where, it  was  quite  a  different  matter. 

After  the  independence  of  the  Congo  State  was  estab- 
lished and  its  boundaries  defined,  there  remained  the  task 
of  surveying  the  country  and  of  extending  the  administrative 
control  —  till  1885  exercised  only  through  a  few  stations 
on  the  main  stream — to  all  sections  of  its  vast  territory. 
This  was  an  undertaking  requiring  an  enormous  amount  of 
painstaking  effort  combined  with  great  patience  and  tact ; 
yet  it  was  accomplished  with  remarkable  skill  and  expedi- 
tion, owing  to  the  devotion  and  energy  of  the  Belgian  offi- 
cials. Unfortunately,  however,  they  were  compelled  to  push 
the  work  more  rapidly  than  wisdom  and  their  own  needs 
warranted,  because  of  pressure  from  the  neighboring  colo- 
nies and  the  demand  that  the  occupation  of  all  protectorates 
should  be  effective.  King  Leopold  II  began  early  to  trans- 
form the  organization  into  a  strictly  Belgian  affair.  In  1887 
he  paid  off  all  the  contributions  from  individuals  of  other 
nationalities,  mostly  British,  to  the  sum  of  X16,888 ;  and 
all  the  money  that  had  to  be  borrowed  after  that  date  was 
secured  from  the  Belgian  Government,  —  such  as  the  Congo 
loan  of  $30,000,000  in  1887,  the  $5,000,000  advanced  in 
1890,  and  the  $10,000,000  furnished  in  1901  for  public 
works.  Previous  to  1886  at  least  one  half  of  the  explor- 
ers and  officials  employed  by  the  International  Association 
were  of  British  or  foreign  birth.  From  the  appointment  of 
M.  Camille  Janssen  as  Administrator-General,  at  the  close 
of  1885,  practically  all  the  employees  engaged  in  the  public 
service  of  the  Congo  Independent  State  were  Belgians. 

In  May,  1887,  Captain  Thys,  representing  a  commercial 
organization  of  which  he  was  a  member,  went  out  with  an 


36      INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

expedition  to  open  up  the  Kasai  River.  In  1888  the  railway 
from  Matadi  to  Stanley  Pool  was  begun  and  Stanley  Falls 
was  occupied  by  Vangele  and  Van  Kerckhoven.  Vangele, 
Le  Marinel,  and  Haanolet  extended  the  Belgian  rule  on  the 
Upper  Ubangi  as  far  as  Banzyville  in  1889;  and  Lieuten- 
ant Clement  de  Saint-Marcq  was  stationed  as  Resident  in 
Kasongo.  Hodister  explored  the  Upper  Mongala  and  the 
region  between  the  Upper  Lomami  and  the  Lualaba  in  1890, 
while  Vangele  was  pushing  up  the  Ubangi-Welle  (or  Uelle) 
to  Jabbir,  which  brought  the  Congo  administration  in  touch 
with  the  Sudan.  In  1891  a  strong  force,  under  Captain 
Stairs  (a  Nova  Scotian)  and  Captain  Bodson  (a  Belgian), 
penetrated  into  the  Katanga  country  and  subdued  the  great 
kingdom  of  Msidi,  —  the  most  notorious  and  oppressive 
native  tyrant  of  Central  Africa,  —  while  the  gallant  Cap- 
tain Jacques  was  establishing  a  fortified  post  at  Albertville 
on  Lake  Tanganyika. 

Perhaps  the  most  remarkable  exploit  accomplished  by 
the  representatives  of  the  Congo  Independent  State  at 
this  period  was  the  destruction  of  the  Arab  power  on 
Lake  Tanganyika.  It  extended  all  the  way  from  Victoria 
Nyanza  to  Lake  Nyasa,  from  Uganda  to  the  headwaters 
of  the  Congo ;  and  its  centers  were  at  Ujiji  on  Lake  Tan- 
ganyika, Kotakota  on  Lake  Nyasa,  and  Nyangwe  and  Ka- 
songo on  the  Upper  Congo,  with  numerous  fine  towns  and 
hundreds  of  plantations  on  the  rivers  and  lakes.  The  no- 
torious Tippoo  Tib  and  his  son  Sefu  or  Sef,  with  their 
partner  Rumalisa,  were  the  leaders  and  promoters  of  the 
organization.  Their  main  business  was  slave-hunting 1  and 
exporting  ivory  and  other  valuable  produce  by  means  of 

1  Captain  Storms,  a  Belgian  in  the  service  of  the  International  Associa- 
tion, and  Mr.  Alfred  Swann.  in  the  employ  of  the  London  Missionary  Society, 
and  later  Senior  Resident  of  British  Nyasaland,  going  out  to  Africa  in  1879 
and  in  1882  respectively,  performed  valiant  services  in  protecting  the  natives 
about  Lakes  Tanganyika  and  Nyasa  from  the  slave-raiders. 


FOUNDING  OF  THE  CONGO  INDEPENDENT  STATE    37 

slave  caravans  to  the  Zanzibar  coast ;  and  in  one  of  the  rich- 
est portions  of  Central  Africa,  they  exercised  a  tyrannical 
and  vicious  dominion  over  the  pagan  blacks.  It  was  only 
with  the  aid  of  Tippoo  Tib l  and  his  associates  that  Stanley 
had  been  able  to  make  his  first  trip  down  the  Congo,  and 
he  always  remained  friendly  to  the  British ;  but  the  Arab 
leaders  became  bitterly  hostile  to  the  Europeans  2  when  they 
realized  that  the  white  man  was  determined  to  destroy  the 
slave  trade  and  to  take  over  the  control  of  the  country  and 
its  commerce. 

As  the  Belgian  officers  advanced  on  the  Upper  Congo 
and  its  tributaries,  the  Arab  leaders  intrigued  against  them, 
opposed  them  vigorously  step  by  step,  and  finally  resorted 
to  force  and  treachery  to  overthrow  their  hold  in  the  region. 
In  1892  the  chiefs  made  prisoners  of  the  Belgian  residents 
at  Kasongo,  attacked  the  Belgian  expedition  on  the  Lomami 
River  and  put  to  death  its  leaders,  including  the  intrepid 
Hodister,  and  killed  Emin  Pasha  at  Kinona.  The  Congo 
executive  at  Brussels  seemed  for  the  moment  paralyzed  at 
the  sudden  attack  and  disaster.  But  a  number  of  valiant 
and  resourceful  officials  in  the  Congo  State  determined  to 
avenge  their  comrades. 

In  July,  1892,  a  poorly  equipped  but  determined  band 
left  Lusambo  for  the  Lomami  district.  It  was  officered  by 
Commandant  Dhanis,  Captain  de  Wouters,  Commandant 
Ponthier,  Captain  Doorm,  —  all  Belgians,  —  with  a  British 
officer,  Captain  Sidney  L.  Hinde,  as  medical  adviser,  and 
two  efficient  negro  leaders,  Albert  Frees,  a  Liberian  ser- 

1  Dr.  Erode,  Tippoo  Tib.  Arnold,  1906. 

2  "Without  my  help  he  [Stanley]  could  never  have  gone  down  the  Congo; 
and  no  sooner  did  he  reach  Europe  than  he  claimed  all  my  country.  Surely 
your  people  must  be  unjust.  .  .  .  The  white  man  is  stronger  than  I  am ;  and 
they  will  eat  my  possessions  as  I  ate  those  of  the  Pagans,  and  some  one  will 
eat  up  yours."  Tippoo  Tib  to  Swann,  in  Fighting  the  Slave  Hunters  in  Central 
Africa,  by  A.  J.  Swann,  1910,  pp.  174-75. 


38       INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

geant  from  Monrovia,  and  Gongo  Lutete,  an  extremely 
able  chief  of  the  Manyema  people.  Their  troops  were  chiefly 
Hausas  recruited  from  Lagos  with  the  consent  of  the  British 
Government,  together  with  some  irregulars  from  Sierra  Leone 
and  Liberia.  After  a  year  of  astounding  adventures,  daring 
exploits,  great  suffering,  and  numerous  misfortunes,  they 
succeeded  in  capturing  Nyangwe  and  Kasongo  and  in  destroy- 
ing almost  completely  the  Arab  power  on  the  Upper  Congo.1 
Meanwhile  the  Congo  officials  were  steadily  pushing  their 
explorations  north  and  east  along  the  Ubangi  and  Welle  and 
Mbomu  Rivers  until  they  reached  the  confines  of  the  Bahr- 
el-Ghazal  region.  In  September,  1892,  Milz  reached  the 
Nile,  and  Captain  Delanghe  occupied  three  posts  on  its 
left  bank  in  the  following  June.  The  Belgians  carefully 
avoided  conflicts  with  the  Dervishes,  to  whom  Egypt  and 
England  had  abandoned  the  Sudan  after  1885 ;  but  in  1894 
the  troops  of  the  Khalifa  attempted  to  occupy  the  moun- 
tain districts  of  Bahr-el-Ghazal  and  to  penetrate  into  the 
Congo  Basin.  A  lively  contest  ensued  in  which  the  Congo 
forces  under  Delanghe,  Gerard,  Denckier,  and  Francqui 
achieved  a  decisive  victory;  and  the  Dervish  leaders  were 
compelled  to  retreat  to  the  main  Nile.  These  successes  of 
the  Belgians  prevented  the  Mahdists  from  invading  Uganda  2 
and  led  to  the  Belgian  occupation  of  the  Lado  Enclave.  For  in 
the  same  year — 1894  —  Great  Britain  signed  a  boundary 
convention  with  the  Congo  State  by  which,  in  exchange 
for  leaseholds  on  a  part  of  Bahr-el-Ghazal  and  on  the  Lado 
Enclave,  she  was  to  receive  a  recognition  of  her  claims  to 
the  rest  of  the  Sudan,  a  piece  of  land  at  the  southwest 
corner  of  Lake  Tanganyika,  and  a  narrow  strip  of  territory 
connecting  Uganda  with  the  lake.  Unfortunately  this  agree- 
ment aroused  such  lively  protests  from  Germany  that  Eng- 

1  Captain  S.  L.  Hinde,  The  Fall  of  the  Congo  Arabs.  Methuen  &  Co. ,  1897. 

2  Sir  Harry  Johnston,  George  Grenfell  and  the  Congo,  vol.  i,  p.  437. 


FOUNDING  OF  THE  CONGO  INDEPENDENT  STATE    39 

land  was  forced  to  give  up  the  small  piece  of  land  between 
Ankole  and  Tanganyika,  which  would  have  completed  the 
Cape  to  Cairo  route ;  and  the  Congo  State  was  compelled  by 
France  to  limit  her  territory  on  the  northeast  at  the  Mbomu 
Kiver.  The  Belgians,  however,  leased  Lado  from  the  British 
and  went  ahead  with  its  occupation ;  and,  after  defeating 
the  followers  of  the  Mahdi  in  two  important  engagements, 
Captain  Chaltin,  in  February,  1897,  raised  the  Congo  flag 
at  Rejaf,  opposite  Gondokoro. 

The  work  of  exploring  the  Congo  Basin  was  greatly  fur- 
thered and  well-nigh  completed  through  the  efforts  of  George 
Grenfell,1  who  spent  twenty-six  years  on  the  Congo  in  the 
service  of  the  Baptist  Missionary  Society,  dying  at  Basoko 
on  July  1, 1906.  He  traveled  thousands  of  miles  on  the  main 
stream  and  its  great  tributaries,  making  an  accurate  topograph- 
ical study  of  the  country  as  he  proceeded.  He  made  a  fine 
detailed  map  of  the  Congo  from  Stanley  Pool  to  Stanley 
Falls ;  and,  from  May,  1892,  to  June,  1893,  he  led  the 
Lunda  Expedition  which  met  the  Portuguese  commission 
on  the  Kwango  and  delimited  the  Congo-Portuguese  bound- 
ary line.  Beginning  with  the  Ubangi,  the  Mongala,  and 
the  Lomami  in  1884,  he  explored  one  after  the  other  the 
extensive  water-courses  that  feed  the  Congo  until  he  reached 
Mawambi  on  the  Aruwimi — only  eighty  miles  from  Uganda 
— in  November,  1902,  and  the  Hinde  Cataracts  on  the  Lua- 
laba-Congo  in  1903.  Although  the  Congo  officials  refused 
to  permit  the  establishment  of  missions  on  the  Aruwimi 
and  in  some  other  districts,  or  to  allow  him  to  carry  on  his 
work  and  his  investigations  freely  in  all  sections  of  the  Congo 
Basin,  his  labors  among  the  natives  (with  whom  he  was  very 
popular  because  of  his  gen  tie  manners,  cheerful  patience,  and 

1  The  best  account  of  the  life  and  work  of  Grenfell  is  to  be  found  in  Sir 
Harry  Johnston's  George  Grenfell  and  the  Congo.  2  vols.,  D.  Appleton  &  Co., 
1910. 


40      INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

friendly  spirit)  were  remarkably  successful,  and  as  an  ex- 
plorer he  earned  a  reputation  in  Central  Africa  second  only 
to  that  of  Stanley. 

For  twenty-three  years  King  Leopold  administered  the 
State  through  two  ministers  resident  at  Brussels  and  one 
Administrator-General  living  at  Boma  on  the  Lower  Congo, 
the  latter  controlling  the  fourteen  districts,  each  under  a  com- 
missioner, into  which  the  territory  was  divided.  The  Govern- 
ment appropriated  all  the  land  not  then  actually  in  use  by  the 
natives  to  itself  as  the  public  domain,  which  it  divided  into 
the  "  Domaine  de  la  Couronne  "  and  the  "  Domaine  Prive." 
The  "  Domaine  de  la  Couronne,"  located  in  the  center  of  the 
Congo  region,  embraced  a  district  six  times  the  size  of  Bel- 
gium, and  was  set  aside  as  the  special  property  of  the  ruler. 
The  "  Domaine  Prive "  was  the  exclusive  property  of  the 
State  and  included  nearly  one  half  the  area  of  the  Congo 
Basin.  It  was  situated  north  of  the  "  Domaine  de  la  Cou- 
ronne" and  of  lat.  3°  S. ;  and,  beginning  about  1890,  the 
Government  began  to  sublet  large  districts  to  trading  com- 
panies and  to  confer  extensive  monopolies  of  various  sorts 
on  private  corporations  in  order  to  insure  the  development 
of  the  country.  The  remaining  territory  to  the  south  and 
west  of  the  crown  property  and  the  state  domain  was  left 
open  at  first;  but  after  1898  the  greater  part  of  this  was 
let  out  in  large  districts  to  concessionnaire  companies  with 
both  commercial  rights  and  political  powers.  In  several  of 
the  most  promising  of  these  Leopold  was  careful  to  retain 
a  large  share  of  the  capital  stock.  The  trade  of  the  region 
increased  rapidly  until  the  total  imports  and  exports  reached 
$9,000,000  in  1897,  and  the  enormous  total  of  $37,000,- 
000  in  1907 ;  while  large  fortunes  were  made  by  King 
Leopold  and  the  other  stockholders.1 

1  Sir  Harry  Johnston  has  estimated,  after  a  careful  perusal  of  all  the  fig- 
ures obtainable  and  allowing  Leopold  a  liberal  sum  in  profits,  together  with 


FOUNDING  OF  THE  CONGO  INDEPENDENT  STATE    41 

The  rule  of  the  subordinate  officials,  particularly  upon 
the  lands  of  the  companies,  was  often  harsh  and  violent. 
As  the  pressure  on  them  for  larger  commercial  returns 
increased,  the  more  heavily  they  bore  down  on  the  natives. 
Cruel  and  inhuman  punishments  were  resorted  to,  and  vil- 
lages burned,  in  order  to  compel  the  negroes  to  work  and 
to  search  for  rubber  and  ivory.  The  seat  of  government  at 
Boma  was  hundreds  of  miles  from  many  of  the  stations ; 
and  the  Administrator-General  knew  very  little  of  ttimes  of 
what  was  going  on  in  the  interior.  No  ruler  was  ever  bet- 
ter or  more  faithfully  served  than  King  Leopold,  in  the 
opening  and  exploration  of  the  country ;  and,  after  the  gov- 
ernment was  organized,  many  of  the  officials  on  the  state 
lands  were  honest  and  consistent  in  the  management  of 
their  districts,  and  considerate  and  skillful  in  their  treat- 
ment of  the  natives  whose  confidence  and  respect  they  won 
and  enjoyed  until  the  very  end  of  their  service.1  But  the 
system  of  administration  employed  both  on  the  state  domain 
and  on  the  territories  of  the  private  companies  was  vicious 
and  led  finally  to  the  total  collapse  of  the  Congo  Inde- 
pendent State  as  a  ruling  body. 

all  the  money  advanced  to  the  Congo  Association  and  his  salary  as  president, 
that  he  took  out  of  the  country  at  least  $20,000,000.  George  Grenfell  and  the 
Congo,  vol.  i,  pp.  451-52  (note). 

1  "  The  agents,  though  able,  willing,  and  intelligent  men,  are  under- 
manned and  overworked,"  wrote  Vice-Consul  Mitchell  in  1906.  "  No  discrim- 
ination is  shown  in  their  distribution.  Civilians  or  soldiers  are  set  in  a  post 
to  do  all  the  various  work  of  the  place  —  house-building,  road-making,  rub- 
ber-collecting, transport,  food-supply,  planting,  police,  judicial  administra- 
tion and  other  miscellaneous  occupations,  in  which  he  has  no  training  or 
experience,  and  for  which  he  receives  neither  extra  pay  nor  promotion.  He 
is  allowed  a  little  money,  or  rather  barter  goods,  for  payment  of  laborers 
and  purchase  of  materials ;  and  it  is  only  with  personal  exertion  and  in- 
genuity that  he  can  keep  things  going  at  all.  .  .  .  Under  the  circumstances 
of  isolation  and  overwork,  the  industry  and  good  conduct  of  nearly  all  the 
state  agents  I  have  met  are  greatly  to  their  credit.  Their  numbers  ought 
to  be  doubled,  and  in  most  cases  trebled."  Brit.  Parl.  Papers,  1906,  Congo, 
cd.  3450,  no.  9,  p.  26. 


42      INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

In  the  first  place,  the  salaries  were  pitiably  low,  —  most 
of  them  from  $400  to  11000  per  year,  —  and,  in  order  to 
equalize  matters,  the  officials  were  allowed  a  commission  on 
all  ivory,  rubber,  or  other  produce  purchased  or  secured  for 
the  State.  It  soon  became  necessary  to  levy  light  taxes  to 
provide  the  necessary  funds  for  the  legitimate  expenses  of 
the  Government.  The  natives  were  not  used  to  taxation. 
Nor  did  they  understand  either  the  necessity  or  the  mean- 
ing of  the  levies ;  but  they  were  compelled  to  pay  just  the 
same,  by  force  or  intimidation.  The  payment  was  always  in 
native  products  or  in  labor ;  and  it  was  easy  for  an  un- 
scrupulous official  to  collect  two  or  three  times  the  required 
amount  of  taxes  under  various  pretenses,  and  to  make  an- 
other neat  profit  for  himself.  In  1889  l  rubber,  gum,  and 
elephant  hunting  were  forbidden  without  a  license  from  the 
State,  while  in  1892  2  natives  on  the  state  lands  were  pro- 
hibited from  selling  or  disposing  of  ivory  or  rubber,  found 
on  the  domains,  to  foreign  traders.  In  most  districts  the 
natives  were  paid  for  their  labor  or  services  in  kind  and 
they  traded  the  payments  back  into  the  State's  or  the  com- 
pany's store  for  the  ordinary  necessities  or  luxuries  of  life. 
So  in  every  way  the  profits  of  opening  the  country  and  de- 
veloping its  trade  fell  to  the  State  or  to  the  concessionnaire 
companies  or  their  officials.  The  native  received  almost 
nothing  for  the  loss  of  his  lands  or  for  his  forced  or  free 
labor. 

All  this  was  serious  enough,  if  the  officials  could  have 
collected  all  the  taxes  and  superintended  the  details  of  ad- 
ministration personally.  But  this  was  impossible  where  one 
white  man  with  twenty  or  thirty  soldiers  had  to  garrison 
five  thousand  square  miles  of  territory.  The  soldiers  col- 

1  Government  Ordinances  of  July  25  and  October  17. 

2  Special  order  of  M.  de  Marinel  of  February  14  in  explanation  of  Gov- 
ernment Ordinance  of  September  29,  1891. 


;  FOUNDING  OF  THE  CONGO  INDEPENDENT  STATE    43 

lected  the  taxes  and  the  purchased  products ;  and  they  — 
particularly  the  blacks,  who  love  power  and  the  display  of 
force  —  had  no  scruples  in  threatening  or  punishing  the 
natives  when  they  did  not  get  the  usual  stipend  or  find  the 
stipulated  ivory  or  rubber  awaiting  them.  "  A  staff  of  some 
fifteen  hundred  Europeans  has  to  fill  the  various  branches 
of  the  Administration,  including  railway  and  steamboat 
service,  and  control  some  seven  thousand  native  troops," 
wrote  Grenfell  in  1902. *  "  The  fifteen  hundred  must  do 
everything  that  has  to  be  done  in  a  territory  nearly  a  third 
the  size  of  Europe.  This  involves  a  lot  of  rough-and-ready 
work,  much  slackness  at  many  points,  and  stress  at  not  a  few." 
If  the  Code  Congolais  could  have  been  universally  ap- 
plied, and  the  levies  equitably  distributed  in  the  form  of  a 
head-tax  throughout  all  the  districts  of  the  Congo  Basin,  a 
satisfactory  relationship  between  the  rulers  and  the  gov- 
erned might  have  been  ultimately  established.  But  this  was 
beyond  the  powers  of  the  overburdened  and  underpaid  "fif- 
teen hundred."  The  soldiers  did  not  care  whether  the  taxes 
fell  equitably  or  not.  Their  only  concern  was  to  get  them 
in  as  quickly  and  as  easily  as  possible.  Evasion  was  easy 
and  frequent  where  so  vast  a  region  was  patrolled  by  so  few 
collectors.  The  bold  and  skillful  often  escaped,  while  the 
burden  fell  on  the  honest  and  the  timid.  Unfortunately  the 
matter  did  not  end  here.  The  demands  of  the  Government 
increased  year  by  year ;  and,  when  they  were  ignored,  severe 
punishments  were  meted  out  to  chiefs  and  villages.  "  It  is 
the  incessant  and  varying  requirements  from  the  people  on 
the  part  of  the  representatives  of  the  Government  that  con- 
stitute in  my  opinion  a  grave  danger  for  the  future  of  the 
State,"  to  quote  again  the  words  of  Grenfell  —  the  mildest 
critic  of  the  Congo  administration. 

1  Letter  dated  December  29,  1902,  and  printed  in  George  Grenfell  and  the 
Congo,  vol.  i,  p.  480. 


44       INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

Conditions  in  the  districts  under  the  concessionnaire  com- 
panies, to  whom  the  Government  had  given  political  powers 
as  well  as  commercial  rights,  were  even  worse,  —  particu- 
larly on  the  domains  of  the  Anglo-Belgian  Indiarubber 
Company  and  the  "  Societe  Anversoise  du  Commerce  du 
Congo."  And  as  time  went  on,  the  pressure  on  the  natives 
steadily  increased  until  whole  districts  were  depopulated  or 
raised  to  the  verge  of  revolt.  Inferior  officers  were  seldom 
called  to  account  by  their  superiors  as  long  as  the  proper 
returns  came  in  ;  and  the  depredations  of  these  men  in  more 
than  one  instance  became  notorious.  The  terrible  cruelties 
perpetrated  upon  the  inhabitants  went  unpunished  to  a  large 
degree,  because  the  officials  were  afraid  to  punish  the  sol- 
diers. Chieftains  were  slain ;  men  and  boys  horribly  mu- 
tilated ;  villages  burned ;  and  men,  women,  and  children 
killed,  because  a  certain  number  of  laborers  were  not  fur- 
nished, the  taxes  not  paid,  or  the  required  amount  of  rub- 
ber had  not  been  brought  in.  Armed  sentries  were  stationed 
in  numerous  villages  to  enforce  the  payment  of  the  tithes 
and  to  compel  the  gathering  of  the  native  products.  Beat- 
ings and  imprisonments  were  frequent ;  and  "  it  is  very  evi- 
dent," wrote  Consul  Nightingale  to  Sir  Edward  Grey  as 
late  as  1906,  "  that  an  idea  prevails  that  the  native  is  as 
much  a  part  and  parcel  of  the  Concessionary  Companies' 
property,  as  if  he  were  a  bundle  of  rubber  or  gum."  : 

In  some  portions  of  the  country  the  policy  of  employing 
the  leading  chiefs  in  the  collection  of  rubber  —  introduced 
by  Major  Lothaire,  Director-General  of  the  Societe  Anver- 
soise—  was  practiced  extensively.  Districts  were  subdi- 
vided into  sections ;  and  the  most  prominent  chief  of  the 
section  was  well  furnished  with  rifles  and  ammunition,  given 
suzerainty  over  the  other  chieftains,  and  authorized  to  super- 

1  November  30, 1906.  Brit.  Parl.  Papers,  1906,  Congo,  cd.  3450,  no.  28, 
p.  57. 


FOUNDING  OF  THE  CONGO  INDEPENDENT  STATE    45 

intend  the  gathering  of  rubber  in  his  section.  The  result 
was  that  jealousies  and  troubles  soon  arose  among  the  na- 
tives of  those  districts ;  and,  when  the  chiefs  became  dis- 
satisfied with  their  treatment  at  the  hands  of  the  Company's 
officials,  they  armed  and  led  their  people  in  revolts  so  wide- 
spread and  violent  that,  in  some  regions,  it  has  only  recently 
become  possible  to  restore  the  old  order  and  security. 

There  was  practically  no  other  recourse  for  the  native  ex- 
cept rebellion  or  flight  to  the  domains  of  Kalambo,  King  of 
the  Bena  Lulua,  or  some  other  native  potentate  who  still  main- 
tained his  independence,  although  in  some  regions  they  be- 
gan to  destroy  the  forests  in  order  to  render  abortive  the 
rubber-collecting.  It  was  exceedingly  difficult  for  the  natives 
to  get  beyond  the  Chef  de  Poste  with  their  troubles  or 
grievances.  He  conducted  all  the  judicial  affairs  touching 
the  inhabitants  of  his  district,  and  settled  them  on  the  spot 
usually  without  special  trial,  investigation,  or  record ;  and 
appeals  to  the  law  courts  or  superior  officials  were  compara- 
tively rare  and  exceedingly  burdensome  owing  to  the  ex- 
pense and  the  great  distances  to  be  traveled.  When  the 
agents  offered  to  pay  the  taxes  of  a  community  for  one 
month's  collection  of  rubber  or  ivory,  and  then  followed 
this  with  increasing  demands  until  six,  eight,  or  ten  months' 
labor  was  necessary  to  fulfill  the  requirements,  nothing 
remained  for  the  native  but  to  leave  his  home  and  fields  in 
desolation,  while  he  waited  patiently  for  the  appointment 
of  an  honest  and  fair-dealing  official. 

The  freedom  of  trade  guaranteed  to  the  Congo  Basin, 
by  the  treaties  of  the  International  Association  and  by  the 
Berlin  Conference,  had  become  a  farce.  The  factories  of 
foreign  states  already  in  existence  were  undisturbed  and 
freedom  of  navigation  on  the  main  stream  of  the  Congo 
was  not  seriously  interfered  with;  but  the  "free  zone"  was 
actually  limited  to  a  "strip  twenty  kilometers  broad  on 


46       INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

both  sides  of  the  Congo  from  Stanley  Falls  to  Isangi." 1  In 
no  other  part  were  traders  permitted  to  purchase  products 
or  remain  for  more  than  a  day  at  a  time,  while  large  dis- 
tricts in  the  interior  were  closed  to  both  traders  and  travel- 
ers on  the  ground  of  grave  danger  from  revolting  or  un- 
friendly chieftains.  Even  missionaries  were  forbidden  to 
set  up  their  stations  outside  of  certain  prescribed  regions 
and  their  movements  were  carefully  restricted.  In  fact,  the 
whole  policy  both  of  the  Government  and  of  the  concession- 
naire  companies  was  monopoly  and  exclusion  on  the  one  hand, 
and  extortion  and  exploitation  on  the  other,  with  as  little 
exertion  and  expense  on  their  part  as  possible  in  the  de- 
velopment of  the  country.  "  So  long  as  the  policy  of  the 
State  Government  is  to  extract  all  it  can  from  the  country, 
while  using  only  local  materials  and  spending  the  least  pos- 
sible amount  on  developments  and  improvements,"  wrote 
Vice-Consul  Mitchell  to  the  British  Foreign  Office  in  1906, 
"  no  increase  in  the  general  well-being  can  be  expected." 

1  Consul  Nightingale's  report  of  December  31, 1906.  Brit.  Parl.  Papert, 
1906,  Congo,  cd.  3450,  no.  30,  p.  63. 


CHAPTEE  III 

TRANSITION   TO   THE   BELGIAN   CONGO 

RUMORS  of  the  misgovernment  of  the  Congo  State  and 
of  the  ill-treatment  of  the  natives  were  not  lacking  in  Euro- 
pean circles.  As  early  as  1891  and  1892  complaints  reached 
the  Congo  ministers  at  Brussels  and  the  presidents  of  some 
of  the  Congo  companies ;  and  in  1893  Mr.  H.  R.  Fox-Bourne, 
of  the  Aborigines  Protection  Society  of  Great  Britain,  be- 
cause of  the  incriminating  reports  of  the  late  Major  Par- 
minter,  the  Reverend  J.  B.  Murphy,  and  Captain  Salisbury, 
began  to  protest  "timidly  and  confidentially"  to  the  Congo 
State  officials. 

Between  the  middle  of  1893  and  1895  the  system  of 
forced  labor  was  introduced  in  the  Congo  and  the  cases  of 
ill-treatment  of  natives  increased  rapidly.  The  news  from 
the  Congo  became  more  and  more  disquieting,  until  the 
spring  of  1897  when  the  Reverend  Sjeblem,  a  Swedish 
missionary  who  had  spent  five  years  on  the  Congo  River, 
appeared  in  London  with  a  detailed  report  (accompanied 
by  a  letter  from  George  Grenfell,  dated  February  13, 1897) 
so  startling  and  so  straightforward  that  not  even  the  clever 
denials  of  M.  Wahis,  the  Governor-General  of  the  Congo 
State,  who  happened  to  be  then  in  Brussels,  could  wholly 
discredit  it.  About  the  same  time  Captain  Hinde's  book, 
The  Fall  of  the  Congo  Arabs,  showing  how  cannibalism 
was  encouraged  among  the  native  troops  by  the  Belgian 
officers,  was  published.  And,  on  April  2,  Sir  Charles  Dilke 
called  the  attention  of  the  British  Parliament  to  the  condi- 
tions in  the  Congo  Independent  State. 


48       INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

This  agitation  aroused  the  Congo  officials  just  enough  to 
prevent  some  of  the  worst  excesses  ;  it  did  not  bring  about 
any  serious  attempt  at  reform.  Matters  dragged  on  as  they 
were  until  1903,  when  the  well-founded  reports  of  the  Rever- 
end J.  H.  Weeks  and  other  missionaries  and  the  investi- 
gations of  Consul  Casement,  supported  by  popular  opinion, 
forced  the  British  Government  to  take  the  initiative  in  de- 
manding of  the  Congo  State  Government  a  strict  account 
of  affairs.  On  August  8,  1903,  the  Marquis  of  Lansdowne 
sent  a  despatch  to  the  British  representatives  at  all  the  Con- 
tinental capitals,  calling  attention  to  the  alleged  cases  of 
ill-treatment  of  natives  and  of  the  existence  of  trade  monop- 
olies in  the  Congo  Basin  in  open  violation  of  Articles  I  and 
V  of  the  Berlin  Act,  and  stating  that  the  British  Govern- 
ment thought  that  the  time  had  come  for  the  powers  signa- 
tory of  the  Berlin  Act  to  consider  whether  or  not  the  Congo 
State  had  violated  the  obligations  concerning  the  treatment 
of  natives  and  the  maintenance  of  the  freedom  of  trade. 
M.  de  Cuvelier  finally  replied  to  this  note  for  the  Congo 
Government,  after  pressure  from  the  other  powers,  on  March 
13,  1904.  He  described  the  situation  from  their  point  of 
view  and  questioned  vigorously  the  truth  of  many  state- 
ments in  the  report  of  Consul  Casement.  From  then  until 
1908,  when  the  Belgian  Government  took  over  the  Congo, 
a  lively  correspondence  ensued  between  Great  Britain  and 
the  officials  of  the  Congo  Independent  State. 

The  British  ministers,  while  admitting  that  some  of  the 
reports  concerning  the  situation  on  the  Congo  were  probably 
exaggerated,  endeavored  to  convince  the  Congo  adminis- 
trators that  the  situation  was  such  as  to  demand  a  thorough 
investigation  and  a  complete  public  report,  as  a  token  of 
their  good  will  and  of  the  sincerity  of  their  intentions.  Surely, 
some  vital  and  far-reaching  reforms  were  necessary ;  and  the 
whole  matter  ought  to  be  carefully  studied  and  remedies 


TRANSITION  TO  THE  BELGIAN  CONGO  49 

applied  at  the  earliest  possible  moment.  The  Congo  Govern- 
ment expressed  its  willingness  to  have  the  subject  investi- 
gated ;  but  it  denied  the  right  of  the  powers  signatory  of 
the  Berlin  Act  to  interfere  in  the  internal  affairs  of  the 
Congo  State.  If  British  subjects  were  ill-treated  on  the 
Congo,  Great  Britain  might  protest;  but  she  had  no  right 
to  interfere  in  matters  between  the  Congo  Independent 
State  and  its  own  subjects. 

The  Congo  Government  had  appointed  in  1896  a  "  Com- 
mission for  the  Protection  of  the  Natives,"  composed  of 
three  Catholic  and  three  Protestant  missionaries,  among 
whom  were  Father  de  Clun  and  George  Grenf  ell.  This  was 
reconstituted  in  March,  1901,  with  practically  the  same 
members,  for  two  years ;  but  it  accomplished  nothing  of  any 
value,  on  account  of  the  lack  of  proper  funds  and  authority, 
and  of  the  impossibility  of  effective  cooperation  between 
men  located  in  widely  separated  fields  of  labor,  where 
communication  was  slow  and  uncertain  at  the  best.  From 
November  1,  1904,  till  January  26,  1905,  a  "  Nonpartisan 
Commission  of  Inquiry,"  appointed  at  the  suggestion  of 
Lord  Lansdowne,  traveled  along  the  Congo  River  trying 
to  ascertain  the  real  conditions  prevalent  in  the  Independent 
State.  The  result  of  its  labors  was  unsatisfactory,  owing  to 
the  short  time  devoted  to  investigation  and  to  the  fact  that 
it  made  no  recommendations  as  to  methods  of  reform.  It 
went  far  enough,  however,  to  demonstrate  clearly  that  no 
white  man  had  ever  inflicted,  as  a  punishment  for  shortage 
of  rubber,  "  mutilation  on  living  natives."  But  its  report, 
in  spite  of  its  reserved  and  dignified  tone,  contained,  as  Sir 
Constantine  Phipps wrote  to  Lansdowne,  "the  most  scathing 
criticisms  of  the  policy  pursued  in  the  Congo  State." l 

1  Brit.  Parl.  Papers,  1906,  Africa  No.  1,  cd.  3002 ;  for  the  correspondence 
between  Great  Britain  and  Belgium,  see  Brit.  Parl.  Papert,  1903,  Africa 
NoJ4,  cd.  1809 ;  1904,  Africa  No.  7,  cd.  2097 ;  1905,  Africa  No.  1,  cd.  2333 ; 


50      INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

Finally,  under  considerable  pressure  from  Great  Britain 
and  other  states,  the  authorities  of  the  Congo  Independent 
State  nominated  a  "  Special  Commission  "  which  made  an 
exhaustive  study  of  the  whole  situation,  holding  its  final 
session  on  March  1,  1906.  A  detailed  report  of  its  work 
has  never  been  made  public ;  but  the  most  important  re- 
sults are  supposed  to  have  been  embodied  in  the  report 
of  the  Secretary-General  of  the  Congo  to  King  Leopold  in 
June,  1906,  which  the  king  used  so  effectively  in  persuad- 
ing the  Belgian  Legislature  to  take  over  the  control  of  the 
Congo  territory. 

Meanwhile,  the  agitation  for  reform  within  the  Congo 
State  kept  up  unabated  and  the  pressure  on  the  Belgian 
Government  increased.  Evidences  of  misrule  and  of  the 
ill-treatment  of  natives  came  in  from  various  sources ;  but 
the  reports,  in  some  important  particulars,  seemed  contra- 
dictory. It  was  apparently  difficult  to  reconcile  the  state- 
ments of  such  travelers  as  Major  Powell  Cotton,  Henry 
Savage  Landor,  Captain  Boyd  Alexander,  Professor  Starr, 
and  of  the  members  of  the  Nonpartisan  Commission,  who 
found  nothing  seriously  remiss  in  the  Congo  administra- 
tion, with  the  incriminating  reports  of  the  consuls  and  mis- 
sionaries. The  facts  are  that  not  one  of  these  explorers 
visited  the  more  remote  regions  where  the  worst  misdeeds 
were  committed.  They  journeyed  only  through  the  best- 
governed  districts  of  the  state  lands  and  of  concession  com- 
panies ;  and  they  were  never  thoroughly  conversant  with 
the  whole  situation.  The  evidences  of  misrule  were  care- 
fully collected  and  sifted  by  men  whose  integrity  and  abil- 
ity no  one  can  question ;  and  there  is  no  longer  any  doubt 
of  the  correctness  of  their  reports.  No  better  testimony 

1907,  Africa  No.  1,  cd.  3450;  1908,  Africa  Nos.  1, 3,  3,  and  4,  cd.  3880, 4070, 
4135,  and  4178,  etc.  For  other  reports  on  conditions,  see  Archives  Diploma- 
tiques,  1U04,  vol.  i,  p.  748  ff. 


TRANSITION  TO  THE  BELGIAN  CONGO  51 

could  be  demanded  than  the  report  of  Lord  Mountmorres, 
who  made  an  extended  tour  of  the  Congo  Independent 
State  in  1904-05 ;  the  minutes  of  the  trial  of  the  agent 
Coudron  at  Boma,  concluded  on  April  7,  1904 ;  the  re- 
searches of  Father  A.  Vermeersch  embodied  in  his  book  — 
La  Question  Congolaise  ;  the  papers  of  M.  S.  Lefranc,  a 
judge  of  the  First  Instance  on  the  Congo,  published  in 
1906  in  Le  Patriot;  the  verbatim  reports  of  the  famous 
five-days  debate  in  the  Belgian  Legislature  in  February 
and  March,  1906  ;  the  accounts  sent  in  by  the  British  con- 
suls, Casement,  Armstrong,  Mitchell,  and  Nightingale,  from 
1903  to  1907  ;  and  the  evidence  of  some  fifty-two  mission- 
aries of  various  denominations  including  the  Reverend 
J.  H.  Weeks  and  George  Grenfell.  In  1904  and  1905  some 
minor  reforms  were  introduced  in  the  sentry  system,  but 
no  serious  attempt  was  made  by  the  Congo  Government 
either  to  dispel  the  accusations  of  misrule  by  a  public  state- 
ment of  the  facts  in  their  possession,  or  to  remedy  the 
grave  faults  of  their  administration.  Their  policy  was  merely 
one  of  evasion  and  makeshift  until  they  should  be  able  to 
pass  on  the  direction  of  affairs  to  the  Belgian  Government. 
The  misgovernment  of  the  Congo  State  and  the  ill-treat- 
ment of  the  natives  being  established  at  length  by  indis- 
putable evidence,  the  matter  soon  attracted  international 
attention.  Official  protests  were  entered  with  the  Belgian 
Government  by  all  the  powers,  including  the  United  States, 
and  a  vigorous  public  agitation  was  conducted  by  the  Abo- 
rigines Protection  Society  of  Great  Britain,  the  Belgian, 
British,  and  American  Congo  Reform  Associations,  and 
similar  organizations.  At  length  the  pressure  from  all  sides 
became  so  great  that  the  authorities  in  Belgium  were  com- 
pelled to  undertake — what  King  Leopold  had  in  vain  tried 
to  induce  them  to  do  —  the  serious  consideration  of  the 
annexation  of  the  Congo  territory. 


52      INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

The  old  king  was  not  only  willing,  but  anxious,  to  make 
this  transfer.  On  August  2,  1889,  he  had  made  a  will  be- 
queathing the  Congo  Independent  State  to  Belgium  on  his 
death,  thinking  to  assure  to  his  country,  as  he  expressed  it, 
"  indispensable  outlets  for  its  commerce  and  industry  and 
.  .  .  new  paths  for  the  activity  of  its  citizens."  In  a  letter  to 
M.  A.  Beernaert,  Belgian  Minister  of  Finance,  accompany- 
ing the  testament  and  dated  August  5,  Leopold  adds  :  "  A 
great  future  is  reserved  for  the  Congo,  whose  immense 
value  will  soon  burst  upon  the  sight  of  all.  .  .  .  When 
death  shall  overtake  me,  it  [Belgium]  will  profit  by  my 
work  as  well  as  by  the  labors  of  these  who  have  aided  me 
in  its  foundation  and  management.  .  .  .  Until  the  day  of 
my  death  I  shall  continue  to  be  guided  by  the  same  thought 
of  national  interest  as  heretofore,  to  direct  and  maintain 
our  African  work ;  but  if,  without  waiting  until  that  time, 
the  country  should  desire  to  contract  closer  relations  with 
my  possessions  in  the  Congo  I  would  not  hesitate  to  put 
them  at  its  disposal." 

Although  it  was  stipulated  in  the  terms  of  the  agree- 
ment of  July  3, 1890,  whereby  Belgium  guaranteed  to  loan 
the  Congo  Independent  State  $5,000,000  in  the  ten  suc- 
ceeding years,  that  the  Belgian  Government  might  annex 
the  Congo  State  within  six  months  after  the  expiration  of 
the  ten  years,  no  steps  were  ever  taken  to  do  so  until  the 
end  of  1906.  A  proposal  to  annex  the  Congo  territory  in 
1901  had  been  laid  on  the  table ;  and,  in  spite  of  a  lively 
debate  in  June  and  July,  1903,  engendered  by  further  re- 
ports of  misrule  on  the  Congo,  and  by  the  strong  speech  of 
Sir  Charles  Dilke  in  the  House  of  Commons  on  May  20  of 
that  year,  and  by  another  discussion  of  the  subject  opened 
by  M.  Vandervelde,  the  Socialist  leader,  on  February  20, 
1906,  the  Belgian  Chambers  made  no  further  progress  than 
to  promise  "  an  early  consideration  of  the  bill  of  1901." 


TRANSITION  TO  THE  BELGIAN  CONGO  53 

In  the  spring  of  1906  the  Special  Commission  at  length 
made  its  report,  recommending  numerous  reforms  in  the 
shape  of  twenty-four  decrees,  which  King  Leopold  laid  be- 
fore the  Belgian  Chambers  on  June  3  with  his  official  sanc- 
tion and  with  a  message  urging  again  the  annexation  of 
the  Congo  by  Belgium.  The  most  important  of  these  meas- 
ures included  the  establishment  of  four  more  courts  of  ap- 
peal ;  improvements  in  the  methods  of  administering  the 
lands  and  of  collecting  taxes  —  the  latter  to  be  done  only 
by  government  officials  assisted  by  the  chiefs ;  the  coinage 
of  a  million  francs  ;  the  creation  of  a  "  Domaine  National" 
embracing  all  the  lands  and  mines  not  ceded  to  companies ; 
the  appointment  of  a  "Conseil  du  Congo"  of  nine  mem- 
bers with  administrative  powers  —  to  examine  the  situation 
from  time  to  time  and  report  to  the  king ;  and  the  raising 
of  130,000,000  to  extend  the  railways  and  to  fight  the 
sleeping  sickness. 

In  his  message  of  recommendation,  King  Leopold  II  did 
not  attempt  to  describe  the  situation  on  the  Congo,  or  to 
explain  the  causes  of  the  misrule  and  disturbances  there. 
He  contented  himself  with  the  statement  that  such  disturb- 
ances are  inseparable  from  human  affairs,  and  that  the 
Congo  has  suffered  in  this  respect  perhaps  even  less  than 
many  more  civilized  communities ;  he  reiterated  his  claim 
that  he  had  founded  the  Congo  in  the  interests  of  civiliza- 
tion and  for  the  good  of  Belgium,  and  that  his  motives 
were  "  patriotic  and  disinterested."  He  reviewed  the  twenty 
years'  history  of  the  Congo  State,  showing  all  that  had  been 
done  to  develop  and  civilize  through  the  abolition  of  the 
slave  trade  and  other  heathen  customs,  the  prohibition  of 
the  sale  of  alcoholic  liquors,  and  the  commencement  of  the 
work  against  the  sleeping  sickness.  And  he  closed  by  call- 
ing attention  to  the  needs  of  economic  improvements  and 
of  trained  men  in  the  public  service,  and  to  the  wisdom 


54      INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

of  encouraging  the  missionaries  and  of  transforming  the 
Congo  State  into  a  Belgian  colonial  possession. 

It  was  not,  however,  until  December  (1906)  that  the 
Chamber  began  the  serious  investigation  of  the  question  of 
annexation ;  and  a  commission  of  sixteen  members,  com- 
posed of  the  leading  men  of  all  political  parties,  was  ap- 
pointed to  study  the  whole  matter  carefully.  After  an 
extended  discussion  between  the  Congo  administrators  and 
the  commission,  a  tentative  treaty  of  cession  and  annexa- 
tion was  signed  on  November  28,  1907,  and  approved  by 
Leopold  on  the  same  day.  It  was  agreed,  pending  the  ap- 
proval of  these  measures  by  the  Belgian  Legislature,  that 
the  Belgian  Government  should  take  over  the  control  of  the 
Congo  revenues  and  expenditures  on  January  1, 1908,  and 
that  a  special  "  Colonial  Law  "  providing  for  the  govern- 
ment of  the  Belgian  Congo  should  be  drafted  immediately. 
The  "  Commission  of  Sixteen  "  entered  promptly  upon  its 
labors,  and,  although  interrupted  from  February  4  to  March 
5  by  the  controversy  between  the  cabinet  and  the  king  over 
the  disposition  of  the  crown  domain,  completed  its  work  on 
March  25,  with  an  almost  unanimous  vote  approving  the 
bill  for  annexation  and  the  Colonial  Law,  and  laid  its  re- 
port on  the  table  of  the  Chamber  on  April  3. 

The  main  difference  between  these  measures  and  the 
draft  law  of  1901  was,  that  it  was  now  proposed  to  give 
the  Chamber  a  share  in  the  government  of  the  Congo  ter- 
ritory and  the  right  to  control  the  budget,  while  the  former 
law  left  the  power  of  the  sovereign  absolute.  There  were 
no  material  alterations  in  the  old  system  of  administration, 
but  the  changes  recommended  were  suggestive  of  a  genuine 
interest  in  the  welfare  of  the  natives  and  mark  a  decisive 
step  in  the  progress  of  reform.  The  king  was  to  rule  the 
Congo,  as  formerly,  through  a  Governor-General  and  such 
Vice-Governors  as  were  necessary ;  but  a  "  Colonial  Office  " 


TRANSITION  TO  THE  BELGIAN  CONGO  55 

was  created  in  the  Belgian  Cabinet  to  which  a  "  Colonial 
Council "  was  added  with  power  to  supervise  all  royal  de- 
crees affecting  the  colony,  to  advise  changes  and  make 
recommendations  in  the  form  of  periodic  reports.  It  was  to 
consist  of  fifteen  members,  six  elected  by  the  two  houses  of 
the  Belgian  Legislature  and  eight  nominated  by  the  king, 
with  the  Minister  for  the  Colonies  as  president. 

To  insure  the  welfare  of  the  native  population,  a  per- 
manent commission  of  seven  members  was  ordered.  It  was 
to  be  presided  over  by  the  Procureur-General,  or  Chief 
Justice  of  the  Congo,  and  was  charged  "  with  the  responsi- 
bility of  watching  over  the  protection  of  the  natives  through- 
out the  whole  territory  and  the  betterment  of  their  moral 
and  material  condition."  The  assistance  of  the  Governor- 
General  in  these  matters  was  made  imperative.  He  was 
ordered  to  "guard  the  preservation  of  the  native  popula- 
tion"; to  "favor  the  expansion  of  individual  liberty,  the 
gradual  abandonment  of  polygamy,  and  the  development  of 
individual  holdings  " ;  and  to  "  protect  and  favor,  without 
distinction  of  nationality  or  religion,  all  the  religious,  scien- 
tific, or  charitable  institutions  and  enterprises  created  and 
organized  for  the  purpose  or  aim  of  instructing  the  natives 
and  bringing  them  to  a  comprehension  and  appreciation 
of  the  advantages  of  civilization."  Christian  missionaries, 
scholars,  and  explorers  were  to  receive  special  protection. 
Natives  were  to  enjoy  civil  rights  conceded  to  them  by  colo- 
nial legislation,  and  "  by  their  customs,  provided  these  are 
not  contrary  either  to  law  or  public  order." 

Every  royal  act  must  in  the  future  be  signed  by  a  min- 
ister ;  and  a  regular  colonial  budget,  accompanied  by  a  com- 
plete report  on  the  administration  of  the  Congo,  must  be 
submitted  annually  to  the  Chamber  in  the  name  of  the 
sovereign.  This  gives  the  Chamber  a  practical  control  over 
the  Congo  finances  and  is  an  excellent  way  of  keeping  the 


66      INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

subject  prominently  in  the  minds  of  the  Belgian  people  and 
their  legislators.  Such  publicity  will  make  impossible  many 
of  the  misdeeds  perpetrated  on  the  Congo  peoples  in  the 
past.  In  addition,  no  member  or  stockholder  of  a  conces- 
sionnaire  company  may  serve  on  the  Colonial  Council  or  in 
any  administrative  capacity  in  the  Congo ;  and  a  special  law 
is  to  be  passed,  regulating  the  granting  of  all  future  con- 
cessions for  trade  or  public  development. 

For  financial  and  administrative  reasons  the  Belgian  Gov- 
ernment felt  it  would  be  unwise  to  assume  the  ownership 
and  control  of  the  Congo  Independent  State  without  the 
possession  of  the  crown  domain  as  well.  Early  in  February, 
1908,  M.  Schellaert,  the  Prime  Minister,  opened  negotia- 
tions with  King  Leopold  on  this  point.  The  ruler  of  the 
Congo  was  willing  to  turn  over  the  royal  lands,  but  only  on 
condition  that  $30,000,000  were  voted  by  the  Belgian  Legis- 
lature for  the  completion  of  certain  public  works  in  Belgium 
and  on  the  Congo,  together  with  annuities  for  Prince  Albert 
and  the  Princess  Clementine.  This  demand  was  declared  inad- 
missible by  the  Premier ;  and  he,  supported  by  a  united  cabinet, 
steadily  declined  to  consider  any  such  enormous  concession. 
Ultimately  a  compromise  was  effected ;  and  on  March  5, 
Leopold  deeded  to  Belgium  all  of  the  royal  Congo  possessions 
and  rights,  —  except  two  tracts  of  twenty  thousand  hectares 
in  the  Mayumbe  district,  where  experiments  in  rubber  and 
cocoa  culture  were  in  progress, — together  with  the  most  of 
his  stock  in  the  various  concessionnaire  companies.1  For  pub- 
lic works  and  fortifications  in  Belgium  the  sum  of  $9,000,000 
was  to  be  appropriated,  of  which  no  more  than  $6,000,000 
was  to  be  spent  without  the  further  consent  of  the  Chamber. 

As  a  token  of  gratitude  for  his  numerous  sacrifices  and 
generosity,  a  fund  of  $10,000,000  was  to  be  paid  over  in 

1  This  gave  the  Belgian  Government  control  of  about  one  half  of  the  stock 
of  the  concessionnaire  companies. 


TRANSITION  TO  THE  BELGIAN  CONGO  57 

fifteen  installments  to  Leopold.  It  was  understood,  however, 
that  this  sum  was  to  be  used  entirely  in  carrying  out  cer- 
tain royal  plans  relative  to  the  Congo,  which  included  the 
"  construction  of  hospitals,  schools  for  the  instruction  and 
the  education  of  negroes,  the  expenses  of  scientific  missions, 
the  establishing  of  institutions  for  the  prevention  and  cure 
of  the  sleeping  sickness,  the  aid  of  missions,  and  of  works 
in  favor  of  the  whites  who  have  rendered  good  service  in 
Africa."  This  cession  was  legalized  by  a  special  act ;  and 
large  sums  were  voted  to  insure  the  completion  of  the  vari- 
ous railways  and  public  improvements  under  construction, 
while  special  laws  were  passed  defining  the  status  of  the 
negroes,  the  work  of  the  courts  of  justice,  the  relations  of 
the  colony  to  the  mother  country,  and  many  other  vital  mat- 
ters of  organization  and  administration.  The  Chamber  be- 
gan its  discussion  of  the  proposed  bill  for  annexation  and 
of  the  Colonial  Law  on  April  15  and  continued  until  May  6, 
when  the  Government  tactfully  decided  to  postpone  the 
vote  on  the  measures  until  after  the  regular  May  elections. 
Being  returned  victorious  with  only  four  fewer  supporters 
in  the  Chamber  and  two  more  in  the  Senate,  the  Premier 
had  the  Legislature  summoned  at  once  to  consider  the  new 
bill  for  annexation.  The  discussion  began  on  June  10  and 
lasted  until  July  19,  the  opposition  making  a  determined 
effort  to  reduce  the  sum  proposed  for  Belgium  improve- 
ments. This  was  followed  by  a  thorough  debate  upon  the 
Colonial  Law,  which  was  prolonged  until  August  20,  when 
the  Chamber  passed  both  measures,  —  the  vote  for  the  an- 
nexation being  83  to  54  and  that  on  the  Colonial  Law  90 
to  48,  —  a  small  section  of  the  Liberal  party,  led  by  M.  Hy- 
mans,  supporting  the  Government.  The  Senate  took  up  the 
matter  on  August  27  and  passed  both  decrees  with  substan- 
tial majorities  on  September  9 ;  and  King  Leopold  affixed 
his  signature  on  October  18,  1908. 


68       INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

Belgium  has  thus  undertaken  the  role  of  a  colonial  power. 
It  remains  to  be  seen  whether  she  can  play  the  part  suc- 
cessfully or  not.  It  was  simply  a  question  whether  Belgium, 
by  assuming  the  risks,  responsibilities,  and  expense  of  man- 
aging a  great  and  difficult  colonial  enterprise,  would  reap 
the  reward  of  the  arduous  labors  of  King  Leopold  and  his 
associates,  or  would  let  the  Congo  go  by  default  to  France, 
to  whom  a  first  lien  on  the  territory  had  been  given  by  trea- 
ties in  April,  1884,  and  February,  1895.  Two  alternatives 
were  open  to  the  Belgian  authorities.  They  could  take  over 
the  colony  and  administer  it  in  the  name  of  the  signatory 
powers  of  the  Berlin  Act  of  1885  and  on  the  precise  terms 
of  that  act,  primarily  for  the  benefit  and  development  of  the 
native  peoples,  and  secondarily  for  whatever  profits  in  trade 
might  accrue  to  Belgium  from  the  transaction.  Or  they 
could  administer  the  Congo  as  a  government  territory  in 
their  own  way  and  primarily  for  their  own  purposes,  giv- 
ing to  the  natives  whatever  protection  lay  in  their  power. 
Few  of  the  Belgian  statesmen  ever  considered  the  first  alter- 
native seriously.  The  financial  and  commercial  interests  of 
Belgium  in  the  Congo  were  already  too  extensive  and  the 
future  burdens  too  heavy  to  permit  undertaking  any  such 
utopian  and  philanthropic  task.  They  were,  moreover,  jeal- 
ous of  outside  interests  and  opposed  to  any  foreign  inter- 
ference ;  and  it  was  generally  believed  that  annexation  by 
Belgium  put  an  end  to  any  rights  of  assistance  or  interfer- 
ence that  the  Act  of  1885  may  have  given  to  the  powers. 
The  Belgian  leaders  agreed  with  the  writer  in  the  Independ- 
ence Beige  of  February  24,  1908,  that  the  Congo  could 
not  "  be  an  international  colony  administered  by  Belgium ; 
it  must  be  nothing  more  or  less  than  a  Belgian  colony,  for 
whose  administration  and  profitable  working  Belgium  alone 
shall  be  responsible."  l 

1  Quoted  in  the  London  Times,  February  26,  1908. 


TRANSITION  TO  THE  BELGIAN  CONGO  59 

Belgium  should  have  annexed  the  Congo  in  1901 ;  and  if 
she  had  done  so,  she  would  have  gained  the  confidence  of 
the  powers  immediately,  and  saved  herself  considerable  criti- 
cism and  constant  prodding  from  the  signatory  states.  Now 
that  she  has  at  length  made  up  her  mind,  she  has  taken  hold 
of  the  matter  with  her  usual  intelligence  and  energy:  "The 
Government  will  see  to  it  that  the  taxation  falling  on  the 
natives  shall  be  moderate  and  Belgium  will  pursue  the  realiz- 
ation of  reforms  of  all  kinds,"  said  M.  Davignon,  Minister 
of  Foreign  Affairs,  to  the  Chamber  on  April  15, 1908.  "No 
one  can  doubt  the  loyalty  of  our  intentions.  We  have  an 
ideal  and  nothing  shall  prevent  us  from  realizing  it.  We 
shall  know  how  to  respond  to  the  wishes  of  a  nation  sin- 
cerely eager  for  colonization  and  to  justify  the  confidence 
of  Europe."  l 

But  Belgium  is  severely  handicapped  by  her  lack  of  ex- 
perience in  colonization.  She  has  practically  everything  to 
learn  and  must  proceed  slowly  and  with  caution.  The  politi- 
cal spirit  of  the  Belgian  people  is  essentially  conservative 
and  somewhat  provincial ;  and  her  entrance  upon  the  untried 
field  of  international  politics  must  necessarily  be  accom- 
panied by  various  readjustments,  to  meet  the  new  inter- 
national relations  and  obligations.  It  is  by  no  means  cer- 
tain that  the  mass  of  the  people  are  vitally  interested  in  the 
new  colonial  enterprise ;  and  the  Socialist  party  is  sure  to 
make  all  the  capital  it  can  out  of  every  mistake  of  the 
Government.  This  may  prove  beneficial  to  the  Congo  natives 
in  securing  them  from  misrule  and  ill-treatment ;  but  it  is 
likely  to  prove  a  source  of  increasing  embarrassment  to  the 
Government  because  of  the  necessary  slowness  of  all  suc- 
cessful colonial  reforms  and  development. 

One  of  the  most  serious  difficulties  to  be  met  at  present 
is  the  problem  of  finding  experienced  and  trained  men  suf- 
1  Quoted  in  the  London  Timet,  April  16,  1908. 


60      INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

ficient  to  administer  honestly,  properly,  and  efficiently  their 
new  and  vast  territory.  "  The  Belgian  people  as  a  whole  are 
not  in  the  least  convinced  that  Belgium  wants  a  colony  at 
all,"  wrote  the  Brussels  correspondent  of  the  London  Times 
on  August  22,  1908.  "The  average  Belgian  is  in  tempera- 
ment essentially  a  stay-at-home.  In  fact,  the  difficulty  of 
getting  good  men  to  expatriate  themselves,  even  for  the 
sake  of  better  pay  and  prospects  than  the  miserably  inade- 
quate terms  hitherto  offered,  is  recognized  as  one  of  the  most 
serious  problems  confronting  the  future  administration  of 
the  colony." 

The  Belgians  are  a  young  and  enterprising  people,  natu- 
rally intelligent  and  generous ;  they  have  grit,  and  we  may 
count  upon  their  rising  to  the  "dignity  of  their  new  bur- 
dens." Their  leaders  are  anxious  to  share  in  the  world  move- 
ment for  colonization  and  commerce,  for  it  is  essential  to 
the  economic  progress  and  development  of  the  Belgian  na- 
tion. And  they  wish  to  play  a  dignified  and  worthy  part  in 
the  opening-up  of  the  new  lands  and  in  bringing  European 
civilization  to  the  heathen  people  of  Africa.  Some  of  the 
ablest  statesmen  and  keenest  minds  of  Belgium  have  en- 
listed themselves  in  this  cause ;  and  they  understand  thor- 
oughly the  gravity  of  the  problem,  the  complexity  of  duties 
and  responsibilities  involved,  and  the  manifold  and  intricate 
difficulties  in  the  path  of  its  successful  solution. 

"  Every  nation  has  to  undertake  the  burden  of  civilizing 
the  people  which  walk  in  darkness,"  wrote  the  editor  of  the 
Brussels  Gazette  on  August  21, 1908.  "  We  know  that  our 
task  is  heavy.  We  mean  to  acquit  ourselves  of  it  with  dig- 
nity, honesty  and  enthusiasm,  because  we  feel  the  nobility  of 
the  action.  We  are  not  becoming  the  masters  of  a  race.  We 
are  assuming  tutelage  of  children  whom  it  is  our  business 
to  make  men.  No  doubt  we  may  legitimately  require  from 
their  work  some  compensation  for  the  sacrifice  which  the 


TRANSITION  TO  THE  BELGIAN  CONGO  61 

task  will  impose  upon  us.  But  we  do  not  wish  to  avail  our- 
selves at  their  expense,  first,  because  that  would  seem  to  lack 
nobility,  and  secondly,  because  it  would  not  be  prudent. 
...  If  only  we  could  give  Europe  an  example  of  a  new 
kind  of  colonial  policy,  exerting  itself  loyally  in  an  admir- 
able task  of  human  culture,  while  ourselves  remaining  a 
laborious  nation  respecting  the  liberty  of  others  in  propor- 
tion to  our  own  passionate  love  of  it."  * 

In  accordance  with  this  spirit  of  philanthropy  and  devo- 
tion, the  Belgian  Government  entered  earnestly  upon  the 
work  of  reform  in  its  own  colony.  M.  Renkin,  the  new 
Colonial  Minister,  prepared  a  set  of  reform  measures  by 
which  the  administration  of  the  country  would  be  materi- 
ally improved,  the  principle  of  free  trade  established  (in- 
cluding the  right  of  the  native  to  traffic  in  the  products  of 
his  own  land),  and  the  character  and  methods  of  taxation 
completely  revised.  These  improvements  were  embodied  in 
the  law  of  March  22, 1910, 2  which  provided  for  their  grad- 
ual introduction.  On  July  1,  1910,  the  districts  of  the 
Lower  Congo,  Stanley  Pool,  Ubangi,  Bangala,  Kwango,  the 
Kasai,  the  Katanga,  Aruwimi,  the  southern  portion  of  the 
Eastern  Province,  and  the  banks  of  the  Congo  River  as  far 
as  Stanleyville,  were  thrown  open  to  trade.  On  July  1, 1911, 
the  former  Domaine  de  la  Couronne,  lying  in  the  center  of 
the  colony,  was  made  a  free-trade  district ;  and  one  year 
later,  the  remaining  region,  the  Welle,  was  placed  on  a 
similar  basis. 

In  the  same  way  the  new  method  of  taxation  has  been 
gradually  introduced  ;  and  the  practice  of  forced  labor  abol- 
ished. Many  material  improvements  are  already  noticeable, 
particularly  in  the  field  of  public  utilities  and  transporta- 
tion. The  entire  course  of  the  Congo  River  has  been  opened 

1  Quoted  in  the  London  Times,  August  22,  1908. 

2  Brit.  Parl.  Papers,  1911,  Congo  No.  1,  cd.  5559. 


62      INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

by  rail  or  by  steamer  to  international  trade ;  numerous 
distant  places  have  been  brought  into  communication  with 
the  world  by  roads,  boats,  and  the  telegraph ;  and  Eliza- 
bethville,  the  capital  of  the  Upper  Congo,  will  ere  long  be 
brought  a  thousand  miles  nearer  Europe  by  the  completion 
of  the  Benguella  Railway  from  Portuguese  Angola  to  the 
Katanga  branch  of  the  Cape-to-Cairo  Railway.  The  trade 
of  the  country  has  been  carefully  protected  and  cultivated, 
so  that  the  combined  imports  and  exports,  which  in  1895 
were  only  about  $9,100,000,  and  at  the  time  of  annexation 
approximately  131,770,000,  reached  $47,508,000  in  1911. 
Yet  the  colony  is  still  far  from  being  a  financial  success.  The 
expenditures  for  1912  exceeded  the  revenue  by  $5,215,000  ; 
and  the  total  public  debt  in  the  same  year  had  already 
reached  $55,749,440. 

It  is  evident,  also,  from  the  reports  of  the  Reverend 
J.  H.  Harris,1  Consuls  Thursten,  Armstrong,2  Campbell, 
and  others,  that  the  Belgian  Government  is  making  a  con- 
scientious and  progressive  effort  to  ameliorate  the  condition 
of  the  natives  and  to  introduce  all  the  promised  reforms 
affecting  their  welfare.  Conditions  have  very  materially  im- 
proved in  many  districts.  Indeed,  so  well  and  so  faithfully 
have  the  Belgian  officials  performed  their  work  and  re- 
deemed their  promises,  that  the  British  Government  officially 
recognized  the  Belgian  annexation  early  in  June,  1913,  and 
the  Congo  Reform  Association  of  Great  Britain  ended  its 
labors  with  a  dinner  on  the  16th  of  that  month. 

But  it  will,  of  necessity,  be  some  years  before  the  admin- 
istration of  the  entire  colony  —  nearly  four  times  the  area 
of  Texas  with  a  population  of  15,000,000 — can  be  com- 
pletely reorganized,  the  development  of  the  vast  region 

1  London  Times,  September  4  and  7, 1911 ;  May  7, 1912 ;  May  12,  1913,  etc. 

2  Brit.  Parl.  Papers,  1910,  Africa  No.  6,  cd.  6145;  1911,  Africa  No.  S, 
cd.  6860;  1912,  Africa,  cd.  G606. 


TRANSITION  TO  THE  BELGIAN  CONGO  63 

placed  upon  an  enlightened  and  systematic  basis,  and  the 
natives  everywhere  provided  with  adequate  protection,  both 
against  the  officials  and  against  each  other.  The  financial, 
economic,  and  administrative  difficulties  which  will  have  to 
be  faced  before  a  successful  regime  can  be  established,  and 
before  Belgium  can  take  an  honorable  place  among  the 
colonial  powers  of  the  world,  are  so  tremendous  that  even 
richer  and  more  powerful  states  might  well  hesitate  to  un- 
dertake the  task.  It  will  require,  indeed,  a  very  considerable 
sacrifice  in  money  and  labor,  great  tact,  the  most  careful 
planning,  and  infinite  patience,  to  carry  out  an  enlightened 
program,  such  as  was  suggested  to  Belgium  in  March  and 
April,  1908,  by  Great  Britain1  and  the  United  States.2  It 
may  be  briefly  summarized  as  follows :  The  exemption  of  the 
native  inhabitants  from  excessive  taxation;  the  abolition 
of  forced  labor ;  the  introduction  of  a  system  of  sound  cur- 
rency ;  the  creation  of  a  new  system  of  land  tenure  by  which 
the  natives  may  become  landowners  and  encouraged  to  take 
up  land ;  the  establishment  of  a  more  equitable  and  efficient 
system  of  justice,  assuring  an  impartial  and  exact  justice 
to  all ;  and  the  preservation  of  the  freedom  of  trade  so  that 
"  traders  and  settlers  of  all  nationalities  [may]  secure  un- 
occupied tracts  of  land,  needed  for  the  prosecution  and 
development  of  peaceful  commerce,  at  reasonable  prices  in 
any  part  of  the  Congo." 

The  present  King  and  Government,  however,  are  in  entire 
sympathy  with  this  plan,  and,  if  not  hindered,  will  see  it 
finally  achieved  in  a  broad  and  liberal  spirit.  "  Belgium  is 
firmly  resolved  that  there  shall  be  in  the  Congo  the  widest 
economic  system,"  wrote  the  Belgian  Premier  on  April  25, 

1908,  "  and  that  the  expansion  of  commerce  and  industry 

1  Brit.  Par/.  Papers,  1908,  Africa,  cd.  4135,  nos.  1  and  2. 

2  Supplement  to  Amer.  Jour,  of  Internal.  Law,  vol.  in,  no.  1,  January, 

1909,  p.  94. 


64      INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

shall  be  furthered  in  the  most  liberal  manner,  without  dis- 
tinction being  made  between  Belgian  subjects  and  foreign- 
ers. .  .  .  Private  persons,  to  whatever  nationality  they 
belong,  will  be  able  to  acquire  the  lands  necessary  for  the 
prosecution  of  their  commerce  and  their  occupation.  The 
government  of  the  future  colony  will  be  regulated  by  these 
principles  and  Belgium  will  see  that  they  are  loyally  and 
fully  applied." l  And  King  Albert,  at  his  New  Year  recep- 
tion in  1914,  said  to  the  Vice-President  of  the  Chamber  of 
Deputies,  "  It  is  my  duty  to  tell  the  Chamber  that  modifi- 
cations in  the  charter  of  the  Congo  Colony  are  necessary. . . . 
It  is  indispensable  that  a  government  be  constituted  on  the 
spot,  which  shall  formally  receive  from  the  home  Legisla- 
ture really  effective  power.  The  intensive  tutelage  of  the 
mother  country  cannot  endure  on  African  soil.  A  respon- 
sible autonomy  must  be  able  to  assert  itself  under  the  di- 
rection, control,  and  sovereignty  of  the  motherland."  2 

1  London  Times,  June  16,  1908. 

2  Ibid.,  January  2,  1914. 


CHAPTER  IV 

GERMAN   COLONIZATION  IN   SOUTHWEST   AFRICA 

THE  interest  of  European  powers  in  the  colonization  of 
Africa  was  aroused,  next  to  the  founding  of  the  Independ- 
ent State  of  the  Congo,  by  the  entrance  of  Germany  into 
Southwest  Africa.  Great  Britain  was  engaged,  at  the  time 
the  International  Association  of  the  Congo  was  formed,  in 
taking  over  the  administration  of  Egypt  for  financial  and 
philanthropic  reasons.  She  was  accordingly  hardly  in  a 
position  either  to  participate  in,  or  to  oppose  successfully, 
other  enterprises.  "Your  father  might  have  upset  our 
apple-cart  in  Egypt,  if  he  had  liked,"  said  a  member  of  the 
British  Cabinet  once  to  Herbert  Bismarck.  "  And  we  ought 
to  have  been  grateful."  Yet  Germany  was  ready  and  anx- 
ious for  colonial  expansion ;  and  the  Chancellor  knew  it. 
But  he  was  conservative,  and  unwilling  either  to  take  any 
step  until  the  time  was  propitious  or  to  assume  greater  re- 
sponsibilities than  his  country  could  bear  at  the  moment. 
Although  under  strong  pressure  after  1878  to  enter  the 
field  of  colonial  politics,  Prince  Bismarck  successfully  post- 
poned action  until  after  he  had  firmly  secured  the  position 
of  the  new  German  Empire  in  Europe,  through  the  adop- 
tion of  a  sane  tariff  program  and  the  creation  of  the  Triple 
Alliance  of  Austria,  Italy,  and  Germany,  in  1882. 

Since  1842  the  Gesellschaft  der  Rheinischen  Missionen 
had  been  at  work  in  Great  Namaqualand  and  Hereroland 
in  Southwest  Africa,  and  had  acquired  twelve  mission  sta- 
tions and  considerable  property  there.  In  1863  civil  war 
broke  out  between  the  Hereros  and  the  Hottentots,  in  the 


66      INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 


0  100  200  300 

TO*          Jxsnrinrfe       £«urt       fron\       pfeenwleh 


Showing  loquliitlon.  lnESfflll883    {££23 18  84     Ki&il1885     E^LI'886  and  1890 


course  of  which  several  of  the  missions  were  attacked  and 
destroyed.  In  1868  the  Prussian  Government  and  the 
Rheinische  Society  petitioned  the  British  Government  for 


GERMAN  COLONIZATION  IN  SOUTHWEST  AFRICA     67 

protection  for  these  missionaries,  the  society  asking  that  a 
British  protectorate  be  established,  particularly  over  Wai- 
fish  Bay  and  the  Hereroland.  This,  however,  the  British 
Foreign  Office  declined  to  do.  Nor  would  they  countenance 
the  use  of  force  at  all  in  the  region.  But  they  sent  out  a 
British  Commissioner,  Mr.  Palgrave,  from  Cape  Colony, 
who  succeeded  finally,  in  1870,  in  establishing  peace  be- 
tween the  warring  tribes. 

Conditions  in  Great  Namaqualand  remained  far  from 
satisfactory;  and  in  1875  the  Cape  Parliament  voted  to 
extend  the  limits  of  Cape  Colony  as  far  north  of  the 
Orange  River  as  the  Crown  should  deem  expedient,  in- 
cluding Walfish  Bay.  Mr.  Palgrave  made  another  tour  of 
the  country  in  1876,  securing  the  cooperation  of  the  chief- 
tains; and  in  1877  Sir  Bartle  Frere,  Governor  of  Cape 
Colony,  energetically  urged  the  British  Government  to 
occupy  Walfish  Bay  immediately,  and  to  pass  an  Order  in 
Council  authorizing  Cape  Colony  to  annex  Namaqualand. 
On  March  12,  1878,  Commander  Dyer  took  possession  of 
Walfish  Bay  and  three  hundred  square  miles  adjacent,  for 
Great  Britain  ;  but  the  Government  refused  to  accept  the 
submission  of  the  chiefs  generally.  The  ten  islands  along 
the  coast  were  taken  over  in  1863  and  1869,  and  chartered 
to  De  Pass,  Spence  &  Co.,  of  Cape  Colony.  The  steady 
refusal  of  Britain  to  establish  a  protectorate  over  the  en- 
tire country  was  due  to  the  fact  that  the  Foreign  Office 
was  unwilling  to  encumber  either  itself  or  Cape  Colony 
with  further  expenses  and  responsibilities  in  South  Africa. 
The  "  Cape,  Zulu,  and  Sikukuni  wars "  were  costing  a 
pretty  penny  ;  and  the  difficulties  in  Bechuanaland,  the 
rebellion  in  Basutoland,  the  unrest  in  Zululand,  and  the 
lawlessness  in  the  Transkei,  were  troubles  enough  for  a 
weak  colonial  government  like  the  Cape  and  for  an  over- 
worked Colonial  Office. 


68      INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

In  1880  war  broke  out  again  in  Namaqualand.  Great 
Britain  refused  to  interfere,  recalling  Palgrave  from  the 
Trans-Garieb  district  and  Major  Musgrove  from  Herero- 
land  to  Walfish  Bay,  on  the  ground  that  it  "  had  been  de- 
cided from  the  very  first  that  no  attempt  to  employ  any 
other  kind  of  force  [than  moral  suasion]  should  be  made." 
To  Germany's  reiterated  request  for  protection  for  the  mis- 
sions, the  Foreign  Office  replied  that  Germans  in  Nama- 
qualand would  receive  the  same  protection  as  British  sub- 
jects, but  the  British  Government  would  "  not  be  responsible 
for  what  might  take  place  outside  of  British  territory,  which 
only  included  (north  of  the  Orange  River)  Walfish  Bay 
and  a  very  small  portion  of  country  surrounding  it."  The 
German  Government  declared  it  was  out  of  the  question 
for  it  to  afford  direct  protection  to  the  German  mission- 
aries and  traders  in  that  district  then ;  and  so  the  matter 
rested. 

On  February  7,  1883,  Count  Herbert  Bismarck  called 
upon  Sir  Julian  Pauncefote  and  asked  if  England  would 
give  protection  to  a  Bremen  merchant  who  was  about  to 
set  up  a  factory  on  the  Southwest  Coast  of  Africa.  If  not, 
or  if  Great  Britain  did  not  have  jurisdiction  there,  the 
German  Government  would  do  its  best  to  extend  "the 
same  measure  of  protection  there  as  they  extend  to  their 
subjects  in  remote  parts  of  the  world,"  but  "  without  having 
the  least  design  to  establish  any  footing  in  South  Africa." 
The  organization  of  the  British  Government  in  those  days 
was  such  as  to  impede  seriously  the  conduct  of  all  diplo- 
matic relations  affecting  colonial  affairs.  The  Foreign  Office 
could  not  act  without  first  consulting  the  Colonial  Office ; 
and  the  Colonial  Office  had  adopted  the  policy  of  always 
consulting  the  colonial  authorities  of  the  self-governing 
colonies  on  all  questions  affecting  their  interests.  Usually 
almost  interminable  delays  resulted  from  this  system ;  but 


GERMAN  COLONIZATION  IN  SOUTHWEST  AFRICA     69 

in  this  instance  Lord  Granville,  with  the  concurrence  of 
Lord  Derby,  Colonial  Secretary,  was  able  to  reply  on  Feb- 
ruary 23  to  the  effect  that  Cape  Colony  had  certain  estab- 
lishments along  the  southwest  coast  of  Africa,  and,  if  the 
precise  location  of  the  German  factory  were  given  the  For- 
eign Office,  inquiries  would  be  made  as  to  the  possibility 
of  affording  it  British  protection. 

In  April,  1883,  Herr  F.  A.  E.  Liideritz,  a  Bremen  mer- 
chant, sent  out  an  expedition  under  the  command  of  Herr 
Vogelsand,  who  purchased,  for  two  hundred  rifles  and  one 
hundred  dollars  in  cash,  one  hundred  and  fifty  square  miles 
in  the  neighborhood  of  the  bay  of  Angra  Pequena  from 
Joseph  Frederica,  the  Hottentot  chief  of  the  region.  In 
August,  Herr  Liideritz  himself  went  out  and  negotiated 
the  purchase  of  the  entire  tract  from  the  Orange  River  to 
lat.  26°  S.,  extending  twenty  miles  inland,  for  three  thou- 
sand dollars  and  sixty  guns.  In  spite  of  the  fact  that  Brit- 
ish traders  had  stations  already  on  this  coast  and  that  the 
islands  had  been  leased  to  a  British  firm,  Liideritz,  basing 
the  interpretation  of  his  grants  on  a  general  rule  of  inter- 
national law,  claimed  control  of  everything  in  sight.  This 
irrepressible  German,  as  Mr.  Spence  called  him,  was  not 
satisfied  with  the  land  and  harbors,  but  wanted  the  sea  as 
well  —  at  least  for  the  five  miles  nearest  shore. 

Meanwhile,  petitions  from  the  British  traders  for  aid 
and  protection  began  to  pour  in  at  the  British  Foreign 
Office,  and  Liideritz  besieged  his  Government  to  support 
his  claims.  The  British  Government  proceeded  with  great 
deliberation  to  inquire  into  the  truth  of  the  matter  from 
the  Cape  Government  and  to  send  H.M.S.  Boadiceato  An- 
gra Pequena  Bay  to  prevent  conflicts  between  the  German 
and  British  traders.  On  September  10,  Baron  von  Plessen, 
German  Charge  d' Affaires  in  London,  left  at  the  Brit- 
ish Foreign  Office  a  "Memorandum,"  stating  that  Herr 


70      INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

Liideritz  had  purchased  one  hundred  and  fifty  square  miles 
of  territory  on  Angra  Pequena  Bay  and  asking  if  England 
claimed  suzerainty  over  that  region.  The  German  Govern- 
ment followed  this  with  an  inquiry  on  November  16,  rais- 
ing again  the  question  of  sovereignty,  and  requesting  a 
definite  statement  of  the  grounds  on  which  the  British 
claims  were  based. 

These  communications  were  misleading  in  two  particu- 
lars. In  the  first  place,  the  two  purchases  of  Liideritz 
amounted  to  three  thousand  two  hundred  English  square 
miles  instead  of  one  hundred  and  fifty ;  and  while  the  cession 
of  the  latter  amount  of  land  would  not  be  of  much  moment 
in  a  sterile  and  half -civilized  Damara-Namaqualand  compris- 
ing over  one  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  square  miles  of  ter- 
ritory, an  acquisition  of  the  former  size  would  be  highly  signi- 
ficant. In  the  second  place,  no  indication  was  advanced  that 
Germany  was  expecting  to  establish  any  special  protectorate 
over  Angra  Pequena,  in  case  England  had  no  control  there. 
In  fact,  the  British  Foreign  Office,  assured  by  its  representa- 
tive in  Berlin  on  August  31,  that  the  German  Government 
had  no  intention  of  setting  up  colonies  or  protectorates  in 
Southwest  Africa  and  that  Liideritz's  expedition  was  every- 
where in  the  press  referred  to  as  a  commercial  enterprise 
{Handel sniederlassung*),  considered  these  communications 
as  friendly  inquiries  as  to  the  propriety  of  Liideritz's  set- 
ting up  a  factory  in  this  region  and  the  probability  of  his 
receiving  protection  from  the  British  authorities. 

Lord  Granville,  realizing  that  considerable  time  would 
elapse  before  a  definite,  detailed  answer  could  be  prepared, 
felt  that  some  definite  statement  of  the  British  position 
should  be  made  at  once.  Accordingly,  on  November  21,  he 
replied  that  the  sovereignty  of  the  Queen  had  not  been  pro- 
claimed over  the  whole  country,  but  only  over  Walfish  Bay 
and  the  islands  near  Angra  Pequena  Bay.  "  But,"  he  added, 


GERMAN  COLONIZATION  IN  SOUTHWEST  AFRICA     71 

"  Her  Majesty's  Government  considered  that  any  claim  to 
sovereignty  or  jurisdiction  by  a  foreign  power  between  the 
southern  point  of  Portuguese  jurisdiction  at  latitude  18° 
and  the  frontier  of  Cape  Colony  would  infringe  their  legiti- 
mate rights."  And  Derby  wrote  the  Cape  Government  on 
December  13  asking  it  to  take  up  the  advisability  of  Cape 
Colony  extending  its  jurisdiction  to  Angra  Pequena. 

Count  Miinster  answered  Granville's  note  in  a  long  let- 
ter, dated  December  31,  1883,  in  which  he  argued  strongly 
to  prove  that  Great  Britain  had  no  claim  to  sovereignty  in 
the  disputed  region,  and  asserted  that  it  was  the  duty  of  the 
German  Government  to  "  afford  protection  and  encourage- 
ment to  German  subjects  trafficking  in  districts  where  suf- 
ficient protection  is  not  guaranteed  by  a  recognized  civil- 
ized government."  He  concluded  with  the  following  query : 
"  What  institutions  [does]  England  possess  on  that  coast, 
which  could  secure  such  legal  protection  for  German  sub- 
jects in  their  commercial  enterprises  as  would  relieve  the 
Empire  from  the  duty  of  providing  itself,  directly,  for  its 
subjects  in  that  territory  the  protection  of  which  they  might 
stand  in  need  ?  "  This  was  interpreted  by  the  British  Gov- 
ernment to  mean  that  the  German  authorities  would  extend 
their  protection  to  Angra  Pequena,  in  case  the  British  de- 
clined to  place  it  under  their  jurisdiction,  and  give  all  the 
traders  there  the  benefit  of  their  institutions  and  military 
protection. 

Lord  Granville,  feeling  that  perhaps  the  time  had  come 
when  his  Government  could  afford  to  widen  its  jurisdiction 
in  South  Africa,  —  particularly  if  Cape  Colony  should  as- 
sume the  expense  involved, — referred  the  matter  to  Lord 
Derby  asking  that  the  Government  of  Cape  Colony  be  ap- 
proached with  this  move  in  view.  He  recognized  that  the  posi- 
tion of  Lmderitz  on  the  coast  could  easily  be  defended  and 
that,  while  the  German  missions  were  located  rather  far  in  the 


72      INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

interior  and  were  not  easy  of  access,  it  would  not  be  a  seri- 
ous problem  to  afford  them  protection.  Then,  too,  the  politi- 
cal situation  in  South  Africa  had  become  easier.  Lord  Derby 
consulted  Sir  Hercules  Robinson,  Governor  of  Cape  Colony, 
then  in  England,  who  was  favorable  to  an  extension  of  ju- 
risdiction ;  and  a  letter  was  dispatched  by  the  Cape  Ministry 
dated  January  30,  1884,  urging  the  British  occupation  of 
the  region  between  the  Orange  River  and  lat.  26°  S.,  on 
the  ground  that  the  "interests  of  order  and  civilization 
[would  be]  best  served  by  annexation." 

But  the  British  authorities  were  unwilling  to  assume  the 
responsibilities  and  expenses  incident  to  such  occupation. 
So,  on  February  3,  Derby  wired  the  administrative  officer 
at  the  Cape :  "  Any  prospect  of  the  Cape  Government  under- 
taking the  control  of  Angra  Pequena?"  If  not,  it  will  "be 
difficult  to  resist  the  representation  made  by  the  German 
Government  that,  failing  other  protection  for  German  sub- 
jects there,  they  would  be  compelled  to  assume  jurisdiction 
over  the  place."  A  reply  came  back  on  the  6th,  asking  that 
the  matter  be  kept  open,  in  the  absence  of  the  Prime  Min- 
ister, until  a  cabinet  meeting  could  be  held.  Shortly  after- 
wards, a  ministerial  crisis  occurred  at  the  Cape  followed  by 
an  entire  change  of  cabinet ;  and  for  three  months,  unfor- 
tunately, nothing  further  was  done  in  the  matter. 

At  length,  on  May  7,  Derby  sent  an  imperative  telegram 
to  the  Cape,  demanding  a  reply  at  once,  if  the  Colony  de- 
sired to  see  the  British  jurisdiction  extended  to  Angra 
Pequena  and  would  "  accept  responsibility  and  cost "  of  the 
move.  Another  delay  ensued  in  order  to  give  the  new  min- 
istry opportunity  to  study  the  question  carefully ;  but,  finally, 
on  May  29,  Sir  H.  Robinson  wired  Lord  Derby  that  the 
ministry  would  recommend  the  Cape  Parliament  to  under- 
take the  control  and  cost  of  extending  the  British  jurisdic- 
tion in  Southwest  Africa.  And  on  June  2,  this  decision 


GERMAN  COLONIZATION  IN  SOUTHWEST  AFRICA     73 

was  referred  to  the  Foreign  Office  with  the  suggestion  that 
Germany  be  assured  that  protection  would  be  afforded  to 
all  Germans  in  Angra  Pequena,  and  that  the  question  of 
land  grants  be  referred  to  a  joint  commission. 

Meanwhile  the  German  Government,  growing  impatient 
at  the  delay,  began  to  act.  On  April  24,  Bismarck  wired 
Lippert,  imperial  consul-general  at  Cape  Town,  to  declare 
officially  that  Herr  Liideritz  and  his  establishments  were 
under  the  protection  of  the  German  Empire.  And  on  June 
4  the  German  ambassador  called  upon  Granville  and  in- 
formed him  confidentially  that  Bismarck  could  not  recog- 
nize the  right  of  Cape  Colony  to  annex  Angra  Pequena ; 
nor  could  he  approve  of  that  method  of  extending  the  Brit- 
ish jurisdiction.  This  was  followed  by  an  intimation  by 
Herbert  Bismarck,  who  called  on  June  14,  that  Derby  had 
been  taking  advantage  of  the  delay  to  gain  time  for  Cape 
Colony  to  annex  the  district  in  dispute.  This  was  denied 
emphatically  by  Granville ;  and  later  Lord  Derby  prepared 
a  "  Memorandum,"  1  explaining  in  detail  each  step  in  these 
negotiations,  as  seen  from  the  English  side,  which  was  for- 
warded to  Berlin  in  October,  1884.  In  this  document  it 
was  clearly  demonstrated  that  the  German  Foreign  Office 
purposely  permitted  the  British  authorities  to  assume  that 
the  Kaiser  had  no  definite  intentions  of  setting  up  a  Ger- 
man protectorate  in  Southwest  Africa.  The  British  officials 
were  guilty  of  no  breach  of  faith ;  but  they  cannot  escape 
criticism  for  their  lack  of  penetration  and  slowness  in  fol- 
lowing up  the  advantages  of  their  original  position.  The 
pressure  of  other  matters  of  seeming  greater  importance 
and  the  delayed  action  of  the  Cape  Government  are  not 
sufficient  excuse  for  a  lack  of  acuteness  and  promptness  in 
following  up  a  matter  of  this  character. 

1  Brit.  Parl.  Papers,  1884,  Angra  Pequena,  cd.  4262,  p.  39.  See  for  whole 
correspondence,  also,  cd.  4265,  cd.  4190,  and  the  German  Weiss  Buck  for  the 
same  year  on  "  Angra  Pequena." 


74      INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

It  is  true  that,  when  the  "  cat  was  out  of  the  bag,"  Lord 
Derby  wired  Robinson  on  July  17,  1884,  to  rush  the  bill 
for  the  annexation  of  the  land  north  of  Angra  Pequena 
through  the  Cape  Parliament,  and  it  was  passed  on  the 
23d.  But  it  was  too  late.  The  Foreign  Office  had  an- 
nounced on  July  12  that  it  would  not  contest  the  German 
claim  to  a  protectorate  over  Angra  Pequena ;  and  on  August 
7,  before  the  British  authorities  had  time  to  occupy  the  coast 
north  of  Angra  Pequena  where  their  claims  were  very  weak, 
the  German  warship  Elizabeth  took  possession  of  the  whole 
region  between  the  Orange  River  and  lat.  26°  S.  At  first 
the  British  Government  protested  at  this  action ;  but  in 
September  they  decided  to  welcome  Germany  as  a  colonial 
neighbor  in  South  Africa  and  to  recognize  her  "  protector- 
ate "  from  the  Portuguese  possessions  at  lat.  18°  S.  to  the 
Orange  River,  on  the  understanding  that  their  own  claims 
to  Walfish  Bay  and  to  the  islands  along  the  coast  should 
not  be  questioned.  To  this  Germany  assented.  A  joint  com- 
mission was  appointed  to  settle  the  questions  of  private 
claims  like  those  of  De  Pass  and  Luderitz ;  and  the  whole 
matter  was  amicably  adjusted  in  the  treaty  of  October,  1885, 
by  which  Germany  made  her  debut  as  an  African  colonial 
power  with  215,000  square  miles  of  territory.  The  eastern 
boundary  of  this  new  possession  was  fixed  in  the  treaty  of 
1890  with  England,  in  which  Germany  obtained  access  to 
the  Zambesi  River ;  and  the  northern  line  was  determined 
in  an  agreement  with  Portugal  signed  on  December  30, 
1886. 

The  German  hesitation  concerning  a  colonial  policy  had 
come  to  an  end  in  June,  1884.  In  the  course  of  a  debate  over 
the  Postal  Subsidy  Bill  in  the  Reichstag  on  June  23  and 
again  on  June  26,1  Bismarck  took  occasion  to  explain  for 
the  first  time,  and  in  detail,  the  contemplated  colonial  pro- 

1  Nord  Deutsche  Allgemeine  Zeitung,  June  25,  1884,  and  June  27,  1884 


GERMAN  COLONIZATION  IN  SOUTHWEST  AFRICA     75 

gram  of  his  Government.  He  was  opposed  to  colonial  expan- 
sion of  the  usual  type  at  that  time.  It  would  be  foolhardy 
for  the  Empire,  without  trained  officials  and  a  well-devel- 
oped colonial  system,  to  attempt  to  acquire  unexplored  lands 
of  doubtful  value  and  to  develop  them  through  colonization 
schemes.  He  was  not  sure  that  the  Empire  would  be  able 
to  furnish  either  the  necessary  funds  or  the  required  pro- 
tection for  persons  and  property. 

But  the  extension  of  German  sovereignty  and  protection 
"  to  free  settlements  of  German  subjects,  which  are,  in  a 
certain  sense,  offshoots  of  the  German  nation,  in  districts 
which  are  not  under  the  recognized  sovereignty  of  any  other 
state,"  was  quite  another  matter.  In  such  cases  it  was  the 
duty  of  the  home  country  to  protect  not  only  the  persons 
and  properties  of  such  subjects,  but  the  "  territories  which 
they  may  have  acquired  "  as  well.  The  Government  did  not 
propose,  however,  to  assume  the  financial  burdens  in  any 
large  degree  of  such  territorial  expansion.  The  development 
of  the  new  lands  would  be  left  to  the  energy  and  ingenuity 
of  individual  pioneers  and  corporations  ;  and  imperial  char- 
ters, similar  to  those  granted  by  England  to  the  East  Indian 
Company  and  the  North  Borneo  Company,  would  be  issued 
to  the  leading  trading  companies.  For  his  policy  was  "  not 
to  found  provinces,  but  mercantile  settlements,  which  would 
be  placed  under  the  protection  of  the  Empire ;  if  they  did 
not  succeed,  the  Empire  would  not  lose  much  and  the  cost 
would  not  have  been  very  great."  The  establishment  of 
coaling-stations,  the  granting  of  ship  subsidies  to  encourage 
trade,  and  the  extension  of  the  consular  service,  would, 
therefore,  mark  the  limits  of  the  Government's  activities  in 
colonial  affairs  for  some  time  to  come. 

Bismarck  was  not  a  colonial  enthusiast.  He  entered  the 
field  only  because  it  was  forced  upon  him  as  a  duty ;  and 
as  late  as  1889  he  declared,  "  I  am  no  colony  man."  As 


76      INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

long  as  he  remained  in  office,  he  advocated  extreme  caution 
and  moderation  in  colonial  expansion.1  The  Empire  ought 
not  to  acquire  more  land  in  Africa  than  it  could  safely 
handle ;  and  no  general  colonial  policy  should  be  entered 
upon  without  the  support  of  a  united  people  and  Parlia- 
ment. The  duty  of  the  Federal  Government,  he  declared 
in  1884,  was  "to  carry  forward  our  colonial  policy  so  long 
as  they  have  reason  to  hope  that  a  majority  of  the  German 
nation  are  behind  them,  but  to  drop  it  should  this  hope  be 
unjustified."  And  again  in  another  speech,  "  To  carry  on 
a  colonial  policy  successfully  the  Government  must  have 
behind  it  in  Parliament  a  solid  majority  in  sentiment,  a 
majority  which  is  superior  to  the  momentary  decline  of  in- 
dividual parties.  Without  such  a  reserve  of  force  in  the 
background  we  cannot  carry  on  a  colonial  policy.  The  na- 
tional energy,  when  neutralized  by  party  struggles,  is  not 
strong  enough  with  us  to  encourage  the  Government  to  un- 
dertake the  step  which  we  first  tried  in  the  case  of  Samoa 
in  1880."  To  his  mind  it  was  better  to  trust  to  the  genius 
of  the  Hanseatic  merchants  than  to  the  rigors  of  the  Prus- 
sian bureaucratic  system,  for  the  rule  of  the  colonies ;  and 
the  study  of  colonial  methods  and  training  of  colonial 
officials  should  precede  any  territorial  expansion  on  a  large 
scale. 

The  advice  of  the  old  chancellor  was  excellent,  and  Ger- 
many would  have  been  saved  much  in  men  and  money  if  it 
had  been  followed.  With  the  establishment  of  a  protector- 
ate over  Southwest  Africa  with  a  nominal  area  of  215,000 
square  miles,  her  work  had  barely  commenced.  Through  the 
efforts  of  Dr.  Nachtigal  and  the  signing  of  more  treaties 
with  native  chiefs,  Togoland  and  the  Cameroons  were  taken 
under  her  protection  in  the  same  year  (1884),  the  latter 
being  acquired  only  after  a  lively  competition  with  the 
British  consul,  Mr.  Hewitt,  who  secured  the  Oil  Rivers 
1  Resigned,  1890. 


GERMAN  COLONIZATION  IN  SOUTHWEST  AFRICA     77 

district  for  England.  Then  began  the  work  of  securing  ac- 
tual control  of  the  vast  interior  districts  of  these  protector- 
ates. Through  vigorous  and  consistent  diplomacy,  resulting 
in  treaties  with  Portugal  in  1886,  with  Great  Britain  in 
1890  and  1893,  with  the  Congo  Independent  State  in 
August,  1894,  and  with  France  in  February,  1896,  the 
boundary  of  Togoland  was  pushed  north  to  lat.  9°  N., 
that  of  the  Cameroons  extended  to  Lake  Chad  including 
the  Adamaua  country,  and  that  of  German  Southwest 
Africa  advanced  north  and  east  so  that  the  areas  of  the 
three  became  33,700,  191,130,  and  322,450  square  miles 
respectively. 

Limits  being  thus  set  to  their  territorial  expansion  in 
West  and  South  Africa,  the  Germans  immediately  set  about 
the  task  of  organizing,  consolidating,  and  establishing  au- 
thority and  order  throughout  these  extensive  domains. 
It  was  an  extremely  difficult  task,  for  which  they  were  ill- 
prepared  and  poorly  equipped.  And  it  cannot  be  said  that 
they  have  been  particularly  successful.  None  of  these  colo- 
nies is  as  yet  on  a  paying  basis.  Up  to  the  end  of  1906 
the  three  protectorates  had  cost  the  German  Government 
$30,875,000,  with  $150,000,000  for  wars  in  Southwest 
Africa  in  addition ;  and  in  1909  the  Empire  was  still  con- 
tributing over  $5,000,000  to  their  annual  budgets,  besides 
large  sums  for  public  buildings  and  internal  development. 
With  little  or  no  practical  experience  in  colonization,  the 
Germans  rushed  with  self-confidence  and  misguided  zeal 
into  a  task,  tremendous  and  beset  with  difficulties,  before 
which  even  an  experienced  colonial  state,  like  Great  Britain, 
might  well  have  hesitated.  They  were  unfortunate  in  the 
selection  of  many  of  their  earlier  officials.  Those  that  were 
not  domineering,  pompous,  and  inexperienced,  were  incom- 
petent or  corrupt.  Little  effort  was  made  to  secure  the  con- 
fidence and  cooperation  of  the  natives ;  and  small  regard 


78      INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

was  had  for  local  customs  and  traditions.  With  true  Teu- 
tonic thoroughness  they  set  vigorously  to  work  to  civilize 
the  inhabitants  and  to  transform  the  country  into  a  Euro- 
pean paradise  within  a  year  or  two.  The  merchants  ex- 
pected to  build  up  an  extensive  trade  immediately  in  the 
new  lands,  and  immense  profits  were  looked  for  within  a 
few  months  on  every  hand.  Colonization  was  supposed  to 
be  an  easy  method  of  developing  a  country  through  land 
grants,  and  it  was  not  deemed  necessary  to  pay  any  atten- 
tion to  the  rights  or  claims  of  natives. 

Many  undesirable  and  inefficient  colonists,  as  well  as 
fortune-hunters,  were  thus  attracted  to  these  colonies,  and 
the  lands  and  property  of  the  natives  were  ruthlessly  seized. 
The  result  has  been  that  almost  constant  irritation  existed 
between  the  settlers  and  inhabitants,  and  the  Government 
was  continually  in  hot  water.  For  twenty  years  after  the 
acquisition  of  German  Southwest  Africa,  the  imperial  au- 
thorities were  compelled  to  resort  to  the  use  of  force  fre- 
quently in  order  to  preserve  peace  and  to  protect  the 
lives  and  property  of  its  colonists.  And  it  was  not  until 
after  the  great  Herero  uprising  in  1904  had  been  put  down 
with  the  annihilation  of  a  large  percentage  of  the  Herero 
nation,  the  most  capable  and  promising  people  in  their  ter- 
ritories, that  real  peace  was  secured. 

In  recent  years,  particularly  since  the  introduction  of  the 
"  new  colonial  era"  by  Herr  Dernburg  in  1907,  matters  have 
been  handled  in  a  more  scientific  and  intelligent  manner. 
A  Colonel  Office  has  been  created  by  the  imperial  authori- 
ties to  supervise  the  government  and  the  development  of 
the  colonies.  Railways  are  being  constructed  into  the  in- 
terior, harbors  built,  roads  opened,  and  excellent  experi- 
mental stations  erected ;  and  everything  possible  is  being 
done  to  conserve  the  natural  resources  of  the  German  West 
African  possessions  and  to  place  them  upon  a  sound  and 


GERMAN  COLONIZATION  IN  SOUTHWEST  AFRICA     79 

prosperous  basis.  Colonization  is  encouraged,  but  only  set- 
tlers who  possess  from  $2500  to  $12,000  are  permitted  to 
purchase  land,  as  it  is  not  in  any  sense  a  poor  man's  coun- 
try. Although  possessing  more  than  thrice  the  area  of  the 
mother  country,  it  is  still  a  question  whether  the  three  pro- 
tectorates will  ever  pay.  Togo,  about  the  size  of  Maine,  and 
the  Cameroons,  now  somewhat  larger  than  Texas,  although 
containing  large  reaches  of  unhealthy  or  unproductive 
territory,  possess  a  fair  share  of  fertile  soil  and  some  ex- 
cellent promise  of  future  worth.  Much  time,  labor,  care, 
and  money  will  have  to  be  expended  still,  before  any  real 
reward  to  the  Empire  can  be  expected.  The  hundred  thou- 
sand square  miles  added  to  the  Cameroons  by  the  Franco- 
German  treaty  of  1911 l  have  made  the  situation  even  more 
difficult,  because  little  had  been  done  previously  to  develop 
the  territory,  and  the  resident  natives  are  doing  all  in  their 
power  to  resist  the  German  occupation. 

But  German  Southwest  Africa,  while  it  is  one  fifth  larger 
than  Texas  and  possesses  some  mines  and  other  valu- 
able assets,  is  still  a  veritable  "  white  elephant "  to  the 
German  Government.  It  has  a  population  of  less  than 
100,000  ;  and  the  greater  portion  of  the  country,  particularly 
the  southern  section,  is  either  a  sandy  desert  or  a  sterile 
plain.  The  ultimate  cost  of  placing  such  a  colony  on  a  self- 
sustaining  or  remunerative  basis  will  be  enormous.  One 
doubts  if  it  will  ever  prove  a  paying  proposition  to  the 
mother  country  ;  for,  in  spite  of  all  that  has  been  done 
during  the  first  twenty-six  years  of  its  history  as  a  German 
colony,  the  Imperial  Government  had  to  make  a  contribu- 
tion of  over  $3,450,000  to  its  budget  in  1911  in  order  that 
the  revenues  might  equal  the  general  expenditures.  From 

i  An  account  of  the  Franco-German  negotiations  of  1911  will  be  found 
on  pp.  209-276,  the  territorial  changes  in  the  Congo  region  being  defined 
on  p.  275. 


80    ;  INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

a  commercial  standpoint,  however,  this  protectorate  is 
already  a  source  of  considerable  profit  to  the  merchants  of 
the  Empire.  The  sum  of  its  imports  and  exports,  which  in 
1899  equaled  only  $2,585,150,  reached  by  1911  the  very 
creditable  total  of  $18,468,500,  of  which  the  share  of  Ger- 
many was  approximately  $6, 08  0,750.  And  the  total  trade 
of  the  three  colonies  —  Togoland,  Cameroons,  and  Ger- 
man Southwest  Africa  —  in  the  same  year  approximated 
$35,845,000. 


CHAPTEK  V 

BRITISH   AND    GERMAN    EAST   AFRICA,    AND    UGANDA 

IN  the  seventies  and  eighties  of  the  last  century,  East 
Africa  was  a  name  loosely  applied  to  the  entire  East  Coast 
from  the  Portuguese  colony  of  Mozambique  to  the  Gulf  of 
Aden,  most  of  which  was  supposed  to  belong  —  actually  or 
nominally  —  to  the  Sultan  of  Zanzibar.  The  Muscat  rulers 
of  Oman,  on  the  Arabian  peninsula,  had  exercised  a  pre- 
carious sovereignty  over  Mombasa  and  the  neighboring 
territory  on  the  East  Coast  of  Africa  ever  since  1698 ; 
but  the  last  important  Mazrui  prince  of  Mombasa  died 
in  1837,  leaving  Said,  Sultan  of  Zanzibar,  supreme  in 
East  Africa.  In  1822,  Seyyid  Said  annexed  the  islands 
of  Pemba  and  Zanzibar,  and  to  the  latter  he  moved  his 
residence  in  1840.  But  after  his  death,  in  1856,  his  sons 
quarreled  over  his  possessions.  No  law  of  succession  existed, 
except  that  described  by  Abdul- Aziz,  brother  of  Said,  as 
the  "  law  of  the  keenest  sword."  Lord  Canning  arbitrated 
the  matter  at  length  in  1861,  assigning  Zanzibar  and  East 
Africa  to  Majid,  the  younger  son,  who  left  them  in  turn  to 
his  son,  Barghash,  in  1870.  The  territory  on  the  mainland 
over  which  Barghash  ruled  extended  from  Tungi  Bay  north- 
ward to  Witu  and  the  island  of  Lamu,  and  he  claimed  to 
exercise  control  over  the  interior  as  far  inland  as  lakes  Tan- 
ganyika and  Victoria  Nyanza.  He  maintained  military  posts 
at  a  number  of  places  in  order  to  keep  open  the  main  trade 
routes ;  and  the  chiefs  of  this  region,  it  is  true,  paid  him 
tribute  and  recognized  the  supremacy  of  Zanzibar.  But 
there  was  no  such  occupation  and  control  of  the  interior  dis- 
trict by  the  Sultan  as  the  powers  laid  down  in  the  Con- 


82      INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

ference  of  Berlin  for  the  establishment  of  all  claims  of 
sovereignty  in  Africa.  Effective  occupation  was  defined  by 
Lord  Salisbury,  in  his  correspondence  with  Portugal,  to  be 
"  in  sufficient  strength  to  maintain  order,  protect  foreigners, 
and  to  control  the  natives."  It  was  this  agreement  con- 
cerning the  occupation  of  territory,  and  the  extension  (at 
the  same  conference)  of  the  Congo  free-trade  zone  straight 
east  to  the  Zanzibar  coast  which  brought  upon  the  Sultan 
of  Zanzibar  the  loss  of  most  of  his  possessions  on  the  main- 
land, and  led  to  the  creation  of  the  German  and  British 
East  African  protectorates. 

Through  the  efforts  of  John  Kirk,  who  had  been  British 
consul  to  Zanzibar  for  twenty  years  and  who  had  become 
the  Sultan's  most  trusted  adviser,  Great  Britain  might  have 
secured  control  of  all  of  East  Africa  if  she  had  been  so 
minded.  Barghash,  in  fact,  offered  to  lease  his  entire  conti- 
nental possessions  to  Kirk  and  Mackinnon  in  1877 ;  but  the 
Foreign  Office  hesitated.  The  British  Government  was  not 
ready  at  that  time  to  consider  seriously  any  general  policy 
of  colonial  expansion.  It  was  still  undecided,  although  forced 
by  circumstances  to  interfere  in  Egypt,  when  Dr.  Gerhard 
Eohlfs,  who  went  out  in  1884  ostensibly  to  explore  the 
East  Coast  of  Africa,  turned  up  as  German  consul-general 
in  Zanzibar.  When  asked  what  was  the  purpose  of  this  mis- 
sion, Bismarck,  disclaiming  any  intention  of  acquiring  ter- 
ritory, informed  Lord  Granville  that  Rohlfs  was  sent  "  to 
exert  his  influence  to  secure  freedom  of  commerce  in  the 
Sultan's  domains,"  in  accordance  with  the  plan  agreed  upon 
at  the  Conference  of  Berlin.  Meanwhile,  in  April  of  the 
same  year,  the  Society  for  German  Colonization  had  been 
founded,  with  Dr.  Carl  Peters  as  president ;  and  in  Novem- 
ber and  December,  Peters,  Count  J.  F.  Pheil,  and  Carl 
Juehlke  were  in  East  Africa  making  treaties  with  the  native 
chieftains.  In  February,  1885,  the  German  East  African 


83 

Company  with  a  capital  of  3,000,000  marks  was  organized. 
It  received,  on  the  17th1  a  protective  charter  from  the 
Government  based  on  a  few  flimsy  treaties  signed  by  chiefs 
who  were  persuaded  by  Peters  that  they  needed  German 
protection,  and  who  were  willing  to  swear  that  Sultan  Bar- 
ghash  possessed  no  sovereignty  over  them  or  their  lands.2 
From  May  to  July,  1885,  Dr.  Carl  Juehlke  —  the  "right- 
ful representative  of  the  German  East  African  Company" 
—  continued  the  labors  of  the  earlier  commission  and  made 
further  treaties  3  with  the  local  potentates  until  some  sixty 
thousand  square  miles  were  marked  off  and  a  German  pro- 
tectorate officially  proclaimed.  At  the  same  time  —  May, 
1885  —  the  Denhardt  brothers  secured  a  concession  of  five 
hundred  miles  from  Sultan  Simla  of  Witu  and  formed  the 
"  Witu  Company." 

On  April  27  the  Sultan  of  Zanzibar  sent  a  protest  to  the 
German  Government  against  the  treaty-making  operations 
of  Peters  and  Juehlke  in  Usagara,  Nguru,  Usegulsa,  and 
Ukami,  claiming  those  districts  as  his  possessions ;  and  on 
May  11  he  made  a  similar  protest  to  Great  Britain  through 
Sir  John  Kirk.  Bismarck,  accepting  the  treaties  at  their 
face  value,  insisted  that  Germany  was  not  interfering  with 
any  valid  sovereign  rights  of  Zanzibar,  but  that  she  was 
merely  establishing  posts  for  the  protection  and  advance- 
ment of  trade  in  East  Africa,  as  any  European  power  was 
entitled  to  do  by  the  terms  of  the  Berlin  Agreement.  And 
he  asked  the  assistance  of  England  in  securing  from  Bar- 
ghash  the  recognition  of  the  new  German  protectorate  and 
the  acceptance  of  certain  commercial  arrangements.4  Lord 
Granville,  as  soon  as  he  had  assured  himself  that  Germany 

1  Brit,  and  For.  St.  Papers,  vol.  77,  p.  10. 

2  Ibid.,  pp.  11-14. 
8  Ibid.,  pp.  14-22. 

4  See  correspondence  beginning  011  page  1099  in  the  Brit,  and  For.  St. 
Papers,  vol.  77. 


84      INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

was  harboring  no  serious  hostile  intent  against  the  king- 
dom of  Zanzibar  "  per  se,"  accepted  the  statement  of  the 
German  Chancellor  without  further  question  and  ordered 
Kirk  to  render  every  assistance  to  Herr  Rohlfs,  German 
consul-general  of  Zanzibar,  in  his  efforts  to  bring  about  a 
satisfactory  adjustment  of  the  matter.  Thus  deserted  by  his 
sole  European  friend,  Sultan  Barghash  was  compelled  to 
accept  unconditionally  the  ultimatum  laid  before  him  by 
Commodore  Paschen  on  August  11, 1885.  He  retracted  his 
protest,  recognized  the  German  protectorate  in  East  Africa, 
and  promised  to  withdraw  his  troops  from  the  disputed  lands, 
as  a  necessary  preliminary  to  the  opening  of  "  negotiations 
to  arrange  by  treaty,"  wired  Sir  John  Kirk,  «'  the  conditions 
for  the  well-being  of  the  lands  under  his  protection  which 
the  Emperor  thinks  urgently  necessary." 

Great  Britain,  not  intentionally  neglectful  of  her  obliga- 
tions to  Zanzibar  or  indifferent  to  her  own  interests  in  East 
Africa,1  insisted  on  an  investigation  of  the  claims  of  Bar- 
ghash and  a  delimitation  of  the  territorial  boundaries  of  the 
Sultan's  domains,  as  a  prerequisite  to  all  further  action  in 
East  Africa.  A  commission  of  three  was  suggested,  France, 
as  one  of  the  guarantors  of  the  integrity  and  sovereignty 
of  Zanzibar  in  1862,  being  asked  to  name  a  member  with 
Germany  and  England.  Granville  nominated,  in  October, 
Lieutenant-Colonel  (now  Lord)  Kitchener;  Germany,  Dr. 
Schmidt,  consul  at  Cairo ;  and  France,  M.  Patrimonio,  con- 
sul-general at  Beirut.  The  Commission  rendered  its  report 
on  June  9, 1886;  and,  on  the  basis  of  their  decisions,  Bar- 
ghash was  assigned,  in  an  agreement  between  Germany  and 

1  In  the  spring  of  1884,  Joseph  Thompson  had  successfully  completed 
his  remarkable  journey  to  Lake  Victoria  from  the  Zanzibar  coast  via  the 
Masai  country,  and  proved  to  the  Royal  Geographical  Society  (which  sent 
him),  and  to  the  British  Government,  the  future  commercial  value  of 
this  direct  route  to  the  interior  and  the  commercial  possibilities  of  East 
Africa. 


BRITISH  AND  GERMAN  EAST  AFRICA  85 

England  dated  October  29,  1886,1  the  islands  of  Zanzibar, 
Pemba,  Lamu,  and  Mafia,  and  a  strip  of  the  coast  ten  miles 
wide  extending  from  the  middle  of  Tungi  Bay  to  Kipini  at 
the  mouth  of  the  Tana  River,  —  approximately  one  thou- 
sand miles,  —  with  five  towns  north  of  Kipini  including 
Kismayu.  This  was  accepted  on  December  4  by  the  Sul- 
tan and  recognized  by  all  the  powers,  except  Portugal, 
which  had  not  been  consulted  and  which  seized  the  whole 
of  Tungi  Bay  by  force  in  1894. 

Germany  and  Great  Britain  then  proceeded  to  define 
their  respective  "  spheres  of  influence "  2  in  East  Africa, 
Germany  taking  the  southern  portion  from  the  mouth  of 
the  Rovuma  to  the  Umba  River  —  620  miles;  and  England 
the  northern  half  from  the  Umba  to  the  Juba  River — 405 
miles.  Considerable  uncertainty  existed  with  regard  to  the 
geographical  features  and  extent  of  the  inland  territory ; 
but  it  was  understood  that  the  claims  of  both  states  were 
to  embrace  the  interior  as  far  as  Victoria  Nyanza,  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  newly  enunciated  German  doctrine  that 
possession  of  the  coast  implied  ownership  of  the  "hinter- 
land." The  correspondence  which  ensued  between  Lord 
Salisbury  and  Baron  von  Plessen,  at  the  time,  shows  that 
a  definite  agreement  existed  to  the  effect  that  the  Germans 
were  to  keep  south  of  Lake  Victoria  in  their  exploration 
and  expansion,  and  the  British  north  of  it,  the  boundary 
being  a  line  drawn  from  the  mouth  of  the  Umba  River  past 
the  northern  base  of  Mount  Kilima-Njaro  to  the  point  where 
the  first  degree  of  south  latitude  intersects  the  eastern  shore 
of  Lake  Victoria.  Thus  an  area  of  approximately  200,000 
square  miles  was  marked  off  in  the  rough  for  the  Kaiser 

1  Hertslet,  Commercial  Treaties,  vol.  18,  pp.  1174-76. 

2  A  term  used  at  the  Berlin  Conference  to  denote  territory  not  completely 
tinder  the  control  of  a  given  European  state,  but  soon  to  be  definitely  occu- 
pied by  it  and  from  which  it  wished  to  exclude  the  political  activities  of 
other  powers. 


86      INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 


BRITISH  AND  GERMAN  EAST  AFRICA  AND  UGANDA 


}  British  Terrltorj 


man  Territory  tnnUII  R»llway« 


and  170,000  for  Queen  Victoria.  And  in  1888,  Germany 
leased  the  coast  strip  bordering  on  her  sphere,  with  harbors 
and  customs,  from  the  Sultan  at  an  annual  rental  for  fifty 


BRITISH   AND   GERMAN  EAST  AFRICA  87 

years,  thus  securing  adequate  seaports  and  the  control  of 
the  coast  trade.1 

Already,  in  May,  1887,  the  Imperial  British  East  Africa 
Company  had  been  formed  and  secured  concessions  from 
Sultan  Barghash,  which  gave  them  the  control  and  admin- 
istration of  his  possessions  on  the  mainland  from  the  Umba 
River  to  Kipini,  for  fifty  years.  In  return  the  company  was 
to  pay  him  the  full  amount  of  the  usual  customs  dues  of 
the  district  and  fifty  per  cent  of  all  additional  revenue.2 
He  was  favored  still  more  by  the  gift  of  one  founder's  share 
in  the  stock  of  the  corporation.  By  the  end  of  the  year  the 
company  had  concluded  twenty-one  treaties  with  native 
chieftains,  giving  it  sovereign  control  for  two  hundred  miles 
inland ;  and,  in  April,  1888,  it  was  duly  incorporated  with 
a  paid-in  capital  of  £250,000.  Sir  William  Mackinnon, 
who,  through  his  interests  in  the  British-India  Steam  Navi- 
gation Company,  which  had  maintained  a  regular  service 
between  India,  Zanzibar,  and  Europe  since  1872,  was  thor- 
oughly familiar  with  the  situation  and  an  enthusiastic  be- 
liever in  colonization,  became  president  and  one  of  the 
largest  investors.  In  September  of  the  same  year  a  royal 
charter  was  issued,  assuring  the  company  a  practical  mo- 
nopoly in  the  development  of  the  region  and  its  natural 
resources.  But  trade  was  to  be  free  except  for  the  regular 
customs  dues.  In  return  the  company  was  to  rule  the  coun- 
try, administer  justice,  protect  the  missionaries  and  foreign 
residents,  preserve  the  ivory  trade,  and  promote  as  far  as 
possible  the  material  welfare  of  the  whole  protectorate. 

In  1889  the  award  of  Baron  Lambermont  in  the  British- 
German  controversy  concerning  the  control  of  the  islands 
of  Lamu,  Manda,  and  Patta,  and  the  ports  of  Kisimayu, 

1  The  whole  of  the  Sultan's  rights  in  this  district  were  acquired  by 
Germany  in  1890  for  4,000,000  marks. 

2  Great  Britain  now  pays  the  Sultan  an  annual  rental  of  £17,000. 


88      INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

Brava,  and  Merka,  placed  the  administration  of  these  places 
also  in  the  hands  of  the  British  company.  In  the  same 
year  the  German  Witu  Company  failed,  and  Witu  with  its 
"  hinterland  "  was  transferred  to  the  Imperial  British  East 
Africa  Company  in  1891,  after  Great  Britain  and  the  Ger- 
man Empire  had  settled  all  their  differences  in  East  Africa 
through  the  celebrated  Anglo-German  Agreement  of  July 
1,  1890.1  This  document  set  definite  limits  to  the  British 
and  German  East  African  protectorates,  assigned  Witu, 
Zanzibar,  and  Uganda  to  England,  and  awarded  Heligo- 
land (in  the  North  Sea)  and  a  large  district  west  and  south 
of  Lake  Victoria  to  Germany.  It  was  preceded  on  June  14 
by  the  acceptance  of  British  protection  by  the  Sultan  of 
Zanzibar :  and  on  August  4,  this  protectorate  was  recog- 
nized by  France  in  return  for  the  British  recognition  of  her 
protectorate  over  Madagascar.  In  May,  1889,  the  Italian 
Government  had  secured  a  protectorate  over  the  Sultanate 
of  Oppia ;  and  in  November  of  the  same  year  the  officials 
of  the  Imperial  British  East  Africa  Company  had  assisted 
the  Italians  in  the  extension  of  their  control  along  the 
Somali  coast.  Finally,  in  1891,  Great  Britain  signed  an 
agreement  with  Italy  making  the  Juba  River  the  boundary 
between  their  respective  "  spheres  of  influence  "  and  recog- 
nizing the  Italian  claims  north  of  that  river.  Thus  Euro- 
pean expansion  in  East  Africa  became  a  recognized  fact ; 
and  the  map  of  the  whole  region  was  definitely  adjusted  to 
the  satisfaction,  in  a  large  degree,  of  all  concerned. 

The  Anglo-German  treaty  of  1890,  however,  aroused  the 
most  violent  criticism  in  both  of  the  countries  concerned. 
The  British  and  German  press  vied  with  each  other  in  try- 
ing to  prove  that  their  own  Government  had  needlessly 
sacrificed  a  quarter  of  the  African  continent  to  the  other. 
Yet  no  better  solution  of  the  problem  could  have  been 
1  Hertslet,  Commercial  Treaties,  vol.  18,  p.  455. 


BRITISH  AND  GERMAN  EAST  AFRICA  89 

found  at  the  time ;  and  it  possessed  decided  advantages  for 
Great  Britain.  By  generously  conceding  one  half  of  a  wild 
and  undeveloped  country,  difficult  and  costly  to  administer, 
she  acquired  a  good  neighbor,  relieved  her  own  colonial 
budget  of  a  heavy  burden,  and  closed  an  intricate  and 
heated  controversy.  When  one  recalls  the  many  and  seri- 
ous blunders  of  the  British  Foreign  Office  in  its  African 
policy  during  this  period,  one  feels  inclined  to  regard  this 
treaty  as  a  sudden  stroke  of  real  diplomatic  genius.  It  evi- 
dently appeared  to  Bismarck,  then  out  of  office,  in  some 
such  light,  for  he  was  most  outspoken  in  his  condemnation 
of  the  German  part  of  the  affair. 

While  the  events  just  narrated  were  in  progress,  Carl 
Peters,  sent  out  from  Berlin  in  February,  1889,  by  the  Ger- 
man Emin  Pasha  Relief  Association,  ostensibly  to  rescue 
Emin  (imprisoned  in  the  Sudan  since  the  Mahdi  uprising 
and  the  death  of  Gordon),  successfully  eluded  the  British 
warships  under  Admiral  Freemantle  at  Lamu  and  effected 
a  landing  in  Witu.  He  advanced  rapidly  inland  via  the 
Tana  River,  Kikuyu  and  Kavirondo,  thinking  to  steal  a 
march  on  the  Imperial  British  East  Africa  Company  and 
to  win  glory  and  territory  for  the  Fatherland  by  securing 
through  treaties  the  lands  in  the  rear  of  the  company's  con- 
cessions.1 Circumstances  were  far  more  favorable  for  such 
a  move  than  he  knew.  For  when  he  reached,  in  February, 
1890,  the  borders  of  Uganda  (a  native  feudal  kingdom  lo- 
cated between  Lakes  Victoria  and  Albert,  the  Nile  River, 

1  Peters,  New  Light  on  Dark  Africa,  1891 ;  a  bombastic  but  accurate  ac- 
count of  his  own  expedition.  Peters  claims  Professor  Schweinf  urth  suggested 
to  him  at  Cairo,  in  1886,  the  plan  of  seizing  Uganda  by  a  relief  expedition 
for  Emin  Pasha.  The  subject  was  first  discussed  seriously  on  his  return  from 
Zanzibar  in  February,  1888.  The  German  Colonial  Society  took  up  the  plan 
in  April ;  a  special  appeal  for  funds  was  sent  out  to  the  German  people  in 
September  by  the  German  East  Africa  Company  and  the  German  East  Africa 
Plantation  Company,  after  a  commission  had  been  appointed  in  July  to  raise 
400,000  marks. 


90      INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

and  the  Congo  State),  he  learned  to  his  satisfaction,  by 
opening  letters  intended  for  Emin  and  Jackson,  that  the 
country  was  in  the  throes  of  a  conflict  between  rival  chief- 
tains. 

Uganda  had  been  visited  as  early  as  1858  by  Captain 
Speke  and  Burton  and  again  in  1875  by  Stanley,  all  of 
whom  were  enthusiastic  over  the  fertility  of  its  soil  and  the 
intelligence  of  its  people.  They  referred  to  it  as  the  "  pearl 
of  Africa  " ;  and  Stanley,  impressed  with  the  good  will  and 
open  mind  of  King  Mutesa,  had  sent  a  stirring  letter  to 
London  urging  that  missionaries  be  sent  out  at  once  to 
Uganda.  The  first  mission  of  the  Church  Missionary  So- 
ciety, led  by  Lieutenant  Shergold  Smith,  accompanied  by 
Alexander  Mackay,  C.  T.  Wilson,  and  two  others,  reached 
the  country  in  1877  by  way  of  Zanzibar.  In  1879  two  more 
missionaries  arrived,  coming  up  the  Nile  and  through  the 
Sudan ;  and,  early  in  1883,  four  more,  including  Bishop 
J.  Hanningtou  and  R.  P.  Ashe,  joined  the  little  band  of 
workers  at  Mengo.1  Meanwhile  the  French  "  Mission  of  the 
White  Fathers,"  organized  by  the  energetic  and  ambitious 
Cardinal  Lavigerie,  of  Algiers  and  Tunis,  to  evangelize  the 
Congo  and  the  Sudan  and  commissioned  by  Pope  Leo  XIII 
to  convert  the  whole  of  Central  Africa,  opened  a  station  in 
Uganda  in  February,  1879.  The  Mohammedan  preachers 
and  emissaries  were  already  on  the  field ;  and  before  long, 
since  the  masses  followed  almost  implicitly  the  individual 
chiefs,  the  whole  country  was  divided  into  three  bitter  and 
jealous  factions,  each  striving  for  power  and  control  of  the 
public  offices.  King  Mutesa,  though  a  cruel  and  unscrupu- 

1  R.  P.  Ashe's  Two  Kings  of  Uganda  (1889)  should  be  read  in  this  con- 
nection. Mr.  Mackay  and  Mr.  Ashe  were  two  of  the  most  devoted,  energetic, 
and  successful  of  the  British  missionaries  in  Africa.  The  former,  greatly 
beloved  by  the  natives,  unfortunately  died  in  1890  in  Uganda.  The  latter, 
after  a  rest  in  England,  returned  to  the  country  in  1891,  but  resigned 
in  1894 


BRITISH  AND   GERMAN  EAST  AFRICA  91 

lous  tyrant,  indifferent  to  religion  except  when  it  promised 
some  political  or  personal  advantage,  was  skillful  enough 
to  maintain  an  uncertain  peace  until  his  death  in  1884. 
But  in  the  five  years  that  followed,  Uganda  suffered  severely 
through  the  weakness  and  ambition  of  its  rulers,  the  com- 
petition of  the  three  religious  parties,  and  a  struggle  of  the 
royal  brothers  for  possession  of  the  throne.  Mwanga,  the 
son  and  successor  of  Mutesa,  alarmed  by  the  progress  of 
the  Europeans  in  the  Sudan,  the  Congo,  and  East  Africa, 
and  by  the  representations  of  the  Arab  traders,  began  the 
troubles  by  persecuting  the  Christians  and  bringing  about 
the  death  of  Bishop  Hannington.  He  next  attempted,  un- 
successfully, to  rid  the  country  of  the  leading  chiefs  of  all 
parties,  through  a  sudden  coup  d'etat,  and  civil  war  ensued. 
At  first,  the  Mohammedans  secured  the  ascendancy  and 
placed  Karema,  the  brother  of  Mwanga,  on  the  throne ;  but 
the  two  Christian  factions  combined  and  ultimately  over- 
threw the  followers  of  Mohammed  in  October,  1889,  restor- 
ing King  Mwanga  —  the  least  of  several  evils  —  to  power.1 
In  1890,  his  position  was  still  exceedingly  precarious ;  and 
Peters  determined  to  hasten  to  his  assistance  and  thus  win 
over  the  country  for  Germany. 

Although  just  at  this  juncture  he  received  news  of  the 
safe  arrival  of  Stanley  and  Emin  Pasha  at  Victoria  Nyanza, 
Peters  decided  to  proceed  into  Uganda,  since  the  question 
of  its  ownership  had  not  yet  been  determined.  He  pushed 
on,  and  reached  the  capital,  Mengo,  on  February  22,  where 
he  remained  about  a  month.  With  the  assistance  of  Pere 
Lourdel  of  the  French  mission,  Peters  secured  a  treaty 
from  King  Mwanga,  signed  on  February  27, 1890,  of  which 
he  made  a  good  deal,  but  which  really  gave  to  Germany 
nothing  more  than  equal  trade  rights  with  other  European 
states.  He  then  crossed  Victoria  Nyanza  and  returned  by 
1  A  good  account  in  R.  P.  Ashe'a  Chronicles  of  Uganda,  1894. 


92      INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

way  of  German  East  Africa  and  Zanzibar,  reaching  Berlin 
on  August  25. 

Six  weeks  after  his  departure,  Mr.  Jackson  —  representa- 
tive of  the  Imperial  British  East  Africa  Company —  arrived 
at  Mengo.  He  had  been  forbidden  by  the  company  to  enter 
Uganda,  but  felt  compelled  to  do  so  at  length  by  the  activi- 
ties of  Peters.  After  a  month's  fruitless  negotiation,  im- 
peded at  every  step  by  the  astute  French  missionaries,  he 
returned  to  British  East  Africa  without  having  improved 
matters  or  procured  an  alliance  with  the  king.  Meanwhile 
the  situation  was  becoming  very  serious.  King  Mwanga  was 
quite  ready  to  sell  his  country  to  whatever  nation  would 
guarantee  him  sufficient  protection  to  insure  him  his  crown. 
The  French  and  English  missionaries  were  hopelessly  di- 
vided ;  and  the  country  seemed  again  on  the  verge  of  revo- 
lution. The  Church  Missionary  Society  issued  imperative 
appeals  for  aid  and  the  philanthropic  spirit  of  the  British 
nation  was  speedily  aroused. 

The  Imperial  British  East  Africa  Company  acted 
promptly.  On  November  1,  1890,  Captain  (now  Sir  Fred- 
erick) Lugard  left  Mombasa  with  a  large  force,  reaching 
Mengo  on  December  18.  He  secured  a  concession  of  Kam- 
pala Hill  near  by,  and  immediately  fortified  it.  After  ex- 
tended negotiations  he  succeeded  in  patching  up  the  chief 
differences  of  the  three  religious  parties  and  in  settling  each 
faction  on  a  territory  specially  assigned  to  it  by  Mwanga. 
Next  he  brought  to  Uganda  Selim  Bey  and  8000  Suda- 
nese, whom  Emin  Pasha  had  left  in  the  Sudan,  and  utilized 
them  to  police  the  country  and  to  preserve  order.  Journey- 
ing through  the  Unyoro,  Buddu,  Kavalli,  and  Ankoli  dis- 
tricts, he  made  treaties  with  the  feudal  chieftains  of  those 
regions  and  placed  them  directly  under  the  protection  of 
the  company.  And  finally,  after  the  king  had  organized  a 
revolt  early  in  1892,  he  returned  to  Mengo,  pacified  the 


BRITISH  AND  GERMAN  EAST  AFRICA  93 

country  again,  and  compelled  Mwanga  to  sign  a  treaty 
on  March  30,  1892,  placing  Uganda,  comprising  117,681 
square  miles  with  a  population  of  2,843,000,  permanently 
under  the  control  of  his  corporation.1 

Thus  the  Imperial  British  East  Africa  Company  accom- 
plished a  remarkable  pioneer  work  and  performed  an  inestim- 
able patriotic  service.  It  had  secured  control  over  a  vast 
region  with  an  area  of  nearly  400,000  square  miles  and  a 
coast-line  of  over  400  miles.  It  had  made  permanent  the 
British  protectorate  in  East  Africa  by  a  large  number  of 
treaties  with  native  chiefs  and  won  the  key  to  the  Nile 
Basin  2  for  Great  Britain  through  the  acquisition  of  Uganda. 
Exploring  parties  had  penetrated  to  all  the  important  points ; 
and  steamers  had  been  placed  on  the  Juba  and  Tana  Rivers. 
The  coast  region  was  fairly  well  administered ;  a  great  deal 
had  been  accomplished  toward  the  suppression  of  the  slave 
trade ;  and  large  sums  had  been  expended  to  develop  the 
general  trade  and  resources  of  the  interior.  And  with  it  all 
the  representatives  of  the  company  enjoyed  a  phenomenal 
success  in  treating  with  the  natives.  "In  fact,"  wrote  Sir 
Gerald  Portal  in  his  report  on  Uganda,  "  to  the  founders 
of  the  company  belongs  the  sole  credit  of  the  acquisition 
for  the  benefit  of  British  commerce  of  this  great  potential 
market  for  British  goods.  It  should,  moreover,  be  remem- 
bered in  justice  to  them  that  in  the  face  of  many  initial 
difficulties  they  succeeded,  in  marked  contrast  to  the  neigh- 
boring European  colonies,  in  establishing  their  influence 
without  bloodshed  and  by  their  own  unaided  efforts." 

But  the  task  was  too  great ;  the  pace  too  rapid.  The  funds 

1  For  detailed  account  of  his  work,  see  Lugard's  Rise  of  Our  East  African 
Empire,  1893,  2  vols.   The  terms  of  the  treaty  are  given  in  Hertslet,  Com- 
mercial Treaties,  vol.  19,  p.  5. 

2  It  was  extremely  important  for  Egypt  that  England  should  control  the 
headwaters  of  the  Nile,  for  only  in  this  way  could  she  be  assured  of  a  regu- 
lar water  supply,  without  the  danger  of  interruption  from  savage  tribes  or 
ambitious  neighbors. 


94      INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

of  the  company  were  exhausted  and  it  was  already  begin- 
ning to  think  of  retrenchment.  In  February,  1891,  an  at- 
tempt was  made  to  induce  the  British  Government  to  vote 
a  subsidy  for  a  railway  to  Uganda.  Lord  Salisbury  was 
favorable  to  the  plan  and  agreed  to  pay  four  fifths  of  the 
expense  of  a  preliminary  survey.  Unfortunately  Parliament 
was  not  willing  to  take  up  the  question  at  the  time ;  and  on 
September  4  the  company  announced  its  decision  to  reduce 
its  yearly  expenditure  from  £100,000  to  £40,000,  and  to 
withdraw  from  Uganda.  Great  excitement  prevailed  in  Eng- 
land when  this  determination  of  the  company  was  made 
public  —  especially  when  it  was  seen  that  this  meant  the 
desertion  of  the  British  missions  at  Mengo.  Stirring  ap- 
peals for  aid  were  made  by  Bishop  Tucker  and  others ;  and 
subscriptions,  of  which  Sir  Mackinnon  himself  gave  £20,000, 
were  raised  sufficient  to  enable  the  company  to  hold  Uganda 
till  March,  1893.  It  was  hoped  that  the  Government  would 
come  to  the  rescue  of  the  company  before  that  date ;  but 
Parliament  had  no  desire  to  provide  funds  to  sustain  a  pri- 
vate corporation.  It  voted  only  the  necessary  £20,000  for 
a  survey  "  to  suppress  the  slave  trade  in  East  Africa,"  on 
March  4,  1892. 

The  British  East  Africa  Company  did  its  part  of  the 
railway  plan  promptly,  entrusting  the  survey  to  Captain 
Macdonald  and  making  its  report  on  August  7,  in  which  it 
was  estimated  that  the  road  could  be  constructed  for  £3,000 
per  mile,  or  from  Mombasa  to  Kikuyu  for  £1,022,000, 
and  to  Victoria  Nyanza  for  £2,240,000.  The  Foreign 
Office,  however,  postponed  action  on  the  report ;  and  it  was 
three  years  before  the  question  of  a  railway  in  East  Africa 
was  taken  up  again  by  the  British  Government.  But,  in 
December,  1892,  Lord  Rosebery  ordered  Sir  Gerald  Portal, 
then  British  consul-general  at  Zanzibar  and  a  promising 
young  diplomat,  to  visit  Uganda  and  report  on  conditions 


BRITISH  AND  GERMAN  EAST  AFRICA  95 

there.  That  country  passed  out  of  the  hands  of  the  Imperial 
British  East  Africa  Company  on  March  31,  1893;  and  the 
British  flag  replaced  the  ensign  of  the  corporation.  A  new 
treaty  was  obtained  from  Mwanga  in  May ;  and  Portal 
returned,  leaving  Captain  Macdonald  in  charge.  Unfortu- 
nately he  died  in  London  the  following  January  at  thirty-five 
years  of  age ;  but  his  report,  dated  at  Zanzibar  November  1, 
1893,1  is  an  admirable  testimony  to  his  talents  and  ability. 
He  favored  the  direct  control  of  the  country  by  Great  Britain 
under  a  royal  commissioner ;  and  Uganda  was  declared  a 
British  protectorate  in  September,  1894. 

Sir  Gerald  Portal  laid  great  emphasis  on  the  need  of  a 
railroad  and  on  the  strategic  value  of  the  land  to  England. 
It  would  give  the  British  the  complete  control  of  the  Nile 
Valley,  provided  Egypt  reconquered  the  Sudan,  and  enable 
them  to  hold  the  Arabs  in  check,  thereby  rendering  well- 
nigh  impossible  such  Mohammedan  coalitions  and  risings 
as  the  Mahdi's.  His  views  on  the  slave  trade  coincided  pre- 
cisely with  the  words  of  Lord  Salisbury  at  Glasgow  on  May 
20,  1891 :  "  Whenever  that  railway  can  be  made,  I  believe 
that  the  end  of  the  African  exportation  of  the  slave  will 
have  been  attained  at  the  same  time.  Because  it  will  not 
only  prevent  the  passage  of  caravans  from  the  Victoria 
Nyanza  eastward,  but  will  place  you  in  command  of  the 
valley  of  the  Nile,  so  that  slaves  will  not  be  able  to  cross 
thence  to  the  Red  Sea."  At  the  time,  practically  all  the 
produce  of  the  interior  was  transported  to  the  coast  on  the 
backs  of  negroes.  In  1892,  Stanley  estimated  the  number 
of  porters  actually  in  service  in  British  and  German  East 
Africa  at  240,000;  and  thousands  of  these  poor  fellows, 
when  they  reached  the  seashore,  were  secretly  shipped  to 
lives  of  servitude  in  Persia  and  other  Asiatic  countries.  So 

1  Brit.  Parl.  Papers,  1894,  Africa  No.  2.     Also  in  Brit,  and  For.  St. 
Papers,  vol.  85,  p.  845. 


96      INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

the  railroad  would  not  only  serve  to  develop  very  mate- 
rially the  trade  of  East  Africa  and  Uganda,  but  would  doubt- 
less put  an  end  to  this  slave  traffic  as  well. 

Meanwhile,  the  position  of  the  Imperial  British  East 
Africa  Company  as  a  trading  corporation  had  become  prac- 
tically untenable.  Its  resources  had  been  exhausted  before 
the  commerce  of  the  country  could  possibly  be  raised  to  a 
paying  basis.  By  the  treaty  of  Brussels  in  1890,  the  powers 
agreed  that  all  trade  in  Central  and  East  Africa  should  be 
free,  with  a  duty  of  five  per  cent  to  be  levied  only  in  dis- 
tricts where  the  products  originated  or  were  to  be  consumed. 
In  1892,  upon  the  advice  of  Great  Britain,  the  Sultan  of 
Zanzibar  fell  in  line  with  this  agreement  and  placed  his 
territories  on  the  list  of  free  countries.  This  worked  a  great 
hardship  on  the  company,  because  it  could  now  collect  no 
duties  on  articles  going  inland  and  only  five  per  cent  on 
those  destined  for  the  Sultan's  coast  possessions,  but  was 
still  compelled  to  pay  Zanzibar's  ruler  the  old  annual  reve- 
nues. Consequently  the  company  withdrew  from  the  Witu 
district  in  July,  1893,  and,  soon  after,  offered  to  sell  all 
its  claims  and  properties  in  East  Africa  to  the  British 
Government. 

A  tedious  correspondence  followed,  lasting  nine  months 
and  ending,  in  March,  1895,  with  the  company's  acceptance 
of  the  nominal  offer  of  <£150,000,  made  by  the  Foreign 
Office,  for  the  whole  of  its  assets  and  rights  in  East  Africa.1 

At  first,  however,  the  British  Government  was  hardly 
more  successful  in  its  management  than  had  been  the  com- 
pany, for  both  failed  to  evolve  a  policy  of  rule  based  on  a 
scientific  knowledge  of  the  country  and  the  conditions  pre- 
vailing among  the  natives.  And  a  procession  of  governors 
—  six  within  ten  years  —  was  certainly  not  conducive  to 

1  The  History  of  the  Foundation  and  Work  of  the  Imperial  British  East 
Africa  Company,  1895,  by  P.  L.  McDerraott  (acting  secretary). 


BRITISH  AND  GERMAN  EAST  AFRICA  97 

the  best  administration.  The  representatives  of  the  Foreign 
Office,  moreover,  were  lacking  in  tact  and  experience  in 
handling  the  natives.  In  1893  and  1894,  Colonel  (now 
Major-General  Sir  Henry)  Colville,  Acting  Commissioner 
for  Uganda,  felt  it  necessary  to  break  the  power  of  Kaba- 
rega,  King  of  Unyoro,  which  he  accomplished  in  a  spirited 
campaign  of  several  months.  A  large  section  of  southern 
Unyoro  was  added  to  Uganda ;  and  the  British  flag  was 
raised  at  Wadelai  on  the  White  Nile  —  only  to  be  ordered 
taken  down  by  the  British  Government  later. 

In  1895,  however,  the  work  had  all  to  be  done  again ; 
and,  after  a  series  of  successful  campaigns 1  conducted  with 
great  skill,  protectorates  were  established  permanently  over 
Unyoro,  Usoga,  Nandi,  and  Kavirondo.  The  whole  region 
east  of  the  White  Nile  and  north  as  far  as  Dufile,  which 
had  been  held  since  1888  by  the  Mahdi,  was  occupied  and 
placed  under  the  British  flag.  The  Nile  now  became  the 
frontier  of  Uganda ;  and  material  assistance  was  rendered 
the  trade  of  the  country  by  the  establishment  of  general 
security,  the  extension  of  the  main  trade  road  straight 
through  from  Entebbe  to  the  Nile,  and  the  stopping  of 
hostile  attacks  on  caravans.  Force  had  thus  been  applied 
with  no  uncertain  hand  and  considerable  progress  been 
made.  But  too  little  consideration  had  been  given  to  the 
rights  and  interests  of  the  natives ;  and  no  special  effort 
was  made,  to  conciliate  and  provide  adequately  for  the 
chiefs,  whose  possessions  and  powers  had  been  materially 
curtailed  in  the  process  of  military  occupation.  And  the 
end  was  not  yet.  The  revolt  of  the  Sudanese  troops  which 
followed  in  189T,  and  the  rebellion  in  Uganda  in  which 
both  King  Kabarega  and  King  Mwanga  took  part  and 
which  lasted  from  1897  to  1899,  were  unfortunate  affairs 

1  A  graphic  description  will  be  found  in  Campaigning  on  the  Upper  Nile 
and  Niger,  1898,  by  Lieutenant  Seymour  Vandeleur. 


98      INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

that  might  have  been  avoided  if  the  proper  precautions  had 
been  taken  and  a  more  just  treatment  been  accorded  the 
native  leaders. 

The  outcome,  however,  was  beneficial,  since  it  ended 
in  the  permanent  pacification  of  Uganda.  Mbogo,  the  Mo- 
hammedan claimant  to  the  throne,  who  had  been  banished 
to  Mombasa  during  the  struggle,  was  brought  back ;  and 
the  various  royal  factions  reconciled  by  the  deposition  of 
Mwanga1  in  favor  of  his  infant  son,  Daudi  Chua.2  In  De- 
cember, 1899,  a  special  commission,  headed  by  Sir  Harry 
H.  Johnston,  reached  Uganda;  and  three  months  later,  on 
March  10,  1900,  a  general  treaty  with  Great  Britain  was 
signed  by  the  regents  (for  the  king)  and  all  the  leading 
chiefs,  which  has  been  faithfully  kept  by  all  parties  and 
has  given  peace  and  prosperity  to  the  country.  In  this 
agreement  a  system  of  government  for  Uganda  was  out- 
lined, and  the  old,  vexatious  problems  of  land  tenure,  taxa- 
tion, justice,  and  military  service  were  settled  to  the  satis- 
faction of  all  concerned.3  A  regency  of  three  now  manages 
the  affairs  of  the  kingdom  through  two  prime  ministers  — 
one  Protestant  and  one  Catholic  —  assisted  by  the  Lukiko, 
or  national  assembly.  In  1895,  Fume  Amari  —  the  treach- 
erous Sultan  of  Witu  —  was  forcibly  dethroned  by  the 
English,  and  Omar-bin-Hamid  appointed  in  his  stead.  By 
supporting  Kashid-bin-Salim  for  the  Sultanate  of  Takaungu 
and  driving  the  older  claimant,  Mbaruk,  over  into  German 
territory,  Great  Britain  completed  the  subjugation  of  the 
realm  of  the  Mazrui,  the  oldest  and  most  influential  Arab 

1  Kabarega  was  banished  to  Kismayu   and  Mwanga  to  the  Seychelles 
Islands,  where  he  died  May,  1903. 

2  Now  (1914)  he  is  nearly  eighteen  years  of  age,  and  will  assume  the  reins 
of  office  within  the  year. 

3  An  excellent  account  of  the  work  of  this  commission  will  be  fonnd  in 
H.  H.  Johnston's  The  Uganda  Protectorate,  vol.  1,  chap.  8  (Hutchinson  &  Co., 
London,  1902);  also  in  his  official  "Report,"  dated  July  10,  1901,  in  the 
Brit.  Parl.  Papers,  1901,  Africa,  cd.  071. 


BRITISH  AND  GERMAN  EAST  AFRICA  99 

power  on  the  East  Coast.  The  pacification  of  all  the  Brit- 
ish possessions  in  East  Africa  was  thus  attained  and  the 
way  paved  for  the  steady  and  systematic  development  of 
the  country. 

The  Uganda  Eailway  was  commenced  at  Mombasa  in 
1895,  and  the  first  train  reached  Lake  Victoria  in  Decem- 
ber, 1901.  It  was  built  with  great  technical  skill  under  the 
direction  of  Sir  G.  Whitehouse,  coolies  being  brought  from 
India  for  the  purpose  ;  but  it  proved  a  most  costly  under- 
taking, the  final  expenditure  amounting  to  over  .£5,317,000 
—  more  than  double  the  estimate  of  the  East  Africa  Com- 
pany. So  many  temporary  bridges  and  sections  were  con- 
structed along  the  line  that  a  prominent  German  official, 
who  passed  over  the  road  shortly  before  its  completion,  was 
moved  to  exclaim :  "  I  am  ashamed  of  my  country.  We 
have  not  built  one  road  to  the  Lake  yet,  and  the  English 
have  built  two."  No  one  knows  just  why  the  Foreign  Office 
suddenly  determined  to  put  through  this  railway ;  but  it 
has  amply  justified  the  expense  since  it  began  operations, 
being  worked  at  a  substantial  profit  ever  since  1904—05. 
The  exports  of  East  Africa,  which  only  approximated 
£70,000  to  £75,000  in  1893,  rose  to  £113,000  in  1901- 
02,  the  year  the  road  opened,  and  reached  £1,016,000  in 
1911—12.  The  imports  increased  correspondingly  —  from 
£106,000  (in  1901)  to  £1,330,000— in  the  same  period, 
while  the  total  trade  of  Uganda  was  growing  from  a  merely 
nominal  sum  to  the  very  promising  figure  of  £1,017,000, 
considerably  more  than  half  of  which  was  with  Great 
Britain. 

On  August  31, 1896,  all  the  British  territory  on  the  East 
Coast,  except  Uganda  and  the  islands  of  Pemba  and  Zan- 
zibar, was  united  in  the  British  East  Africa  protectorate. 
Since  that  date  the  two  districts  of  East  Africa  and  Uganda 
have  been  administered  directly  through  royal  commission- 


100     INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

ers,  responsible  till  1905  to  the  Foreign  Office,  and  since 
then  to  the  Colonial  Office.  The  area  of  the  protectorate  is 
about  250,000  square  miles  ;  and  the  total  population  just 
a  little  over  4,000,000.  The  offices  of  the  central  adminis- 
tration are  divided  between  Mombasa  on  the  coast  and 
Nairobi,  capital  of  the  Ukamba  province,  in  the  interior. 
On  April  1,  1902,  two  provinces  —  Naivasha  and  Kisumu 
—  were  transferred  to  it  from  Uganda ;  and  it  now  has 
seven  provinces  administered  by  subcommissioners  residing 
at  the  local  capitals,  except  in  Jubaland  and  a  large  unor- 
ganized territory  to  the  northwest  (near  Abyssinia),  which 
are  under  military  rule.  The  subcommissioners  are  assisted 
by  collectors  and  subcollectors  in  the  gathering  of  taxes  and 
other  local  work ;  but,  wherever  possible,  the  services  of 
the  native  chiefs l  and  leading  men  are  enlisted,  usually  to 
great  advantage.  The  Uganda  protectorate,  with  an  area 
of  223,500  square  miles  and  a  native  population  equal  to 
that  of  East  Africa,  although  divided  for  administrative 
purposes  into  five  provinces,  is  still  ruled  through  the  King 
of  Uganda  and  some  twenty  local  chieftains  —  each  en- 
trusted with  the  administration  of  a  given  district ; 2  and 
the  native  institutions  and  customs  have  been  carefully 
preserved  and  protected. 

The  planters  have  had  great  hopes  of  their  grain  crop 
since  the  opening  of  the  railway  has  cheapened  transpor- 
tation, but  recent  experience  gives  little  promise  of  substan- 
tial profit  from  this  source  at  present.  The  mainstay  of 
the  country,  next  to  rubber,  maize,  and  coffee,  the  exporta- 

1  For  instance,  Lenana,  the  leading  chief  of  the  Masai,  was  given  a  prom- 
inent share  in  the  administration  of  his  country  and  his  loyal  services  have 
contributed  much    to  the  maintenance  of  the   present  friendly  relations 
between  the  British  and  the  ablest  and  most  warlike  of  the  tribesmen  of 
East  Africa. 

2  The  kingdom  of  Uganda  proper  was  bounded  by  the  territories  of  Usoga, 
Unyoro,  Ankoli,  and  Koki,  now  all  in  the  protectorate  of  Uganda. 


BRITISH  AND  GERMAN  EAST  AFRICA  101 

tion  of  which  is  increasing  rapidly,  promises  to  be  cotton l 
which  can  readily  be  raised  there  in  large  quantities.  East 
Africa  has  large  areas  of  sterile  territory  and  some  very 
unhealthy  districts  near  the  coast ;  but  there  is  plenty  of 
good  land  on  the  uplands  of  the  East  Africa  protectorate 
and  on  the  fertile  plateau  of  Uganda,  where  Europeans 
can  live  in  safety  and  comparative  comfort.  Yet  it  is  not 
a  poor  man's  land.  Only  colonists  with  a  fair  capital  — 
estimated  by  the  British  authorities  at  not  less  than  <£1200 
—  and  an  enterprising  spirit  should  venture  into  the  coun- 
try. Mr.  Roosevelt  has  been  quoted  recently  as  saying 
that  British  East  Africa  has  a  most  promising  outlook, 
but  that  its  chief  need  is  a  race  of  sturdy  pioneers  such 
as  opened  up  the  center  and  west  of  the  United  States. 
But  such  colonists  will  not  go  there  in  any  large  numbers 
until  the  British  Government  has  established  a  working  con- 
nection between  East  Africa,  the  Sudan,  and  South  Africa, 
and  has  solved  successfully  the  problem  of  colonization. 
Title  deeds  and  leases  on  over  3,000,000  acres  of  land 
were  issued  in  East  Africa,  to  be  sure,  between  1903  and 
1911 ;  but  a  great  deal  of  dissatisfaction  still  exists  among 
the  planters.  This  is  due  to  the  ill-advised  system  of  land 
grants  employed  by  the  colonial  administration.  Nothing 
has  done  more,  indeed,  to  retard  the  development  of  the 
country  and  to  arouse  the  enmity  of  the  colonists  than  this 
mistaken  agricultural  policy,  accompanied  as  it  has  been 
by  an  over-zealous  desire  to  protect  every  right  —  fancied 
and  real  —  of  the  natives.  Two  classes  of  cessions  have 
been  permitted  by  the  British  Government :  freeholds  to 
natives  and  leases  for  ninety-nine  years  at  nominal  rentals 
to  whites.  On  account  of  the  great  diversity  of  the  land, 

1  Cotton  to  the  value  of  $860,000  was  shipped  from  the  two  protectorates 
in  1909  and  1910,  or  about  2312  tons,  and  over  $840,000  from  Uganda  alone 
in  1911  and  1912. 


102    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

the  territory  was  divided  into  sections  and  the  maximum 
number  of  acres  possible  to  obtain  was  fixed  at  from  900 
to  5000,  according  to  the  nature  and  value  of  the  property. 
The  government  might  convey,  in  special  cases,  as  high  as 
1500  acres  of  the  best  land  to  an  individual  or  corporation. 
The  process  of  surveying  the  districts  was  necessarily  slow ; 
but,  as  soon  as  this  work  was  finished  in  any  section,  a 
proper  applicant,  appearing  in  person  at  the  right  office, 
might  secure  a  lease  for  two  years  at  a  rental  of  from  one 
and  one  half  pence  to  three  pence  per  acre  according  to 
the  class  of  his  land.  If,  however,  he  failed  to  introduce 
certain  enumerated  improvements  within  six  months  and  a 
day,  the  lease  would  not  be  extended  to  ninety-nine  years, 
but  the  land  would  revert  to  the  government  with  all  im- 
provements at  the  end  of  two  years.  And  from  May  7, 
1908,  to  March,  1911,  all  leases  had  a  clause  permitting 
the  raising  of  the  rental  at  the  end  of  thirty-three  and  of 
sixty-six  years.  The  colonists  have  vigorously  protested 
against  this  system ;  and,  within  the  past  year,  the  Colonial 
Office  has  made  some  important  concessions. 

The  government  of  East  Africa  has  always  been  strongly 
centralized  under  the  British  home  authorities.  It  consists 
of  a  Governor,  assisted  by  an  Executive  Council  of  four 
members,  a  Legislative  Council  of  eight  official  and  four 
non- official  members,  a  Land  Board,  and  an  Education 
Board,  the  last  three  of  which  are  appointed  by  the  Gov- 
ernor ;  but  popular  representation  is  secured  by  means  of 
local  nominations.  The  country  is  divided  into  seven  prov- 
inces and  one  unorganized  territory,  each  under  a  Provincial 
Commissioner  and  divided  into  districts  supervised  by  Dis- 
trict Commissioners,  all  of  whom  are  responsible  to  the 
Governor.  Unfortunately,  these  under-officials  are  poorly 
paid  and  the  opportunity  for  promotion  slow  and  not  suf- 


BRITISH  AND  GERMAN  EAST  AFRICA  103 

ficiently  promising,  from  a  financial  standpoint,  to  attract 
the  best  men. 

The  white  settlers  want  a  share  in  their  own  government, 
particularly  the  right  to  elect  members  to  the  Legislative 
Council  which  they  hope  will  be  made  truly  representative 
in  time.  A  Colonial  Association,  organized  in  1910  by 
Lord  Delamere  and  Mr.  Grogan,  represents  the  interests 
of  the  colonists  and  is  making  a  valiant  fight  for  popular 
government  and  better  colonial  laws.  It  was  an  outgrowth 
of  the  Convention  of  Associations  including  all  branches 
of  agriculture  and  industry,  which  had  an  attendance  of 
fifty  deputies  in  its  session  of  July,  1913.  Trouble  and  dis- 
content are  liable  to  prevail  in  any  colony  where  the  citi- 
zens are  not  given  a  share  in  the  administration  of  the 
country,  or  are  not  taken  into  the  confidence  of  the  ruler. 
This  is  certain  to  be  the  case,  when  a  committee  in  London 
supervises  the  leading  matters  of  administration,  takes  a 
hand  in  the  distribution  of  the  land,  and  is  susceptible  to 
the  influence  of  large  corporations,  like  the  East  Africa 
Syndicate,  which  received  a  lease  of  five  hundred  square 
miles  of  the  best  land  on  April  29,  1904,  at  an  extremely 
reasonable  figure.1  The  resignation  of  Sir  Charles  Eliot2 
in  1904,  caused  by  a  difference  with  the  Foreign  Office  on 
the  question  of  land  distribution  and  the  control  of  the 
Masai,  and  the  recent  deportation  of  the  Honorable  Gal- 
braith  Cole  3  because  he  fired  at  and  killed  a  native  sheep- 

1  A  twenty-five-year  lease  without  rent  for  seven  years  and  only  a  nominal 
rental  of  £500  a  year  for  eighteen  years,  and  the  privilege  of  purchasing  the 
•whole  tract  for  £5000  at  any  time  within  that  period. 

2  Brit.  Parl.  Papers,  1904,  Africa  No.  8,  cd.  2099 ;  and  introduction  to 
his  book  on  the  East  Africa  Protectorate,  published  in  1905.  This  excellent 
volume  contains  a  comprehensive  description  of  present  conditions  in  the 
East  African  protectorate ;  but  it  has  been  superseded  somewhat  by  Lord 
Cran worth's  work  entitled  A  Colony  in  the  Making,  published  in  1912. 

8  Mr.  Cole  was  one  of  the  most  respected  colonists  in  East  Africa.  He 
caught  the  native  in  the  act  of  stealing,  and  was  afterwards  exonerated  from 
the  charge  of  murder  by  a  jury.  London  Times,  September  11,  1911. 


10*     INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

stealer,  demonstrates  the  evil  of  a  too  minute  supervision 
of  colonial  administrations.  It  is  usually  a  wiser  and  saner 
policy  to  permit  wide  discretionary  powers  to  colonial 
officials  —  particularly  in  the  minor  affairs  of  administra- 
tion —  when  they  are  thoroughly  trained,  competent,  and 
forceful,  like  Sir  Percy  Girouard,  who  resigned  the  gov- 
ernorship of  the  East  Africa  protectorate  in  July,  1912, — 
greatly  regretted  by  the  colonists. 

The  whole  region  should  be  placed  under  one  resident 
commissioner  or  governor  with  full  powers,  who  should  be 
assisted  by  deputy  commissioners  on  the  coast,  in  the  high- 
lands, and  Kisumu,  and  in  Uganda,  and  who  should  con- 
trol the  allotment  of  lands  and  the  work  of  developing  the 
country.  Large  areas  are  still  untouched  and  are  certain 
to  repay  the  investment  and  labor  necessary  to  render  them 
productive.  A  large  increase  of  subordinate  officials  is 
needed  to  assist  in  the  organization  of  new  districts,  the 
opening  of  new  land,  and  the  promotion  of  trade.  They 
would  soon  more  than  earn  their  salaries  through  the  in- 
creased traffic.  The  British  investments  in  East  Africa, 
outside  of  the  cost  of  the  Uganda  Railway,  have  not  been 
excessive,  while  the  revenue  has  been  steadily  approaching 
the  expenses.  In  1902,  the  expenditures  were  .£312,000 
and  the  receipts  ,£95,000 ;  but  in  1911-12  the  sum  ex- 
pended in  both  protectorates  reached  £1,055,000,  while 
the  income  equaled  ,£932,000.  It  is  evident  that  these 
colonies  are  still  far  from  being  a  paying  investment,  for  the 
governmental  grant-in-aid  to  them  for  1910-11  amounted 
to  over  §1,100,000,  chiefly,  however,  to  meet  the  expenses 
of  railway  extensions,  of  the  care  of  certain  native  tribes, 
and  of  military  protection.  No  one  can  safely  predict  when 
the  country  will  become  self-sustaining ;  but  if  the  present 
rate  of  development  is  maintained,  that  point  ought  to  be 
attained  before  many  years  have  elapsed.  The  Uganda  Hail- 


BRITISH  AND  GERMAN  EAST  AFRICA  105 

way  is  now  the  main  outlet  for  the  trade  of  the  eastern 
portion  of  the  Congo  State,  the  German  territory  about 
Lake  Victoria,  Uganda,  and  British  East  Africa.  Steamers 
run  once  a  month  from  Khartoum  to  Gondokoro  on  the 
White  Nile ;  and  the  waters  of  Victoria  Nyanza  are  being 
connected  by  rail  with  Lake  Kiogo,  and  Albert  Nyanza 
with  the  navigable  part  of  the  White  Nile.  The  railway  of 
South  Africa  and  that  of  Germany  in  German  East  Africa 
are  approaching  Lake  Tanganyika.  When  regular  and  ade- 
quate connection  has  been  established  between  these  cen- 
ters, the  rapid  development  of  the  country  and  its  commerce 
can  confidently  be  prophesied. 

Of  East  Africa,  Great  Britain  holds  the  best  and  most 
promising  portion.  Italian  Somaliland,  although  compris- 
ing some  100,000  square  miles  of  territory  and  administered 
since  1905  directly  by  government  officials,  is  still  in  a  wild 
and  undeveloped  condition  for  the  most  part.  The  soil  is 
poor  and  the  country  thinly  settled,  with  a  forbidding  coast 
line  and  no  harbor  worthy  of  the  name.  In  the  interior  there 
are  some  fertile  districts,  like  the  valley  of  the  Webi  Shebel ; 
but  they  are  relatively  insignificant.  It  is  difficult  to  imagine 
how  anything  worth  while  can  be  made  out  of  such  an 
unpromising  district. 

German  East  Africa,  with  an  area  of  384,000  square 
miles  and  an  estimated  population  of  10,000,000,  has  a 
longer  coast  line  than  the  British  sphere,  but  it  is  lacking 
in  fertility,  in  good  natural  harbors,  and  in  navigable  rivers. 
The  climate  is  probably  less  healthy ;  but  the  mineral  wealth 
may  prove  to  be  greater  than  that  of  British  territory.  The 
best  routes  to  the  interior  —  those  of  the  Uganda  Railway 
and  the  Zambesi  River — lie  either  side  of  the  German  pos- 
sessions. There  is  an  Imperial  Governor  with  an  advisory 
council  for  the  colony,  which  is  divided  into  twenty-one 
administrative  districts  and  nine  communes.  The  latter 


106    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

have  administrative  officials  and  councils  of  three  to  five 
members  appointed  by  the  Governor.  The  Imperial  Govern- 
ment has  spent  large  sums  on  the  protectorate  and  made 
earnest  efforts  to  develop  its  trade;  and  this,  despite  the 
fact  that  its  annual  revenues  have  hardly  exceeded  £390,000 
at  any  time.  In  1900-01  Germany  was  contributing  to  the 
budget  of  East  Africa  as  much  as  £G  18,0 00  yearly,  in 
addition  to  ship  subsidies  and  other  special  aids;  but  this 
amount  has  since  steadily  decreased  until  only  .£180,900 
(approximately)  was  voted  in  1912.  A  fine  harbor  has  been 
constructed  at  Dar-es-Salaam ;  and  an  imposing  city  laid 
out  there  with  stately  government  buildings,  substantial 
residences,  and  a  splendid  hospital.  Railroads  have  been 
extended  over  two  hundred  miles  into  the  interior  in  two 
directions;  and  one — the  Central  Railway — is  seven  hun- 
dred and  eighty-eight  miles  long  and  was  completed  to 
Lake  Tanganyika  from  Dar-es-Salaam  in  February,  1914. 
It  is  hoped  to  connect  this  ultimately  with  the  railways  of 
the  German  Cameroons  and  of  British  South  Africa.  But 
that  day  is  far  distant.  So,  too,  is  the  dream  of  a  German 
India  in  East  Africa.  Thirty-one  public  schools,  including 
four  for  handicrafts,  have  been  opened  for  the  natives,  in 
addition  to  those  conducted  at  the  missions.  The  greater 
part  of  the  country  has  been  accurately  explored,  sur- 
veyed, and  mapped  at  considerable  expense;  and  serious 
efforts  have  been  put  forward  to  open  up  the  country  in  all 
directions.  Yet  one  cannot  say  that  any  remarkable  progress 
has  been  achieved,  either  in  the  colonization  or  in  the  de- 
velopment of  the  region  as  a  whole.  It  is  true  that  the  total 
exports  and  imports  reached  the  goodly  sum  of  $17,082,000 
(approximately)  in  1911-12,  having  increased  over  fifty 
per  cent  in  three  years.  Yet,  when  it  is  remembered  that 
at  least  $11,475,400  of  this  amount  represents  imports,  it 
will  be  seen  that  Germany  has,  indeed,  found  an  excellent 


BRITISH  AND  GERMAN  EAST  AFRICA  107 

market  for  her  cotton  goods  and  other  wares,  but  that  her 
new  possession  is  not  intrinsically  an  "Eldorado."  And 
even  this  amount  of  trade  is  relatively  insignificant  for  a 
country  one  third  larger  than  Texas,  when  one  bears  in  mind 
the  fact  that  Germany's  commerce  in  1912  with  her  small- 
est European  neighbor  —  Portugal — was  approximately 
one  and  one  half  times  that  of  her  East  African  protec- 
torate. 

Enough  has  been  said  to  show  that  colonization  in  East 
Africa  is  not  the  rosy-hued  affair  that  Captain  Lugard  and 
some  others  would  have  us  believe,  and  that  it  is  yet  far 
from  being  on  a  self-sustaining  basis.  The  history  of  East 
Africa  has,  however,  amply  demonstrated  not  only  the  folly  of 
entrusting  administrative  powers  to  commercial  companies, 
but  also  that  it  is  practically  impossible  for  trading  corpo- 
rations to  develop  vast  territories  successfully  without  gov- 
ernmental cooperation  and  support.  It  is  equally  evident 
that  African  protectorates  are  unwieldy  and  extremely  ex- 
pensive affairs,  imposing  great  responsibilities  and  heavy 
burdens  upon  their  possessors,  which  should  be  undertaken 
only  after  the  most  careful  consideration  of  the  obligations, 
the  risks,  the  costs,  and  the  profits  involved.  And  when 
one  compares  the  confusion  that  existed  in  the  early  days, 
and  the  serious  blunders  committed  in  both  the  British  and 
German  protectorates,  with  the  present  orderly  and  en- 
lightened administrations,  one  is  reminded  of  the  proverb : 
"Fortune  brings  in  some  boats  that  are  not  steer'd." 


CHAPTER  VI 

FRENCH   COLONIAL   EXPANSION   IN  WEST   AFRICA  THE 
SUDAN,  AND   THE   SAHARA 

FRENCH  colonial  enterprises  in  Africa  began  in  1636, 
when  Claude  de  Rochefort  built  Fort  St.  Louis  at  the  mouth 
of  the  Senegal  River  on  the  West  Coast  and  explored  the 
interior  for  a  hundred  miles.  He  was  followed  during  the 
eighteenth  and  early  nineteenth  centuries  by  other  intrepid 
explorers,  who  made  settlements  at  Mellicouri  on  the  Guinea 
Coast  and  at  Assinie  and  Grand  Bassam  on  the  Ivory  Coast, 
and  who  penetrated  farther  and  farther  into  the  interior 
until  the  valiant  Rene  Caille,  after  marvelous  adventures, 
reached  Timbuctu,  on  the  Upper  Niger,  in  1837.  The 
French  holdings  on  the  Senegal  were  extended  and  consoli- 
dated into  an  effective  base  for  future  operations  by  the 
energetic  General  Faidherbe  from  1854  to  1865,  who  added 
the  Oulof  country  as  far  south  as  Cape  Verde  and  the 
kingdom  of  Cayore,  and  built  the  harbor  at  Dakar.  He 
was  the  first  to  recognize  the  possibilities  of  West  Africa 
as  a  colonial  center.  "  Our  possession  on  the  West  Coast," 
he  wrote  to  the  Colonial  Office,  "  is  possibly  the  one  of  all 
our  colonies  that  has  before  it  the  greatest  future ;  and  it 
deserves  the  whole  sympathy  and  attention  of  the  Empire." 

By  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century,  other  trade  cen- 
ters had  been  established  at  Libreville  on  the  Gaboon  River, 
and  at  Porto  Novo  on  the  Dahomey  coast;  but  it  was  not 
until  the  early  eighties  that  the  dream  of  a  wonderful 
colonial  empire,  stretching  from  the  Mediterranean  to  the 
Congo,  was  first  conceived.  It  arose  when  the  Senegal 


FRENCH  WEST  AFRICA,  THE  SUDAN  AND  THE  SAHARA   109 

colonists  had  reached  the  Niger,  and  De  Brazza  was  explor- 
ing the  Gaboon  and  Congo  Rivers.  The  French  statesmen, 
studying  eagerly  the  map  of  the  continent,  determined  to 
push  their  pioneers  and  explorers  east  from  the  Niger  and 
north  from  the  Upper  Congo  until  they  met  at  Lake  Chad, 
and  then  to  join  hands  with  them  from  Algeria  across  the 
Sahara  Desert. 

In  order  to  execute  successfully  such  a  plan,  it  was  neces- 
sary, first  of  all,  for  the  French  Republic  to  consolidate  its 
holdings  and  establish  itself  firmly  in  West  Africa  and  on 
the  Congo.  Under  the  able  leadership  of  such  men  as  Cap- 
tain Gallieni,  Colonel  Frey,  and  Colonel  (now  General) 
Auchinard,  their  forces,  beginning  on  the  Upper  Senegal, 
worked  their  way  rapidly  east  and  south.  Between  1880  and 
1890,  they  occupied  the  territory  lying  between  the  Sene- 
gal and  Niger  Rivers,  set  up  a  strong  outpost  at  Bamaku 
on  the  Niger,  subdued  the  southern  portion  of  the  kingdom 
of  the  Ahmadu,  drove  the  armies  of  Samory  beyond  the 
Niger,  made  numerous  treaties  with  native  chieftains,  and, 
finally,  established  a  direct  connection  between  Senegal  and 
their  little  colony  of  French  Guinea. 

By  1891,  Colonel  Auchinard  had  overrun  the  greater 
part  of  the  Ahmadu  country  as  far  as  Nioro  and  Segu ; 
but  he  found  Samory  difficult  to  handle.  This  able  and 
crafty  chief,  although  of  humble  origin  and  a  native  of 
Segu,  possessed  a  commanding  personality  and  a  remark- 
able talent  for  organization.  Through  intrigue,  treachery, 
and  a  skillful  use  of  force,  he  had  succeeded  in  construct- 
ing an  extensive  kingdom,  extending  in  1880  from  the 
Kong  Mountains  nearly  to  the  Senegal  River  and  embrac- 
ing both  banks  of  the  Upper  Niger,  with  its  capital  at  Bis- 
sandugu.  His  army  was  well  disciplined  and  armed  with 
modern  rifles  ;  and  he  lived  in  comparative  luxury  with  the 
government  of  his  realm  well  in  hand.  He  opposed  the 


110    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

French  vigorously  at  the  opening  of  their  campaign  for 
expansion ;  but,  after  suffering  several  severe  defeats  at 
their  hands,  Samory  placed  himself  and  his  country  under 
French  protection  in  1886. 

In  the  treaties  of  1887  and  1889  this  relationship  was 
confirmed ;  but  his  territory  was  limited  to  the  east  side 
of  the  Niger  and  the  Bafing  (or  Tankisse)  Rivers.  He  did 
not  long  remain  satisfied  with  this  situation,  but  invaded 
Kenedugu,  seizing  and  sacking  its  capital,  Sikasso,  and  made 
a  league  with  the  Sultan  of  Segu  and  with  the  Sefas  to 
drive  out  the  French.  The  French  forces  resumed  opera- 
tions, and  in  a  brilliant  series  of  maneuvers,  lasting  from 
1891  to  1894  and  conducted  by  Colonels  Auchinard,  Hum- 
bert, and  Combes  (known  among  the  natives  as  "  Coumbo, 
the  All-conquering"),  reduced  Samory  to  desperate  straits. 
Owing  to  the  recall  of  Colonel  Auchinard  and  the  decision 
of  the  French  Government  to  stop  operations  in  the  Sudan 
for  a  time,  he  was  given,  however,  a  breathing  space  for 
three  or  four  years. 

Meanwhile  in  September,  1887,  Captain  Binger  left  Ba- 
maku  on  what  appeared  to  be  a  madcap  attempt  to  reach 
the  Ivory  Coast.  Passing  in  the  rear  of  the  British  colony 
of  Sierra  Leone,  he  visited  Bissandugu  and  Sikasso  in  the 
Samory  country,  pushed  on  south  and  east  into  the  Gou- 
rounsi  and  Mossi  districts,  where  for  a  time  he  was  thought 
to  have  lost  his  life,  made  treaties  with  the  chiefs  of  Kong 
and  Bonduku,  and  reached  Assinie  finally  in  the  spring 
of  1889.  A  distance  of  four  thousand  kilometers  had  been 
traversed  and  the  French  possessions  of  Senegal  and  the 
Ivory  Coast  definitely  united.  Between  1890  and  1895, 
Captains  Quiquandon  and  Destanave  completed  the  union 
of  the  two  districts,  by  establishing  the  French  supremacy 
from  Tiola  to  the  Bobos  country,  and  by  making  treaties 
with  the  chiefs  of  the  Gourounsi  and  Mossi  countries.  In 


FRENCH  WEST  AFRICA,  THE  SUDAN  AND  THE  SAHARA  111 

December  of  the  year  1890,  M.  Monteil  crossed  the  whole 
of  Central  Sudan  from  the  eastern  border  via  Kano  to 
Lake  Chad,  and  returned  to  Europe  by  way  of  Tripoli, 
which  he  reached  on  December  10,  1892.  He  had  traveled 
five  thousand  miles  and  explored  a  path  by  which  France 
might  reach  the  lake. 

Meanwhile,  Colonels  Frey  and  Auchinard  were  taking 
over  for  France  the  whole  of  the  great  district  between 
the  Senegal  and  the  Upper  Niger,  as  far  north  as  Nioro ; 
and  Lieutenants  Caron  Jaime  and  Davoust  explored  the 
Niger  northward  from  Bamaku  to  Kourioume.1  Jenne  was 
permanently  occupied  in  1893  and  the  gallant  Colonel  Bon- 
nier took  Timbuctu  in  1894.  In  this  latter  year,  in  Daho- 
mey, which  had  been  taken  under  French  protection  in  1884 
at  the  instigation  of  Felix  Faure  (then  Secretary  of  the 
Colonies)  and  created  a  French  colony  in  1893  through  the 
campaigns  of  General  Dodds  against  the  King  of  Behansin, 
Captain  Toutee  was  starting  on  a  remarkable  journey.  From 
Porto  Novo  on  the  Gulf  of  Guinea  he  made  his  way  slowly 
north  to  Badjibo  on  the  Niger  Eiver,  which  he  ascended 
past  Boussa  and  Say  to  Tibi-Farca  (opposite  Zinder).  On 
November  8,  1895,  Lieutenant  Hourst2  left  Timbuctu  in 
an  aluminum  boat,  brought  from  France  in  sections  and 
specially  constructed  for  running  the  cataracts ;  and,  care- 
fully surveying  the  country  as  he  proceeded,  he  made  his 
way  down  the  river  to  Zinder,  Say,  and  Boussa.  After  re- 
markable adventures,  he  reached  the  northern  outposts  of 
the  British  Royal  Niger  Company,  by  whose  agents  he  was 
escorted  to  the  coast,  and,  finally,  arrived  at  the  French 
consulate  in  Porto  Novo  on  November  1, 1896.  Thus  accu- 
rate knowledge  of  the  Upper  Niger  was  obtained  for  the 

1  The  port  for  Timbuctu. 

2  His  adventures  are  described  in  detail  in  his  entertaining  volume,  enti- 
tled French  Enterprise  in  Africa,  published  in  1898. 


112    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

first  time  by  the  French  and  a  definite  connection  estab- 
lished between  their  Senegal-Niger  lands  and  the  colony 
of  Dahomey. 

To  make  sure  of  this  connection,  the  French  had  already 
begun  active  operations  in  the  Dahomey  "  hinterland."  In 
1893  and  1894,  Captain  Deco3ur  founded  Carnotville  and 
pushed  northeast  to  the  Borgu  country,  while  Lieutenant 
Baud  made  treaties  with  the  chiefs  of  Gambarri  and  Gourma 
and  pushed  north  to  Say.  But  the  Royal  Niger  Company 
had  been  trading  for  some  years  in  this  region.  Under  the 
energetic  leadership  of  Sir  George  T.  Goldie,  this  company 
—  organized  as  the  United  National  African  Company  in 
1879  and  chartered  by  Great  Britain  as  the  Royal  Niger 
Company  in  1886  —  had  negotiated  over  three  hundred  trea- 
ties with  native  chieftains  by  1894  and  placed  over  three 
hundred  thousand  square  miles  of  Nigeria,  as  far  north  as 
Gando  and  Sokoto,  under  British  protection.  A  military 
government  was  established ;  and  an  efficient  constabulary 
was  organized  from  the  Hausa  tribes.  The  headquarters 
moved  north  to  Lokoja  in  1889  ;  and  a  treaty  with  France 
on  August  5,  1890,1  fixed  the  boundary  roughly  between 
the  British  and  French  spheres  of  influence  by  a  line  drawn 
from  Say  on  the  Niger  due  east  to  Lake  Chad.  But  the 
western  boundary  of  Nigeria,  the  Lagos-Dahomey  hinter- 
land, remained  undetermined. 

The  officials  of  the  company  were  busy  consolidating  their 
holdings  and  developing  the  trade  of  the  region,  when  the 
news  of  the  arrival  of  Captain  Decosur  in  the  vicinity  of 
West  Nigeria  reached  them.  Captain  Lugard,  who  had  dis- 
tinguished himself  in  East  Africa  by  saving  Uganda  for 
Great  Britain,  was  ordered  to  the  Nigeria  frontier.  By 
forced  marches  he  reached  Borgu,  Nikki,  Kishi,  and  Gain- 

1  Arch.  Dip.,  1899,  vol.  i.  French  Yellow  Book,  Affaires  d'Afrique,  1881-93, 
pp.  211-13. 


FRENCH  WEST  AFRICA,  THE  SUDAN  AND  THE  SAHARA  113 

baga  and  made  treaties  with  the  chiefs  there,  and  Captain 
Wallace  renewed  the  alliances  with  the  Kings  of  Sokoto 
and  Gando,  before  Captain  Decosur's  appearance  on  the 
scene  in  October.  Thus,  in  the  initial  moves  of  the  contest, 
the  Niger  Company  scored  first. 

Still,  the  French  pioneers  were  not  discouraged.  They 
held  with  great  determination  to  their  plan  of  securing  a 
hold  on  the  Lower  Niger  as  an  outlet  for  the  trade  of  Upper 
Dahomey,  and  of  establishing  a  thorough  connection  between 
Dahomey  and  their  Senegal-Niger  possessions.  The  next  year, 
1895-96,  we  find  Captain  Toutee  quietly  making  his  way 
up  through  the  "debatable  lands,"  as  far  as  Boussa,  signing 
treaties  wherever  possible ;  and  Lieutenants  Voulet  and 
Chanoine  coming  down  from  Bandiagara  in  the  north,  which 
they  left  on  July  30, 1896,  and  securing  protectorates  over 
Yatenda,  Mossi,  Gourounsi,  and  the  Bobos.  Captains  Baud 
and  Vermeesch  left  Porto  Novo  in  November  and,  passing 
via  Gourma  to  the  northwest,  finally  effected  a  junction  with 
Voulet's  party  at  Tibja  on  February  17,  1897,  thus  com- 
pleting the  occupation  of  some  100,000  square  kilometers 
of  territory.  The  British  Foreign  Office  notified  the  French 
Government,  meanwhile,  as  early  as  January,  1895,  of  its 
treaties  with  the  rulers  of  this  district,  and  complained  of 
these  incursions  of  the  Senegal  officials.  A  diplomatic  corre- 
spondence ensued  concerning  the  limits  of  the  French  and 
British  spheres  of  influence  in  West  Africa,  which  lasted 
for  nearly  three  years  and  which,  though  pressed  with  con- 
siderable firmness  and  heat  at  times,  was  conducted  with 
the  utmost  courtesy  and  conciliation  on  both  sides. 

Before  the  questions  at  issue  could  be  satisfactorily  ad- 
justed, however,  the  situation  was  complicated  by  events  in 
Nigeria.  On  January  1, 1897,  Naval-Lieutenant  Bretennet, 
who  had  been  commissioned  to  make  a  direct  and  perma- 
nent connection  between  Dahomey  and  the  French  Sudan, 


114    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

left  the  northernmost  French  post  in  Dahomey  and  entered 
Borgu  en  route  for  the  Niger  River.  Establishing  stations 
at  Bori,  Saore,  Bouay,  and  Kandi,  he  reached  Ho  on  the 
Niger  January  25, and  in  February  pushed  on  down  the  river 
to  Boussa,  which  he  occupied  in  a  "  facon  effective."  Late  in 
1896,  a  rebellion  had  broken  out  in  Nupe  and  Ilorin ;  and 
Major  Arnold  and  Sir  George  T.  Goldie  were  busily  engaged, 
during  January  and  February,  1897,  in  overthrowing  the 
insurgent  forces  and  restoring  peace  and  order  in  the  dis- 
trict, when  the  news  of  the  French  approach  reached  them. 
They  hastened  north  to  Nikki  and  soon  found  themselves 
face  to  face  with  the  determined  French  officials,  who  re- 
fused to  withdraw  without  orders  from  Paris.  Serious 
trouble  seemed  imminent  and  the  wires  between  Europe  and 
Africa  were  kept  busy  for  days.  The  troops  conducted 
themselves  well.  The  officers  held  the  situation  well  in 
hand.  The  two  foreign  departments  acted  promptly  with 
a  calmness  and  conciliation  admirable  in  such  a  time  of 
public  excitement ;  and  a  settlement  was  finally  reached  in 
June,  1898,  the  military  forces  of  both  powers  evacuating 
simultaneously,  between  the  15th  and  17th,  the  lands  in 
their  possession  on  the  Middle  Niger. 

This  agreement  of  June  14, 1898,  was  the  first  of  a  series 
of  treaties  between  Great  Britain  and  France,  that  were 
destined  to  break  down  the  old  barriers  of  hatred,  distrust, 
and  personal  ambition  engendered  by  three  centuries  of  al- 
most uninterrupted  rivalry,  and  to  establish  a  thorough  under- 
standing and  a  practical  cooperation  between  the  two  nations 
in  all  matters  of  importance  affecting  Africa  and  Asia.  Be- 
tween 1886  and  1893,  Great  Britain  and  Germany  had  ad- 
justed satisfactorily  and  amicably  a  great  controversy  in  East 
Africa  without  recourse  to  force  and  in  spite  of  the  violent 
diatribes  and  opposition  of  the  imperialist  leaders  in  both 
countries.  And  now  France  and  England,  declining  an  ap- 


FRENCH  WEST  AFRICA,  THE  SUDAN  AND  THE  SAHARA  115 

peal  to  arms,  reached  a  similar  agreement  in  West  Africa. 
This  conciliatory  policy  and  willingness  to  make  reasonable 
concessions  and  adjustments  when  great  issues  and  prob- 
lems affecting  the  future  of  a  whole  continent  were  at  stake, 
is  a  striking  example  of  the  new  spirit  which  has  played  a 
dominant  part  in  European  diplomacy  in  recent  years.  It 
is  a  long  step  toward  the  establishment  of  a  genuine  world 
peace  and  the  creation  of  an  international  comity  and  com- 
petition of  the  right  sort. 

In  1880,  Great  Britain  and  France  had  been  convinced 
by  the  increasing  border  difficulties  that  some  understand- 
ing must  be  reached  with  regard  to  the  boundaries  of  their 
respective  spheres  of  influence  in  West  Africa.  The  fron- 
tier of  all  the  West  Coast  colonies  was  open  and  undeter- 
mined at  the  rear,  exact  geographical  knowledge  of  the 
region  was  lacking,  and  no  attempt  had  been  made  to  de- 
limit accurately  the  lines  of  division  between  the  settle- 
ments. No  scientific  surveys  of  the  "  hinterland  "  had  been 
made  anywhere ;  and  conflicting  claims  and  overlapping 
jurisdictions  were  everywhere  in  evidence.  In  the  agree- 
ment of  June  28,  1882,1  the  watershed  between  the  Melli- 
couri  and  Great  Scareies  Rivers  was  fixed  as  the  dividing 
line  between  French  Guinea  and  Sierra  Leone;  and  on 
August  10,  1889,2  and  June  26,  1891,3  the  boundaries  be- 
tween the  British  colonies  of  Gambia,  Sierra  Leone,  Gold 
Coast,  and  Lagos  and  the  adjoining  French  possessions  were 
carefully  outlined.  The  Gambia  colony  was  to  include  all 
the  land  within  ten  kilometers  of  both  sides  of  the  river 
and  to  extend  as  far  into  the  interior  as  Yarbatenda.  Sierra 
Leone  was  to  end  at  lat.  10°  N. ;  Gold  Coast,  Lagos,  and 
Dahomey  at  9° ;  but  the  two  latter  were  to  be  separated  by 
a  line  running  north  from  the  intersection  of  the  meridian 

1  Brit,  and  For.  St.  Papers,  vol.  77,  pp.  1007-12. 

2  Brit.  Parl.  Papers,  1892,  Africa  No.  7,  cd.  6701,  pp.  8-15. 
8  Ibid.,  pp.  16-17. 


116    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

of  the  Ajarra  Creek  with  the  coast.  Joint  delimitation  com- 
missions were  to  be  appointed  to  survey  and  mark  out  these 
lines  accurately ;  and  some  general  agreements  were  reached 
concerning  freedom  of  trade  on  the  rivers  and  in  the  in- 
terior, and  the  amount  of  customs  duties  to  be  levied.  But 
the  western  limits  of  the  Lagos-Nigeria  protectorate  were 
left  indefinite  north  of  lat.  9°  N. ;  and  various  other  vital 
matters  were  not  seriously  considered. 

On  March  30,  1892,1  Lord  Salisbury  wrote  to  the  Mar- 
quis of  Dufferin,  the  British  Ambassador  at  Paris,  calling 
attention  to  the  history  of  the  relations  of  France  and  Eng- 
land in  West  Africa  and  the  unsatisfactory  status  of  affairs 
there,  and  urging  him  to  secure,  if  possible,  the  cooperation 
of  the  French  in  completing  the  boundaries  and  arriving 
at  a  complete  understanding  on  the  whole  subject.  The 
question  was  constantly  in  the  minds  of  both  foreign  offices ; 
and  the  pressure  to  have  it  adjusted  increased  steadily,  until 
an  agreement 2  was  signed  on  January  15, 1896,  to  appoint 
a  commission  of  four,  which  should  determine  by  an  exam- 
ination of  the  titles  and  claims  the  most  equitable  delimita- 
tion of  the  French  and  British  possessions  on  the  Lower 
Niger. 

The  first  session  of  the  delegates  lasted  from  Febru- 
ary 8  to  May  22,  1896,  but  was  discontinued  because  no 
definite  agreement  concerning  the  general  line  of  partition 
seemed  possible.  The  consistent  conciliatory  policy  of  M. 
Gabriel  Hanotaux  and  Lord  Salisbury,  however,  triumphed 
and  the  negotiations  were  resumed  on  October  24,  1897.3 
Rene  Lecomte,  First  Secretary  of  the  Foreign  Office,  and 
M.  Louis  Binger,  Director  of  African  Affairs  in  the  Minis- 
try for  the  Colonies,  ably  represented  France ;  while  Martin 
Gosselin,  Secretary  of  the  British  Embassy,  and  Colonel 

1  Brit,  and  For.  St.  Papers,  vol.  84,  pp.  844-50.  And  Brit.  Parl.  Papers, 
1892,  Africa  No.  7. 

2  Arch.  Dip.,  1899,  part  i,  pp.  176-81.  3  Ibid.,  p.  181. 


FRENCH  WEST  AFRICA,  THE  SUDAN  AND  THE  SAHARA    117 

William  Everett  supported  the  British  interests  as  skill- 
fully as  Edwin  Egerton  and  Sir  Joseph  Crowe  had  done 
in  the  earlier  treaties.  The  results  of  their  negotiations  were 
summed  up  in  two  "notes"  presented  by  England  and 
France  respectively  on  February  18  and  24 l  and  embodied 
in  the  convention  of  June  14,  1898,2  referred  to  above  as 
settling  the  Nikki-Boussa  dispute. 

In  this  treaty  the  northern  boundary  of  the  British  Gold 
Coast  colony  was  pushed  up  from  lat.  9°  N.  to  11°,  the 
"  debatable  "  Borgu-Boussa  district  was  practically  divided 
between  France  and  Great  Britain,  and  the  French  claims 
to  the  "  septentrionale  et  orientale "  shores  of  Lake  Chad, 
were  confirmed.  France  did  not  get  Boussa,  or  as  much  of 
a  hold  on  the  Lower  Niger  as  she  aspired  to ;  but  a  hun- 
dred miles  of  cataracts  between  her  "  claims  "  and  the  navi- 
gable part  of  that  river  reconciled  her  to  this  concession. 
As  a  compensation,  she  was  permitted  to  rent  a  piece  of  land 
for  trading  purposes,  either  on  the  Lower  Niger  opposite 
the  chief  trading  center  of  northern  Dahomey  or  at  the  mouth 
of  the  Niger.  Nor  did  Great  Britain  secure  Say,  or  all  the 
territory  to  which  she  laid  claim  in  the  Say-Borgu  country ; 
but  she  was  more  than  compensated  by  her  gains  on  the  Gold 
Coast  frontier,  and  in  the  advantages  incident  to  the  settle- 
ment of  the  whole  question  of  the  boundary  lines  between 
the  French  and  British  spheres  of  influence  in  West  Africa. 
Thus  the  first  stage  of  French  expansion  was  complete. 
Her  colonial  possessions  reached  from  the  Atlantic,  via  the 
Senegal  and  the  Niger  Rivers,  to  Lake  Chad ;  and  with  this 
vast  tract  she  had  safely  and  securely  joined  her  enlarged 
southern  colonies  of  Guinea,  Ivory  Coast,  and  Dahomey. 

Meanwhile,  before  the  details  of  the  agreement  were 
worked  out,  an  incident  occurred  in  the  eastern  Sudan 

1  Arch.  Dip.,  1890,  part  r,  pp.  188-93. 

8  Ibid.,  pp.  195-201 ;  and  Brit,  and  For.  St.  Papers,  vol.  91,  pp.  38-54. 


118    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

which  threatened  for  a  time  to  undo  the  good  work  of  the 
commissioners  and  diplomats  in  western  Africa,  but  which 
ended  finally  in  an  amicable  delimitation  of  the  French 
and  British  spheres  of  influence  in  the  eastern  Sudan  and 
Sahara. 

This  incident  is  intimately  connected  with  the  attempt 
of  the  French  to  unite  their  Congo  possessions  with  their 
Niger-Sudan  territories,  and  is  best  understood  when  stud- 
ied in  the  light  of  these  operations.  Savorgnan  de  Brazza, 
who  for  ten  years,  1875  to  1885,  was  the  inspired  and  ener- 
getic promoter  of  French  expansion  on  the  Gaboon  and 
Congo  Rivers,  and  who  was  only  prevented  from  crossing 
the  Congo  by  the  earlier  arrival  there  of  Henry  M.  Stanley 
representing  the  Congo  Association,  was  the  originator  of 
this  design.  He  performed  a  remarkable  work  exploring  the 
whole  region  between  the  Gaboon  and  Upper  Congo  and 
penetrating  far  to  the  east  and  north.  His  third  journey, 
known  officially  as  "la  Mission  de  L'Ouest  Africain,"  1881— 
85,  accomplished  a  particularly  splendid  piece  of  explor- 
ing and  surveying  for  some  four  thousand  kilometers  from 
Franceville  on  the  Upper  Ogoove  River  northward  toward 
Lake  Chad.  Between  1888  and  1891,  Paul  Crampel  tried 
to  establish  a  connection  between  this  Congo  Colony  and 
Lake  Chad.  He  traveled  without  European  companions 
or  interpreters,  and  had  astounding  adventures.  For  three 
years  he  was  singularly  successful,  reaching  the  Baguirmi 
country  and  El-Kouti  in  safety ;  but  unfortunately  he  lost 
his  life  in  the  territory  of  the  chief  of  the  Senoussi,  who 
was  severely  punished  by  the  French  under  M.  Dybowsky 
in  October,  1891. 

Lieutenant  Mizon  attempted  to  make  the  connection  in 
the  reverse  order,  by  going  up  the  Niger  and  Benue  Rivers 
to  Yola  and  making  his  way  south  to  the  French  Congo.  He 
got  as  far  as  the  Adamaua  country  in  1892 ;  but  the  com- 


FRENCH  WEST  AFRICA,  THE  SUDAN  AND  THE  SAHARA     119 

plaints  of  the  British  and  German  Governments,  which  had 
claims  in  this  region,  prevented  him  from  accomplishing 
anything  of  importance  in  this  way.  However,  Casimir 
Maistre  succeeded  in  the  next  year  (1893)  in  mounting 
northward  from  the  Congo  and  Ubangi  Rivers  to  the  basin 
of  the  Gribingui  River,  to  Adamaua,  and  returning  via 
Yola  and  the  Niger.  In  the  same  year  the  last  portion  of 
the  Nigeria-Cameroon  frontier  was  worked  out  by  Germany 
and  England  to  Lake  Chad,  so  that  England  received  Yola 
and  Adamaua  went  to  Germany. 

The  French  objected  vigorously  to  this  partition  and 
refused  to  recognize  the  treaty  until  her  claim  to  Baguirmi 
with  access  to  Lake  Chad  from  the  south  was  recognized 
officially  in  the  German-French  treaty 1  of  March  15, 1894. 
The  southern  boundary  of  the  French  Congo  was  definitely 
determined  by  a  delimitation  treaty  2  with  the  Congo  Inde- 
pendent State  on  August  14,  1894;  and  finally,  after  M. 
Closel  had  founded  Carnot  on  the  Ekela-Sanga  River  and 
made  his  way  north  via  the  rivers  Lobay  and  Bali  to  the 
Oua  branch  of  the  Bahr-Sara  (a  tributary  through  the 
Chari  to  Lake  Chad)  in  1894  and  1895,  the  whole  Came- 
roon-Congo frontier  was  satisfactorily  adjusted  in  a  treaty 
with  Germany  in  February,  1896. 

The  northeastern  portion  of  the  French  Congo,  border- 
ing on  the  Bahr-el-Ghazal  district  of  the  Egyptian  Sudan, 
remained  still  unexplored  and  lacking  in  definite  frontiers. 
The  Egyptian  Sudan  from  Khartoum  south  had  been  lost 
to  Egypt  since  the  Mahdi  insurrection  in  1884  and  1885. 
The  rule  of  the  Khaliphate  had  steadily  declined  after  the 
death  of  the  Mahdi,  Mohammed  Ahmed,  in  June,  1885, 
until  the  government  of  the  whole  region  was  honeycombed 
with  corruption  and  the  extent  of  the  atrocities  committed 

1  Brit,  and  Far.  St.  Paper*,  vol.  86,  pp.  974-78. 

2  Ibid.,  vol.  90,  p.  1278. 


120    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

by  the  leaders  horrified  the  civilized  world.  M.  Liotard, 
who  had  become  Commissioner-General  of  the  Upper  Congo, 
determined  to  round  out  the  northeast  frontier  of  his  col- 
ony; and  at  the  same  time,  by  taking  advantage  of  the 
situation  in  the  Sudan  he  hoped  to  add  a  large  portion  of 
Bahr-el-Ghazal  to  the  French  possessions  and  provide  an 
outlet  by  way  of  the  Nile  for  the  trade  of  the  northern 
Congo  region.  The  establishment  of  a  definite  connection 
between  the  French  protectorates  in  the  Sudan  and  Upper 
Congo  with  Abyssinia  and  the  French  colony  of  Obock  on 
the  East  Coast  was  even  contemplated. 

Accordingly,  on  June  25,  1896,  he  sent  out  Major 
Marchand  with  a  small  company  of  eight  officers  and  one 
hundred  and  twenty  men,  who  explored  the  Ubangi  district 
and  traversed  the  Bahr-el-Ghazal  country  successfully.  He 
reached  the  Nile  ultimately,  equipped  a  small  flotilla  and 
pushed  north  to  Fashoda,  where  he  raised  the  French  flag 
and  took  possession  of  the  territory  on  the  left  bank,  on 
July  10,  1898.  He  repulsed  an  attack  of  the  Dervishes 
in  August ;  but  his  position  —  so  far  from  any  reliable  source 
of  supplies — was  extremely  precarious. 

Meanwhile  Sir  Herbert  Kitchener  was  reconquering  the 
Sudan  for  Egypt.  In  1896,  he  defeated  the  Dervishes  and 
occupied  the  province  of  Dongola.  He  constructed  a  rail- 
way and  advanced  steadily  southward  the  next  year.  On 
September  2,  1898,  he  inflicted  a  decisive  defeat  on  the 
chief  Dervish  army  at  Omdurman  and  two  days  later  en- 
tered Khartoum  in  triumph.  Without  stopping  to  rest,  he 
pushed  on  down  the  Nile  with  his  army  of  23,000  men,  until 
he  had  captured,  on  September  15,  the  great  camp  of  the 
Dervishes  at  Renkh,  three  hundred  miles  south  of  the  capital 
of  the  Sudan.  Here  he  learned  of  the  presence  of  Marchand 
at  Fashoda,  through  Said  Sogheir,  the  captured  leader  of 
the  Dervishes,  and  he  continued  his  advance  the  same  day. 


FRENCH  WEST  AFRICA,  THE  SUDAN  AND  THE  SAHARA    121 

When  within  twelve  miles  of  Fashoda,  Kitchener  re- 
ceived on  September  19  a  letter  from  the  French  com- 
mander notifying  him  of  the  French  occupation  of  Bahr-el- 
Ghazal  and  the  Shillouks  country  from  the  confluence  of 
the  Bahr-el-Jebel  along  the  left  bank  of  the  White  Nile  to 
Fashoda.  He  reached  the  latter  place  the  same  day,  hoisted 
the  Egyptian  flag  on  the  old  Egyptian  fort,  five  hundred 
meters  from  the  French  flag,  and  protested  vigorously 
against  Marchand's  invasion  of  the  Khedive's  lands.  De- 
manding immediate  withdrawal,  Kitchener  asserted  that 
England  would  never  tolerate  the  occupation  of  any  part 
of  the  Nile  Valley  by  a  foreign  power.  Marchand  replied 
that  he  was  unable  to  oppose  the  raising  of  the  Egyptian 
flag,  but  that  he  was  acting  under  the  orders  of  the  French 
Government  and  could  not  leave  until  ordered  to  do  so 
officially.  Kitchener  left  a  garrison  at  Fashoda  and  pro- 
ceeded south  as  far  as  Sobat  reclaiming  the  country  for 
the  Khedive  of  Egypt ;  but  he  returned  soon  after,  inform- 
ing Marchand  that  the  whole  country  was  under  martial 
law  and  the  transport  of  munitions  of  war  was  forbidden, 
yet  offering  to  furnish  a  boat  and  escort  to  accompany  him 
down  the  river  to  Cairo. 

Meanwhile  the  news  of  the  encounter  at  Fashoda  was 
heralded  over  two  continents,  great  excitement  prevailed 
in  Paris  and  London,  and  a  lively  correspondence  ensued 
between  the  Foreign  Offices  of  both  countries.  A  discus- 
sion of  the  British  rights  in  Bahr-el-Ghazal,  started  by  a 
statement  of  Sir  E.  Grey  in  a  speech  before  the  Cham- 
ber of  Commerce  on  March  28,  1895,  to  the  effect  that 
England's  sphere  of  influence  based  on  the  rights  of  the 
Khedive  embraced  the  whole  of  the  Nile  Valley,  had  been 
carried  on  for  some  time  by  M.  Hanotaux  and  Lord  Kim- 
berley.  It  was  now  taken  up  vigorously  by  M.  Delcasse  and 
Lord  Salisbury.  The  French  claimed  that  they  had  never 


122    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

concurred  in  the  British  claim  to  all  of  the  Nile  Valley ; 
that  England  could  not  claim  lands  never  effectively  occu- 
pied by  her;  that  only  Egypt  could  rightfully  assert  any 
ownership  over  the  Upper  Nile;  and  that  the  successful 
revolt  of  the  Sudan  separated  that  country  distinctly  from 
the  Egyptian  possessions  and  gave  any  nation  the  right  to 
participate  in  the  reconquest  and  partition  of  it.  They  as- 
serted, moreover,  that  Major  Marchand  was  not  in  charge 
of  a  "  mission "  sent  out  by  the  French  Government  to 
seize  the  Upper  Nile  district,  but  an  "  envoye  de  la  civili- 
sation "  sent  out  by  M.  Liotard  to  assist  in  putting  an  end 
to  the  frightful  disturbances  and  misrule  of  the  Dervishes. 
They  were  pleased  with  the  successes  of  Lord  Kitchener 
and  very  desirous  of  avoiding  any  serious  difficulty  with 
England  ;  but  they  would  not  enter  upon  negotiations  until 
they  had  received  Marchand's  official  report,  and  then  only 
on  a  basis  of  an  equitable  division  of  Bahr-el-Ghazal.1 

The  British  consistently  and  firmly  refused  to  discuss 
the  matter  seriously  until  Marchand  should  be  recalled 
from  the  Upper  Nile.  They  asserted  that  Kitchener's  con- 
quest of  the  Sudan  revived  all  the  earlier  titles  of  the  Khe- 
dive of  Egypt  to  the  control  of  these  lands  which  had  been 
in  his  possession  since  the  early  days  of  the  nineteenth 
century ;  that  "  effective  occupation  "  was  a  vague  and  ill- 
defined  term  that  could  not  be  applied  in  Central  Africa 
as  it  is  used  in  Europe ;  and  that,  while  the  powers  de- 
clined to  recognize  Turkey's  claim  to  Tunis  in  1856  out 
of  courtesy  to  France,  nothing  was  said  at  that  time,  or  in 
1878,  as  to  the  integrity  of  lands  in  the  equatorial  regions 
acquired  after  1856.  Salisbury  was  ready  to  join  with 
France  in  the  delimitation  of  the  western  frontiers  of  the 

1  Correspondence  in  Arch.  Dip.,  1898,  vol.  n,  pt.  4,  pp.  22-72.  M.  Gabriel 
Ilanotaux  published  in  1909  a  little  book  entitled  Fachoda,  which  contains 
an  able  and  accurate  account  of  the  whole  episode,  from  the  French  point 
of  view. 


FRENCH  WEST  AFRICA,  THE  SUDAN  AND  THE  SAHARA     123 

Egyptian  Sudan,  and  assured  the  French  statesmen  that 
the  withdrawal  of  Marchand  would  in  no  way  compromise 
their  claims ;  but  he  declined  to  consider  any  division  of 
the  Bahr-el-Ghazal  district. 

While  this  discussion  was  in  progress,  the  British  for- 
warded a  message  from  M.  Delcasse  to  Major  Marchand, 
asking  for  his  report ;  and  in  October  one  of  his  officers, 
through  the  courtesy  and  assistance  of  the  British  officials, 
made  his  way  to  Paris  via  Cairo.  In  November,  Marchand 
received  instructions  to  withdraw  from  Fashoda  by  way 
of  the  Sobat  River  in  Abyssinia.  In  due  time  he  reached 
French  Somaliland  in  safety  and  arrived  in  Paris  toward 
the  end  of  May,  1899,  where  he  was  welcomed  with  a  great 
ovation.  But  the  fate  of  the  Upper  Nile  had  already  been 
definitely  determined  in  an  agreement  signed  by  Salisbury 
and  Paul  Cambon  on  March  21.1 

The  whole  frontier  between  the  French  possessions  in 
Central  Africa  and  the  British-Egyptian  spheres  of  influ- 
ence on  the  Nile  and  in  the  Sudan  was  carefully  worked 
out  in  this  treaty.  Bahr-el-Ghazal  and  the  old  province  of 
Dar-Fur  were  retained  for  Egypt ;  and  the  kingdom  of  the 
Ouadai  (Wadai),  with  the  two  valuable  oases  of  the  Tibesti 
and  Borku,  went  to  France.  By  this  arrangement  France 
rounded  out  her  Sahara  possessions  south  of  Tripoli,  joined 
them  securely  with  the  Lake  Chad  lands,  and  these  again 
with  the  Upper  Congo.  And  thus  a  definite  and  permanent 
connection  was  established  between  all  the  French  spheres 
of  influence  in  West,  Central,  and  South-Central  Africa. 

But  already  a  movement  was  on  foot  to  unite  politi- 
cally and  scientifically  these  separate  French  territories, 
by  means  of  three  special  and  thoroughly  equipped  expedi- 
tions. The  first,  known  as  the  "  Mission  Gentil "  after  its 

1  Arch.  Dip.,  1899,  vol.  i,  p.  210;  also  Supplement  to  Amer.  Jour,  of 
Internal.  Law,  1907,  vol.  i,  p.  425. 


124    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

leader,  left  Loango  in  the  French  Congo  on  July  27, 1895, 
and  proceeding  via  the  Congo,  Ubangi,  and  Kemo  Rivers, 
and  the  Baguirmi  and  Rabah  kingdoms,  reached  the  south- 
ern end  of  Lake  Chad  on  November  1,  1897.  Here  it 
remained  over  two  years  establishing  firmly  the  French 
suzerainty  over  the  entire  district  between  the  lake  and  the 
Rabah  kingdom.  The  "  Voulet-Chanoine  Mission  "  (changed 
later  to  the  "  Joalland-Meynier  Mission  "  because  of  the  in- 
subordination of  its  two  leaders)  left  northern  Dahomey 
in  February,  1897,  crossed  northern  Nigeria  taking  Zin- 
der  en  route  in  July,  1898  (where  the  gallant  Captain 
Cazemajou1  had  been  slain  in  the  previous  May),  and 
reached  the  western  shore  of  Lake  Chad  in  October,  1899. 
The  third  force,  "Mission  Foureau-Lamy,"  set  out  from 
Biskra  in  1898  and  crossed  the  Sahara  Desert  by  way  of 
Temassinin,  Tassili,  In-Azaoua,  Tadjen,  Air,  and  Aguellal, 
making  treaties  with  the  desert  chieftains  en  route.  They 
arrived  in  the  neighborhood  of  the  lake  early  in  1900. 
The  three  missions,  after  the  satisfactory  conclusion  of 
their  individual  tasks,  triumphantly  united  their  forces  at 
Mandjafa  on  April  11,  1900. 

Meanwhile,  the  French  protectorates  in  the  Sudan  and 
on  the  Guinea  and  Ivory  Coasts  were  being  effectively 
joined.  On  November  3, 1896,  the  French  occupied  Timbo 
by  force;  and  between  1896  and  1899,  Dr.  McLaud  and 
Captain  Salesses  explored  thoroughly  a  large  part  of  French 
Guinea  and  its  hinterland  with  a  view  to  railroad  construc- 
tion as  well  as  to  political  control.  And  Dr.  Noel  Ballay, 
who  was  Governor  of  the  colony  from  1891  to  1902,  estab- 
lished an  excellent  seaport  at  Konakry,  paid  great  attention 
to  the  trade  and  internal  development  of  the  province,  and 
made  strenuous  efforts  to  construct  a  railway  and  roads  that 

1  He  left  France  in  March,  1897,  to  explore  the  region  between  Lake  Chad 
and  Say,  north  of  Sokoto,  and  to  proceed  east  to  the  Wadai  country. 


FRENCH  WEST  AFRICA,  THE  SUDAN  AND  THE  SAHARA    125 

should  open  a  direct  connection  between  his  colony  and  the 
Upper  Niger. 

During  the  years  1895  to  1898,  Captains  Pobeguin, 
Marchand,  Blondiaux,  and  Closel  explored  all  the  hinter- 
land district  of  the  Ivory  Coast,  covering  the  country  be- 
tween Beyla  and  Tenindieri,  and  penetrating  into  Indenie. 
Finally,  Colonel  Audeou  resumed  operations  in  the  Cen- 
tral Sudan  and  occupied  Sikasso  on  May  1,  1898;  and 
Captains  Gouraud  and  Gaden  subdued  and  captured  Sa- 
mory,  the  Napoleon  of  the  Sudan,  who  was  transported 
to  the  Congo  where  he  died  on  June  2,  1900.  The  subjec- 
tion of  the  Sudan  was  now  complete  ;  and  in  1899  the  mis- 
sion of  Governor  Hostains  and  Lieutenant  D'Ollone  ex- 
plored and  surveyed  the  country  from  Bereby  via  Cavally 
to  Beyla,  where  they  joined  hands  with  the  mission  of 
Lieutenants  Woelfel  and  Mangin,  which  had  come  from 
Kong  to  the  northwestern  part  of  the  Ivory  Coast  colony 
by  way  of  Touba.  Thus  was  established  effective  connec- 
tion between  the  three  protectorates,  the  Sudan,  Guinea, 
and  the  Ivory  Coast. 

The  union  of  all  the  French  colonial  possessions  in  Africa 
was  now  accomplished ;  yet  four  things  remained  to  be 
done  before  this  union  could  be  said  to  be  permanent  and 
complete :  the  complete  pacification  of  the  Upper  Congo ; 
the  subjugation  of  Mauretania,  making  connection  between 
the  Senegal  and  Algeria  possible ;  the  extension  of  the 
French  control  over  the  Algerian  hinterland  and  the  cen- 
tral Sahara ;  and  the  establishment  of  proper  means  of 
communication  and  transport  between  the  various  parts  of 
this  colonial  empire.  The  first  of  these  was  speedily  accom- 
plished, during  the  years  1899-1901,  through  the  capture 
of  Dikoa  and  the  subjugation  of  the  kingdom  of  Eabah  by 
Commandant  Lamy  and  Captain  Dangeville  with  the  com- 
bined forces  of  the  three  missions. 


126    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

Several  attempts  were  made  to  penetrate  the  western 
Sahara,  notably  by  M.  Soleillet  in  1880,  by  Camille  Douls 
in  1887,  and  by  Fabert  between  1889  and  1893 ;  but  a 
successful  connection  of  these  territories  with  the  other 
French  protectorates  was  not  accomplished  until  Paul 
Blanchet  reached  Atar,  the  capital  of  Adrar  (T-Marr),  in 
1900.  On  June  27,  1900,  the  Sebkha  d'Idjil  was  added  in 
a  delimitation  treaty  with  Spain.  In  the  two  years  that 
followed,  the  French  power  was  firmly  established  in  the 
northern  portion  ;  and  in  1903  the  districts  of  Trarza  and 
Brakna,  just  north  of  Senegal,  were  taken  over.  Finally, 
the  whole  region  was  formed  into  the  Territory  of  Mau- 
retania  and  governed  by  a  commissioner. 

During  the  years  1859  to  1861,  Henri  Duveyrier  exe- 
cuted a  series  of  remarkable  explorations  covering  nearly 
the  whole  of  southern  Algeria  and  the  desert  immediately 
south  and  penetrating  as  far  into  the  central  Sahara  as  Gha- 
dames,  Ghat,  and  Zouila.  Then  came  a  number  of  unsuc- 
cessful attempts,  between  1873  and  1889,  to  establish  a 
direct  connection  between  southern  Algeria  and  the  Upper 
Niger  country  via  the  oases  of  the  central  Sahara.  Of  these 
the  "  Mission  Choisy "  penetrated  twelve  hundred  kilo- 
meters south  from  Laghouat;  and  the  ill-starred  "Mission 
Flatters,"  going  by  way  of  Biskra,  in  1879  and  1880, 
passed  beyond  Ouargla,  only  to  be  massacred  in  the  heart 
of  the  Sahara  by  the  Touaregs.  Two  natives  survived  and, 
after  incredible  experiences,  wandered  into  Biskra  with  the 
terrible  news.  In  1886,  Lieutenant  Palet  lost  his  life  in 
a  similar  expedition;  and  in  1889,  the  gifted  explorer, 
Camille  Douls,  perished. 

The  real  work  of  southern  expansion  in  the  central 
Sahara  was  begun  by  Fernand  Foureau,  probably  the 
greatest  of  the  Sahara  travelers,  who  explored  carefully  a 
number  of  routes  across  the  desert  between  the  years  1890 


FRENCH  WEST  AFRICA,  THE  SUDAN  AND  THE  SAHARA     127 

and  1894,  acquired  an  intimate  knowledge  of  the  leading 
oases  and  their  inhabitants,  and  extended  his  researches 
as  far  as  In-Salah  and  Air.  He  was  the  first  to  recognize 
the  strategic  importance  of  the  great  oases  of  In-Salah  and 
Tidikelt  as  a  key  to  the  control  of  the  Sahara ;  and  upon 
his  advice  the  French  decided  to  use  force  against  the 
Touaregs,  as  the  only  method  likely  to  give  them  control 
of  the  desert  and  to  furnish  security  for  life  and  property. 
"There  is  a  constant  succession  of  pillaging  forays,"  he 
wrote.  "  The  consequence  is,  that  the  Sahara  is  in  a  con- 
stant state  of  turmoil  and  insecurity;  murders,  theft,  pil- 
lage, and  ambushes  are  of  everyday  occurrence.  It  is  quite 
certain  that  this  state  of  things  must  stop  all  intercourse 
and  commerce  as  well  as  all  hope  of  exploring  the  country." 
Accordingly  the  forward  movement  of  the  French  forces 
began.  At  that  time,  1890,  the  outposts  were  El  Oued, 
Touggourt,  Ouargla,  Ghardaia,  and  Ain  Sefra.1  El  Golea 
and  Hassi  Inif el  were  now  occupied  and  fortified ;  and 
between  1892  and  1895  the  line  was  pushed  forward  one 
hundred  to  one  hundred  and  fifty  miles.  A  series  of  forts 
connecting  the  French  outposts  were  erected  and  the  rail- 
way extended  from  Ain  Sefra  to  Duveyrier.  In  1898, 
Foureau  with  Commandant  Lamy  set  out  on  the  great 
mission  which  was  to  bring  him  to  Lake  Chad  and  to  a 
junction  with  the  missions  from  Dahomey  and  the  Congo 
in  1900.  The  "Mission  Flamaud,"  two  columns  proceed- 
ing southeast  from  the  Sud-Oranais  and  occupying  the 
oases  of  Igli,  Gourara,  Aougerout,  and  Timminoun,  joined 
the  third,  coming  southwest  from  Algeria,  successfully  in 
securing  control  over  the  oases  of  Tidikelt,  Touat,  and  In- 
Salah,  in  May,  1900.  General  Serviere  occupied  Adghar  in 
Touat  during  August  of  the  same  year;  and  by  1901  he 
had  completed  the  subjection  of  the  whole  region  of  the 

1  See  map  on  p.  218. 


central  oases.  On  July  20  of  that  year,  the  Convention 
of  Figuig  was  signed  with  Morocco,  which  confirmed  these 
holdings  to  France,  awarded  Figuig  to  Morocco,  and  pro- 
vided for  a  cooperation  in  the  policing  of  the  Morocco- 
Oranais  frontier.  Thus  the  French  protection  over  the 
central  Sahara  and  a  direct  connection  with  the  Sudan  via 
the  desert  were  practically  complete. 

A  magnificent  colonial  empire  has  been  in  this  manner 
won  for  France.  The  lion's  share  of  West  Africa,  the  west- 
ern Sudan,  and  the  Sahara,  together  with  a  large  por- 
tion of  the  Congo  region,  have  passed  under  her  control. 
To  these  Morocco,  Algeria,  and  Tunis  are  now  joined,  so 
that  her  protection  extends  over  an  area  equal  to  that 
of  the  United  States  including  Alaska.  From  the  earlier 
experience  of  France  in  Algeria  and  the  Far  East,  it  was 
inferred  that  the  efforts  of  the  Republic  to  establish  a  suc- 
cessful administration  in  these  regions  would  more  than 
likely  end  in  failure.  But  the  world  has  been  happily  dis- 
appointed. The  twenty-five  years  of  progressive  and  en- 
lightened government,  just  passed,  have  demonstrated  that 
the  French  deserve  a  place  in  the  front  rank  of  the  world's 
greatest  colonizers.  Here  we  note  again  the  evidence  of  the 
new  spirit  of  progressive  and  triumphant  democracy  which 
came  to  life  with  the  new  Republic  in  1871,  and  which 
rejuvenated  the  French  nation,  awakened  the  ambition  of 
her  leaders,  saved  the  old  stagnant  colonies,  and  gave  her 
a  new  colonial  empire. 

The  work  of  unification  and  development  has  progressed 
steadily  and  intelligently.  In  1895,  the  whole  of  French 
West  Africa  was  brought  under  one  government  which  was 
still  further  systematized  in  1904.  A  governor-general  re- 
sponsible to  the  cabinet  in  Paris  rules  the  entire  district. 
Under  him  are  lieutentant-governors  who  administer  the 
colonies  of  Senegal,  Upper  Senegal  and  Niger,  French 


FRENCH  WEST  AFRICA,  THE  SUDAN  AND  THE  SAHARA     129 

Guinea,  Ivory  Coast,  and  Dahomey.  In  addition  there  are 
commissioners  superintending  the  five  circles  of  Maureta- 
nia,  that  portion  of  the  West  Sahara  reaching  from  the 
Morocco- Algerian  to  the  Senegal-Niger  frontier.  The  area 
thus  administered  amounts  to  more  than  2,300,000  square 
miles  and  has  a  population  of  about  9,000,000. 

By  the  use  of  native  troops  and  methods,  the  French 
have  succeeded  in  establishing  a  high  degree  of  order  and 
security.  In  the  colonies  of  Senegal  and  the  Upper  Senegal 
and  Niger,  excellent  roads  have  been  built  between  the 
important  centers  and  railways  run  from  Dakar  to  St. 
Louis  and  from  Kayes  on  the  Senegal  to  Koulikaro  (near 
Bamaku)  on  the  Niger  —  altogether  about  512  miles.  So  it 
is  now  possible  to  travel  by  rail  and  steamer  from  Europe 
to  Timbuctu.  Dakar,  connected  by  submarine  cable  with 
Brest,  is  fast  becoming  one  of  the  finest  harbors  on  the 
African  coast.  A  remarkable  system  of  telegraph  lines  has 
been  established,  extending  from  Dakar  as  far  as  Zinder  and 
Say  on  the  Niger,  and  connecting  with  the  Ivory  Coast  and 
with  Porto  Novo  on  the  Dahomey  coast.  In  1908,  France 
spent  over  $3,200,000  for  the  defense  and  development  of 
this  region.  A  uniform  system  of  education  was  introduced 
in  1903,  the  present  annual  expense  of  which  amounts  to 
$250,000  or  $300,000.  Some  ten  thousand  children  are 
regularly  enrolled,  of  whom  three  thousand  are  girls. 

Protection  and  increased  transportation  facilities  affected 
immediately  the  economic  condition  of  the  region;  and 
rapid  strides  have  been  made  in  the  development  of  nat- 
ural resources  and  in  the  increase  of  wealth.  In  1906,  the 
total  trade  of  French  West  Africa  reached  $18,000,000, 
of  which  the  French  enjoyed  about  $11,000,000. 

Southern  Algeria,  bordering  upon  an  uncertain  desert 
and  a  turbulent  Morocco,  has  been  the  source  of  consider- 
able trouble.  But  in  1905,  it  was  effectively  organized  into 


130    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

the  four  territories  of  Ain  Sefra,  Ghardaia,  Touggourt, 
and  the  Sahara  Oases.  Direct  communication  has  been  es- 
tablished between  the  oases  and  Algeria  on  the  one  hand, 
and  the  colony  of  Upper  Senegal  and  Niger  on  the  other. 
And  the  entire  region  is  thoroughly  policed  by  the  assist- 
ance of  friendly  native  tribes  and  the  "  Meharis,"  the  camel 
police.  In  1905,  Professor  E.  F.  Gautier,  of  the  College  of 
Arts  in  Algiers,  crossed  the  desert  from  Figuig  to  Gao 
on  the  Niger  —  a  distance  of  thirteen  hundred  miles  — 
unattended  except  by  a  guide  and  a  servant.  He  was  sur- 
veying the  path  of  the  new  telegraph  line  which  is  being 
constructed  to  connect  Algeria  with  the  Senegal -Niger 
country.  It  is  now  proposed  to  establish  wireless  stations 
at  the  chief  centers.  Thus  the  great  Sahara  has  been  con- 
quered and  French  North,  West,  and  Central  Africa  per- 
manently united.  There  remains  only  the  eastern  Sahara, 
the  Bornu-Wadai  regions.  These  are  under  military  rule, 
and  France  and  England  are  actively  engaged  at  this  very 
time  in  making  secure  the  Wadai-Dar-Fur  boundary. 


CHAPTER  VII 

NIGERIAN   ENTERPRISE 

BRITISH  NIGERIA,  embracing  some  335,500  square  miles 
of  territory  with  a  population  of  over  17, 000,000,  has  been 
characterized  by  the  London  Times,  as  "  the  only  British 
dependency  in  any  part  of  the  world,  which  approaches  the 
Indian  Empire  in  magnitude  and  variety."1  It  lies  on  the 
West  Coast  wholly  within  the  tropics,  and  possesses  an 
area  equal  to  that  of  the  German  Empire,  Italy,  and  Hol- 
land combined,  densely  populated  with  intelligent  and  pro- 
gressive peoples,  and  richly  endowed  by  nature  with  a  va- 
riety of  soil,  favorable  climatic  conditions  and  economic 
resources.  Although  this  wonderful  basin  of  the  Niger  and 
its  tributaries  was  known  to  the  people  of  ancient  times 
and  referred  to  by  the  historian  Herodotus  twenty-five  hun- 
dred years  ago,  it  has  been  one  of  the  latest  portions  of 
Africa  to  be  opened  to  the  European  world.  Its  history, 
however,  is  as  fascinating  as  it  is  unique. 

It  has  been  shown  above  2  how  the  upper  waters  of  the 
Niger  had  been  discovered  and  explored  by  Mungo  Park, 
Major  Denham,  and  Captain  Clapperton,  and  how  the 
brothers  Lander  —  Richard  and  John  —  had  paddled  down 
this  solitary  but  majestic  stream  from  Boussa  to  its  delta 
during  1830  and  1831,  demonstrating  at  last  that  its  out- 

1  The  writer  is  here  speaking  of  dependencies,  not  of  colonies.  He  is  also 
laboring1  under  the  impression  prevalent  for  so  many  years  that  Nigeria  was 
from  600,000  to  1,000,000  square  miles  in  area.   British  East  Africa  and 
Uganda  together,  Rhodesia,  and  the  Anglo-Egyptian  Sudan,  all  exceed  it  in 
area,  but  cannot  be  compared  with  it  in  density  of  population  and  fertility 
of  soil. 

2  Chapter  i,  Introduction. 


132    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

let  was  in  the  Bight  of  Benin.  In  1832  and  1841,  two  ill- 
starred  expeditions  were  organized  and  sent  to  explore  and 
trade  on  the  Lower  Niger,  but  returned  with  a  loss  of  from 
thirty  to  sixty  per  cent  of  their  crews  and  little  profit. 
MacGregor  Laird — the  energetic  Liverpool  merchant  and 
chief  promoter  of  these  enterprises  —  was  not  discouraged ; 
but  fathered  a  third  well-equipped  party  of  scientific  and 
experienced  men,  under  the  direction  of  Dr.  William  B. 
Baikie  in  1854.  This  went  out  in  the  Pleiad,  carrying 
some  missionaries  and  a  mixed  cargo,  and  explored  the 
Lower  Niger  and  the  Benue  successfully.  From  1857  to 
1864  a  consular  agent  —  Dr.  Baikie  —  was  maintained  at 
Lokoja  (at  the  confluence  of  the  Niger  and  the  Benue),1 
and  a  number  of  companies  began  to  send  ships  there  at 
irregular  intervals ;  but  no  real  progress  was  made  by  the 
British  in  developing  the  trade  of  the  region  till  the  sev- 
enties. 

In  1877,  Mr.  George  Goldie  Taubman  (now  Sir  George 
T.  Goldie)  accompanied  an  exploring  expedition  to  the  Niger. 
He  soon  saw  the  fallacy  of  attempting  to  create  a  prosper- 
ous trade  through  the  medium  of  a  few  poorly  equipped 
trading  posts  and  of  a  number  of  weak  and  rival  trading 
corporations,  engaged  in  a  cutthroat  competition,  yet  unable 
to  maintain  a  steady  intercourse  with  the  chief  trade  cen- 
ters. These  steamship  companies  possessed  neither  the  cap- 
ital, the  resources,  nor  the  influence  requisite  for  the  open- 
ing of  such  a  large  territory  to  the  commerce  of  the  world. 
After  considerable  manipulation,  he  succeeded,  two  years 
later,  in  uniting  all  the  various  interests  on  the  Niger  into 
one  organization,  known  as  the  "  United  African  Company," 
with  a  capital  amounting  approximately  to  <£125,000. 

Its  success  was  rapid.  A  regular  system  of  trading  sta- 
tions was  established  and  a  fair-sized  fleet  of  ships  was  kept 

1  See  map  on  p.  151. 


NIGERIAN  ENTERPRISE  133 

busy  on  a  regular  schedule  between  Great  Britain,  the  West 
Coast,  and  the  Niger.  The  agents  of  the  company  performed 
excellent  service,  not  only  in  developing  trade,  but  also  in 
maintaining  order,  protecting  traders  and  missionaries,  and 
in  securing  treaties  from  the  native  chiefs.  The  British 
Government,  finding  that  the  new  corporation,  with  com- 
mendable zeal,  intelligence,  and  resourcefulness,  was  suc- 
ceeding in  keeping  open  the  trade  routes,  stopping  the  slave 
trade,  and  preventing  civil  strife  among  the  natives  by 
the  promise  of  British  protection,  began  to  subsidize  it.  In 

1881,  the  capital  was  increased  to  Xl,000,000 ;  and  in 

1882,  the  firm  was  reorganized  as  the  "  National  African 
Company,"  for  the  purpose  of  securing  greater  efficiency 
and  of  extending  its  operations  into  the  vast  region  north 
of  Lokoja. 

The  interests  of  two  French  corporations  which,  attracted 
by  the  success  of  the  British  organization,  had  established 
stations  on  the  Niger  were  bought  out  in  1884.  Treaties 
were  concluded  with  the  chieftains  of  Nupe,  Sokoto  (1885), 
and  Boussa ;  and  British  trade  and  authority  were  carried 
energetically  into  the  northern  districts.  Meantime,  the 
British  consul,  Hewitt,  was  engaged  in  making  treaties 
with  the  chiefs  of  the  Oil  Rivers  district  and  competing 
with  the  Germans  along  the  Cameroon  border.  And  the 
French  explorers  from  Senegal  reached  Bamaku  on  the 
Upper  Niger  about  the  same  time,  and  began  a  work 
of  expansion  northward  toward  Timbuctu.  Great  Britain, 
at  length,  under  the  pressure  of  these  French  and  German 
activities,  realized  the  necessity  of  formulating  a  definite 
policy  of  expansion  in  West  Africa,  and  of  marking  out 
promptly  the  future  field  of  her  operations.  She  had  been 
in  no  haste  to  enter  upon  a  race  for  territory  in  West  Af- 
rica. Many  of  her  statesmen  were  strongly  opposed  to  any 
further  acquisitions  in  that  region  ;  but  the  march  of  events 


134     INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

and  the  rise  of  unforeseen  circumstances  were  slowly  but 
surely  forcing  the  British  Government  into  the  path  of  ex- 
pansion. In  1873,  the  first  Ashanti  war  had  led  the  impe- 
rial authorities  into  an  extension  of  their  authority  into  the 
hinterland  of  the  British  Gold  Coast  colony ;  and  in  1882, 
competition  between  the  French  and  English  colonists  in 
West  Africa  forced  them  to  join  with  the  French  in  delim- 
iting the  northern  boundary  of  Sierra  Leone,  as  far  in- 
land as  the  head  waters  of  the  Mellicouri  and  Great  Scarcies 
Rivers.  And  now,  in  order  to  reap  the  results  of  the  efforts 
of  the  National  African  Company  and  to  protect  her  in- 
terests on  the  Niger,  a  British  protectorate  was  proclaimed 
on  June  5,  1885,1  over  the  coast  region  extending  from 
the  river  Benin  (eastern  boundary  of  Lagos)  to  the  west 
bank  of  the  Rio  del  Rey,  and  the  hinterland  reaching  to 
Lokoja  at  the  confluence  of  the  Niger  and  the  Benue,  and 
to  Ibi  on  the  Benue.  And  in  1886  the  English  Govern- 
ment recognized  the  work  of  the  company  officially,  ap- 
pointing it  their  legal  agent  by  a  royal  charter2  issued  to 
that  corporation  under  the  name  of  the  "  Royal  Niger  Com- 
pany," which  it  still  bears. 

The  entire  region  mentioned  in  the  official  declaration  of 
the  Niger  protectorate  was  placed  at  first  under  the  juris- 
diction of  the  new  company,  together  with  any  territory  to 
the  north  that  they  might  acquire  in  the  future.  In  August, 
1891,  the  Oil  Rivers  district  and  the  trading  posts  of  the 
coast  section  were  organized  into  the  "Oil  River  Protecto- 
rate" under  an  Imperial  Commissioner,  which  changed  its 
name  to  the  "Niger  Coast  Protectorate"  in  May,  1893. 
This  was  extended  in  1899  north  as  far  as  Idah  on  the 
Niger  —  280  miles  from  the  coast — under  the  title  of  the 
"Southern  Nigerian  Protectorate"3  which,  in  July,  1901, 

1  Brit,  and  For.  St.  Papers,  vol.  76,  p.  978. 

2  Ibid.,  vol.  77,  p.  1022.  8  Ibid.,  vol.  91,  pp.  1140-55. 


NIGERIAN  ENTERPRISE  135 

was  added  to  the  colony  of  Lagos ; l  and  finally  on  Febru- 
ary 16,  1906,  the  two  districts  were  incorporated  in  the 
colony  of  southern  Nigeria.2  The  Oil  River  and  Niger  Coast 
Protectorates  were  first  ruled  by  commissioners  or  consuls, 
Lagos  by  a  Colonial  Governor,  and  northern  Nigeria  by 
the  chartered  company.  Thus  we  have  in  Nigeria  an  excel- 
lent example  of  the  three  ways  in  which  Britain  governed 
her  possessions  —  consular  jurisdiction,  chartered  companies, 
and  the  Colonial  Office.  "The  raw  material  is  worked  into 
shape  by  the  Foreign  Office  until  the  time  arrives  when  the 
finer  processes  of  the  Colonial  Office  are  applicable,"  once  re- 
marked a  noted  British  statesman,  in  explaining  this  process. 
"Chartered  companies  in  Africa,"  writes  The  /Scotsman, 
"  as  elsewhere,  have  been  the  best  pioneers  of  British  com- 
merce and  authority."  The  Royal  Niger  Company  was  no 
exception.  It  was  given  political  as  well  as  commercial 
powers,  and  held  responsible  for  the  control  of  the  river 
traffic  which  England  at  the  Berlin  Conference  of  1885 
promised  to  administer  equitably.  In  addition,  the  company 
was  granted  full  jurisdiction  over  all  British  and  foreigners 
in  the  country,  and  authorized  to  make  treaties  with  the 
chieftains,  protect  natives,  abolish  the  slave  trade,  and  pro- 
mote British  interests.  It  was,  however,  permitted  no  trade 
monopoly ;  and,  although  allowed  to  collect  customs  dues 
on  imports  and  exports  amounting  to  about  two  per  cent 
and  taxes  which  in  time  reached  £90,000  a  year,  it  had  to 
pay  its  share  of  the  governmental  expenses.  "Ours  is  the 
only  chartered  company  of  our  time,"  exclaimed  the  chair- 
man at  the  annual  meeting  of  1897,  "  which  is  forbidden 
to  earn  profits  on  its  capital  out  of  customs  duties  or  other 
taxation ;  the  entire  revenues  so  raised  having  to  be  ex- 
pended for  public  purposes." 

1  Brit,  and  Far.  St.  Papers,  vol.  94,  pp.  194-95. 

2  Ibid.,  vol.  99,  pp.  398-402. 


136    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

An  Agent-General  with  an  executive  staff  and  a  Chief 
Justice  were  appointed  to  administer  the  affairs  of  state 
and  the  department  of  justice,  consisting  of  one  high  and 
several  lower  courts.  A  native  constabulary  consisting 
chiefly  of  Hausas  was  created,  numbering  at  first  four 
hundred,  but  soon  increased  to  one  thousand ;  while  a  fleet 
of  vessels  kept  communication  open  for  hundreds  of  miles 
along  the  Niger  and  its  tributaries.  But  wherever  possible 
the  country  was  ruled  through  the  native  chiefs  and  their 
assistants ;  and  local  customs,  languages,  and  methods  were 
preserved. 

The  success  of  the  company  was  remarkable.  Almost 
from  the  start,  by  skillful  financial  management  the  enter- 
prise was  made  to  pay,  the  natives  were  well  cared  for,  and 
British  interests  actively  promoted.  By  1888,  some  275 
treaties  had  been  signed  with  local  rulers  giving  the  Royal 
Niger  Company  control  over  all  the  territory  along  the 
Benue  to  Yola,  the  Lower  and  Middle  Niger,  and  one  thou- 
sand miles  into  the  interior  —  as  far  as  the  states  of  Borgu, 
Gando,  and  Sokoto.  Approximately  500,000  square  miles 
were  placed  under  the  protection  of  the  British  flag  by  the 
agents  of  the  company;  but  this  vast  area  was  materially 
reduced  later  by  the  Franco-British  treaty  of  1898.  A  sys- 
tem of  forts  and  interior  patrols,  antedating  the  scheme 
proposed  at  the  Brussels  Conference  of  1890,  was  inaugu- 
rated, which  proved  most  effective  in  stopping  slave  raids 
and  in  promoting  trade.  Yet  sterner  measures  were  neces- 
sary, as  will  soon  be  seen,  before  the  slave  trade  could  be 
exterminated ;  and  the  competition  with  other  European 
states  along  the  borders  had  to  be  eliminated  before  the 
country  could  be  effectively  organized  and  security  firmly 
established. 

In  1886,  a  line  was  drawn  from  the  Rio  del  Rey  north- 
east to  a  point  on  the  Benue  a  little  east  of  Yola,  to  mark 


NIGERIAN  ENTERPRISE  137 

the  boundary  between  British  Nigeria  and  the  German 
Cameroons.  A  sharp  competition  ensued  for  the  Adamaua 
country  at  the  end  of  this  line,  which  was  finally  ended  in 
1893  by  the  delimitation  of  a  line  from  the  vicinity  of  Tola 
to  Lake  Chad,  giving  both  powers  an  entrance  to  the  lake 
and  assigning  the  most  of  the  Adamaua  district  to  Ger- 
many. In  1890,  England  and  France  marked  out  the  lim- 
its of  their  respective  spheres  of  influence  in  the  Niger 
country,  by  a  line  drawn  from  Say  on  the  Upper  Niger  to 
Lake  Chad.  It  has  been  shown  above1  how  active  the  French 
were  on  the  West  Coast,  and  how  a  contest  arose  over  the 
possession  of  Nupe,  Boussa,  and  Borgu  on  the  Niger- 
Dahomey  border,  which  was  amicably  adjusted  in  the  An- 
glo-French treaty  of  June,  1898. 

Therefore,  by  1898,  the  Royal  Niger  Company  was  free 
to  organize  and  develop  the  country  in  its  own  way.  This 
work  had  already  been  started  in  the  southern  districts  in 
an  efficient  and  methodical  manner.  In  1897,  the  Moham- 
medan Emir  of  Nupe,  who  had  ignored  the  messages  of  the 
British  Resident  and  continued  his  slave  raids  and  oppres- 
sion, was  captured  in  Bida,  his  capital,  by  Sir  George 
Goldie  and  550  men.  He  was  promptly  deposed  ;  and  his 
son,  promising  obedience  to  Great  Britain,  was  installed 
ruler  in  his  stead.  The  southern  and  pagan  portion  of  the 
state  was  removed  from  his  control  to  that  of  the  company, 
the  people  freed  from  oppression,  and  slavery  abolished. 
The  Mohammedan  Emir  of  Ilorin  was  next  threatened  with 
the  same  fate;  but  he  hurriedly  made  his  submission,  and 
signed  a  tready  with  Sir  George.  In  1898,  Colonel  Frederick 
Lugard  came  out  with  a  number  of  assistants  and  organ- 
ized the  military  forces.  The  Hausas,  particularly,  made 
excellent  soldiers  and  soon  Lugard  had  two  battalions  of  in- 
fantry, two  batteries  and  one  company  of  engineers  well 
1  Chapter  vi,  ante. 


188    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

drilled  and  in  active  service.  The  next  two  years  were  oc- 
cupied by  the  company  in  consolidating  their  holdings  and 
in  peaceful  organization. 

The  work  of  the  Royal  Niger  Company  thus  far  had  been 
admirable.  In  addition  to  securing  an  immense  territory 
for  Great  Britain,  it  had  created  the  basis  for  a  great  com- 
mercial development ;  pacified  the  country  by  freeing  a  large 
portion  of  it  from  slave  raids  and  the  incubus  of  tyranny 
and  ignorance ;  established  communication  from  the  coast 
to  Sokoto ;  and  laid  the  foundations  of  an  efficient  govern- 
ment. All  this  had  been  accomplished  without  serious  blood- 
shed, without  injury  to  the  country  or  its  inhabitants,  and 
without  arousing  the  hostility  of  any  large  proportion  of 
the  varied  population  of  the  region.  There  remained,  how- 
ever, much  to  be  done  and  many  intricate  problems  to  be 
solved.  In  large  sections  of  northern  Nigeria  the  submis- 
sion of  the  chiefs  was  still  merely  nominal,  the  people  war- 
like and  restless.  The  whole  of  the  North  had  yet  to  be 
consolidated  under  one  administration ;  the  entire  country 
to  be  unified  by  roads,  railways,  and  trade  routes ;  and  sev- 
eral delicate  international  questions  to  be  solved. 

The  British  Government  was,  however,  convinced  that 
the  time  had  arrived  for  it  to  take  over  the  direct  adminis- 
tration of  northern  Nigeria.  Accordingly,  on  June  15, 1899, 
after  the  conclusion  of  the  Franco-British  treaties  of  June, 
1898,  and  March  21,  1899,  Lord  Salisbury,  in  a  note  to 
the  Treasury,  expressed  the  desire  of  the  Government  to 
relieve  the  company  of  its  political  powers.  The  matter  was 
immediately  taken  up  with  Sir  George  Goldie  and  an  agree- 
ment reached  on  June  30.  The  charter  was  canceled  j1  and 
arrangements  were  made  for  the  imperial  authorities  to  take 

1  The  revocation  of  the  charter  was  announced  in  an  Order  in  Council, 
dated  Angnst  9,  1899,  authorizing  payments  to  the  company  not  to  exceed 
in  all  £865,000.  The  official  notice  of  the  revocation  of  the  charter  appeared 
on  December  28,  1899.  Brit,  and  For.  St.  Papers,  vol.  91,  pp.  124  and  1031. 


NIGERIAN  ENTERPRISE  139 

control  on  January  1,  1900.  The  British  Government  ac- 
quired all  war  materials,  administrative  buildings  and  posts, 
steamers,  wharves,  and  other  property  designated  for  the 
public  service ;  and  it  was  assigned  the  benefits  of  all  trea- 
ties, and  of  land  and  mining  rights.  The  company  was  per- 
mitted to  retain  all  its  commercial  privileges,  plants,  stations, 
and  accessories,  was  paid  X150,000  for  the  rights  sur- 
rendered (in  addition  to  X300,000  refunded  for  sums  ad- 
vanced for  the  development  of  the  country),  and  was  to 
receive  one  half  of  the  mining  royalties  for  ninety-nine 
years.  The  public  debt  of  Nigeria,  together  with  the  an- 
nual interest  charges,  was  assumed  by  the  Imperial  Gov- 
ernment. Thus,  after  fourteen  years  of  progressive  and 
efficient  service  as  a  public  servant,  the  Royal  Niger  Com- 
pany reverted  to  its  original  position  as  a  commercial  enter- 
prise. 

The  whole  region  north  of  Idah  on  the  Niger  was  now 
incorporated  in  the  protectorate  of  northern  Nigeria,  and, 
together  with  the  two  protectorates  of  Lagos  (including 
the  old  colony  and  protectorate  of  the  same  name  extend- 
ing north  to  Borgu)  and  of  southern  Nigeria,  was  placed 
under  the  Colonial  Office.  Each  sphere  was  to  have  its  own 
commissioner,  or  governor,  and  a  separate  administration. 
In  1901,  however,  Lagos  and  southern  Nigeria  were  placed 
under  one  administrator ;  and,  in  1906,  both  were  incor- 
porated into  one  protectorate  having  three  provinces  and 
known  as  southern  Nigeria.  The  general  policy  of  the  new 
regime  included  free  trade  (except  in  northern  Nigeria, 
where  all  traffic  in  firearms  and  liquors  was  forbidden), 
abstention  from  all  direct  taxes  (for  some  time  at  least), 
abolition  of  slave  raids,  noninterference  with  native  relig- 
ions and  customs,  and  rule  through  the  cooperation  of  native 
rulers  and  chiefs. 

Colonel  Lugard  was  appointed  the  first  High  Commis- 


140    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

sioner  of  northern  Nigeria;  and  he  set  to  work  at  once  to 
organize  an  efficient  administration  which  should  embrace 
the  entire  region.1  The  company  had  kept  very  largely  to 
the  chief  waterways,  and  the  territory,  now  taken  under 
direct  control  by  the  British  authorities,  extended  from 
Idah  to  Boussa  on  the  Niger  and  from  Idah  to  Lau  on  the 
Benue.  It  was  divided  into  nine  provinces,  over  each  of 
which  was  placed  a  British  officer,  known  as  a  "  Resident." 
Some  of  these  provinces  were  as  large  as  Scotland,  and  the 
difficulties  of  administration  were  enormous.  The  Resident, 
who  had  only  one  or  two  English  and  several  native  assist- 
ants, was  expected  to  preserve  law  and  order ;  hear  all  com- 
plaints and  investigate  all  crimes ;  to  superintend  the  police, 
transportation,  sanitation,  and  the  erection  of  all  public 
buildings ;  to  administer  the  provincial  accounts  and  reve- 
nue; to  get  off  the  daily  mail,  including  reports  on  native 
statistics,  languages,  and  customs;  to  map  and  become 
familiar  with  the  conditions  and  resources  of  his  province ; 
and  to  encourage  trade  and  agriculture. 

The  whole  staff  for  northern  Nigeria  at  first  consisted  of 
but  eighty-five  men,  including  secretaries,  treasurers,  doc- 
tors, and  marines,  of  whom  only  fifty-seven  were  on  duty  at 
any  one  time,  owing  to  the  established  rule  that  a  year's 
service  in  West  Africa  be  followed  by  a  six  months'  leave, 
on  account  of  the  climate  and  unfavorable  local  conditions. 
By  utilizing  the  local  chiefs  and  natives,  it  proved  possible 
to  administer  a  province  with  from  ten  to  seventeen  men, 
where  ordinarily  three  hundred  would  have  been  necessary. 
Proclamations  were  speedily  issued  by  the  High  Commis- 
sioner, with  the  approval  of  the  Crown,  forbidding  foreign- 
ers to  acquire  land  from  natives  without  the  consent  of  the 

1  For  the  pacification  and  organization  of  Northern  Nigeria,  see  the  North. 
Nig.  Annual  Reports,  1900  to  1909,  1910  to  1911,  and  Orr,  The  Making  of 
Northern  Nigeria,  191 1 ;  an  excellent  account  hy  an  officer  in  the  political 


NIGERIAN  ENTERPRISE  141 

Government,  establishing  a  system  of  courts,  prohibiting 
the  sale  of  liquors  and  firearms,  and  forbidding  the  enslave- 
ment of  any  person  after  April  1,  1901. 

The  Royal  Niger  Company  had  directed  its  affairs  from 
Lokoja  and  Jebba ;  but  a  suitable  site  for  an  administrative 
capital  was  now  selected  at  Zungeru,  ten  miles  from  the 
Kaduna  branch  of  the  Niger,  and  in  a  fairly  central  loca- 
tion for  all  northern  Nigeria.  It  also  had  the  advantage  of 
being  in  one  of  the  disaffected  districts;  and  the  High  Com- 
missioner was  thus  enabled  to  keep  a  close  personal  watch 
upon  one  of  the  least  trustworthy  native  rulers.  Within 
three  years  several  comfortable  and  serviceable  administra- 
tive buildings  had  been  erected  and  a  light  railway  built 
down  to  the  river,  the  headquarters  of  the  Government 
being  permanently  moved  to  Zungeru  in  September,  1902. 

The  British  authorities  desired  to  establish  a  strictly 
civil  administration  as  rapidly  as  possible  throughout  the 
country.  The  Residents  were  instructed  to  get  in  touch  with 
the  people,  win  their  confidence,  and  aid  them  as  far  as 
practicable  to  rule  themselves.  In  a  number  of  instances, 
however,  military  officials  and  garrisons  had  to  be  main- 
tained in  the  provinces,  owing  to  the  restlessness  of  the 
natives  and  unsettled  conditions.  In  some  of  the  outlying 
states,  prominent  and  corrupt  native  rulers,  who  had  defied 
the  officials  of  the  company,  continued  to  ignore  the  over- 
tures and  demands  of  the  administrators  of  the  new  Pro- 
tectorate. Their  lands  lay  for  the  most  part  either  along 
the  main  trade  routes  or  in  the  vicinity  of  the  chief  markets 
of  the  North ;  and  they  were  a  constant  menace  to  the  peace 
and  security  of  the  country  on  account  of  their  slave-raid- 
ing expeditions  and  attacks  upon  the  caravans.  It  was, 
therefore,  imperative,  not  only  to  insure  the  abolition  of 
the  slave  trade,  but  also  to  protect  life  and  property  and 
to  establish  respect  for  British  authority,  that  these  refrac- 


142    INTERVENTION  AND   COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

tory  chieftains  be  brought  under  control.  Particularly  was 
it  necessary  that  the  Sultan  of  Sokoto  should  be  forced  to 
submit  to  British  suzerainty,  since  he  was  the  recognized 
overlord  of  all  the  Emirs  of  northern  Nigeria. 

The  constabulary  of  the  Niger  Company  was  incorporated 
in  the  West  African  Frontier  Police,  which  was  reorganized 
by  Colonel  Lugard  and  raised  to  over  one  thousand  men. 
From  the  spring  to  the  autumn  of  1901,  Sir  Frederick  was 
called  away  to  assist  in  putting  down  a  rising  in  Ashanti- 
land,  and  compelled  to  take  a  large  portion  of  his  new  force 
with  him ;  but  by  the  end  of  the  year  he  was  back  and 
ready  for  action.  His  first  move  was  in  December  against 
the  Emir  of  Bida,  who,  since  his  expulsion  by  the  company 
in  1897,  had  returned  and  secured  control  of  the  government 
of  Nupe,  and  the  Emir  of  Kontagora — a  notorious  "de- 
stroyer" (slave-hunter)  and  tyrant.  The  lands  of  these 
two  chieftains  lay  on  both  sides  of  the  main  caravan  route 
between  the  great  trade  mart  of  Kano  and  the  Middle  Niger, 
which  must  be  kept  open  and  safe.  These  rulers  had,  more- 
over, been  defying  the  Government  and  devastating  the 
country  during  the  absence  of  the  troops.  In  January, 
1902,  Kontagora  was  taken  and  the  forces  of  its  Emir  dis- 
persed without  difficulty,  but  he  unfortunately  escaped  cap- 
ture. In  spite  of  the  peaceful  overtures  of  the  British  com- 
mander, the  Emir  of  Bida  fled  without  waiting  for  Lugard 
to  approach  his  capital.  He  was  deposed  soon  after;  and 
the  chief,  .formerly  installed  by  the  Niger  Company,  re- 
appointed  in  his  place.  Garrisons  were  left  temporarily  in 
both  states  and  a  Resident  at  Bida. 

The  people  everywhere  made  demonstrations  of  delight 
at  the  overthrow  of  these  well-known  despots;  but  the 
British  authorities  were  careful  not  to  be  led  astray  from 
their  established  policy  of  maintaining  everywhere  members 
of  the  ruling  families  on  the  thrones  of  the  different  states. 


NIGERIAN  ENTERPRISE  143 

The  Mohammedan  Fulani,  who  had  secured  the  sovereign 
power  over  the  pagan  blacks  throughout  northern  Nigeria, 
had  amply  demonstrated  their  political  sagacity  and  ability. 
If  only  they  could  be  properly  advised  and  the  abuses  of 
their  rule  corrected,  their  natural  genius  for  administration 
would  render  their  services  of  inestimable  value,  both  to 
their  country  and  to  the  British.  Sir  Frederick  urged  the 
Residents  everywhere  to  "utilize  their  wonderful  intelli- 
gence, for  they  are  born  rulers  and  incomparably  above  the 
negroid  races  in  ability." 

The  next  move  was  against  the  Emir  of  Yola, — four 
hundred  miles  up  the  Benue  River, — the  most  notorious 
slave-raider  on  that  branch  of  the  Niger,  where  whole  dis- 
tricts lay  desolate  from  his  depredations.  He  had  refused 
to  permit  the  Niger  Company  to  trade  within  his  territory, 
and  finally  compelled  them  in  1901  to  take  down  their  flag 
from  the  old  hulk  in  the  river  which  served  as  a  trading 
post.  In  September  of  the  same  year,  however,  the  High 
Commissioner  sent  an  expedition  of  four  hundred  men 
against  him,  which  took  his  capital,  in  spite  of  a  spirited 
resistance,  and  set  up  a  legal  heir  in  his  place. 

Meanwhile,  the  neighboring  state  of  Bornu  had  become 
a  scene  of  conflict  and  anarchy.  Rabah,  —  one  of  the  ablest 
lieutenants  of  Zubeir  Pasha  in  the  Sudan, — after  the  over- 
throw there  of  the  slave-holding  Sheiks  led  by  Zubeir's  son, 
Suleiman,  through  the  genius  of  Gessi  Pasha,  had  formed 
a  kingdom  of  his  own  on  the  Dar-Fur-Wadai  border.  In 
1891,  he  came  into  conflict  with  the  French;  and,  after 
some  reverses  moved  into  Bornu,  where  he  slew  the  reign- 
ing Sheik  and  made  himself  ruler.  Rabah  took  up  his 
residence  at  first  in  the  chief  town, — Kuka, — but  later 
moved  to  Dikoa  within  the  German  sphere.  While  here, 
he  again  incurred  the  enmity  of  the  French  by  attacking 
the  expedition  of  M.  Gentil,  then  on  its  way  to  connect  the 


144     INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

French  Congo  with  Lake  Chad  and  to  set  up  a  protector- 
ate in  Wadai.  This  was  some  time  before  definite  boun- 
daries had  been  set  up  between  the  French,  British,  and 
German  spheres  of  influence  about  Bornu ;  and  the  British 
had  not  yet  assumed  control  there.  So  the  French,  after  the 
three  expeditions  sent  out  to  unify  the  French  possessions 
in  West  Africa,  the  Sahara,  and  the  Congo,  had  success- 
fully joined  hands  near  Lake  Chad,  pursued  Kabah  and 
dealt  a  crushing  blow  to  his  forces  in  a  well-directed  at- 
tack, in  the  course  of  which  the  adventurous  Sheik  lost 
his  life. 

His  son,  a  gifted  and  forceful  character  named  Fadr- 
el-Allah,  succeeded  him,  but  finally  withdrew  into  the  in- 
terior of  Bornu  and  asked  for  British  protection.  Sir 
Frederick  Lugard,  who  had  been  watching  the  maneuvres 
with  great  interest,  sent  an  officer  to  interview  him  in  June, 
1 901 ;  but  while  these  negotiations  were  in  progress,  the 
Arab  leader  became  again  involved  in  a  struggle  with  the 
French.  They  pursued  him  one  hundred  and  sixty  miles 
within  the  British  territory,  and  defeated  his  army  in  an 
eight-hour  engagement  near  Gujba.  Fadr-el- Allah  was  slain 
in  the  conflict  and  his  brother,  with  the  remnant  of  the 
forces,  compelled  to  surrender  two  days  later.  Five  thousand 
Bornu  natives,  who  had  been  enslaved  as  captives  during 
the  wars  of  Rabah  and  his  son,  were  freed  immediately ; 
and  the  French  thereupon  retired  to  their  own  country. 

The  High  Commissioner  at  length  sent  Colonel  Morland 
with  five  hundred  men  into  the  Bornu  country  in  February, 
1902,  to  investigate  the  situation.  En  route,  the  column 
made  a  special  detour  through  the  state  of  Bauchi  to  depose 
its  Emir,  who  had  been  a  slave-hunter,  and  who  had  caused 
great  suffering  among  the  pagan  tribes  under  him.  His  son 
was  installed  in  his  place  and  given  a  Resident  with  a  garri- 
son to  assist  him.  A  little  farther  on,  a  usurper  named  Mai- 


NIGERIAN  ENTERPRISE  145 

lam  Jibrella,  who  had  proclaimed  himself  a  Mahdi,  killed 
the  Mohammedan  ruler  of  Gombe  in  1894,  and  seized  the 
most  of  his  lands,  attempted  to  bar  the  progress  of  the  ex- 
pedition. His  forces  were  easily  dispersed,  however,  Jibrella 
himself  being  captured  after  a  brilliant  pursuit,  and  exiled 
to  Lokoja. 

On  reaching  Bornu,  Morland  learned  that  the  legal  Sheik 
of  the  country,  who  was  a  nephew  of  the  Emir  slain  by 
Rabah  and  who  had  been  installed  as  ruler  in  1900  by  the 
French,  was  being  held  at  Dikoa  by  French  officials  for  a 
war  indemnity  of  $50,000,  while  his  state  was  being  ran- 
sacked for  the  money.  But  he  returned  quickly  and  was 
duly  installed  in  office  after  the  British  commander  had 
sent  him  a  promise  of  protection  and  arranged  for  with- 
drawal of  the  claims  for  ransom.  A  Resident  and  a  com- 
pany of  troops  were  left  to  assist  him  in  reorganizing 
his  province  and  in  repairing  the  losses  and  devastation 
caused  by  the  long  conflict.  A  German  force  appeared  just 
at  this  moment  at  Dikoa ;  and  the  presence  of  three  Euro- 
pean armies  in  the  vicinity  of  Lake  Chad  led  to  various 
international  complications  which  were  happily  soon  dissi- 
pated by  a  prompt  delimitation  of  the  frontiers  between 
the  spheres  of  influence  of  the  three  powers.  In  this  way 
Great  Britain  was  definitely  assigned  some  60,000  square 
miles  —  organized  as  the  province  of  Bornu  —  together 
with  an  opening  on  Lake  Chad. 

Between  Bauchi  and  the  Lower  Benue  lay  an  important 
district  through  which  two  caravan  routes  passed  from  Kano 
and  Zaria.  It  was  dominated  at  this  time  by  a  deputy  of  the 
Emir  of  Zaria,  known  as  the  "  Magaji,"with  headquarters 
at  Keffi.  This  personage,  Dan  Tanmusa  by  name,  was  a  re- 
sourceful character,  independent  and  unscrupulous,  using 
his  position  and  energies  to  thwart  the  efforts  of  the  British 
agents  to  maintain  order  and  in  robbing  caravans  and  steal- 


146     INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

ing  slaves.  At  length  the  High  Commissioner  was  aroused 
and,  early  in  1902,  organized  the  district  into  the  province 
of  Nassarawa,  sending  a  Resident  with  troops  to  Keffi  to 
put  an  end  to  the  lawlessness  and  brigandage.  In  June  a 
successful  expedition  was  made  to  the  important  town  of 
Abuji,  where  order  was  restored,  the  murder  of  a  native 
missionary  punished,  and  a  new  chief  installed.  But  in 
attempting  to  win  over  the  Magaji  by  a  firm  but  concilia- 
tory policy,  without  a  display  of  force,  the  Resident  and  a 
political  agent  were  treacherously  killed ;  and  Dan  Tanmusa 
fled  at  once  to  Kano,  where  he  was  received  with  honor. 

Meanwhile  trouble  was  brewing  in  the  North.  The  Emir 
of  Kontagora,  Ibrahim,  deposed  by  the  British  in  1901,  ap- 
peared suddenly  with  a  large  following  in  the  domains  of  the 
Emir  of  Zaria,  who  appealed  in  January,  1902,  to  the  British 
for  aid.  The  High  Commissioner  responded  promptly ;  and 
the  Emir  of  Kontagora  was  surrounded  and  captured  after 
a  brilliant  campaign.  He  was  exiled  for  a  time  to  Lokoja, 
but  ultimately  restored  to  his  old  position  as  sovereign  of 
Kontagora,  where  he  has  since  done  excellent  service  under 
a  Resident.  In  the  mean  time  the  Emir  of  Zaria,  who  had 
been  freed  from  attack  and  whose  state  had  been  definitely 
formed  into  the  province  of  Zaria  in  1902,  refused  to  coop- 
erate with  the  Resident  appointed  and  began  to  intrigue 
with  the  rulers  of  Kano  and  Sokoto.  He  was  adroitly  seized 
and  transported  to  Zungeru,  where  he  was  kept  under  the 
eye  of  the  Government,  practically  a  prisoner,  for  some 
time. 

It  was  now  apparent  that  the  unrest  and  troubles  of 
northern  Nigeria  could  not  be  dissipated,  nor  peace,  security, 
and  prosperity  permanently  established,  until  the  northern 
states  had  been  brought  fully  under  the  supervision  of  the 
Government  of  Great  Britain.  The  paramount  overlord 
of  the  region  was  the  Sultan  of  Sokoto.  His  authority  was 


NIGERIAN  ENTERPRISE  147 

recognized  throughout  all  the  Hausa  states  and  in  the  dis- 
tricts beyond,  while  the  Emirs  paid  him  tribute  and  were 
selected  by  him  for  their  offices  from  the  members  of  the 
ruling  families,  exercising  their  authority  independently, 
however,  in  all  local  matters.  Accordingly,  Sir  Frederic 
tried  patiently  and  diplomatically  in  various  ways  to  estab- 
lish friendly  relations  with  this  renowned  sovereign  and  his 
chief  associate,  the  Emir  of  Kano,  but  without  success.  No 
reply  was  vouchsafed  to  the  messages  of  the  High  Commis- 
sioner until  May,  1902,  when  a  letter  of  defiance  was 
brought  to  his  hand  from  the  haughty  ruler  of  Sokoto. 

Matters  dragged  along  without  change  until  the  end  of 
the  year,  when  the  approaching  mission  of  the  Anglo-French 
Delimitation  Commission  to  mark  the  boundaries  necessi- 
tated steps  being  taken  immediately  for  its  protection.  On 
January  29,  1903,  an  expedition  comprising  some  twenty- 
four  British  officers  and  seven  hundred  West  African 
Frontier  troops  set  out  from  Zaria  for  Kano  and  Sokoto. 
Considerable  resistance  was  expected  at  the  former  town, 
since  it  was  defended  by  a  strong  wall  and  moat.  But  the 
Emir,  Alieu,  with  two  thousand  horsemen,  happened  to  be 
absent  in  Sokoto  at  the  moment ;  and  the  place  was  easily 
and  quickly  taken.  A  new  ruler  was  set  up  and  slavery 
abolished ;  but  otherwise  no  one  was  molested  or  deprived 
of  his  possessions.  After  leaving  a  Resident  and  garrison 
in  Kano  and  receiving  the  submission  of  the  Emir  of  Kat- 
sena  in  the  northern  part  of  the  province,  the  column  ad- 
vanced toward  Sokoto.  En  route  it  met  and  defeated  the 
forces  of  the  returning  Emir  of  Kano,  and  finally  forced 
an  entrance  into  the  capital  triumphantly  without  encoun- 
tering serious  resistance.  The  Sultan,  Attahiru,  fled  and 
was  deposed,  a  new  Sarikin  or  king  being  nominated  by  the 
High  Commissioner,  after  an  assembly  of  the  chiefs  and 
elders  had  agreed  unanimously  upon  the  best  candidate. 


148    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

Sir  Frederick  Lugard  took  advantage  of  the  occasion  to 
explain  the  changed  situation  to  the  native  rulers  and 
people  and  to  outline  the  main  features  of  the  future  Brit- 
ish policy.  He  had  come,  he  declared,  to  settle  the  country 
and  to  give  it  peace.  Since  the  Sultan  of  Sokoto  and  a  num- 
ber of  the  Emirs,  in  whose  name  the  treaties  had  been 
signed,  had  broken  the  Niger  Company  treaties,  declared 
war  on  the  British,  and  finally  been  beaten,  the  old  treaties 
were  dead  and  the  sovereignty  of  the  country,  taken  over 
by  the  Fulani  through  right  of  conquest,  now  passed  to  the 
British.  "  Every  Sultan  and  Emir  will  [henceforth]  be 
appointed  by  the  High  Commissioner  who  will  be  guided  by 
the  usual  laws  of  succession  and  the  wishes  of  the  people, 
but  who  reserves  the  right  to  set  them  aside  for  good  cause." 
There  would  be  no  interference  with  their  religion,  or  with 
its  head,  the  Sarikin  Muslimin.  For,  added  Lugard,  "  the 
British  Government  never  interferes  with  religion  ;  taxes, 
law,  and  order,  punishment  of  crime,  these  are  matters  for 
the  Government,  but  not  religion."  l 

The  Emirs  and  chiefs  were  to  continue  their  rule  and 
the  collection  of  taxes,  as  formerly,  but  they  must  obey  the 
laws  and  cooperate  with  the  Eesidents.  "  Buying  and  sell- 
ing and  enslaving  of  people,"  the  importation  of  firearms, 
bribery  in  the  courts,  and  mutilation  or  inhuman  treatment 
of  prisoners  were  forbidden.  Every  person,  including  slaves, 
would  have  "  the  right  of  appeal  to  the  High  Commissioner," 
who  would  "  uphold  the  power  of  the  native  courts."  "  If 
slaves  are  ill-treated,"  concluded  Sir  Frederick,  "  they  will 
be  set  free  as  your  Koran  orders,  but  otherwise  there  will 
be  no  interference  with  domestic  relations.  Slaves  once  free, 
however,  must  work  and  not  become  idlers  or  thieves."  2 

1  Address  of  Sir  F.  Lngard  on  March  20,  1903,  printed  in  Appendix  m 
of  Orr's  The  Making  of  Northern  Nigeria. 
3  Address  on  March  21,  ibid. 


NIGERIAN  ENTERPRISE  149 

Before  peace  and  security  could  be  permanently  estab- 
lished, however,  one  more  military  expedition  was  necessary. 
The  ex-Sultan  of  Sokoto,  the  ex-Emirs  of  Kano  and  Bida, 
the  Magaji  of  Keffi,  and  other  dissatisfied  leaders  had  col- 
lected a  large  following  to  dispute  the  control  of  the  coun- 
try with  the  British.  After  some  maneuvering  they  were 
driven  eastward  to  Burmi  by  the  English  forces,  where 
with  the  assistance  of  a  new  Mahdi  —  son  of  the  old  Mallam 
Jibrella  —  they  successfully  repulsed  their  pursuers.  The 
troops  of  the  High  Commissioner  withdrew  to  Bauchi  tem- 
porarily ;  but,  being  soon  reinforced  by  a  new  expedition 
from  Lokoja,  returned  and  stormed  the  town  of  Burmi  on 
July  27,  1903.  It  cost  the  British  their  commander  and 
some  eighty  men ;  but  the  ex-Sultan,  the  Magaji,  and  most 
of  the  rebellious  chieftains  were  slain  in  the  conflict,  and 
their  following  completely  dispersed. 

With  this  victory,  the  pacification  of  northern  Nigeria 
was  practically  complete.  Only  one  serious  outbreak,  that 
of  1906,  has  occurred  since  then.  In  January  of  that  year, 
when  the  Government  had  sent  an  expedition  up  the  Benue 
to  stop  a  conflict  between  the  Hausa  traders  and  some 
pagan  tribes  assisted  by  the  warlike  Munshi,  the  country 
was  suddenly  startled  by  the  appearance  in  the  northeast- 
ern corner  of  the  protectorate  of  a  "  marabout,"  or  itiner- 
ant priest,  preaching  a  holy  war  and  arousing  the  natives 
against  foreign  domination.  The  Resident  of  the  province, 
his  assistant,  and  twenty-five  soldiers,  who  went  to  arrest 
the  marabout,  were  killed.  Fortunately  the  Sultan  of  So- 
koto and  the  other  leading  chiefs  of  the  North  remained 
faithful  to  the  British.  Troops  were  hurried  up  from  Zun- 
geru,  Koutagora,  Lokoja,  and  Kano ;  and  on  March  10,  the 
rebels  were  defeated,  their  leader  captured  (and  later  exe- 
cuted), and  the  town  which  had  sheltered  him  razed  to  the 
ground.  The  failure  of  this  rising  and  the  fate  of  its  pro- 


150    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

moters,  together  with  the  prompt  punishment  inflicted  upon 
the  rebellious  chiefs  three  years  previously,  had  a  whole- 
some effect  upon  the  natives  of  the  protectorate  and  enhanced 
the  reputation  and  position  of  the  new  sovereign  power. 
Minor  expeditions  have  been  occasionally  necessary  since 
then,  but  only  to  prevent  strife  between  tribes  and  to  pre- 
serve order. 

The  two  great  needs  of  the  protectorate  were  an  efficient 
administration  embracing  the  whole  country  and  direct  and 
rapid  communication  between  all  the  centers  of  administra- 
tion and  of  trade.1  The  first  was  soon  met  in  a  satisfac- 
tory way  by  the  division  of  northern  Nigeria  into  fourteen 
provinces,  each  under  a  civil  Resident  to  whom  were  as- 
signed two  assistants,  a  military  officer  or  two,  a  physician, 
and  some  dozen  native  policemen.  Later  the  provinces  were 
divided  into  districts  under  Sub-Residents  and  assistants 
responsible  to  the  Resident;  and  in  1907  the  West  African 
Frontier  Force,  which  had  been  increased  by  a  regiment 
of  mounted  infantry  in  1903,  was  reorganized  as  a  constab- 
ulary under  the  Residents.  The  second  was  not  so  easily 
or  speedily  established  in  a  country  where,  aside  from  the 
rivers,  the  narrow  caravan  paths  were  the  only  means  of 
intercourse  and  the  backs  of  men  the  sole  method  of  trans- 
port. Some  of  the  best  trading  centers  were  at  great  dis- 
tances from  the  Niger  and  Benue,  and  many  of  the  new 
provincial  capitals  were  from  four  to  fourteen  days'  march 
inland  from  the  waterways. 

Work  was  immediately  begun  on  a  system  of  telegraph 

1  Brit.  Parl.  Papers,  1898,  Africa  No.  S,  cd.  8775;  1903,  Kano,  cd. 
1433;  1905,  Nigeria,  cd.  2787  ;  1907,  North  Nigeria,  cd.  3620;  1910,  North 
Nigeria,  cd.  5102.  The  best  of  the  recent  books  on  the  protectorate  are  : 
E.  D.  Morel,  Nigeria:  Its  Peoples  and  its  Problems,  1911;  A.  J.  N.  Tre- 
nnearne,  The  Niger  and  the  West  Sudan,  1910 ;  Mockler-Ferryman,  British 
Nigeria,  1902 ;  and  British  West  Africa,  1900.  Lady  Lngard,  A  Tropical 
Dependency,  1905.  Mary  Kingsley,  Wett  African  Studies,  1899.  Delafosse, 
Le  Havt-Senegal-Niger,  1912. 


NIGERIAN  ENTERPRISE 


151 


NIGERIA 

minimi      Railroad* 


lines,  which  would  connect  all  the  provincial  centers  with 
the  capital;  but  it  was  not  till  1909  that  the  High  Com- 
missioner at  Zungeru  was  holding  weekly  conversations 
with  all  the  Residents  in  northern  Nigeria,  owing  to  the 
great  distances  to  be  traversed  and  the  numerous  local, 
financial,  and  other  difficulties  to  be  surmounted.  The  main 
caravan  routes  were,  meanwhile,  improved  and  kept  open, 
a  transport  department  organized,  and  a  wagon  road  built 
from  Zungeru  to  Zaria  and  Kano  in  1904  and  1905.  As 
early  as  1900,  Sir  Frederick  Lugard  had  asked  for  a  rail- 
way; but  it  was  not  till  1907  that  the  Secretary  of  State, 
upon  the  earnest  solicitation  and  recommendation  of  Sir  P. 
Girouard,  —  the  second  Governor  of  northern  Nigeria,  — 


152     INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

authorized  the  construction  of  a  line  350  miles  long  from 
Baro  on  the  Middle  Niger  to  Kano.  This  has  since  been 
completed,  together  with  a  connecting  line  from  Lagos  on 
the  Gulf  of  Guinea  via  Ilorin,  Jebba,  and  Zungeru,  and  a 
branch  line  to  Bukuru  in  the  vicinity  of  the  valuable  tin 
mines  of  Bauchi  —  928  miles  in  all.  It  is  now  possible  to 
travel  direct  from  the  coast  to  the  great  mart  of  Kano 
—  not  far  from  the  northern  limits  of  northern  Nigeria. 
The  growth  of  the  traffic  during  the  first  two  years  has 
been  remarkable  ;  and  the  railway  has  proved  of  inestima- 
ble value  both  to  the  administration  and  to  the  trade  of 
the  country. 

The  next  serious  difficulty  was  the  problem  of  creating 
a  revenue  sufficient  to  meet  the  needs  of  the  new  govern- 
ment. The  people  were  unaccustomed  to  regular  taxes  ;  and 
many  of  the  chiefs  had  been  deprived  of  their  main  source 
of  income  by  the  abolition  of  slave  trading.  Recourse  was 
had  at  first  to  a  light  tax  upon  the  caravan  and  canoe  men, 
whose  business  had  greatly  improved  with  the  stopping  of 
the  slave  raids  and  the  establishment  of  peace.  In  1903, 
all  canoe  men  were  ordered  to  take  out  licenses  varying 
from  five  shillings  to  three  pounds  according  to  the  size  and 
capacity  of  their  canoes,  and  the  caravan  men  to  pay  tolls 
of  from  five  to  fifteen  per  cent  ad  valorem  on  all  goods, 
according  to  the  number  of  provinces  traversed.  Although 
the  income  from  this  source  rose  from  X7826  in  1903-04 
to  £39,250  in  1904-05,  it  afforded  but  a  temporary  relief ; 
and  in  1907,  the  canoe  licenses  and  caravan  tolls  were 
abolished  in  favor  of  a  general  tax  system.  The  influence, 
however,  of  the  increasing  number  of  caravan  and  canoe 
traders  bringing  news,  trade,  and  civilization  into  all  the 
out-of-the-way  places  had  been  almost  incalculable,  and  had 
prepared  the  way  for  the  levying  of  general  taxes. 

The  new  scheme  of  taxation  was  simple  and  based  upon 


NIGERIAN  ENTERPRISE  153 

the  old  method  employed  by  the  Emirs  of  the  Mohamme- 
dan states,  who  had  farmed  out  the  taxes  to  certain  favored 
headmen  and  levied  them  on  the  basis  described  in  the 
Koran.  These  assessments  usually  included  tithes  of  corn, 
sugar-cane,  tobacco,  and  onions,  together  with  taxes  upon 
agriculturalists  (except  in  Sokoto),  butchers,  dyers,  hunt- 
ers, etc.  They  were  not  heavy,  because  of  the  large  returns 
from  slave  raiding ;  but  the  system  was  wasteful  and  ineffi- 
cient, owing  to  the  large  number  of  officials  employed  and 
the  prevalence  of  corruption  and  oppression.  Early  in 
1904,  the  issuance  of  a  proclamation  ordering  all  the  Emirs 
to  pay  one  fourth  of  their  incomes  to  the  government  was 
followed  by  an  attempt  to  unite  all  the  petty  assessments 
into  one  levy  resembling  a  poll  tax  —  the  Residents,  visit- 
ing every  town  and  village  within  their  provinces,  explain- 
ing the  plan.  And  in  1906,  the  Native  Revenue  Proclama- 
tion was  issued  containing  the  detailed  provisions  for  the 
levying  and  collecting  of  all  the  public  revenues  of  the 
Mohammedan  states,  the  assessments  in  each  province  and 
district  being  based  on  the  annual  return  from  lands,  flocks, 
trade,  manufacture,  etc.,  and  being  payable  once  a  year — 
alternatively  in  money  and  kind.  All  the  chiefs  of  districts 
and  headmen  of  communities,  employed  to  collect  the  taxes, 
were  to  be  appointed  by  the  Resident  and  their  duties  care- 
fully prescribed  with  penalties  for  breach  of  orders  or  cor- 
ruption. The  wild  pagan  tribes  were  assessed  a  small  sum 
arbitrarily  by  villages,  in  order  to  accustom  them  to  an 
annual  payment  in  return  for  protection  and  security ;  and 
the  more  advanced  pagan  communities  paid  according  to 
their  soil,  wealth,  accessibility,  etc. 

This  improvement  in  methods  produced  an  instant  and 
pronounced  increase  in  revenues,  the  native  returns  for 
1904-05  reaching  £94,026,  while  those  of  1903-04  were 
only  £53,726.  Of  course  the  administration  of  northern 


154    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

Nigeria  would  not  have  progressed  very  far  or  successfully 
if  it  had  been  dependent  entirely  upon  these  local  levies. 
From  the  start,  however,  the  home  authorities  had  been  lib- 
eral in  voting  supplies.  In  1902,  the  grant-in-aid  was  £280,- 
000,  which  was  increased  by  1903-04  to  £405,000,  a  large 
portion  being  devoted  to  military  purposes  and  to  tele- 
graphs. Since  then,  the  native  revenues  have  been  steadily 
increasing  and  the  imperial  grants  diminishing,  until  1911, 
when  the  income  from  local  taxes  reached  .£344,000,  and 
the  imperial  contribution,  £275,000.  This  gave  a  total  in- 
come of  <£619,000  against  an  expenditure  of  only  £565,- 
000 ;  and  in  1912,  the  ratio  was  £905,000  to  £827,000. 
In  this  later  year  the  revenue  of  southern  Nigeria,  includ- 
ing the  grant-in-aid,  exceeded  its  expenses  by  £238,917 ; 
and  it  is  now  hoped  that  the  united  colony  will  become 
practically  self-supporting  within  a  decade. 

An  attempt  was  made  to  use  the  English  common  law 
in  the  courts;  but  in  1904,  the  local  criminal  law  was  very 
wisely  substituted  for  the  British.  In  1906,  detailed  proc- 
lamations were  published  reestablishing  the  Alkali's  Court, 
authorizing  the  Judicial  Council,  and  empowering  the  pro- 
vincial courts  to  punish  for  disobedience  to  the  native  au- 
thorities or  courts  within  their  spheres.  And  this  combina- 
tion of  native  law  and  native  courts  has  worked  admirably. 
The  same  was  true  in  the  matter  of  the  public  lands,  for 
the  British  Government  having  acquired  the  territorial  and 
mining  rights  of  the  Royal  Niger  Company  and  having 
taken  over  by  conquest  the  sovereign  rights  of  the  Sultan 
of  Sokoto  over  northern  Nigeria  with  respect  to  ownership 
and  control,  considered  itself  the  owner  of  all  lands  and 
proceeded  to  administer  all  questions  of  title,  ownership, 
and  rent  from  the  British  point  of  view.  This  led  to  vari- 
ous complications  and  innumerable  difficulties,  all  of  which 
were  fortunately  overcome  later  by  the  appointment  of  a 


NIGERIAN  ENTERPRISE  155 

committee  of  investigation  in  1908  and  the  issuance  of  the 
Land  and  Native  Eights  Proclamation  taking  effect  on 
January  1,  1911. 

In  this  ordinance  it  was  decreed  that,  while  all  land  — 
occupied  or  unoccupied  —  shall  hereafter  be  considered 
native  land,  it  is  to  be  under  the  control  of  the  Govern- 
ment and  to  be  held  and  administered  for  the  needs,  use, 
and  benefit  of  the  natives.  The  British  administration  is  to 
exercise  its  powers  in  accordance  with  native  laws  and  cus- 
toms ;  but  it  may  give  rights  of  occupancy  at  reasonable 
rates  and  may  take  over  lands  in  return  for  compensation, 
nonpayment  of  taxes,  or  other  good  cause.  In  this  way  the 
land  was  communalized  rather  than  nationalized,  the  occu- 
pant retaining  full  control  of  his  holdings  and  complete 
enjoyment  of  his  improvements,  but  paying  a  rent  to  the 
community  in  place  of  a  landlord.  And  on  its  side,  the 
Government  will  derive  a  large  and  steady  revenue  from 
the  rentals. 

Thus,  within  a  dozen  years'  time,  the  whole  of  northern 
Nigeria,  including  some  255,000  square  miles  of  territory 
and  a  population  of  approximately  10,000,000,  has  been 
occupied  with  little  bloodshed,  effectually  organized  into 
fourteen  provinces,  and  set  well  on  the  way  toward  a  peace- 
ful and  prosperous  future.  This  has  been  accomplished 
without  injury  to  public  interest  or  private  rights,  through 
the  purification  and  development  of  native  political  institu- 
tions and  the  assistance  of  local  rulers,  chiefs,  and  head- 
men. Some  of  the  higher  officials  had  to  be  removed,  as  we 
have  seen,  but  most  of  the  Fulani  reigning  families  have 
been  retained,  and  the  minor  officers,  as  far  as  possible. 
The  Emirs  rule  as  formerly,  assisted  by  the  Residents  and 
their  own  Judicial  and  Executive  Council  composed  of  the 
Waziri  (Vizier),  Treasurer,  Chief  Justice,  and  five  Malle- 
mei,  or  teachers.  This  body  acts  also  as  the  Supreme  Court. 


156    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

Below  are  the  district  chieftains,  sub-district  officials,  and 
village  headmen.  A  number  of  village  communities  form  a 
tribe,  over  which  there  is  a  partly  elective,  partly  heredi- 
tary, ruler  who  superintends  the  collection  of  taxes  and 
regulates  the  occupancy  of  land,  but  against  whom  the 
natives  may  appeal  to  the  native  law  and  courts,  in  cases 
of  oppression  or  corruption,  and  even  to  the  Resident.  So 
well  does  the  system  work  in  preserving  order  that  the  great 
market  city  of  Kaiio,  for  instance,  is  policed  by  only  twenty 
natives,  while  but  ninety  persons  are  employed  in  this  ser- 
vice for  the  whole  of  that  Emirate  containing  1,500,000 
inhabitants. 

Charles  Temple,  recently  acting  governor,  completed  the 
organization  of  the  Beit-el-Mal,  or  provincial  public  treas- 
ury. One  half  of  the  total  annual  revenue  of  each  province 
goes  directly  to  the  Nigerian  Government  and  one  fourth 
to  the  native  Beit-el-Mal  for  salaries  and  public  works. 
The  remainder  is  distributed  among  the  district,  sub-dis- 
trict, and  village  officials  in  the  proportion  of  two  fifths, 
two  fifths,  and  one  fifth.  The  Emirs  receive  a  fixed  annual 
sum  commensurate  with  their  position  and  the  wealth  of 
their  states ;  and  the  other  public  expenditures  are  regu- 
lated by  the  Residents,  the  Waziri,  for  example,  usually 
getting  X1000.  The  payment  of  fixed  salaries  in  this  way 
has  had  the  most  beneficial  effects,  particularly  in  the 
courts,  where  much  bribery  existed  on  account  of  the  low 
and  uncertain  income  of  the  judges. 

A  good  start  has  been  made  toward  the  organization  of 
a  national  system  of  education.  Elementary  and  technical 
schools,  and  an  institution  for  the  training  of  teachers  and 
the  sons  of  chiefs,  are  now  in  operation  near  Kano.  In  the 
last  named  there  are  eleven  sons  of  Emirs  among  the  pu- 
pils. Every  scholar  pays  his  way  and  is  instructed  in  his 
own  religion,  African  geography,  agriculture,  institutions, 


NIGERIAN  ENTERPRISE  157 

and  in  the  elements  of  education.  All  the  work  is  in  the 
Hausa  language  and  along  practical  lines,  so  that  the  youth 
may  be  kept  constantly  in  touch  and  in  sympathy  with  his 
own  land  and  people.  In  the  Church  Missionary  Society 
school  at  Lokoja  practically  the  same  methods  are  employed, 
no  child  being  allowed  to  learn  English  till  he  can  read  his 
own  native  language,  and  all  the  pupils  being  trained  for 
the  governmental  or  educational  service.  The  young  sheiks 
will  in  time  succeed  their  fathers  as  rulers  or  fill  important 
official  positions.  The  other  scholars  will  become  clerks  in 
the  different  departments  of  the  Government,  or  teachers 
in  the  elementary  schools  to  be  established  throughout  all 
the  provinces,  where  technical  instruction  will  also  be  pro- 
vided as  widely  as  possible. 

Northern  Nigeria  is  not  a  rich  country,  but  it  contains  a 
large  amount  of  good  land ;  and  its  future  is  promising. 
Its  imports  —  cotton  goods,  kola  nuts,  salt,  and  cigarettes 
—  are  steadily  increasing,  the  largest  article  of  importa- 
tion —  cotton  goods  —  rising  from  £63,000  in  1909-10 
to  £107,000  in  1910-11.  Its  ordinary  exports  of  shea- 
nuts,  rubber,  palm  oil,  skins,  and  ostrich  feathers  are  also 
multiplying,  but  are  still  relatively  insignificant.  Cotton  is 
grown  in  considerable  quantities,  but  not  more  than  is  con- 
sumed locally.  The  rich  tin  deposits  form  the  only  really 
great  asset  of  the  country.  They  have  been  found  in  more 
or  less  paying  quantities  on  over  9000  square  miles  of  ter- 
ritory ;  and  41,000  acres,  approximately,  have  been  leased 
to  companies  between  1910  and  1913.  The  exports  of  this 
mineral  rose  from  £26,000  in  1909-10  to  £71,000  in 
1910-11,  or  about  1642  tons,  and  to  3000  tons  in  1911- 
12.  The  completion  of  the  railway  to  Bukuru  will  greatly 
facilitate  as  well  as  reduce  the  cost  of  exportation ;  and  the 
value  of  the  industry  is  destined  to  be  considerable,  the 
regular  yield  being  now  about  5000  tons  a  year. 


158     INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

The  relation  of  this  northern  country  to  southern  Nige- 
ria has  always  been  a  source  of  difficulty  and  apprehen- 
sion to  the  British  authorities ;  and  the  Imperial  Govern- 
ment has  but  recently  hit  upon  what  promises  to  be  a 
happy  and  skillful  solution  of  the  problem.  Southern  Ni- 
geria is  a  richer  country  than  its  northern  neighbor,  though 
only  one  fourth  its  size,  and  it  has  been  administered  on 
quite  different  lines.  After  the  union  of  the  whole  southern 
region,  including  the  Lagos  colony  and  protectorate,  into 
one  protectorate  in  1906,  it  was  divided  into  three  prov- 
inces: the  eastern,  with  29,000  square  miles  of  territory 
and  headquarters  at  Old  Calabar ;  the  central,  comprising 
20,000  square  miles  with  its  capital  at  "VVarri ;  and  Lagos, 
including  about  27,000  square  miles  of  land,  whose  seat  of 
government  and  that  of  the  whole  protectorate  was  located 
at  the  old  seaport  of  the  same  name.  Each  province  was 
administered  by  a  commissioner  and  assistants,  who  ruled 
as  far  as  possible  with  the  aid  of  local  chiefs  and  native 
councils ;  and  the  whole  protectorate  was  governed  by  a 
governor  and  commander-in-chief,  aided  by  executive  and 
legislative  councils.  The  general  tendency  here  was  toward 
a  direct  control  by  British  officials  of  all  branches  of  the 
administration,  while  in  the  North  an  opposite  policy  had 
been  followed,  as  far  as  practicable.  No  direct  taxes  were 
levied  upon  the  natives,  while  the  chiefs  were  frequently 
helped  and  subsidized  by  the  Government ;  but  a  great  deal 
more  had  been  accomplished  in  the  construction  of  public 
buildings,  public  works,  and  in  the  establishment  of  a  wide- 
spread system  of  public  education,  than  in  the  North. 

Toward  the  end  of  1911,  a  plan  was  devised  for  the 
amalgamation  of  all  Nigeria  into  one  protectorate.  It  was 
proposed  to  consolidate  the  northern  and  southern  admin- 
istrations into  one  thoroughly  reorganized  and  progressive 
government,  under  the  control  of  one  governor  and  com- 


NIGERIAN  ENTERPRISE  159 

mander-in-chief,  and  to  divide  the  entire  country  into  four 
administrative  districts  according  to  the  natural  and  polit- 
ical boundaries,  each  under  lieutenant-governors  to  whom 
the  Residents  in  the  different  provinces  should  be  respon- 
sible. The  most  workable  and  generally  approved  plan  for 
the  creation  of  these  four  units  is :  (1)  The  northern,  in- 
cluding the  most  of  the  Mohammedan  states  with  its  capital 
at  Kano ;  (2)  the  central,  comprising  the  territory  north 
of  the  Benue  and  west  to  the  Kaduna-Kara  Rivers  (west 
of  Zungeru);  (3)  the  western,  containing  the  region  be- 
tween the  Niger,  the  sea,  and  the  western  frontier;  and 
(4)  the  eastern,  embracing  the  district  lying  between  the 
Niger,  the  Gulf  of  Guinea,  and  the  Cameroons.  The  head- 
quarters of  the  new  government  will  be  located  at  some 
central  point  near  the  Niger.  River  —  preferably  on  the 
plateau  behind  Lokoja. 

In  the  spring  of  1912,  Sir  Walter  Edgerton  who  had 
been  Governor  of  southern  Nigeria  for  eight  years,  was 
transferred  to  British  Guiana,  and  Sir  H.  H.  Bell,  who 
had  administered  northern  Nigeria  for  some  time,  was  made 
Governor  of  the  Leeward  Islands.  The  way  was  now  open 
for  the  work  of  unification ;  and  in  May,  Sir  Frederick  Lu- 
gard,  who  had  been  serving  as  Governor  of  Hongkong  since 
his  resignation  as  High  Commissioner  of  northern  Nigeria 
in  1906,  was  appointed  Governor  and  Commander-in-Chief 
of  both  northern  and  southern  Nigeria.  In  August  of  the 
same  year,  John  Eaglesome,  C.M.G.,  who  had  been  the 
Director  of  Public  Works  in  northern  Nigeria  in  1900  and 
of  the  Baro-Kano  Railway  construction  in  1907,  was  nomi- 
nated Director  of  Railways  and  Public  Works  in  Nigeria. 
Sir  Frederick  went  out  to  Nigeria  in  September,  where  with 
the  exception  of  trips  to  London  for  conference  with  the 
home  authorities  he  has  been  busily  employed  ever  since, 
studying  present  conditions  and  preparing  the  way  for  the 


160    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

amalgamation  of  the  two  protectorates.  Meanwhile,  the 
British  authorities  issued  an  Order  in  Council  on  November 
22,  1912,  authorizing  this  unification,  which  was  success- 
fully achieved  on  January  1,  1914.  Sir  Frederick  Lugard 
became  the  first  Governor-General  of  Nigeria,  with  A.  G. 
Boyle  as  Lieutenant  -  Governor  of  the  South  and  C.  L. 
Temple,  Lieutenant  -  Governor  of  the  North,  assisted  by 
nominated  Executive  and  General  Councils.  The  composi- 
tion of  the  latter  is  unusual.  It  contains,  besides  the  Gov- 
ernor-General and  members  of  the  Executive  Council,  one 
member  from  each  of  the  Chambers  of  Commerce  of  Lagos 
and  Calabar,  one  from  the  Chamber  of  Mines,  four  Euro- 
peans representing  the  commercial,  shipping,  mining,  and 
banking  interests  of  the  country,  and  six  natives.  There  is 
to  be  a  Chief  Justice  appointed  for  the  whole  land  and  the 
entire  system  of  justice  will  be  reconstituted.  A  compre- 
hensive scheme  of  readjustments,  in  addition,  is  being 
worked  out  as  rapidly  as  possible,  which  includes  a  consol- 
idation and  reorganization  of  finances,  some  important  re- 
forms affecting  administration  and  taxation,  and  various 
vital  improvements  in  the  line  of  public  works  and  railroads. 
Among  the  last-mentioned  projects,  the  most  important  is 
a  new  eastern  railway  which,  starting  from  Port  Harcourt 
at  the  head  of  the  Bonny  estuary,  will  run  north  through 
the  central  province  to  the  coal  fields  of  Udi,  thence  north- 
eastward, via  Abinsi  on  the  Benue  and  Jemma,  till  it  forms 
a  junction  with  the  Kaduna  Biver-Bukuru  branch  of  the 
Baro-Kano  line. 

On  January  1,  1913,  the  new  Governor-General  held  a 
great  Durbar  of  northern  Nigerian  chiefs,  at  which  sixty- 
three  emirs  and  rulers,  representing  sixty-eight  different 
tribes,  were  present,  and  the  representatives  of  many  pagan 
hill  tribes  were  in  attendance,  unarmed  in  the  presence  of 
their  traditional  enemies.  Lugard  was  assured  by  all  the 


NIGERIAN  ENTERPRISE  161 

leaders,  "with  the  greatest  emphasis,  that  everything  was 
entirely  satisfactory,  prosperous,  and  peaceful."  These  con- 
ditions are  confirmed  also  in  the  reports  of  missionaries  and 
officials  —  all  testifying  to  the  remarkable  success  of  the 
northern  Nigeria  administration ;  and  equally  satisfactory 
reports  are  being  received  from  the  southern  district.  The 
reorganization  of  the  whole  country  upon  ethnographical 
and  geographical  lines,  the  abolition  of  the  old  artificial 
divisions,  the  consolidation  of  governmental  forces,  and  the 
introduction  of  an  enlightened  program  of  public  improve- 
ments, will  go  far  toward  placing  the  administration  of  Ni- 
geria upon  a  permanent,  progressive,  and  highly  efficient 
basis.  The  beneficent  effects  of  British  control  are,  how- 
ever, already  noticeable  in  all  parts  of  the  protectorate. 
The  total  trade  of  the  country  has  risen  from  .£5,076,339 
in  1902  to  £12,795,178  in  1911-12,  of  which  Great  Brit- 
ain's share  was  over  fifty-eight  per  cent.  The  soil  of  the 
southern  portion,  comprising  the  delta  district  and  the  great 
forest  region  behind  it,  is  extremely  fertile.  The  trade  in 
palm  oil,  which  is  the  chief  product,  reached  the  remark- 
able figure  of  £4,295,195  in  1911-12  ;  and  the  exportation 
of  cocoa,  which  was  only  £8,622  in  1900,  amounted  to 
£164,666  in  the  same  year.  There  are  also  good  harvests 
of  rubber  and  cotton.  In  the  northern  portion  there  are 
some  fine  agricultural  sections,  particularly  in  Kano  and 
Zaria,  where  the  science  of  land  cultivation  has  reached  a 
high  development ;  and  the  agricultural  possibilities  of  the 
whole  protectorate  are  excellent.  The  natives  are  indus- 
trious, intelligent,  and  skillful  workmen,  and  good  traders. 
They  raise  sufficient  quantities  of  all  the  necessities  of  life 
to  supply  the  needs  of  their  country.  "  Cassava  and  cotton, 
indigo  and  sugar-cane,  sweet  potatoes  and  tobacco,  onions 
and  ground  nuts,  beans  and  pepper,  yams  and  rice,  accord- 
ing to  the  locality  and  suitability  of  the  soil.  The  farmers 


102    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

of  a  moist  district  will  concentrate  on  the  sugar-cane  —  its 
silvery,  tufted,  feathery  crowns  waving  in  the  breeze  are 
always  a  delight ;  of  a  dry,  on  ground  nuts ;  those  enjoying 
a  rich  loam,  on  cotton,  and  so  on."  And  when  the  work  of 
unification  and  reconstruction  is  successfully  achieved,  Great 
Britain  will  have  under  her  flag  in  West  Africa  —  in  spite 
of  the  fact  that  it  is  a  country  in  no  way  suitable  for  the 
residence  of  white  men  —  one  of  the  richest  and  best  ad- 
ministered protectorates  in  the  world,  with  its  millions  of 
inhabitants  prosperous  and  happy.  The  British  statesmen 
have  already  ample  reason  to  congratulate  themselves  upon 
this  triumph  of  the  New  Internationalism,  which  has  demon- 
strated what  admirable  service  a  rich  and  civilized  state 
can  render  an  undeveloped  and  unenlightened  people — 
oppressed  by  ignorance  and  superstition  —  without  the  de- 
struction of  native  ideals  and  institutions  or  the  seizure  of 
their  rights  and  properties. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

.SOUTH   AFKICAN  EXPANSION   AND   UNION 

THE  term  "South  Africa"  has  been  employed  in  such  a 
variety  of  ways  that  it  no  longer  conveys  a  definite  impres- 
sion to  the  mind  of  the  general  reader.  To  the  ordinary 
Britisher  or  Cape  resident  it  means  the  territory  included 
in  the  four  states  of  the  Union  —  Cape  Colony,  Natal, 
Orange  River  Province,  and  the  Transvaal  —  and  lying  be- 
tween Cape  Town,  Durban,  and  the  Limpopo  River.  For 
administrative,  stragetical,  geographical,  and  commercial 
reasons,  the  vast  regions  of  the  Rhodesias  and  Nyasaland, 
stretching  northward  to  Lakes  Nyasa  and  Tanganyika, 
should  be  considered  integral  portions  of  British  South 
Africa.  The  English  residents  of  northern  Rhodesia  are  in 
no  haste  to  see  their  territory  linked  definitely  to  the  South 
African  Union ;  the  citizens  of  the  Union  are  apt  to  look 
upon  the  northern  regions  as  outside  the  natural  limits  of 
their  own  country.  Yet,  so  intimate  are  the  present  rela- 
tions, and  so  closely  are  the  futures  of  the  two  districts 
interwoven,  that  the  whole  region  from  the  Cape  to  Tan- 
ganyika must  —  for  some  time  to  come  at  least  —  be  re- 
garded as  a  geographical  unit. 

The  story  of  South  Africa  is  one  of  a  conflict  for  suprem- 
acy between  two  distinct  political  ideals  emanating  from 
different  branches  of  the  great  Teutonic  family,  compli- 
cated by  a  vexatious  "  native  question,"  and  the  interposi- 
tion of  an  imperative  expansion  policy.  The  landing  of  Jan 
van  Riebeck  at  Table  Bay  in  1652,  the  subsequent  rule 
of  the  Dutch  at  the  Cape  for  162  years,  and  the  coming  of 


164    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 


fAjC-AAbercorn 
•i»4;ife 
Miimr     ;*W>ron 
,>*^V..i 
, — ,„.   ,     V\sii:i{>  ;  --,  \\  , 

t     HIIJJIIKSIA  \  ' 

Jss^k    ^s7 


BRITISH  SOUTH  AFRICA 


British  Territories 
German  Southweit  Africa 


J  Portuguese   Estt,  Afrlot 
1  South  African  Union 


some  hundreds  of  Huguenots  in  1688,  introduced  a  racial 
element  into  the  social  and  political  life  of  the  South  Afri- 
can communities,  which  the  British,  who  came  into  final 
possession  of  the  colony  in  1814,  were  inclined  to  minimize, 
but  which  has  played  an  all-important  role  in  the  history 
of  the  country  from  that  day  to  this. 

It  is  to  be  noted  that  the  physical  characteristics  and 
the  political  and  religious  ideals  of  the  Dutch  inhabitants 
of  the  Cape  in  the  eighteenth  century  bear  a  striking  resem- 


SOUTH  AFRICAN  EXPANSION  AND  UNION          165 

blance  to  those  of  the  "  Boers  "  of  the  nineteenth.  The  un- 
just and  oppressive  rule  of  the  Dutch  East  India  Company 
and  its  hard-headed  and  selfish  governors  had  aroused  in 
the  people  a  desire  for  independence  and  freedom  from 
control.  This,  coupled  with  an  innate  love  for  the  open, 
free  life,  a  disregard  for  the  conventionalities  of  life  and 
the  rights  of  others,  a  proud  spirit  of  self-reliance,  and  a 
narrow  religious  morality,  made  them  a  difficult  people  for 
the  British  to  handle.  The  long  isolation  of  South  Africa 
from  European  intercourse,  due  to  the  great  distance  and 
the  lack  of  direct  and  close  communication  for  so  many 
years,  placed  them  completely  out  of  touch  with  Conti- 
nental developments  and  movements  down  quite  to  the 
middle  of  the  nineteenth  century.  And,  while  Europe  pro- 
gressed, the  Cape  practically  stood  still. 

Unfortunately  the  British  Government  did  not  grasp  the 
salient  features  of  the  situation  at  the  Cape  when  it  took 
over  the  control  of  affairs.  It  did  not  approach  the  problem 
with  sympathy,  intelligence,  and  firmness  at  the  start,  or 
appreciate  the  paramount  necessity  of  preserving  social  and 
political  equality  and  of  cultivating  the  respect  and  confi- 
dence of  its  South  African  subjects.  In  fact,  the  Home 
Government  never  evolved  any  continuous  and  enlightened 
policy  till  the  days  of  the  Boer  War ;  but  preferred  to  fol- 
low a  sort  of  "  hit  and  miss  "  plan,  adjustable  to  circum- 
stances. "  I  have  never  been  able  to  discover  any  principle 
in  our  policy  in  South  Africa,"  said  Sir  Bartle  Frere,  one 
of  the  ablest  and  most  popular  British  representatives  in 
that  country  in  the  last  half  of  the  nineteenth  century, 
"  except  that  of  giving  way  whenever  opposition  or  trouble 
is  encountered."  The  intentions  of  the  English  authorities 
were  usually  excellent ;  but  they  had  the  happy  faculty  of 
doing  those  things  most  likely,  not  only  to  destroy  every 
vestige  of  confidence  in  the  justness  and  wisdom  of  their 


166    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

rule,  but  also  to  antagonize  the  very  people  whose  coopera- 
tion they  needed.  The  Home  Government,  for  instance, 
showed  so  much  interest  in  the  welfare  of  the  native  tribes 
and  gave  so  much  more  credence  to  the  testimony  of  the 
missionaries  than  to  the  reports  of  its  regular  officials  dur- 
ing the  first  thirty  years  of  British  rule  at  the  Cape,  that 
any  resident  there  —  British  or  foreign  —  might  well  have 
believed  that  the  philanthropic  ambitions  of  the  English 
nation  were  of  far  more  importance  than  the  welfare  and 
progress  of  its  colonies. 

When  Lord  Charles  Somerset,  the  first  regular  British 
Governor,  arrived  at  Cape  Town  in  1814,  he  found  himself 
ruler  of  an  unprogressive,  ill-developed,  and  poorly  pro- 
tected region  of  some  120,000  square  miles,  with  a  popu- 
lation of  60,000,  of  whom  17,000  were  free  Hottentots, 
13,000  slaves,  and  about  30,000  whites.  The  majority  of 
the  last-named  were  Dutch  settlers  who  had  won  their  own 
homes  through  a  constant  struggle  with  nature  and  were 
living  in  imminent  danger  from  the  warlike  natives  of  the 
North.  They  were  slave-owners  and  their  occupation  was 
chiefly  agriculture,  viticulture,  and  stock-raising.  They 
lived  on  widely  scattered  farms  which  were  worked  indif- 
ferently ;  but  they  were  closely  bound  together  by  common 
ideals,  language,  and  customs,  as  well  as  by  a  natural  in- 
stinct of  self-preservation  and  a  suspicion  of  all  govern- 
ment, with  which  they  always  associated  corruption  and 
autocracy.  In  spite  of  the  democratic  character  of  their 
local  institutions  and  their  general  belief  in  the  freedom  of 
the  individual,  they  had  no  desire  to  see  political  equality 
extended  either  to  the  blacks  or  to  the  incoming  foreigners. 

No  regard,  however,  was  paid  by  the  new  rulers  either 
to  their  preferences  or  their  beliefs.  The  British  considered 
that  the  will  of  the  master  was  the  dominating  factor  in 
the  situation,  and  began  the  anglicizing  of  the  colony  at 


SOUTH  AFRICAN  EXPANSION  AND  UNION          167 

once.  In  1820,  the  first  large  installment  —  approximately 
4000  —  of  English  settlers  arrived  and  the  next  few  years 
saw  this  number  greatly  augmented.  In  1825,  English  be- 
came the  official  language,  its  use  being  made  obligatory  in 
the  law  courts  in  1828  ;  and  the  Dutch  form  of  local  gov- 
ernment, in  which  the  colonists  shared  in  the  management 
of  local  affairs,  was  replaced  by  a  nominated  legislative 
council  in  1835  that  barred  Dutch  and  English  alike  from 
participation  in  their  own  government.  Meanwhile,  polit- 
ical equality  had  been  extended  to  all  free  blacks  in  1828 
and  the  slave  trade  abolished  between  the  years  1833  and 
1834,  the  slave-owners  being  awarded  a  small  compensation 
for  their  loss.  In  1835,  Sir  Benjamin  D'Urban, — an  able 
and  cautious  administrator,  —  on  the  occasion  of  the  third 
Kaffir  war,  advanced  the  frontiers  to  the  Kei  River  and 
defended  it  with  forts ;  but  Lord  Glenelg  committed  the 
unpardonable  blunder  of  ordering  him  to  abandon  the  new 
territory,  thus  leaving  the  northern  boundaries  again  in 
an  undefended  and  unsettled  state.  Yet  this  was  not  all. 
Treaties  were  soon  concluded  with  the  native  tribes  placing 
them  under  the  protection  of  the  British  Government. 

The  situation  became  at  last  unbearable  to  the  old  set- 
tlers ;  and  in  1836,  Pieter  Retief  led  the  first  migration  of 
the  Dutch  farmers  —  known  as  the  "  Great  Trek  "  —  out 
of  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope  colony  into  the  hinterland  of 
Natal.  Despairing  of  saving  the  colony  from  the  evils  that 
had  fallen  upon  it,  complaining  of  severe  losses  from  the 
emancipation  of  slaves  and  the  plundering  of  country  dis- 
tricts by  Kaffirs,  and  referring  to  the  unjustifiable  odium 
placed  upon  them  by  "interested  and  dishonest  persons 
under  the  cloak  of  religion,  whose  testimony  is  believed  in 
England,"  Retief,  in  a  "Manifesto"  published  on  Febru- 
ary 2,  1837,  declared  their  purpose  to  be :  the  leading  of  a 
more  quiet  life,  the  "upholding  of  the  principles  of  liberty," 


168    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

and  the  taking  up  of  a  new  residence  without  molesting 
"  any  people  or  depriving  them  of  the  smallest  property." 1 
During  the  next  ten  years  many  thousands  followed  the 
first  intrepid  band;  and  by  1838,  a  "Republic"  had  been 
founded  with  its  headquarters  at  Pietermaritzburg. 

But  the  English  residents  of  Natal  did  not  wish  the 
Dutch  for  neighbors  or  fellow  citizens.  So  they  persuaded 
the  Home  Government,  which  had  refused  to  make  the  re- 
gion a  British  colony  in  1835,  to  send  out  General  Napier, 
who  drove  out  the  Dutch  farmers  in  1842  and  annexed  the 
district  in  1843.  In  the  same  year  treaties  were  made  with 
the  chieftains  Moshesh  and  Adam  Kok,  which  placed  the 
Basutos  and  Griquas  under  British  protection ;  and  it  be- 
came at  once  apparent  that  the  future  policy  of  the  British 
Government  would  center  upon  the  control  of  the  coast  and 
the  protection  of  the  native  states.  However,  they  con- 
tinued the  pressure  on  the  Dutch  trekkers  forcing  them 
gradually  northward.  Kaffraria  —  the  district  between  the 
Keiskamma  and  the  Kei  Rivers  —  was  reoccupied  in  1847 
and  1848  ;  and  English  sovereignty  was  extended  to  the 
region  between  the  Orange  and  the  Vaal  by  the  defeat  of 
Andries  Pretorius  near  Boomplatz  in  August,  1848,  who 
with  his  Dutch  followers  was  forced  to  seek  a  new  home 
beyond  the  Vaal  River.  But  the  Home  Government  let  it 
be  clearly  understood  that  it  had  no  intention  of  inaugura- 
ting a  policy  of  territorial  expansion  by  these  moves.  "It 
must  be  superfluous  for  me  to  disavow  on  the  part  of  Her 
Majesty's  Government  any  wish  to  extend  the  dominions 
of  the  Crown  in  South  Africa,"  wrote  Earl  Grey  to  Sir 
Henry  Pottinger  in  November,  1846.  "Considered  in  them- 
selves, such  acquisitions  would  be  not  merely  worthless 
in  themselves  but  pernicious  —  the  cause  not  of  increased 

1  The  Grahamstown  Journal,  February  2,  1837 ;  reprinted  in  Appendix  I 
of  Cana's  South  Africa  from  the  Great  Trek  to  the  Union,  1S09,  p.  295. 


SOUTH  AFRICAN  EXPANSION  AND   UNION  169 

strength  but  of  weakness  —  enlarging  the  range  of  our 
responsibilities  while  yielding  no  additional  resources  for 
properly  sustaining  them."  1 

Meanwhile  with  the  increase  of  settlers  in  the  Orange 
River  territory  and  in  the  regions  beyond  the  Vaal,  troubles 
arose  between  natives  and  the  white  home-seekers.  Diffi- 
culties multiplied  and  disputes  arose,  culminating  in  the 
eighth  Kaffir  war  of  1850-51.  At  length  the  British  Gov- 
ernment decided  to  rid  itself  of  the  expense  and  responsi- 
bilities incident  to  all  these  border  complications ;  and  on 
January  17, 1852,  Earl  Grey  gave  his  approval  to  the  Sand 
River  Convention,  recognizing  the  independence  of  all  com- 
munities north  of  the  Vaal  River.  Two  years  later,  in  the 
convention  of  February  2,  1854,  Lord  Aberdeen  withdrew 
British  sovereignty  from  the  Orange  River  territory,  in  spite 
of  the  fact  that  the  majority  of  its  ten  thousand  population 
did  not  desire  independence.  Through  the  influence  of  Sir 
George  Grey  —  Governor  of  Cape  Colony  from  1855  to 
1862  —  the  Cape  was  given  representative  government ;  and 
in  1856,  Natal  was  separated  from  it  and  given  its  own 
representative  institutions.  The  province  of  Kaffraria  was 
definitely  annexed  to  Cape  Colony  in  1865 ;  and,  through 
the  assistance  of  Dr.  Moffat,  a  road  was  opened  directly 
into  Bechuanaland  in  the  interior. 

But  the  Dutch  communities  were  left  to  shift  for  them- 
selves. The  Orange  Free  State  was  the  first  to  perfect  an 
organized  "republican"  government.  In  1856,  Mathinus 
Pretorius  united  the  communities  of  Petchef  stroom,  Rusten- 
burg,  and  Pretoria  into  the  South  African  Republic,  which 
by  1864  included  all  the  Dutch  settlements  north  of  the 
Vaal.  Thus  two  rival  and  independent  states  were  created 
on  the  north,  which  had  to  be  reckoned  with  in  every  step 
that  was  taken  in  the  internal  development  and  interior 
1  Correspondence  relative  to  the  state  of  the  Kaffir  tribes,  February,  1848. 


170    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

expansion  of  British  South  Africa.  In  spite  of  the  fact  that 
the  Orange  Free  State  maintained  friendly  relations  with 
the  Cape  Government  for  thirty  years  (largely  through  the 
efforts  of  the  late  John  Brand,  its  president  for  several 
terms  beginning  in  1862),  conditions  were  always  far  from 
satisfactory.  Jealousies  and  commercial  rivalries  constantly 
impeded  the  development  of  the  colonies,  which  was  very 
slow  at  the  best.  Custom  houses  were  maintained  on  every 
frontier;  and  the  relations  of  four  independent  states,  each 
striving  to  get  on  at  the  expense  of  the  others,  were  fre- 
quently strained  and  antagonistic.  The  financial  and  adminis- 
trative difficulties  were  great  in  all  the  colonies;  and  the 
situation  was  not  improved  by  the  ultimate  assistance  of 
the  imperial  representatives  in  Natal  and  Cape  Colony,  and 
by  the  placing  of  the  direction  of  native  affairs  throughout 
South  Africa  in  the  hands  of  a  British  High  Commissioner. 
In  general,  conditions  contrasted  favorably  with  those  in 
the  American  colonies,  when  the  complete  failure  of  the 
Confederation  necessitated  the  formation  of  the  present 
Union. 

Sir  George  Grey  was  the  one  British  statesman  to  grasp 
the  real  situation  and  suggest  a  possible  solution.  Realizing 
that  the  colonies  were  of  necessity  interdependent  and  in 
need  of  a  common  commercial  and  fiscal  policy,  he  became 
convinced  that  "  federal  union  alone "  could  bring  relief, 
and  he  urged  in  March,  1857,  a  treaty  of  alliance  between 
Cape  Colony  and  the  Orange  Free  State.  Finally,  on  No- 
vember 19,  1858,  he  sent  an  imperative  dispatch  1  to  the 
Home  Government  earnestly  advocating  the  union  of  Cape 
Colony,  Natal,  and  the  Orange  Free  State  into  a  federal 
government  with  a  representative  congress,  a  responsible 
cabinet,  and  an  appointive  governor  who  should  replace  the 
High  Commissioner.  Each  state  was  to  retain  its  inde- 

1  Reprinted  in  Appendix  11  of  Cana's  South  Africa,  p.  298. 


SOUTH  AFRICAN  EXPANSION  AND  UNION          171 

pendence  and  the  control  of  its  own  local  affairs.  The  time 
was,  indeed,  ripe  for  such  a  move ;  the  administrations  all 
willing,  and  the  people  as  a  whole  favorable.  No  plan  better 
suited  to  the  general  needs  of  the  country  and  to  the  special 
interests  of  the  individual  communities  could  have  been  de- 
vised. And  it  would  have  made  possible  the  organization  of 
a  sound  South  African  government,  which  in  time  would  have 
proved  self-supporting  and  prosperous,  and  thus  relieved  the 
imperial  authorities  of  many  worries  and  responsibilities. 

Yet  Sir  George  failed  to  convince  the  leaders  hi  Eng- 
land. To  his  first  suggestions  the  Secretary  for  the  Colo- 
nies replied :  "I  must  remind  you  that  the  policy  of  recog- 
nizing by  treaty  the  formation  of  independent  states  on  the 
frontiers  of  British  possessions  by  emigrant  British  subjects, 
and  thus  raising  an  effectual  barrier  to  the  system  of  con- 
tinual and  indefinite  expansion  of  those  frontiers  towards 
the  interior,  has  now  been  for  some  time  established."  And 
to  his  demand  for  union,  Sir  Bulwer  Lytton  answered: 
"  After  weighing  the  arguments  which  you  have  adduced, 
Her  Majesty's  Government  are  not  prepared  to  depart  from 
the  settled  policy  of  their  predecessors  by  advising  the  re- 
sumption of  British  sovereignty  in  any  shape  over  the 
Orange  Free  State."  Sir  George  was  soon  after  recalled  and 
all  chance  of  union  postponed  for  a  quarter  of  a  century. 

By  1871,  conditions  had  changed  and  Her  Majesty's 
Government  had  experienced  a  "change  of  heart."  The  dis- 
covery of  the  diamond  mines  between  1869  and  1871  brought 
a  large  influx  of  British  and  other  settlers  and  transformed 
the  economic  and  social  status  in  the  outlying  provinces  of 
South  Africa.  On  October  27, 1871,  the  district  of  Griqua- 
land,  including  the  chief  diamond  mines,  the  ownership  of 
which  was  in  dispute  between  the  Cape  and  Transvaal 
authorities,  was  awarded  to  Great  Britain  in  the  decision 
of  the  Lieutenant-Governor  of  Natal,  based  on  the  claims 


172     INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

of  Nicholas  Waterboer,  —  a  Griquan  leader,  —  and  annexed. 
In  the  same  year,  Sir  Henry  Barkly,  Governor  of  Cape 
Colony  and  High  Commissioner  from  1871  to  1877,  asked 
the  Home  Government  if  it  would  take  the  question  of 
forming  a  union  in  South  Africa  under  advisement.  Lord 
Kimberley  replied  on  November  16,  giving  a  general  assent 
and  asking  that  the  presidents  of  the  Dutch  or  Boer  Re- 
publics (as  they  were  beginning  to  be  called)  be  approached 
on  the  subject.  In  these  states  conditions  were  far  from 
satisfactory  and  troubles  were  numerous  and  increasing.  In 
the  Transvaal  the  independent  rule  had  proved  a  failure. 
The  government  was  practically  bankrupt  and  the  leaders 
divided  and  selfish.  Added  to  these  difficulties,  there  was 
constant  friction  between  the  Boer  farmers  and  the  native 
tribes  —  particularly  the  Zulus  of  Natal  who  were  on  the 
verge  of  revolt. 

Lord  Carnarvon,  who  took  over  the  direction  of  the 
Foreign  Office  at  this  juncture,  believed  that  the  security 
and  public  order  of  South  Africa  —  constantly  endangered 
by  conditions  in  the  Transvaal  and  on  the  borders  —  im- 
peratively demanded  the  formation  of  a  union.  So  con- 
vinced was  he  of  the  merits  of  his  plan  as  a  panacea  for  all 
the  troubles  of  that  country  that  he  was  prepared  to  force 
the  different  states  into  line  if  necessary.  In  1874,  and 
again  in  1875,  he  sent  out  James  Anthony  Froude,  the 
historian,  on  a  special  mission  of  investigation,  summoned 
Sir  Theophilus  Shepstone — a  great  authority  on  native 
affairs  —  to  England  to  give  advice,  and  finally  held  a  gen- 
eral conference  on  the  question  in  London,  to  which  he  un- 
fortunately permitted  himself  to  nominate  all  the  South 
African  representatives.  After  due  deliberation  and  the 
passage  of  the  "  Permissive  Federation  Bill "  to  enable  the 
colonies  of  South  Africa  to  unite,  Carnarvon  appointed 
Shepstone  Special  Commissioner  to  the  Transvaal  toward 


SOUTH  AFRICAN  EXPANSION  AND  UNION          173 

the  end  of  1876.  He  was  ordered  to  make  a  fu]l  inquiry 
"  into  the  origin,  nature,  and  circumstances  "  of  the  "  griev- 
ous disturbances — in  the  territories  adjacent  to  our  colonies 
in  South  Africa,"  and  authorized  to  annex  such  territories 
provided  it  was  "  necessary,  in  order  to  secure  the  peace  and 
safety  of  our  said  colonies,  and  of  our  subjects  elsewhere." 
Sir  Theophilus  reached  Pretoria  on  January  22,  1877; 
and,  after  being  fully  convinced  by  personal  investigation 
and  by  letters  of  the  necessity  for  union,  he  annexed  the 
Transvaal  in  the  name  of  Great  Britain  on  April  12.  Un- 
fortunately, though  able  to  place  his  hand  to  the  plough, 
Shepstone  lacked  the  ability  of  directing  it  safely  through 
the  furrows  of  trouble  and  discontent  that  lay  before  it. 
He  is  described  by  Frere  as  a  "  shrewd,  observant,  silent, 
self-contained,  immobile  man  —  having  a  vast  fund  of  use- 
ful information  if  one  could  get  at  it."  His  popularity  and 
ability  as  a  native  administrator  naturally  handicapped  him 
as  a  ruler  of  the  Boers.  But  he  seems  to  have  been  lacking 
in  initiative,  energy,  force,  and  the  ability  to  win  the  con- 
fidence of  the  Boer  farmers,  the  majority  of  whom  were 
unsympathetic  with  the  move  for  annexation.  And  he  failed 
completely  both  in  setting  up  a  successful  regime  in  place 
of  the  one  he  destroyed  and  in  redeeming  his  promises  to 
the  Boer  leaders  made  when  the  new  administration  began. 
Trouble  ensued  from  the  start.  The  discontented  politi- 
cians, instead  of  being  admitted  to  places  in  the  new  regime 
and  treated  with  a  firm  and  just  hand,  were  permitted  to 
intrigue  and  organize  for  the  recovery  of  independence. 
Kruger  and  Joubert  were  even  allowed  to  set  out  for  Lon- 
don in  1879  to  ask  for  self-government.  "  It  was  not  the 
annexation,"  wrote  Frere  to  his  wife  in  1879,  "  so  much  as 
the  neglect  to  fulfill  the  promises  and  anticipations  held 
out  by  Shepstone  when  he  took  over  the  government,  that 
has  stirred  up  the  great  mass  of  the  Boers  and  given  a 


174    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

handle  to  agitators."  Colonel  Owen  Lanyon,  —  a  brusque 
and  tactless  administrator,  —  who  succeeded  Sir  Theophilus 
in  1879,  was  equally  unsuccessful  in  an  attempt  to  rule  by 
force  and  oppression. 

Fortunately,  in  the  mean  time,  Lord  Carnarvon,  in  the 
pursuit  of  his  scheme  for  union,  had  called  Sir  Bartle 
Frere  from  a  distinguished  service  in  India  to  be  Governor 
of  Cape  Colony  and  High  Commissioner.  He  was  pre- 
eminently fitted  for  the  work  of  reconstruction  and  recon- 
ciliation, by  reason  of  his  extensive  experience,  practical 
common  sense,  judgment,  and  tact.  He  visited  Natal  and 
the  Transvaal,  grasped  the  salient  points  of  the  situation 
at  once,  and  won  the  confidence  of  all  classes  of  settlers. 
"  Any  attempt  to  give  back  or  restore  the  Boer  Republic 
in  the  Transvaal,"  he  wrote  in  1879,  "must  lead  to  anarchy 
and  failure.  .  .  .  There  is  no  escaping  from  the  responsi- 
bility which  has  been  already  incurred  ever  since  the  Eng- 
lish flag  was  planted  on  the  castle  here.  All  our  real  dif- 
ficulties have  arisen,  and  still  arise,  from  attempting  to 
evade  or  shift  this  responsibility.  .  .  .  Your  object  is  not 
conquest,  but  simply  supremacy  up  to  Delagoa  Bay.  This 
will  have  to  be  asserted  some  day,  and  the  assertion  will 
not  become  easier  by  delay."  If  he  had  been  given  a  free 
hand  and  been  firmly  supported  by  the  Home  Government, 
there  is  no  doubt  that  Sir  Bartle  could  have  brought  about 
an  adjustment  of  the  situation  acceptable  alike  to  Boers 
and  British.  The  success  of  his  efforts  was  thwarted  by  a 
serious  reversal  in  native  affairs  and  the  triumph  of  Mr. 
Gladstone  and  the  Liberals  in  the  English  elections  of  1879, 
who  were  committed  by  their  campaign  speeches  to  inde- 
pendence for  the  Boers  and  who  represented  that  section 
of  the  British  public  which  opposed  imperial  expansion  and 
understood  but  little  of  the  real  situation  in  the  colonies. 
Nothing  is  more  pathetic  in  the  annals  of  Africa  than  the 


SOUTH  AFRICAN  EXPANSION  AND  UNION          175 

fall  of  Sir  Bartle,  at  whose  departure  strong  men  wept,  and 
the  reversal  of  whose  policy  entailed  disaster  and  trouble 
for  many  years  to  come  on  the  British  Government. 

Just  at  the  moment  when  Frere  .was  getting  a  firm  hold 
on  the  situation,  Cetywayo,  —  the  Zulu  king,  —  assisted  by 
his  neighbor,  Sikukuni  (the  Transvaal  chief),  declared 
war.  Sir  Bartle,  realizing  clearly  that  trouble  with  the 
natives  would  never  cease  until  they  were  compelled  to 
respect  the  British  authorities,  planned  to  force  the 
chieftains  into  submission  by  a  well-arranged  display  of 
force.  While  the  High  Commissioner,  Shepstone,  and 
Henry  Bulwer  (Lieutenant-Governor)  of  Natal  were  mak- 
ing every  effort  to  win  over  Cetywayo,  and  the  British 
forces  were  being  moved  along  the  Zulu  frontier,  the  troops 
of  Lord  Chelmsford  were  drawn  into  an  engagement  at 
Isandlwana  on  January  20,  1879,  by  Cetywayo's  Impis, 
and  terribly  defeated.  Frere,  whose  policy  was  unpopular 
at  home,  but  who  was  in  no  way  responsible  for  this  defeat, 
was  recalled  to  Cape  Colony  and  left  for  home  on  Septem- 
ber 15,  1880.  Sir  Hercules  Robinson  succeeded  him  as 
High  Commissioner  and  as  Governor  of  the  Cape ;  and  Sir 
Garnet  Wolseley  was  sent  with  a  large  force  to  "  settle 
Zululand,"  which  he  did  in  1879  and  1880  most  effectively. 

Meanwhile  conditions  had  gone  from  bad  to  worse  in  the 
Transvaal.  The  Boers,  disgusted  with  the  vacillating  policy 
of  the  home  officials,  lost  all  confidence  in  the  integrity  of 
the  Liberal  party  leaders,  who,  now  that  they  were  finally 
in  office,  seemed  to  have  forgotten  the  burning  appeals  of 
their  campaign  for  Transvaal  independence.1  They  became 

1  "  Now  there  is  but  one  cry, '  We  will  have  no  imperial  help! '  Why  is 
this  ?  We  have  lost  confidence  in  a  Government  who  could  play  with  our 
welfare,  and  among'  the  many  injuries  done  us,  the  greatest  was  to  remove 
from  among  us  a  ruler  such  as  Your  Excellency  was."  Madame  de  Wet  to 
Frere  on  November  16,  1880,  reprinted  in  J.  Martineau's  The  Life  and  Cor- 
respondence of  the  Eight  Hon.  Sir  liartle  Frere. 


176    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

at  length  suspicious  of  every  word  or  move  of  the  Foreign 
Office,  and  on  April  12,  1879,  some  twelve  hundred  of 
them  started  a  revolt  near  Pretoria,  demanding  independ- 
ence. Frere  promptly  held  a  meeting  with  the  leaders  — 
Kruger,  Joubert,  and  M.  Pretorius  —  and  averted  any 
serious  outbreak  for  a  time.  But  his  recall  shortly  after- 
wards and  the  attempt  of  Lanyon  to  collect  taxes  from  the 
"  passive  resisters  "  by  force  was  the  last  straw.  The  sei- 
zure of  Piet  Bezuidenhout's  ox  wagon  in  default  of  taxes 
on  November  11,  1880,  was  made  an  occasion  for  open 
revolt ;  and  on  December  16,  1880,  the  Boers  proclaimed 
a  republic  at  Paardekraal.  Kruger  and  M.  Pretorius  were 
nominated  executives,  Joubert  being  chosen  commander-in- 
chief  of  the  military  forces ;  and  an  appeal  to  arms  followed. 
When  the  British  tried,  by  the  use  of  troops,  to  compel 
the  Boer  farmers  to  remain  within  the  empire,  they  were 
twice  defeated,  and  finally  suffered  a  disastrous  blow  at 
Majuba  Hill  on  February  27,  1881,  where  Sir  George 
P.  Colley's  army  —  unexpectedly  engaged  —  was  defeated 
and  he  himself  slain.  The  news  caused  great  excitement 
and  chagrin  in  England.  Demands  for  the  retrieval  of  Brit- 
ish honor  were  heard  on  all  sides.  Suddenly  the  British 
government  changed  its  mind.  Sir  Evelyn  Wood,  in  ac- 
cordance with  instructions  from  England,  concluded  a  tem- 
porary peace  on  March  22,  which  was  ultimately  trans- 
formed into  a  permanent  treaty  at  the  Convention  of 
Pretoria  on  August  3,  1881,1  and  the  London  Conference 
of  February  27,  1884.2  The  independence  of  the  Trans- 
vaal Republic  was  recognized.  It  was  not  to  tax  foreigners 
more  than  burghers  or  attempt  to  extend  its  borders ;  nor 
was  it  to  make  treaties  with  other  nations,  except  the 
Orange  Free  State,  without  the  approval  of  Great  Britain. 

1  Brit.  Part.  Papers,  1881,  South  Africa,  cd.  2998. 

2  Ibid.,  1881,  South  Africa,  cd.  3914. 


SOUTH  AFRICAN  EXPANSION  AND  UNION          177 

Religious  freedom  and  the  earlier  regulations  against  slav- 
ery were  to  be  enforced ;  and  certain  well-defined  provi- 
sions providing  for  the  protection  of  the  natives  and  their 
property  rights  were  added.  Thus  were  all  difficulties  ad- 
justed and  the  problem  of  the  Transvaal  solved ;  but  at  what 
a  cost  to  the  honor  and  to  the  interests  of  Great  Britain 
in  South  Africa  ! !  Gladstone  gave  rein  to  his  "  change  of 
heart "  too  late.  The  Liberal  leaders  gave,  under  compul- 
sion, what  they  had  refused  repeatedly  to  permit  earlier. 
There  were  undoubtedly  good  grounds  for  giving  the  Boer 
farmers  their  own  government  and  their  own  state  under 
British  suzerainty  ;  but  this  was  neither  the  time  nor  the 
way  in  which  it  best  could  be  accomplished.  It  was  a  great 
political  blunder  which  had  to  be  rectified  years  later  at  a 
great  sacrifice  of  men  and  money.  And  it  was  a  tremen- 
dous blow  to  British  prestige  in  South  Africa,  giving  simul- 
taneously an  enormous  impetus  to  the  development  of  Boer 
ideals  of  exclusiveness  and  independence. 

During  the  next  quarter  of  a  century,  three  new  factors 
intervened  to  change  completely  the  situation  in  South 
Africa.  The  first  of  these  was  the  inauguration  of  a  move- 
ment to  secure  the  union  of  South  Africa  upon  the  basis  of 
local  independence  and  cooperation,  yet  under  the  British 
flag.  It  was  started  at  the  first  congress  of  the  "  Afrikander 
Bond,"  held  at  Graaff  Eeinet  in  1882,  and  ardently  cham- 
pioned by  the  Bond,  which  comprised  all  the  Boers  and 
pro-Boers  in  all  the  colonies,  and  by  its  able  leader  (after 
1883),  the  late  Mr.  Hofmeyr.  The  Farmers'  Protective 
Society  of  Cape  Colony  joined  the  Bond  in  1883 ;  and  soon 
a  lively  agitation  for  a  customs  union  was  set  on  foot.  In 
1889,  Cape  Colony  and  the  Orange  Free  State  perfected  a 
zollverein,  which  was  joined  by  Basutoland  in  1891,  by 
southern  Rhodesia  in  1898,  and  by  Natal  in  1899.  The 
Transvaal  alone  held  aloof.  There  is  little  doubt  that,  if 


178    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

that  republic  had  been  ruled  by  open-minded  and  concili- 
atory statesmen  and  had  participated  actively  in  this  move- 
ment, a  real  union  might  have  been  ultimately  attained  in 
South  Africa  without  conflict  or  serious  friction. 

The  second  factor  was  the  economic  revolution  which 
began  with  the  discovery  of  diamonds  between  1869  and 
1872,  but  was  given  a  tremendous  stimulus  by  the  gold  dis- 
coveries on  the  Kaap  fields,  the  Witwatersrand,  and  the  Rand 
near  Johannesburg,1  and  by  the  railway  competition  of  the 
early  nineties.  The  finding  of  gold  brought  into  the  country 
—  particularly  the  Transvaal  —  a  great  influx  of  English 
and  other  foreigners,  who  soon  threatened  to  outnumber 
the  original  white  inhabitants.  Their  presence  affected  ma- 
terially the  whole  social  and  political  situation,  bringing  at 
the  same  time  a  tremendous  increase  to  the  financial  and 
commercial  wealth  of  the  community.  By  1891,  the  Natal 
Government,  with  some  outside  assistance,  had  completed 
their  line  from  Durban  to  the  Transvaal  frontier.  The 
Cape  Railroad  —  a  sharp  competitor  —  pushed  its  line  to 
the  edge  of  the  Transvaal  by  May,  1892,  with  the  assist- 
ance of  the  Government  and  the  consent  of  the  Orange 
Free  State,  and  completed  its  connections  with  the  chief 
ports  of  Cape  Colony  in  September  of  the  same  year.  Mean- 
while, the  Netherlands  South  African  Company  started  a 
line  from  Louren9O  Marques  on  Portuguese  territory, 
which  was  brought  successfully  into  the  Rand  in  May, 
1894.  The  Transvaal  Government,  which  owned  a  ma- 
terial interest  in  this  latter  line,  attempted  to  turn  all  the 
traffic  to  this  shorter  road  to  the  coast ;  and  it  was  only  the 
interference  of  the  Home  Government  that  secured  for 
the  railways  of  Natal  and  the  Cape  an  entrance  to  the 
Transvaal  on  anything  like  an  equal  commercial  basis.  The 
building  of  these  railway  lines,  however,  proved  a  great 
stimulus  to  the  trade  and  development  of  the  country. 

1  The  gold  production  rose  from  £34,710  in  1886  to  £8,603,821  in  1896. 


SOUTH  AFRICAN  EXPANSION  AND  UNION          179 

The  third  element,  which  played  an  important  role  in 
the  changing  conditions  of  the  last  quarter  of  the  nineteenth 
century,  was  the  transformation  in  the  colonial  policy  of 
the  British  authorities.  Aroused  by  their  reverses  at  the 
hands  of  the  Transvaal  Boers,  the  serious  native  troubles 
between  1879  and  1884,  and  the  entrance  of  Germany  into 
Southwest  Africa  in  1884,  the  English  leaders  were  con- 
vinced that  a  sound  and  definite  policy  should  be  elabo- 
rated in  the  conduct  of  South  African  affairs.  They  were 
very  slow,  however,  in  determining  the  main  principles  to 
be  followed.  The  Conservative  party,  which  after  1885  re- 
mained in  power  most  of  the  time  till  the  end  of  the  cen- 
tury, decided  at  length  upon  two  leading  features  of  their 
program  :  protection  of  natives  and  native  states,  and  free- 
dom of  action  for  the  Transvaal  Government,  as  long  as  it 
did  not  interfere  in  native  affairs  or  attempt  to  extend  its 
territory.  This  was  soon  evident  from  the  recognition  of 
the  "  New  Republic  "  formed  by  Dinizulu  —  son  of  Cety 
wayo  —  in  1886  and  added  to  the  Transvaal,  the  establish- 
ment of  the  Basutoland  and  Bechuanaland  protectorates 
in  1884  and  1885,  and  the  annexation  of  Kaffraria  to  Cape 
Colony  during  the  years  1890  to  1892,  together  with  the 
passage  of  the  Glen  Grey  Act  for  the  protection  of  its 
black  inhabitants  in  1894.  The  creation  of  the  two  native 
protectorates,  followed  as  it  was  by  the  issuance  of  a  charter 
in  1889  to  the  British  South  African  Company,  which  pro- 
posed to  carry  British  sovereignty  into  the  extensive  ter- 
ritories of  the  Matabeles  and  the  Mashonas  north  of  the 
Limpopo  River,  had  a  still  further  significance.  It  marked 
the  conversion  of  the  British  Government  to  a  policy  of 
colonial  expansion.  Pressed  on  all  sides  by  the  lively  am- 
bitions and  competition  of  other  European  powers,  Great 
Britain  was  forced  to  participate  in  the  general  forward 
movement  for  African  colonies  ;  but  she  did  so  with  great 


180    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

hesitation  and  deliberation.  For  the  moment  she  remained 
content  with  issuing  permits  to  commercial  companies, 
such  as  the  British  Nigerian,  South  African,  and  East 
African  Companies,  to  mark  out  and  occupy  those  hinter- 
lands most  desirable  for  her  future  control. 

Meanwhile,  matters  in  the  Transvaal  had  taken  on  a  se- 
rious aspect.  The  old  burghers,  or  the  more  conservative 
element  of  that  Boer  community,  held  control  of  the  gov- 
ernment. Their  leaders  were  not  only  extremely  cautious, 
but  also  narrow-minded  and  suspicious  of  all  outsiders  and 
new  things.  They  favored  high  tariffs  and  an  exclusive 
policy,  disdaining  all  suggestions  of  customs  or  federal 
union  not  in  strict  conformity  with  their  own  ideals.  They 
were  as  hostile  to  the  neighboring  states,  in  many  ways,  as 
they  were  to  the  ever-increasing  number  of  foreigners  who 
took  up  their  residence  within  the  Transvaal.  The  presence 
of  these  "  Uitlanders,"  as  they  were  called  by  the  farmers, 
was  most  distasteful  to  the  old  burghers,  who  feared  these 
immigrants  and  considered  them  interlopers  and  "  pol- 
luters of  the  country."  President  Kruger  was  the  personi- 
fication of  the  old  Boer  ideals,  and,  as  such,  stanchly  sup- 
ported and  respected  by  a  strong  following.  He  was  an  able 
leader  and  a  shrewd  politician,  possessing  a  sincere  devo- 
tion to  his  country  and  its  interests.  But  he  was  lacking 
in  education  and  breadth  of  view,  and  permitted  his  own 
prejudices  and  his  ambitions  for  his  own  people  to  override 
an  ordinarily  sound  judgment.  He  and  his  friends  seemed 
obsessed  with  the  idea  that  every  move  by  the  colonial 
or  imperial  authorities  was  part  and  parcel  of  a  deep-laid 
plot  to  steal  the  Transvaal  from  the  Boers. 

To  secure  his  aims  and  the  preservation  of  Boer  control, 
Mr.  Kruger  descended  ultimately  to  questionable  methods ; 
but  he  began  by  laying  obstacles  in  the  Uitlanders'  path 
toward  the  suffrage.  In  1882,  the  period  of  residence 


SOUTH  AFRICAN  EXPANSION  AND  UNION          181 

necessary  to  qualify  for  citizenship  was  raised  from  one 
to  five  years ; l  and  in  July,  1887,  the  same  prerequisite, 
together  with  the  requirement  of  membership  in  a  Protes- 
tant church,  was  laid  down  for  all  candidates  to  the  Volks- 
raad.  Finally,  in  1889,  the  franchise  was  limited  to  persons 
born  in  the  Republic;  and  in  1893,  the  approval  in  writing 
of  the  burghers  in  the  ward  where  the  candidate  resided, 
together  with  the  consent  of  the  President,  the  executive 
body  and  the  First  Raad,  were  made  necessary  to  the  issu- 
ance of  citizenship  papers.  In  this  way  the  party  of  Mr. 
Kruger  and  his  friends  retained  control  of  the  government 
and  successfully  prevented  the  aliens,  of  whom  there  were 
some  48,000  in  the  Transvaal  by  1890  and  over  100,000 
by  1895,  from  participation  in  political  affairs. 

This  would  not  have  been  a  serious  matter,  even  though 
the  Uitlanders  did  possess  sixty-three  per  cent  of  the  land, 
ninety  per  cent  of  the  personal  property,  and  were  paying 
ninety-five  per  cent  of  the  taxes  (as  was  claimed  on  good 
authority),  if  the  country  had  been  ably  and  equitably  ad- 
ministered. But  this  was  not  the  case.  The  conditions  of  life 
in  the  neighborhood  of  the  mines  were  frequently  distress- 
ing and  irritating  ;  and  little  was  done  to  improve  them.  It 
is  true  many  of  the  newcomers  were  not  the  most  desirable 
material  for  citizens.  Violent  acts  by  some  of  the  more  radi- 
cal members  brought  the  whole  body  under  suspicion ;  and 
no  one  would  have  criticized  a  fair-minded  government  that 
sought  to  protect  itself  from  the  evils  of  a  precipitate  adop- 
tion of  unrestricted  manhood  suffrage.  In  fact,  the  better 
element  of  the  foreign  population  cared  little  for  citizen- 
ship, and  would  have  given  the  Transvaal  authorities  no 
serious  trouble  if  the  proper  protection  for  life,  property, 
personal  and  corporate  interests  had  been  forthcoming.  On 
the  contrary,  troubles  and  conflicts  between  Boers  and 
aliens  were  constant  and  increasing.  In  addition  to  in- 
1  Reduced  some  years  later  to  two  years. 


182    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

creasing  the  taxes  upon  the  industries  at  every  opportunity, 
many  serious  and  vexatious  restrictions  were  laid  upon  trade 
and  the  corporations,  while  little  was  done  by  the  Govern- 
ment to  promote  the  commerce  and  economic  development 
of  the  Transvaal.  Hollanders  and  other  foreigners  were 
often  given  the  preference  over  the  British  residents ;  and 
numerous  instances  of  official  graft,  peculation,  and  favor- 
itism came  to  light.  British  subjects  were  even  comman- 
deered for  service  in  the  Transvaal  army  without  recourse ; 
and  only  the  kindness  of  the  wealthier  Uitlanders  prevented 
great  suffering  among  families  deprived  of  their  bread- 
winners. The  advice  of  President  Brand  of  the  Orange 
Free  State,  "If  you  wish  to  govern  the  strangers  success- 
fully, make  friends  with  them,"  was  ignored ;  but  every 
move  of  the  aliens  toward  reform,  either  through  the  bal- 
lot or  other  means,  was  looked  upon  as  a  plot  to  seize  the 
Transvaal  for  Britain. 

For  some  time  the  leading  capitalists  declined  to  have 
anything  to  do  with  politics  or  to  assist  the  foreign  resi- 
dents to  secure  the  franchise.  In  the  early  nineties,  it  be- 
came impossible  longer  to  ignore  the  situation ;  and  in 
1892,  the  Transvaal  National  Union  was  formed  with  the 
assistance  of  some  capitalists,  for  the  purpose  of  protecting 
the  rights  and  interests  of  the  alien  population.  In  1893, 
Kruger  was  reflected  president  by  an  official  majority  of 
800  out  of  15,000  votes,  and  his  election  was  approved 
by  the  Volksraad,  although  the  facts  seem  to  show  that 
Joubert  — the  reform  candidate  —  actually  received  a  ma- 
jority of  the  ballots.  All  hope  of  real  reform  seemed  now 
indefinitely  postponed ;  and  "  hope  deferred  maketh  the 
heart  sick."  Conditions  remaining  unchanged  and  no  signs 
of  improvement  in  sight,  the  leading  Uitlanders  in  Johan- 
nesburg were  encouraged  to  consider  plans  for  securing 
control  of  the  administration  by  strategy  or  force. 


SOUTH  AFRICAN  EXPANSION  AND  UNION          183 

Mr.  Rhodes  discussed  an  action  of  this  sort  with  Mr. 
Lionel  Phillips,  chairman  of  the  National  Union,  in  De- 
cember, 1894,  and  sent  Mr.  Beit  in  June,  1896,  to  Johan- 
nesburg to  consult  with  the  alien  leaders  and  assist  in  work- 
ing out  a  suitable  plan.  Between  August  and  October,  Mr. 
Rhodes,  who  was  then  Prime  Minister  of  Cape  Colony,  went 
in  person  to  the  Transvaal,  and  a  general  scheme  was  out- 
lined. But  the  Uitlanders  disagreed.  Some  favored  the  use 
of  force  and  the  placing  of  the  Transvaal  under  the  British 
flag.  Others,  more  conservative,  preferred  to  secure  reform 
and  self-government  within  the  Transvaal  from  Johannes- 
burg as  a  center.  "  We  don't  want  any  row,"  wrote  Mr. 
Lionel  Phillips  to  Messrs.  Beit  and  Wernher  on  July  15, 
1894.  "Our  trump  card  is  a  fund  of  £10,000  to  £15,000 
to  improve  the  Raad."  1 

Finding  it  practically  impossible  either  to  reconcile  these 
conflicting  elements  or  to  secure  a  necessary  working  co- 
operation among  the  leaders,  the  great  imperialist  aban- 
doned for  the  moment  all  hope  of  immediate  action.  One 
of  his  chief  aids,  however,  thought  otherwise  and  launched 
the  movement,  while  his  colleagues  in  Johannesburg  hesi- 
tated and  the  world  was  unsuspecting.  Dr.  Jameson  — 
familiarly  known  throughout  South  Africa  as  "  Dr.  Jim  " 
—  who  during  the  past  four  years  had  met  with  unprece- 
dented success  as  administrator  for  the  South  African  Com- 
pany in  southern  Rhodesia,  had  concentrated  some  six  hun- 
dred of  the  company's  police  near  the  western  border  of  the 
Transvaal,  under  the  suggestion  of  Mr.  Rhodes,  to  assist 
the  Uitlanders  if  necessary.  On  December  29,  1895,  he 
started  these  troops  on  the  historic  but  ill-starred  "  Raid  " 
to  Johannesburg,  which  ended  so  abruptly  and  ignomini- 
ously  at  Krugersdorf  four  days  later.  "  I  received  so  many 

1  Printed  -with  other  letters  from  Mr.  Phillips  in  Appendix  C  of  Scoble 
and  Abercrombie's  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  Erugerism,  1900,  p.  274. 


184    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

messages  from  day  to  day,  now  telling  me  to  come,  then  to 
delay  starting,  that  I  thought  it  best  to  make  up  their  minds 
for  them,  before  the  Boers  could  get  together,"  1  said  Jame- 
son to  Lady  Sarah  Wilson  a  few  days  later.  But  he  had 
underestimated  the  real  strength  of  his  adversaries,  and  was 
unaware  of  their  quiet  but  effective  preparations  to  head  off 
such  a  movement,  while  the  aliens  in  the  Transvaal  were  not 
sufficiently  united,  organized,  or  prepared  to  be  of  any  real 
assistance  to  him.  He  and  his  fellow  officers  who  were  cap- 
tured at  Krugersdorf  were  sent  immediately  to  England  for 
trial ;  but  the  Johannesburg  leaders,  who  surrendered  a  few 
days  later,  —  January  7,  —  were  tried  and  sentenced  to 
death  as  rebels.  Kruger,  however,  under  pressure  from  the 
Home  Government  and  appeased  by  a  congratulatory  tele- 
gram from  Emperor  William  of  Germany,  commuted  their 
sentences  to  heavy  fines. 

The  "Raid,"2  was  one  of  those  movements  which  are 
condoned  if  they  succeed,  but,  if  failure  results,  condemn 
those  connected  with  them  to  unmitigated  censure  and  dis- 
approval. The  well-deserved  popularity  of  Cecil  Rhodes 
and  Dr.  Jameson  (the  former  had  been  as  popular  with  the 
Boers  as  with  the  British)  disappeared  in  a  day ;  and  both 
lost  their  positions  as  public  officials  and  political  leaders 
—  Mr.  Rhodes  voluntarily,  though  he  managed  to  save  the 
South  African  Company  from  dissolution.  If  it  had  suc- 
ceeded, it  would  no  doubt  have  transferred  the  control  of 
the  Transvaal  from  the  old  burghers  to  the  Uitlanders  and 
have  prevented  the  Boer  War  of  1899  to  1901.  But  its 
failure  reacted  in  such  a  way  as  to  remove  practically  every 
chance  of  reconciliation  between  Boer  and  British  interests 
in  South  Africa.  Race  f eeling  was  embittered  and  the  Boer 

1  Lady  Sarah  Wilson,  South  African  Memories,  1909,  p.  35. 

2  Brit.  Parl.  Papers,  1897,  So.  Af.  Rep.,  cd.  8380,  8404,  8423.  Brit.  Parl. 
Papers,  1899,  So.  Af.  Rep.,  cd.  9343,  9507,  9521,  9530.  Arch.  Dip.,  1896, 
vol.  i,  pt.  11,  pp.  121-23. 


SOUTH  AFRICAN  EXPANSION  AND  UNION          185 

contempt  for  English  authority  and  suspicion  of  British 
honor  and  integrity  increased.  All  the  Boer  interests  of 
South  Africa  were  drawn  together;  and  the  Transvaal 
leaders  were  given  a  most  effective  argument  for  their 
charges  of  aggression  and  discrimination  on  the  part  of  the 
Cape  Government  and  the  imperial  authorities.  Boer  am- 
bition advanced  by  leaps  and  bounds ;  and  the  serious  con- 
flict which  now  ensued  between  the  two  national  forces  was 
brought  on  —  next  to  the  mistaken  diplomacy  of  Kruger 
himself  —  through  the  agency  of  this  ill-advised  military 
expedition. 

The  policy  of  Mr.  Kruger  and  his  friends  embraced 
three  main  issues  :  control  of  the  Transvaal  administration, 
freedom  from  British  suzerainty,  and  advancement  of  Boer 
unity  in  South  Africa  as  rapidly  as  possible.  On  March  17, 
1896,  a  defensive  and  offensive  alliance1  was  concluded 
with  President  Steyn,  of  the  Orange  Free  State ;  and  the 
following  year  the  President  of  the  Transvaal  repudiated 
the  overlordship  of  Great  Britain,  while  bidding  strenu- 
ously for  the  friendship  of  foreign  states  like  Holland  and 
Germany.  "  In  the  convention  of  1881  the  suzerainty  was 
mentioned,  but  not  in  the  treaty  of  1884.  It  has  therefore 
ceased  to  exist,  ..."  said  Mr.  Kruger  to  the  Volksraad  on 
August  25,  1897.  "On  the  other  hand,  I  recognize  the 
right  of  England  to  oppose,  within  six  months,  treaties 
made  between  the  Transvaal  and  foreign  powers."  And 
his  interpretation  was  unanimously  approved  by  the  popu- 
lar assembly.  The  British  Government,  however,  steadily 
refused  to  recognize  this  view  of  their  relationship  to  the 
Boer  Republic,  and  tried  every  means  to  secure  a  reas- 
onable and  mutually  satisfactory  understanding  on  the 
question. 

Relations  were  strained  still  further  by  the  attitude  of 
1  Arch.  Dip.,  1897,  vol.  i,  pt.  n,  pp.  118-21. 


186    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

the  Transvaal  authorities  toward  the  British  residents  of 
that  country.  Aroused  and  irritated  by  the  "  Kaid,"  Mr. 
Kruger  and  his  supporters  were  determined  thereafter  to 
hold  the  foreign  element  in  complete  control.  On  Septem- 
ber 28, 1896,  the  Alien  Expulsion  Act  was  passed,  empow- 
ering the  President  and  Executive  Council  to  expel  any 
alien  from  the  state  who  was  in  any  way  a  danger  to  the 
public  peace. 

Two  days  earlier,  a  press  law l  had  been  enacted  giv- 
ing the  Executive  the  right  to  prohibit  the  circulation  of 
all  printed  matter  which  he  should  consider  a  menace  to  the 
peace  and  morals  of  the  Republic.  And  in  November, 
1896,  a  further  alien  law  was  decreed  by  the  Volksraad 
requiring  all  foreigners  entering  the  country  to  be  provided 
with  passports  showing  that  they  possessed  proper  means  of 
support  or  were  in  a  position  to  obtain  such  by  work.  The 
British  Government  protested  in  vain  against  this  discrim- 
inating legislation ;  and  the  consistent,  conciliatory  efforts 
of  Sir  Hercules  Robinson  and  Sir  Alfred  Milner  (who  was 
appointed  High  Commissioner  in  May,  1897)  were  una- 
vailing to  secure  any  proper  recognition  of  the  rights  and 
interests  of  the  British  residents.  At  length  the  chief,  and 
practically  the  only,  safeguard  of  these  residents  was  re- 
moved in  1897,  when  the  Volksraad  was  permitted  to  over- 
ride the  decisions  of  Judge  Kotze  of  the  Supreme  Court — 
a  proceeding  with  which  Mr.  Kruger  had  threatened  Mr. 
Kotze  as  early  as  1895.2 

It  was  no  longer  possible  for  the  British  Government  to 
ignore  the  conditions  existing  in  the  Transvaal.  The  Uit- 
lander  Association  in  Pretoria  petitioned  the  Home  Gov- 

1  Brit.  Par/.  Papers,  1897,  So.  Af.  Sep.,  ed.  8423,  p.  5. 

2  In  an  interview  on  September  7,  a  "  Memorandum  "  of  which  was  made 
at  the  time  by  Kotze  and  witnessed  to  by  Paul  Mare  and  a  notary  public. 
Printed  in  Appendix  H  of  Scoble  and  Abercrombie's  The  Rise  and  Fall  of 
Erugerism,  p.  292. 


SOUTH  AFRICAN  EXPANSION  AND  UNION  187 

ernment  in  1897.  After  the  reelection  of  Kruger  in  1897, 
and  the  killing  of  an  Englishman  named  Edgar  by  a  Boer 
policeman,  a  monster  petition  signed  by  21,000  people 
was  forwarded  in  March,  1899,  to  Queen  Victoria.  Some- 
thing more  must  be  done  than  the  issuance  of  protests. 
It  was  finally  decided  to  use  pressure,  upon  the  advice  of 
Sir  Alfred  Milner,  who  wired  on  May  4,  1899,  asking  for 
some  "  striking  proof  of  the  intention  of  Her  Majesty's 
Government  not  to  be  ousted  from  its  position."  "  The 
only  condition  on  which  they  (the  two  principal  white 
races)  can  live  in  harmony  and  the  country  progress,"  he 
added,  "  is  equality  all  around.  South  Africa  can  prosper 
under  two,  three,  or  six  governments,  but  not  under  two 
absolutely  conflicting  social  and  political  systems.  .  .  .  The 
attempt  to  remedy  the  hundred  and  one  wrongs  springing 
from  a  hopeless  system  by  taking  up  isolated  cases  is  per- 
fectly vain.  It  may  easily  lead  to  war,  but  will  never  lead  to 
real  improvement.  The  true  remedy  is  to  strike  at  the  root 
of  all  these  injuries  —  the  political  importance  of  the  in- 
jured. ...  It  seems  a  paradox,  but  it  is  true  that  the  only 
effective  way  of  protecting  our  subjects  is  to  help  them  to 
cease  to  be  our  subjects.  The  admission  of  Uitlanders  to  a 
fair  share  of  political  power  would  no  doubt  give  stability 
to  the  Republic,  but  it  would  at  the  same  time  remove 
most  of  our  causes  of  difference  with  it,  and  modify,  and 
in  the  long  run  entirely  remove,  that  intense  suspicion  and 
bitter  hostility  to  Great  Britain  which  at  present  domi- 
nates its  internal  and  external  policy.  The  case  for  inter- 
vention is  overwhelming." 

At  the  suggestion  of  Mr.  Chamberlain,  Sir  Alfred  met 
President  Kruger  in  a  conference  at  Bloemfontein  lasting 
from  May  31  to  June  5  ;  but  no  agreement  was  reached. 
Hofmeyr  and  Abraham  Fisher  were  sent  to  Pretoria  to 
use  their  influence  with  the  Executive  and  the  Volksraad ; 


188    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

and  an  offer  to  submit  the  differences  to  a  joint  commission 
for  settlement  was  made  by  England.  All  in  vain.  The 
only  compromise  to  which  Mr.  Kruger  would  listen  was  his 
own  impossible,  arrogant,  and  dictatorial  proposal  on  August 
18  :  To  give  the  aliens  the  franchise  after  five  years'  resi- 
dence, provided  Great  Britain  dropped  her  claim  of  suze- 
rainty and  agreed  not  to  interfere  again  in  Transvaal  affairs, 
but  to  submit  all  future  disputes  to  arbitration.  Such  a 
demand  no  self-respecting  nation  could  consider  for  a  mo- 
ment. Certainly  England  could  not  afford  to  see  the  Ma- 
juba  mistake  committed  a  second  time  if  South  Africa  was 
ever  to  be  dominated  by  the  Anglo-Saxon  race.  It  was  not 
for  her  to  be  the  aggressor,  however ;  and  she  waited  in 
dignified  patience  the  onslaught  of  the  leaders  of  the  Boers, 
who  had  sowed  the  seeds  of  discord  and  were  now  to  reap 
the  whirlwind.  On  September  27,  1899,  the  Orange  Free 
State  voted  for  joint  action  with  the  Transvaal  Boers ;  and, 
after  issuing  an  ultimatum  to  Great  Britain  on  the  9th, 
demanding  a  withdrawal  of  her  troops  from  the  frontier, 
the  Boer  forces  invaded  Natal  and  Cape  Colony  on  Octo- 
ber 12. 

The  events  of  the  Boer  War  are  too  well  known  to  be 
detailed  here.1  There  could  be  but  one  result  of  such  a  con- 
flict ;  and  Great  Britain,  who  suffered  some  serious  reverses 
in  the  beginning,  demonstrated  the  superiority  of  her  arms 
and  saved  her  good  name  in  the  end  through  the  genius  of 
Lords  Roberts  and  Kitchener,  after  she  had  learned  to  re- 
spect the  courage,  the  dogged  perseverance,  and  the  skill 
of  her  undaunted  opponents.  We  resume  our  story  with 
the  signing  of  the  treaty  of  peace  at  Pretoria  on  May  31, 
1902.2  It  was  a  remarkable  treaty,  for  never  before  had  a 
conquering  power  meted  out,  in  a  spirit  of  friendly  gener- 

1  See  Report  of  Com.  on  the  War,  1903,  cd.  1789,  1790,  1191. 

2  Arch.  Dip.,  1902,  vol.  n,  pt.  111,  pp.  271-84. 


SOUTH  AFRICAN  EXPANSION  AND  UNION          189 

osity,  such  favorable  terms  to  a  subjected  people.  At  the 
opening  of  the  negotiations,  the  Boer  leaders  tried  to  retain 
their  independence  and  to  secure  a  share  in  the  settlement 
of  all  important  local  matters,  such  as  internal  reforms,  the 
franchise,  the  language  question,  economic  development,  etc. 
They  offered  to  surrender  all  control  over  foreign  affairs  if 
permitted  to  retain  these  national  rights  and  privileges ;  but 
Great  Britain  remained  firm  and  dictated  the  terms  of  peace. 
This  was  necessary,  not  only  in  the  interests  of  British  su- 
premacy and  self-respect,  but  also  to  cultivate  a  feeling  of 
confidence  and  respect  for  the  English  Government  in  the 
minds  and  hearts  of  the  Boers  themselves,  who  had  harbored 
so  long  sentiments  of  distrust  and  contempt  toward  the 
dominant  race  of  South  Africa.  The  British  authorities, 
moreover,  rightly  insisted  upon  the  retention  in  their  own 
hands  of  all  political  power,  both  in  national  and  local 
affairs.  This  was  imperative,  not  only  in  the  interests  of  the 
Transvaal  and  Orange  River  Colonies,  but  in  those  of  the 
whole  of  South  Africa  as  well.  The  future  development  of 
the  two  revolting  states  and  of  the  rest  of  South  Africa,  as 
well  as  the  relations  between  the  Home  Government  and 
these  colonial  units,  demanded  that  the  affairs  of  the  Trans- 
vaal and  Orange  River  Colonies  should  be  directed  by  a 
powerful  and  unbiased  hand,  tempered  firmly  by  justice, 
intelligence,  and  patience,  for  some  years  to  come.  It  is  not 
always  wise  to  submit  entirely  to  the  mercy  of  the  con- 
queror, but  the  Boer  leaders,  having  no  other  alternative 
and  trusting  the  word  of  the  British  authorities,  signed  the 
terms  of  peace,  after  these  had  been  approved  by  their  peo- 
ple. The  results  have  justified  this  submission  and  this 
trust. 

In  the  treaty  of  Pretoria,  provision  was  made  for  the 
surrender  of  the  Boer  armies  and  for  a  general  amnesty  for 
all  burghers,  both  inside  and  outside  of  the  Transvaal  and 


190    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

the  Orange  River  Colonies,  who  had  participated  in  the 
struggle.  The  two  states  were  to  be  placed  under  a  British 
military  government ;  but  a  civil  administration,  followed 
by  local  autonomy,  was  to  be  introduced  as  soon  as  prac- 
ticable. No  one  was  to  be  deprived  of  liberty  or  property, 
and  no  special  tax  for  the  payment  of  the  costs  of  the  war 
was  to  be  levied.  The  Dutch  language  would  be  taught 
in  the  schools  and  used  in  the  courts,  but  the  question 
of  the  franchise  was  postponed,  dependent  upon  later  de- 
velopments. In  addition,  the  British  Government  offered 
to  furnish  .£3,000,000,  together  with  a  number  of  expert 
officials,  to  assist  the  people  in  resettling  and  restoring  their 
lands  and  to  care  for  the  poor  and  helpless.  Additional 
money  would  be  loaned  for  two  years  without  interest,  and 
thereafter  at  three  per  cent,  to  assist  the  Boer  farmers  in 
procuring  seeds,  implements  and  other  necessities  for  the 
reopening  of  the  lauds  and  the  resumption  of  ordinary  oc- 
cupations. 

All  these  promises  the  British  authorities  kept  well.  On 
June  21,  1902,  the  great  work  of  repatriation  began  and 
in  a  little  over  eight  months'  time  about  200,000  old  burgh- 
ers had  been  transported  to  their  homes,  fed  and  cared  for, 
and  assisted  in  planting  their  first  crop.  This  colossal  un- 
dertaking was  carried  out  successfully  in  spite  of  the  diffi- 
culties of  transportation,  the  condition  of  the  country,  and 
the  winter  season,  through  the  medium  of  Central  Repatria- 
tion Boards  in  each  colony  and  local  District  Commission- 
ers, all  of  whom  displayed  great  energy,  diligence,  and 
resourcefulness.  Many  officials  of  the  neighboring  colonies 
gave  material  assistance  and  took  a  great  interest  in  the 
work,  Lord  Milner  himself  traveling  two  thousand  miles  to 
oversee  the  direction  of  the  operations  personally.  The  ex- 
pense of  the  movement  was  enormous,  some  £9,000,000 
being  paid  out  by  the  British  Government  during  this 


SOUTH  AFRICAN  EXPANSION  AND  UNION          191 

period,  which  included  the  <£3,000,000  given  to  the  Boer 
families  and  .£2,000,000  distributed  among  the  British 
subjects  and  others,  who  had  suffered  by  the  war. 

The  military  government,  established  by  the  proclama- 
tions of  Lord  Roberts  and  the  letters  patent  of  August  2, 
1901,  was  replaced  in  the  Orange  River  Colony  on  June 
23  and  in  the  Transvaal  on  September  23, 1  1902,  by  civil 
administrations  consisting  of  a  governor,  lieutenant-gov- 
ernor, executive  and  legislative  councils  —  all  appointed 
through  the  imperial  authorities.  The  work  of  this  new 
regime  was  excellent.  By  1904,  the  people  were  again  set- 
tled on  their  homesteads  and  over  1,132,000  acres  were 
allotted  to  some  656  new  settlers,  of  whom  435  were  Brit- 
ish. Roads  were  built,  public  works  started,  industries  re- 
opened, police  forces  organized,  and  considerable  progress 
made  in  education  and  in  the  construction  of  schools.  Local 
government,  which  had  always  been  too  largely  under  the 
control  of  the  central  authorities,  was  revived  upon  a  sound 
and  equitable  basis,  and  a  steady  political  development  took 
place.  At  length  a  strong  sentiment  in  favor  of  self-rule 
arose,  which  soon  took  on  a  definite  form.  In  the  beginning 
of  1905,  there  were  three  parties  in  the  field  advocating 
responsible  government,  the  most  important  of  which  was 
"  Het  Volk,"  or  the  people's  party,  organized  in  January, 
1905,  composed  almost  entirely  of  Boers.  The  British  au- 
thorities were  not  long  in  recognizing  that  the  time  had 
come  to  give  the  two  recalcitrant  colonies  some  form  of  local 
autonomy.  Late  in  March,  1905,  draft  constitutions  were 
drawn  up  with  the  cooperation  of  Lord  Milner ;  but,  owing 
to  the  necessity  for  a  further  investigation  and  the  firm 
conviction  of  some  of  the  British  statesmen  that  nothing 
short  of  complete  home  rule  would  fit  the  case,  the  final 
letters  patent  authorizing  the  new  administrations  were  not 

1  Brit.  Parl.  Papers,  1903,  Transvaal  No.  8,  cd.  1463,  1551,  2400. 


192    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

issued  until  December  6, 1906,  for  the  Transvaal  and  June 
5,  1907,  for  the  Orange  River  Colony.1 

The  government  in  each  colony  under  the  new  regime  was 
to  consist  of  a  governor  and  commander-in-chief  appointed 
by  the  Crown,  an  executive  council  nominated  by  the  Gov- 
ernor, and  a  legislative  assembly  with  full  powers  elected 
by  the  people.  At  the  end  of  four  months,  the  Governors 
were  empowered  to  form  a  ministry  of  six  persons  in  their 
respective  colonies,  who  should  have  the  right  to  sit  in  either 
of  the  two  houses  of  legislation.  Citizenship  in  the  new 
colonies  had  already  been  provided  for  in  the  naturalization 
laws  of  May  20,  1902,2  which  required  a  previous  service 
in  the  employ  of  the  Crown,  or  a  five  years'  residence  in 
the  revolting  districts,  and  the  taking  of  an  oath  of  alle- 
giance to  Great  Britain.  They  were  now  extended  to  include 
"  every  white  male  British  subject  of  the  age  of  twenty-one 
and  upward,"  who  was  not  serving  in  the  armies  of  England 
and  who  had  resided  in  the  colonies  for  six  months  just  pre- 
ceding the  date  of  registration.  Thus  the  British  nation  at 
one  stroke  gave  the  conquered  provinces  responsible  gov- 
ernment and  admitted  the  former  citizens  of  the  two  Boer 
states  to  an  equality  with  all  the  subjects  of  the  British 
Empire.  This  may  have  been  a  bitter  pill  for  the  old  burgh- 
ers to  swallow,  but  it  was  a  vital  and  significant  move  in  the 
interests  of  all  the  people  of  South  Africa.  All  real  prog- 
ress, all  internal  development,  prosperity,  and  good  will, 
depended  upon  the  preservation  of  political  equality  and 
of  personal  initiative.  The  future,  not  only  of  the  two  colo- 
nies, but  also  of  all  South  Africa,  was  wrapped  up  in  it. 
For  "  the  Dutch  can  never  own  a  perfect  allegiance  merely 
to  Great  Britain,"  said  Lord  Milner  in  his  farewell  speech 
at  Johannesburg.  "  The  British  can  never,  without  moral 

1  Brit.  Parl.  Papers,  1907,  Orange  Riv.  Col.,  cd.  3526. 

2  Arch.  Dip.,  1903,  pt.  iv,  pp.  306-17. 


SOUTH  AFRICAN  EXPANSION  AND  UNION          193 

injury,  accept  allegiance  to  any  body  politic  which  excludes 
their  motherland.  But  British  and  Dutch  alike  could,  with- 
out loss  of  dignity,  without  sacrifice  of  their  several  tradi- 
tions, unite  in  loyal  devotion  to  an  Empire-State,  in  which 
Great  Britain  and  South  Africa  would  be  partners,  and 
could  work  cordially  together  for  the  good  of  South  Africa 
as  a  member  of  that  great  whole." 

It  so  happened  that  Lord  Milner,  who  had  been  Gov- 
ernor of  the  two  Boer  colonies  from  1900  to  1905  and  High 
Commissioner,  was  succeeded  in  all  three  offices  by  the 
Earl  of  Selborne  in  May  of  the  last-named  year,  and  by 
Sir  Hely-Hutchinson  as  Governor  of  Cape  Colony.  Selborne 
was  assisted  by  Lieutenant-Governors  in  the  Orange  Free 
State  and  the  Transvaal  until  the  new  constitutions  went 
into  effect  in  1907,  when  the  office  of  Lieutenant-Governor 
was  abolished,  and  he  became  Governor  of  the  Transvaal 
and  Sir  H.  J.  Goold-Adams  of  the  Orange  River  Colony. 

Meanwhile  excellent  progress  was  being  made  under  the 
two  new  governments,  and  things  were  picking  up  throughout 
all  of  South  Africa.  Railway  systems  were  reopened  and 
adjusted  to  the  new  conditions ;  some  obnoxious  taxes  abol- 
ished ;  the  finances  reorganized ;  public  improvements  in- 
stituted ;  and  numerous  measures  for  the  improvement  of 
economic  and  agricultural  conditions  introduced.  In  spite 
of  this  material  progress,  however,  conditions  were  far  from 
satisfactory.  This  was  due  chiefly  to  rivalry,  competition, 
and  jealousy  among  the  South  African  colonies,  of  whom 
there  were  now  five  distinct  communities,  each  with  its  own 
independent  administration,  system  of  laws,  railways,  com- 
mercial and  economic  problems.  In  many  instances,  these 
vital  interests  overlapped  ;  and  an  increasing  number  of  in- 
tercolonial questions  were  constantly  arising,  which  caused 
friction  and  distrust  among  the  colonists  and  upon  which 
it  was  impossible  to  make  permanent  or  lasting  settlements. 


194    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

The  situation  had,  indeed,  reached  a  state  comparable  to 
that  in  Canada  before  the  Union  or  in  the  North  American 
colonies  before  the  adoption  of  the  Federal  Constitution  of 
1789,  where  the  individual  communities  engaged  in  a  cut- 
throat competition  for  trade  and  a  lively  but  vicious  com- 
petition for  individual  rights  and  special  privileges. 

The  existing  political  system  was  a  failure,  both  in  the 
way  of  meeting  present  demands  and  in  preparing  the 
ground  for  future  developments.  The  Governors  of  the  dif- 
ferent colonies  exerted  every  nerve  to  bring  about  coopera- 
tion and  to  promote  general  prosperity,  with  indifferent  suc- 
cess. Lord  Milner,  who  strove  impartially  to  further  the 
development  of  the  country,  found  the  interests  he  was  ad- 
vocating as  Governor  of  the  Transvaal  often  diametrically 
opposed  to  those  he  wished  to  advance  as  Governor  of  the 
Orange  River  Colony.  A  successful  administration  of  South 
African  affairs  was  impossible,  as  long  as  there  remained 
a  complete  division  of  authority  between  five  groups  with 
no  proper  means  of  cooperation  or  of  central  control.  Nor 
could  any  form  of  real  home  government  be  attained,  as 
long  as  Great  Britain  possessed  such  a  strong  hand  in  the 
direction  of  all  local  affairs  as  existed  in  the  High  Com- 
missioner, the  Governors,  the  native  commissioners,  and 
other  Imperial  representatives.  No  matter  how  capable  or 
efficient  such  officials  might  be,  they  were  not  ruling  as 
South  Africans,  —  nor  did  their  policy  represent  that  of  the 
people  of  South  Africa. 

The  old  Customs  Union,  founded  in  1898  by  the  Cape 
of  Good  Hope  Colony,  Natal,  and  the  Orange  Free  State, 
was  resurrected  in  March,  1903,  at  Bloemfontein  by  the 
Governors  of  the  same  colonies  and  of  the  Transvaal,  and 
the  administrator  of  Southern  Rhodesia.1  This  new  Union 

1  Brit.  Parl.  Paper*  1903,  So.  Afr.,  cd.  1599  and  1640 ;  supplementary 
agreements  on  May  6,  12,  25  ;  June  3  ;  August  15.    Hertslet,  Com.  Treaties, 


SOUTH  AFRICAN  EXPANSION  AND  UNION          195 

included  the  protectorates  of  Basutoland  and  Bechuanaland, 
and  proved  very  helpful  within  the  sphere  of  its  activities, 
a  special  tariff  schedule  being  established  at  a  convention 
held  at  Pietermaritzburg  in  March,  1906.1  But  it  was  only 
one  step  in  the  direction  of  South  Africa's  greatest  need : 
real  union.  On  February  16,  1903,  Lord  Milner  recom- 
mended the  organization  of  an  Intercolonial  Council  to 
deal  with  those  questions  of  administration,  railways,  and 
finance  common  to  the  Transvaal  and  Orange  River  Colo- 
nies. This  Council  was  created  by  letters  patent  in  May 
and  put  in  operation  in  the  colonies  on  June  15. 2  It  was 
composed  of  the  High  Commissioner  of  Railways,  two 
members  nominated  by  the  Secretary  of  State,  and  two 
members  each  from  the  Executive  and  Legislative  Coun- 
cils of  each  colony.  It  soon  proved  of  great  value  to  the 
communities  concerned  and  to  southern  Rhodesia ;  but  it 
failed  to  relieve  the  general  situation  in  South  Africa,  the 
real  solution  of  whose  difficulties  lay  beyond  customs-union 
or  intercolonial  confederations. 

On  November  29,  1906,  Sir  Walter  Hely-Hutchinson, 
Governor  of  Cape  Colony,  transmitted  to  Lord  Selborne  a 
"  minute  "  from  the  ministry  of  the  Cape  and  signed  by 
L.  S.  Jameson,  the  Premier,  suggesting  that  the  people  of 
South  Africa  be  given  an  opportunity  to  express  their 
opinion  as  to  the  desirability  and  best  means  of  bringing 
about  a  "  central  national  government  embracing  all  the 

vol.  24,  p.  52 ;  Arch.  Dip.,  1904,  vol.  n,  pt.  in,  pp.  822-38.  Swaziland  was 
admitted  in  1904.  Hertslet,  Com.  Treaties,  vol.  24,  p.  120. 

1  Brit.  Parl.  Papers,  1906,  So.  Afr.,  cd.  2977. 

2  Brit.  Parl.  Papers,  1903,  Transv.  and  Orange  Bv.,  cd.  1641.    This  Coun- 
cil was  increased  on  April  24,  1904,  by  the  addition  of  four  members  from 
the  public  officials  of  each  colony,  and  by  increasing  the  number  of  mem- 
bers from  the  Transvaal  Legislative  Assembly  to  six,  and  from  the  Orange 
River  Colony  to  four.   It  was  renewed  again  in  1906-07,  the  last-named 
members  being  now  elected  by  the  Assemblies  in  question  and  their  num- 
ber being  raised  to  seven  and  five  respectively. 


196    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

colonies  and  protectorates  under  the  British  South  African 
administration." J  Lord  Selborne  sympathized,  as  fully  as 
Sir  Walter  and  the  ministers,  with  the  general  desire  for 
reform  and  Union.  "  What  South  Africa  requires,"  he  wrote, 
"more  than  anything  else  is  stability  —  stability  in  politi- 
cal conditions,  stability  in  economic  conditions,  stability  in 
industrial  conditions.  Stability  alone  will  enable  the  farmer 
securely  to  reap  what  he  has  sown ;  stability  alone  will  give 
security  to  the  investments  of  the  merchant  and  the  pro- 
ducer ;  stability  alone  will  improve  credit ;  stability  alone 
will  tempt  the  investor  back  to  South  Africa.  But  true 
stability  will  remain  impossible  so  long  as  there  are  five 
separate  governments  in  South  Africa,  each  developing  a 
different  system  in  all  branches  of  public  life  and  each  a 
potential  antagonist  of  the  other,  but  no  one  national  gov- 
ernment with  authority.to  harmonize  the  whole." 

On  January  7, 1 907,  he  sent  out  a  circular  letter  advocat- 
ing colonial  union  to  all  the  Governors  and  Lieutenant- 
Governors  of  the  colonies  involved,  together  with  an  exhaus- 
tive memorandum  carefully  prepared  and  covering  the  whole 
question  of  the  existing  relations  of  the  South  African  col- 
onies. He  followed  this  with  another  excellent  study  on  the 
vital  problem  of  railway  management  on  January  21,  add- 
ing a  powerful  argument  to  his  first  contentions  for  a  federal 
union.  For  he  was  firmly  convinced  that  it  presented  the 
only  satisfactory  and  possible  solution  of  the  political,  finan- 
cial, and  economic  difficulties,  and  that  only  a  strong  cen- 
tral government  could  successfully  undertake  and  ultimately 
solve  the  four  great  pressing  problems  of  South  Africa : 
political  organization,  railway  cooperation,  the  native  ques- 
tion, and  colonial  expansion  and  consolidation  to  the 
north. 

Meanwhile,  the  leaders  at  Cape  Town,  Durban,  and  Pre- 
1  Brit.  Parl.  Papers,  1907,  -So.  Afr.,  cd.  3564. 


SOUTH  AFRICAN  EXPANSION  AND  UNION          197 

toria  were  asking  for  union ;  and  "  Closer  Union  Societies  " 
were  being  formed  in  all  the  colonies  through  the  instru- 
mentality of  such  men  as  Lionel  Curtis,  Patrick  Duncan, 
F.  S.  Malan,  and  Mr.  C.  J.  Smuts.  In  England  the  Liberal 
party,  led  by  Sir  Henry  Campbell-Bannermann,  came  into 
power  in  December,  1905,  and  the  new  Parliament  —  the 
first  under  Edward  VII  —  met  on  February  13, 1906.  The 
Liberal  leaders  had  regarded  the  annexation  of  the  South 
African  Republics  as  unjustifiable  and  were  committed  to  a 
policy  of  self-government  for  the  Boer  communities.  They 
now  took  up  with  enthusiasm  the  proposals  for  union,  and 
in  1907  summoned  a  Colonial  Conference,  which  met  at  Pre- 
toria in  May,  1908,  and  finished  its  labors  at  Cape  Town, 
and  which  completed  arrangements  for  the  calling  of  a  na- 
tional convention  with  power  to  take  definite  steps  to  form  a 
union.  The  elections  of  1907  and  1908  had  resulted  favor- 
ably to  the  pro-Boer  and  the  pro-union  forces,  Louis  Botha 
and  Het  Volk  securing  a  majority  of  seven  in  the  Transvaal ; 
the  Orangie  Unie,  led  by  A.  Fisher  and  Generals  Herzog 
and  de  Wet,  getting  twenty-nine  out  of  thirty-eight  seats  in 
the  Assembly  of  the  Orange  River  Colony ;  and  the  Bond, 
with  Mr.  Merriman  coming  into  control,  in  Cape  Colony. 
So  no  difficulty  was  experienced  in  prevailing  upon  the 
different  parliaments  to  appoint  delegates  to  a  constitu- 
tional convention. 

This  assemblage  met  in  October,  1908,  at  Durban  and 
continued  till  February  3, 1909,  finishing  its  work  at  Cape 
Town.  The  ablest  and  most  experienced  statesmen  of  South 
Africa  were  among  the  delegates,  such  as  Dr.  Jameson,  Chief 
Justice  de  Villiers,  ex-President  Steyn,  Sir  George  Farrer, 
Sir  Percy  Fitzpatrick,  F.  T.  Moor  (Premier  of  Natal),  Mr. 
Smuts,  and  the  Boer  leaders  just  mentioned.  The  conven- 
tion drew  up  a  "  Draft  Act  "  which  provided  for  the  incor- 
poration of  the  colonies  of  the  Transvaal,  Orange  River, 


198    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

Natal,  and  Cape  of  Good  Hope  into  the  South  African 
Union  on  an  equal  basis  —  a  unitary  state  composed  of 
provinces  rather  than  a  federal  union.  This  was  submitted 
to  the  legislative  bodies  of  the  four  colonies  for  discus- 
sion, and  was  approved  with  certain  amendments  —  Na- 
tal and  Cape  Colony  suggesting  eleven  each  —  by  March 
30,  1909.1  From  May  3  to  11,  a  second  convention  was 
held  at  Bloemfontein,  where  the  Draft  Bill  was  finally  ap- 
proved by  the  representatives  of  the  four  colonies  with  some 
alterations,  the  chief  of  which  was  the  elimination  of  the 
principle  of  proportional  representation  in  favor  of  general 
majority  representation  based  on  the  number  of  voters  in 
any  district  or  area.  It  was  then  promptly  submitted  to  a 
popular  vote,  and,  after  an  exciting  campaign,  successfully 
adopted  in  all  four  states,  Natal  being  the  last  to  vote  on 
June  10.  A  select  committee  took  the  bill  to  England,  where 
it  was  introduced  into  Parliament  in  July  and  became  law 
on  September  20,  1909.  The  Union  went  into  effect  on 
May  31,  1910,  on  which  day  Viscount  Gladstone  —  ap- 
pointed the  first  Governor-General  by  King  George  —  was 
duly  inaugurated. 

Steps  had  already  been  taken  to  organize  political  parties, 
resulting  in  the  formation  of  the  "  South  African  "  or  "Na- 
tionalist Party  "  during  April  24  to  27  —  a  pro-Boer  but 
conservative  organization  led  by  Generals  Botha  and  Herzog 
and  controlling  a  majority  of  votes  in  three  of  the  provinces 
—r-  and  the  "  Unionists  "or  "  Progressives,"  who  inaugu- 
rated their  party  at  a  meeting  of  150  delegates  from  the 
Transvaal,  Orange  River  Colony,  and  the  Cape  at  Bloem- 
fontein on  May  23  and  24,  1910. 

Dr.  Jameson  struck  the  keynote  of  their  policy  when  he 
said,  at  the  closing  session,  it  was  hoped  that  "  measures, 
not  men,  should  be  the  dividing  line  in  the  future  politics  of 
1  Brit.  Parl.  Papers,  1909,  So.  Afr.,  cd.  4525  and  cd.  4721. 


SOUTH  AFRICAN  EXPANSION  AND   UNION          199 

the  Union,"  and  that  the  new  party  stood  for  "  equality  of 
opportunity  and  rapid  development  of  the  country,"  coupled 
with  adequate  national  defense,  moderate  protection,  and 
"reciprocal preference  with  the  sister  states  of  the  Empire." 
It  was  hoped  that  the  new  government  would  be  organized 
on  a  coalition  basis,  including  the  best  men  of  all  per- 
suasions. But  the  Governor-General  selected  General  Botha 
as  Premier,  who  finally  decided  to  rely  chiefly  upon  the  men 
of  his  own  party.  The  first  parliamentary  elections  were 
held  upon  September  15,  1910,  resulting  in  a  majority  of 
thirteen  seats  for  the  "  Nationalists  "  ;  and  the  first  session 
of  the  Union  Parliament  began  on  November  4,  1910. 

The  Union  Government  was  admirably  adapted  to  the 
conditions  and  needs  of  the  country.  All  invidious  and  ir- 
ritating distinctions  were  removed  by  the  adoption  of  a 
provincial  system  of  absolute  equality,  instead  of  a  federal 
union.  A  due  regard  for  British  ideals  and  proper  respect 
for  their  vital  relationship  to  the  Empire  were  shown  in  the 
recognition  of  the  King  as  sovereign  with  the  power  of  ap- 
pointing the  Governor-General,  who  should  exercise  the 
executive  authority  of  the  Union  through  a  ministry  of  his 
appointment,  not  exceeding  ten  in  number.  The  legislative 
functions  were  delegated  to  a  Senate  and  House  of  As- 
sembly. The  former  numbers  forty,  of  whom  thirty-two  are 
elected  by  the  provincial  assemblies  —  eight  from  each  — 
and  eight  are  nominated  by  the  Governor-General,  four  of 
whom  must  be  specially  familiar  with  the  conditions  and 
needs  of  the  native  races.  To  qualify  for  Senator,  one  must 
be  a  British  subject  of  European  descent,  thirty  years  of 
age,  a  resident  of  the  Union  for  five  years,  and  own  prop- 
erty amounting  to  $2500,  without  incumbrance.  The  House 
of  Assembly  consists  of  one  hundred  and  twenty-one  mem- 
bers distributed  as  follows :  Cape,  fifty-one ;  Transvaal, 
thirty-six  ;  Natal,  seventeen  ;  and  Orange  River  Province, 


200     INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

seventeen ;  and  each  province  is  divided  into  a  similar 
number  of  electoral  districts.  The  franchise  for  parlia- 
mentary voting  is  on  the  same  basis  as  that  in  force  in 
each  province  for  its  own  assembly ;  but  to  sit  in  the  Assem- 
bly a  candidate  must  be  a  British  subject  of  European  de- 
scent and  have  resided  five  years  in  the  Union,  as  well  as 
be  "qualified  as  a  registered  voter." 

All  money  bills  originate  in  the  Assembly  and  are  passed 
up  to  the  Senate  with  the  approval  of  the  Governor-General ; 
but  the  upper  house  enjoys  only  a  restricted  power  of  amend- 
ment. The  Governor-General  has  power  to  call  and  dis- 
solve the  houses ;  but  it  is  provided  specially  that  the  pres- 
ent Senate  shall  not  be  dissolved  for  ten  years.  The 
existing  Assembly  is  expected  to  stand  for  five  years.  To 
satisfy  equitably  the  claims  of  the  different  communities, 
it  was  provided  to  place  the  government  of  the  Union  at 
Pretoria,  the  seat  of  legislation  at  Cape  Town,  and  the 
home  of  the  Supreme  Court  at  Bloemfonteiu.  A  special 
commission  was  established  to  take  over  the  control  and 
administration  of  the  railway  systems ;  and  free  trade  was 
set  up  throughout  the  Union.  A  central  financial  adminis- 
tration was  to  be  worked  out  through  the  consolidation  of 
the  monetary  systems  and  funds  of  the  provinces ;  and  a 
Supreme  Court  was  established  with  branches  in  each  colony. 
The  provincial  administration  was  taken  out  of  party  poli- 
tics by  making  the  colonial  states  into  mere  congressional 
units  of  the  Union.  The  provinces  are  governed  by  adminis- 
trators appointed  for  five  years  by  the  Governor-General 
and  by  elective  provincial  councils  that  sit  for  three  years, 
but  whose  activities  are  strictly  limited  to  purely  local 
affairs. 

Provision  was  made  for  the  admission  of  Rhodesia  to 
the  Union ;  but  no  mention  was  made  of  the  subdivisions 
of  this  great  district.  Southern  Rhodesia  is  being  settled 


SOUTH  AFRICAN  EXPANSION  AND  UNION  201 

rapidly  with  a  European  population  to  which  it  is  well 
adapted,  and  may  some  day  become  a  member  of  the  Union. 
But  northern  Rhodesia  —  the  region  north  of  the  Zambesi 
River  —  is  tropical  and  belongs  more  properly  to  Central 
Africa  and  the  Nyasaland  protectorate.  Their  fate  must  be 
left  to  future  developments.  The  question  of  the  natives 
was  one  of  the  most  difficult  problems  confronting  the 
Unionists,  all  of  whom  were  anxious  to  treat  the  blacks 
fairly  and  handle  the  problem  wisely.  After  an  extended 
discussion,  a  schedule  was  agreed  upon  and  added  to  the 
Draft  Act  providing  for  the  proper  administration  under 
the  supervision  of  the  Governor-General  of  all  the  native 
protectorates  —  Bechuanaland,  Basutoland,  and  Swaziland 
— in  the  event  that  the  control  of  them  should  be  trans- 
ferred to  the  Union  by  the  imperial  authorities. 

The  future  of  South  Africa  is  intimately  bound  up  with 
that  of  the  native  protectorates  ;  and  to  understand  its  signi- 
ficance, one  must  go  back  to  the  early  eighties  for  a  mo- 
ment. In  those  days  the  relations  between  the  native  chief- 
tains and  the  British  and  the  Boer  colonies  were  a  constant 
source  of  trouble  and  irritation  to  the  Imperial  Govern- 
ment as  well  as  to  the  colonial  authorities.  As  has  been 
shown  above,  the  Home  Government's  policy  in  these  mat- 
ters was  almost  continually  one  of  protection  for  the  natives 
and  of  suspicion  of  the  motives  and  acts  of  the  colonists  as 
well  as  of  apparent  indifference  to  their  interests.  Another 
element  of  discord  was  introduced  when  the  Transvaal 
Boers  attempted  to  expand  their  state  by  the  annexation  of 
the  neighboring  native  states.  In  1882,  the  "Stellaland" 
and  "Goshen"  republics  were  set  up  by  the  Boers,  who 
also  established  Dinizulu,  son  of  Cetywayo,  as  king  in  the 
"New  Republic"  on  his  father's  lands,  in  May,  1884,  and 
attempted  to  penetrate  into  Bechuanaland  as  well.  Great 
Britain  recognized  these  new  organizations  and  permitted 


202     INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

them  all  to  be  incorporated  within  the  Transvaal  by  1888; 
but,  after  the  Boer  War,  in  1903,  the  "New  Republic" 
—  known  as  the  "Vryheid  District"  —  was  transferred, 
together  with  the  Utrecht  District  and  a  part  of  Wakker- 
strom,  to  Natal,  to  which  Zululand  had  already  been  an- 
nexed in  1897.  And  to-day,  the  minister  of  native  affairs 
of  Natal,  with  the  aid  of  commissioners  and  native  chief- 
tains, rules  these  districts. 

Meanwhile,  aroused  by  the  entrance  of  Germany  into 
Southwest  Africa  in  1884,  and  the  pushing  of  the  Boers  west- 
ward, the  Imperial  Government  placed  Basutoland  in  18  84, 
Bechuanaland  in  1885,  and  finally  Swaziland  in  1894,  under 
its  protection.  A  Resident  Commissioner  was  put  in  control 
over  the  first  immediately;  but  the  others  were  administered 
for  a  time  by  the  South  African  Company — Bechuanaland 
till  1891  and  Swaziland  till  1903.  They  are  all  now  under 
resident  commissioners,  subject  to  the  High  Commissioner 
of  South  Africa,  and  ruled  through  the  native  headmen 
and  chiefs,  of  whom  there  are  usually  one  paramount  chief- 
tain and  a  number  of  lesser  rulers  responsible  for  their  re- 
spective districts  or  tribes  to  the  head  chief.  Local  customs, 
rights,  tribal  government,  languages,  and  methods  of  life, 
trade,  and  agriculture  have  been  carefully  preserved.  Eng- 
land has  been  well  served  and  her  resident  commissioners 
have  been  uniformly  able,  tactful,  broad-minded  men,  in- 
spiring the  confidence  and  preserving  the  good  will  of  both 
the  people  and  the  chiefs.  This  system  of  rule  has  been 
very  successful  among  the  native  states  in  South  Africa, 
and  it  has  given  to  these  protectorates  many  years  of  peace, 
fair  prosperity,  and  steady  development,  and  removed  a 
serious  thorn  from  the  side  of  the  colonies.  In  addition 
300,000  square  miles,  approximately,  have  been  added  to 
the  British  possessions  in  South  Africa. 

While  this  movement  was  in  progress,  another  of  far 


SOUTH  AFRICAN  EXPANSION  AND   UNION  203 

more  consequence  for  South  Africa  was  inaugurated  and 
brought  through  tribulation  to  a  successful  issue.  North  of 
the  Transvaal  and  the  Limpopo  River  lay  the  two  native 
districts  of  Matabeleland  and  Mashonaland  covering  an 
area  of  144,000  square  miles  and  reaching  to  the  Zambesi 
River.  Beyond  that  great  waterway,  a  vast  unoccupied 
region  stretched  away  northward  to  the  Congo  and  Lakes 
Nyasa  and  Tanganyika.  Cecil  Rhodes,  who  later  earned  the 
title  of  "  empire-builder,"  was  among  the  first  to  see  the 
possibilities  of  this  great  hinterland  and  what  its  possession 
might  mean  to  the  British  South  Africa  of  the  future ;  and 
he  conceived  the  project  of  taking  over  the  habitable  por- 
tion of  the  immense  plateau  between  the  Limpopo  and 
Zambesi  Rivers  for  Britain,  with  the  hope  that  it  and  the 
vast  tropical  region  behind  it  would  ultimately  become 
part  of  a  strong  and  prosperous  Federal  Union  of  South 
Africa. 

It  was  due  to  his  influence  largely  that  the  way  to  the 
north  was  kept  open  by  the  annexation  of  Bechuanaland 
in  1885  ;  but  he  knew  it  was  out  of  the  question  to  per- 
suade the  Home  or  the  Cape  Government  to  undertake 
such  an  extensive  policy  of  expansion.  He,  therefore,  de- 
termined to  work  out  the  enterprise  through  a  commercial 
company,  being  convinced,  through  observation  and  the  ex- 
pert advice  of  such  men  as  John  Hays  Hammond,  that  the 
mineral  and  agricultural  wealth  of  the  region  would  in  time 
make  the  venture  a  paying  one.  Accordingly,  Rochfort 
Maguire,  accompanied  by  Messrs.  C.  D.  Rudd  and  F.  R. 
Thompson,  went  into  Matabeleland  and  secured  a  "  conces- 
sion," on  October  30,  1888,  from  King  Lo  Bengula,  who 
ruled  over  that  district  and  Mashonaland,  giving  them  full 
mining  rights  and  the  ownership  of  all  metals  and  minerals 
in  his  kingdom  in  exchange  for  1000  Martini  rifles,  100,- 
000  cartridges,  .£500,  and  a  subsidy  of  £100  per  month. 


204    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

The  British  South  African  Company  was  then  formed  with 
a  capital  of  £1,000,000,  under  the  presidency  of  the  late 
Duke  of  Abercorn.  Among  the  original  directors  were  the 
Duke  of  Fife,  Lord  Gifford,  Alfred  Beit,  Cecil  Khodes, 
and  other  prominent  and  able  British  financiers.  A  formal 
petition  was  prepared  asking  for  imperial  recognition  and 
protection,  and  on  October  29,  1889,  the  British  Govern- 
ment issued  a  charter *  formally  incorporating  the  British 
South  African  Company  and  endowing  it  with  political  as 
well  as  commercial  powers.  On  February  3,  1891,  a  deed 
of  settlement  was  issued  authorizing  the  company  to  ex- 
plore, colonize,  and  develop  the  country  between  the  Lim- 
popo and  Zambesi  Rivers ;  and  the  organization  was  ready 
for  business. 

The  same  year  the  "  Pioneer  Column  "  of  first  settlers  — 
numbering  five  hundred  —  left  Fort  Tuli,  on  the  southeast 
corner  of  Matabeleland,  for  the  plateau  of  Mashonaland 
which  they  reached  on  August  13,  1891,  after  a  one  thou- 
sand-mile march,  four  hundred  of  which  was  through  dense 
forests.  They  found  the  "  promised  land  beautiful  but  an 
open  waste,"  as  Mr.  Rhodes  said  two  years  later ;  and  the 
difficulties  of  settlement  and  of  opening  up  the  country  in 
an  undeveloped  region,  cut  off  from  civilization,  seventeen 
hundred  miles  from  the  sea,  where  food  cost  £70  per  ton, 
were  many  and  serious.  However,  headquarters  were  estab- 
lished at  Fort  Salisbury  and  after  six  months  of  isolation, 
rain,  and  discomfort,  the  most  serious  phase  of  the  occu- 
pation was  passed.  A  second  "  concession "  was  secured 
from  Lo  Bengula  by  Edward  A.  Lippert  on  November  17, 
1891,  giving  the  company  the  right  to  lease  farms  and 
land  and  to  levy  taxes  and  rents  for  one  hundred  years, 
for  the  payment  of  £1000  down  and  an  annuity  of  £500. 
Dr.  Jameson  (now  Sir  Starr  and  the  recently  elected  presi- 
1  Hertslet,  Com.  Treaties,  vol.  18,  p.  134.  J 


SOUTH   AFRICAN  EXPANSION  AND   UNION  205 

dent  of  the  company)  was  persuaded  by  Rhodes  to  become 
the  first  administrator  of  the  new  protectorate.  Soon  a 
large  influx  of  new  settlers  ensued ;  and  the  towns  of  Salis- 
bury and  Victoria  were  laid  out.  The  following  year  — 
1892  — Mr.  Rhodes  himself  visited  the  country  and  assisted 
in  a  complete  reorganization  of  the  financial  and  adminis- 
trative system,  so  that  it  became  possible  for  Dr.  Jameson 
to  strike  a  favorable  balance  in  his  accounts  the  following 
year. 

Disputes  and  difficulties  between  the  natives  and  colon- 
ists over  land,  cattle,  and  pasturage  led  to  the  great  raid 
of  the  Matabeles  into  Mashonaland  in  July,  1893.  This 
was  followed  by  the  successful  campaign  of  Major  Forbes 
into  Matabeleland,  the  death  of  Major  Wilson,  and  the 
flight  and  death  of  King  Lo  Bengula  in  the  last  part  of 
the  year.  With  the  occupation  of  Matabeleland,  came  the 
incorporation  of  that  district  within  the  sphere  of  the  com- 
pany's activities ;  and  in  1894,  the  whole  region  between 
the  Limpopo  and  the  Zambesi  Rivers  was  organized  under 
one  government,  known  as  Southern  Rhodesia,  which  con- 
sisted of  an  administrator  and  a  council  of  four  members, 
nominated  for  three  and  two  years  respectively  by  the  com- 
pany with  the  approval  of  Great  Britain.  In  1898,  when 
the  white  population  had  grown  to  about  14,000  persons, 
Orders  in  Council  were  issued  creating  Southern  Rhodesia 
a  separate  protectorate  and  adding  to  its  governmental  or- 
gans a  legislative  council  numbering  ten,  of  whom  six  (in- 
cluding the  Resident-Commissioner)  were  nominated  by 
the  company  and  four  elected  by  the  people.  A  movement 
was  soon  set  on  foot  to  increase  the  popular  representation 
and  steadily  fostered,  until  in  1903,  it  was  decreed  that 
seven  should  be  appointed  and  seven  elected.  The  popula- 
tion has  increased  as  well  as  the  demand  for  popular  con- 
trol, until  there  are  now  about  25,000  people  in  the  pro- 


206     INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

tectorate  and  they  elect  twelve  out  of  twenty  members  of 
the  Legislative  Council. 

In  the  mean  time  another  movement  was  starting  in  the 
North.  The  African  Lakes  Company,  directed  by  the  ener- 
getic Moir  brothers,  undertook  to  open  to  British  trade  and 
British  missions  the  district  lying  to  the  south  and  west 
of  Lake  Nyasa  and  brought  to  the  notice  of  the  world  by 
Livingstone's  explorations.  Trading  stations  were  opened, 
beginning  at  Karonga ;  and  the  representatives  of  the  Lon- 
don Missionary  Society  arrived  in  1887.  Through  the  as- 
sistance of  Captain  Lugard,  Alfred  Swann,  Sir  Alfred 
Sharpe,  and  H.  H.  Johnston  (now  Sir  Harry),  who  was 
Commissioner  of  this  region  under  the  South  African  Com- 
pany (including  northern  Khodesia)  from  1891  to  1895, 
the  slave  trade  was  stamped  out,  treaties  made  with  the 
natives  up  to  Lake  Tanganyika  and  west  to  Msiri  and  the 
Congo,  and  a  district  six  hundred  miles  long  and  seventy 
miles  wide  marked  out  for  British  control.  On  February 
12,  1893,  a  protectorate  was  officially  proclaimed  over  this 
region  which  was  designated  as  "British  Central  Africa," 
but  has  been  known  since  1907  as  British  Nyasaland.  In 
the  Anglo-Portuguese  treaty  of  June  11,  1891,  the  bound- 
aries between  Portuguese  East  Africa  and  the  new  claims 
of  Great  Britain  in  South  Central  Africa  were  delimited 
and  Britain's  right  to  Nyasaland  and  Rhodesia  recognized. 
In  the  Anglo-German  treaties  of  1890  and  1893,  the  Ger- 
man Empire  officially  ratified  England's  claims  in  this  re- 
gion, and  the  boundary  between  them  and  German  South- 
west and  German  East  Africa  was  marked. 

The  extension  of  British  authority  to  the  great  plateau 
of  Tanganyika  and  Northeastern  Rhodesia  followed  rapidly, 
through  the  able  efforts  of  Major  P.  D.  Forbes  and  Robert 
Codrington,  the  latter  being  administrator  of  Northeastern 
Rhodesia  from  1898  to  1907.  Abercorn  was  founded  in 


SOUTH  IAFRICAN  EXPANSION  AND  UNION       207 

1893,  Fife  in  1895,  numerous  treaties  arranged  with  the 
native  chiefs,  slave  raids  and  the  practice  of  mutilation 
stopped,  peace  established  between  the  tribes,  and  the  head- 
quarters of  the  company's  government  removed  from  Blan- 
tyre  to  Fort  Jameson.  Late  in  1898,  Codrington,  at  the 
invitation  of  the  "White  Fathers,"  who  had  been  pre- 
vailed upon  by  King  Mwamba  to  take  land  and  set  up  a 
mission  near  his  capital  earlier  hi  the  year,  sent  M'Kinnon 
and  Young  to  Kasarna  and  secured  a  protectorate  over  the 
Awemba  —  the  most  powerful  tribe  of  the  whole  region.1 
Within  a  year  he  succeeded  in  organizing  the  whole  north- 
eastern province  into  nine  fiscal  and  magisterial  districts 
and  in  placing  the  administration  on  a  sound  and  perma- 
nent basis.  And  in  1899  and  1900,  the  entire  region, 
reaching  from  the  Zambesi  to  the  borders  of  the  Congo  and 
German  East  Africa,  was  divided  and  organized  into  two 
separate  protectorates  known  as  Northeastern  and  North- 
western Rhodesia,  the  definite  boundary  between  Northwest- 
ern Rhodesia  and  Portuguese  West  Africa  being  finally 
adjusted  in  the  Barotse  treaty  between  England  and  Por- 
tugal in  1 90S.2 

Thus,  and  chiefly  through  the  efforts  of  the  South  Af- 
rican Company,  a  vast  territory  —  amounting  approxi- 
mately to  479,376  square  miles  —  had  been  secured  for 
England.  If  we  add  to  this  the  area  —  293,252  square 
miles  —  of  the  three  other  protectorates  controlled  by 
Britain  —  Bechuanaland,  Basutoland,  and  Swaziland  —  we 
get  the  total  of  772,628  square  miles ;  and  putting  with 
this  the  territory  of  the  Union,  the  grand  total  of  land 
under  the  British  flag  in  South  Africa  is  1,245,812  square 
miles,  or  nearly  one  half  the  size  of  the  United  States,  not 

1  Gouldsbury  and   Sheane,   The  Great  Plateau   of  Northern   Rhodesia, 
Arnold,  1911. 

2  Hertslet,  Com.  Treaties,  vol.  24,  p.  936. 


208     INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

counting  Alaska  and  the  outside  territories  —  certainly  a 
wonderful  expansion  from  the  insignificant  settlements 
under  the  shadow  of  Table  Mountain. 

The  value  of  the  vast  Rhodesian  territories  is  no  longer 
problematical.  The  great  mineral  wealth  and  agricultural 
possibilities  have  been  thoroughly  tested  and  proved.  The 
foresight  and  wisdom  of  Mr.  Rhodes  have  been  more  than 
justified  in  the  results.  The  South  African  Company  has 
gone  on  pouring  money  into  the  country  until  their  report 
for  March,  1913,  showed  that  £7,500,000,  or  approxi- 
mately $ 37,500,000,  had  been  invested  there.  They  are  not 
at  all  disturbed  that  the  twenty-fifth  anniversary  of  the 
founding  of  their  company  is  nearly  here  without  a  single 
penny  having  been  paid  in  dividends.  The  fact  that  a  re- 
spectable excess  of  income  over  expenditures  has  been 
achieved  since  the  year  1909-10  does  not  signify  greatly. 
It  is  the  way  in  which  the  immense  capital  of  the  company 
has  been  administered  that  counts ;  and  a  glance  at  the 
map  of  South  Africa  shows  how  efficiently  this  has  been 
done  —  the  history  of  the  company  is  writ  large  upon  the 
face  of  the  country.  A  railway  system  has  been  built  across 
the  Rhodesias  and  connected  with  the  Transvaal  and  Cape 
Colony  systems,  and  with  the  Portuguese  line  running  down 
to  the  port  of  Beira.  Roads  have  been  built ;  public  im- 
provements inaugurated  and  completed ;  farms  mapped  out 
and  settlers  assisted  to  occupy  them  ;  towns  and  cities  with 
all  modern  conveniences  and  advantages  have  arisen ;  and 
the  civilization  of  the  white  man  brought  to  the  heart  of 
the  Dark  Continent.  The  foundations  of  British  rule  and 
of  the  commercial  and  economic  development  of  the  Rho- 
desias have  been  laid  thoroughly  and  well ;  and  the  direc- 
tors and  friends  of  the  company,  with  the  white  citizens  of 
Rhodesia,  may  face  the  future  with  confidence. 

Southern  Rhodesia,  with  its  144,000  square  miles  of  fer- 


SOUTH  AFRICAN  EXPANSION  AND  UNION  209 

tile  plateaus,  uplands,  and  favorable  climatic  conditions,  is 
a  suitable  country  in  every  respect  for  the  white  man,  and 
some  day  will  support  a  large  population  of  European  ex- 
traction. During  the  first  fifteen  to  eighteen  years  of  its 
history,  the  influx  of  whites  was  comparatively  slow ;  but 
recently  the  immigration  has  steadily  increased  until  the 
population  for  1912  exceeded  that  of  1911  by  thirteen  per 
cent.  At  this  rate  it  will  not  be  much  over  a  decade  before 
the  country  will  be  thoroughly  settled  and  on  a  self-govern- 
ing basis.  Because  of  complicated  interests  and  problems, 
such  as  the  ownership  of  land,  the  introduction  of  settlers, 
and  control  of  railways  and  their  rates,  it  is  impossible  for 
the  company  to  separate  its  commercial  from  its  govern- 
mental powers.  It  is  the  present  policy  of  the  company, 
however,  to  continue  giving  an  increased  share  of  political 
power  to  the  citizens  until  the  people  are  able  to  rule  and 
the  country  is  ready  for  self-government.  In  March,  1914, 
the  people  voted  by  a  substantial  majority  in  favor  of  the 
continuance  of  charter  government.  The  result  of  the  re- 
cent anti-charter  agitation  and  of  the  visit  of  Sir  Starr 
Jameson  has  been  to  convince  the  people  of  the  sincerity 
and  integrity  of  the  South  African  Company ;  to  assure 
them  of  increased  popular  control  and  to  make  it  apparent 
to  all  that  no  better  means  for  promoting  the  future  devel- 
opment and  prosperity  of  the  company  can  be  found  than 
in  the  new  proposals  of  the  company.  For  the  present  all 
serious  thought  of  union  with  South  Africa  is  abandoned, 
out  of  fear  of  the  grave  economic  and  political  complica- 
tions that  would  be  sure  to  follow  such  a  move.  It  is  even 
possible  that  a  new  independent  state  may  arise  in  the 
North  if  the  conditions  in  the  South  African  Union  do  not 
improve  very  materially  in  the  future. 

In  spite  of  the  slowness  of  its  early  development  and  the 
unfavorable  criticism  and  prophesies  of  the  first  eight  years, 


210    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

the  country  has  proved  to  be  rich  in  minerals.  Gold,  dia- 
monds, copper,  lead,  coal,  chrome  iron,  and  asbestos  have 
been  found  in  abundance;  and  the  mineral  output  of  1912 
was  £2,890,757  greater  than  that  of  1911.  Gold  mining, 
which  produced  only  £83,000  between  1890  and  1898,  in- 
creased steadily  until  at  the  end  of  twenty-three  years'  labor 
£22,250,000  of  gold  have  been  shipped  to  London,  and  in 
1912  one  company  at  least  was  paying  thirty  per  cent  on 
its  capital.  Tobacco-raising  and  general  agriculture  are 
profitable ;  but  this  is  not  a  poor  man's  country,  only  set- 
tlers with  from  £700  to  £1000  being  encouraged  to  come 
out.  The  most  promising  crop  now  is  citrus  fruits,  the  pro- 
duction of  which  increased  from  £450,000  in  1911-12  to 
£1,397,000  in  1912-13,  and  a  great  future  is  predicted  in 
this  industry.  One  of  the  leading  sources  of  wealth  and  in- 
dustry in  the  near  future  will  be  cattle-raising.  Since  1906, 
the  number  of  cattle  in  Rhodesia  has  increased  264  per 
cent ;  and  Earl  Grey  and  others  who  have  visited  the  coun- 
try within  the  past  year  are  enthusiastic  over  the  conditions 
and  prospects,  mentioning  especially  one  herd  of  25,000 
cattle  in  excellent  condition.  The  Company  has  a  ranch  of 
500,000  acres  in  the  Gwelo  district  and  has  brought  Mr. 
Walsh,  of  twenty-six  years'  experience  in  Texas,  to  instruct 
the  whites  and  natives  in  the  science  of  making  ranches 
and  of  cattle-raising.  It  has  been  estimated  that  there  are 
50,000,000  acres  of  unalienated  land  available  for  ranch- 
ing in  both  northern  and  southern  Rhodesia,  which  would 
support  25,000,000  head  of  cattle.  The  chief  work  in  the 
development  of  the  country  has,  thus  far,  necessarily  been 
in  the  hands  of  large  corporations  such  as  the  Transvaak 
Rhodesian  Estates  owning  37,698  acres  in  Rhodesia  and  a 
half  interest  in  four  estates  of  298,430  acres  in  the  Gwanda 
and  Tuli  districts ;  the  Amalgamated  Properties  of  Rhode- 
sia controlling  the  other  half-interest  in  the  four  estates 


SOUTH  AFRICAN   EXPANSION  AND  UNION  211 

just  mentioned  and  sixty-six  additional  farms  containing 
1,239,000  acres,  and  the  equally  prosperous  Rhodesian 
Gold  Mining  and  Investment  Company.  But  the  time  has 
now  come  when  the  individual  investor,  farmer,  and  ranch- 
man of  limited  capital  can  enter  the  field  with  every  chance 
of  success.  Indeed,  the  number  of  such  colonists  is  increas- 
ing rapidly  every  year  —  though  as  yet  not  fast  enough  to 
suit  the  hopes  of  the  South  African  Company ;  and  it  is 
very  desirable  that  it  should. 

The  protectorates  of  Northeastern  and  Northwestern 
Rhodesia,  since  August  17,  1911,  united  in  the  protector- 
ate of  Northern  Rhodesia,  lie  in  the  tropics  and  at  a  much 
lower  level  than  of  Southern  Rhodesia.  The  difference  is 
noticeable  as  soon  as  one  crosses  the  Zambesi.  Large  areas 
will  always  have  to  be  left  to  the  black  man  and  the  tetse 
fly ;  but  there  remains  considerable  territory  suitable  to  the 
use  of  the  white  man.  The  mineral  wealth  is  probably  the 
greatest  asset  of  this  vast  region.  This  has  been  fully  dem- 
onstrated by  the  Zambesi  Exploring  Company  and  the 
Tanganyika  Concessions  Limited,  which  have  financed  and 
built  the  Rhodesia-Katanga  Junction  Railway  from  Broken 
Hill  to  Katanga,  and  are  constructing  the  Banguello  Rail- 
way from  Lobito  Bay  on  the  West  Coast  through  Portu- 
guese West  Africa  to  Katanga  and  the  headwaters  of  the 
Congo.  These  roads  are  already  yielding  a  good  profit  on 
all  the  sections  opened ;  and  the  Rhodesia-Katanga  Com- 
pany, seventy  per  cent  of  which  is  owned  by  the  Tanganyika 
Concessions  Limited,  is  now  bringing  out  from  ten  to  twelve 
thousand  tons  of  copper  yearly  and  delivering  it  in  Europe 
at  about  <£37  per  ton. 

In  the  Rhodesias,  as  well  as  in  the  provinces  of  the  Union, 
one  tremendous  problem  faces  the  governing  bodies  —  and 
probably  always  will  do  so  —  the  status  and  care  of  the  im- 
mense black  population  which  in  the  Rhodesias  alone  totals 


212    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA' 

approximately  1,600,000  souls.  They  furnish  the  manual 
labor  of  the  country  and  therefore  form  an  important  asset 
of  its  wealth.  Many  of  them  own  and  till  large  tracts  of 
land  from  which  they  ought  not  to  be  driven.  Just  how  far 
they  ought  to  be  trained,  educated,  and  cared  for  is  still 
a  question ;  but  their  advance  in  many  sections,  since  the 
coming  of  the  whites,  has  certainly  been  remarkable.  Their 
lives  and  property  must  be  protected,  and  their  interests 
conserved :  but,  while  the  colonists  are  evidently  well-in- 
tentioned toward  the  aborigines,  they  are  determined  not 
to  give  them  the  ballot,  but  rather  to  make  South  Africa  a 
white  man's  country.  The  Natives'  Lands  Bill  —  by  some 
called  the  "  Natives'  Charter  "  —  passed  at  the  last  session 
by  the  Union  Parliament,  in  1913,  suggests  the  probable 
direction  that  the  future  general  policy  of  the  South  Afri- 
can administrators  in  native  affairs  will  take.  This  pro- 
vides for  the  gradual  introduction  of  territorial  segrega- 
tion of  whites  and  blacks,  including  the  removal  of  some 
900,000  negro  squatters  on  public  lands  to  lands  set  aside 
for  blacks  and  forbidding  in  the  future  all  new  leases,  ex- 
changes, or  purchases  of  lands  between  natives  and  Euro- 
peans, and  squatting  or  giving  labor  in  exchange  for  land. 
If  this  plan  is  carried  out  carefully  and  justly,  it  will  prob- 
ably result  in  many  advantages  to  both  parties.  Yet  it 
is  only  one  step  in  the  great  and  vital  work  of  outlining 
a  comprehensive  policy  for  the  preservation  of  the  proper 
relationship  between  both  elements  of  the  population,  and 
for  the  protection  of  the  interests  and  future  development 
of  all  concerned.  This  is  imperative,  and  bears  a  vital  re- 
lationship to  the  future  peace,  prosperity,  and  welfare  of 
South  Africa ;  for,  as  Viscount  Gladstone  said  in  a  recent 
address,  "  The  problem  is  not  how  to  make  this  a  white  or 
a  black  man's  country  —  it  should  be  both  —  but  how  to 
adjust  the  relations  between  black  and  white." 


SOUTH  AFRICAN  EXPANSION  AND  UNION  213 

The  old  racial  animosity  and  composition  still  exists 
within  the  Union,  but  it  probably  will  not  be  a  serious  men- 
ace in  the  future.  The  leaders  of  both  political  parties  are 
making  every  effort  to  overcome  racial  prejudices,  to  avoid 
conflicts  along  the  old  British  and  Boer  lines,  and  to  concen- 
trate their  energies  along  lines  of  national  development, 
unity,  and  progress.  Their  success  is  evidenced  by  the  bills 
passed  at  the  last  session  of  the  Union  Parliament  providing 
for  large  railway  extensions,  public  works,  the  equalization 
of  taxation  throughout  the  Union,  and  the  organization  and 
expansion  of  the  national  finances.  The  recent  attack  of 
General  Herzog  upon  the  Prime  Minister  —  General  Botha 
—  and  attempt  to  arouse  a  racial  partisanship  in  politics 
will  probably  not  have  serious  consequences.  At  any  rate, 
it  will  not  be  the  British  colonists  who  will  fan  such  a 
movement ;  and,  in  process  of  time,  —  the  healer  of  many 
ailments,  —  this  racial  drawback  to  complete  harmony  and 
unity  of  effort  in  South  Africa  will  cease  to  be  a  serious 
impediment  to  progress  and  stable  government. 


CHAPTER  IX 

THE  REOCCUPATION  OF  NORTHERN  AFRICA 
ALGERIA,   ORAN,   AND   CONSTANTINE 

THE  opening  of  the  nineteenth  century  found  all  the 
commercial  nations  of  the  world  paying  tribute  to  the 
Bashaw  of  Tripoli,  the  Bey  of  Tunis,  and  the  Dey  of  Al- 
giers in  order  to  secure  the  safety  of  their  subjects  and 
their  trading  vessels  on  the  Mediterranean  Sea.  These 
Arab  potentates,  as  well  as  the  rulers  of  Morocco,  Oran, 
and  Constantine,  had  all  secured  a  practical  independence 
from  Turkish  domination,  but  governed  territories  of  un- 
certain extent  and  limited  natural  resources.  Morocco  and 
Tunis  possessed  reigning  families  of  importance,  enjoying 
absolute  power,  but  the  heads  of  the  others  were  feudal 
lords  owing  their  power  chiefly  to  the  election  and  the  sup- 
port of  tribal  chieftains.  The  jurisdiction  of  all  these  rulers 
was  very  largely  confined  to  the  seaports  and  their  imme- 
diate hinterland.  The  regions  of  the  interior,  composed  of 
mountain  ranges,  high  arid  plateaus,  deserts,  and  oases, 
were  inhabited  by  wild  and  warlike  tribes  of  Kabyles, 
Berbers,  and  Touaregs  whose  chieftains  paid  tribute  to 
and  recognized  the  authority  of  the  seaboard  monarchs 
only  when  compelled  to  do  so  by  a  strong  hand  or  a  mili- 
tary demonstration.  Only  two  of  the  capital  cities  —  Fez 
in  Morocco  and  Constantine  —  were  in  the  interior.  The 
others  lay  on  the  coast.  And  the  boundaries  between  these 
little  states  were  ill-defined;  their  administration  in  every 
case  inefficient  and  corrupt ;  their  income  uncertain,  often 
dependent  to  a  large  degree  upon  the  booty  from  the  ex- 


ALGERIA,  ORAN  AND  CONSTANTINE  215 

peditions  of  their  admirals  —  or  Barbary  pirates  as  they 
were  known  to  Europe ;  their  lands  undeveloped  or  but 
poorly  cultivated. 

Since  the  days  of  Mohammedan  expansion  under  the 
successors  of  Mohammed,  all  of  these  states  had  been  dom- 
inated by  the  Arabs  whose  numbers  and  importance  in- 
creased after  the  fall  of  Granada  and  the  expulsion  of  the 
Moors  from  Spain.  The  entire  population  of  North  Africa 
was  Mohammedan  and  led  by  two  classes  of  influential 
men :  the  marabouts,  or  religious  wise  men,  and  the  tribal 
chiefs  who  were  warriors.  Men  with  military  protection,  or 
those  who  could  obtain  it,  got  on  fairly  well ;  but  the  lot 
of  the  common  man  was  hard.  Justice  and  security  were 
practically  unknown,  and  nowhere  were  life  and  property 
safe.  Robbery  and  brigandage  were  as  common  on  land  as 
piracy  on  the  sea  —  and  had  been  for  four  centuries.  Trade 
languished ;  and  it  was  impossible  to  make  any  headway 
in  agriculture  or  industry.  The  towns  and  villages  were 
groups  of  unsanitary  plaster  dwellings,  scantily  furnished ; 
and  the  masses  led  a  hand-to-mouth  existence,  constantly 
subject  to  the  rapacity  and  corruption  of  rulers  and  chief- 
tains. 

Most  of  the  European  states,  and  the  United  States  as 
well,  had  relations  of  a  desultory  sort  with  these  Barbary 
states,  and,  early  in  the  nineteenth  century,  finally  forced 
the  rulers  of  Algiers,  Tunis,  and  Tripoli  to  respect  their 
flags  and  protect  their  citizens.  But  it  remained  for  France 
to  start  the  movement  for  the  reoccupation  of  northern 
Africa  by  Europe.  This  action  of  the  French  was  not,  how- 
ever, the  result  of  any  preconceived  plan  of  colonial  or 
national  expansion.  It  was  rather  the  result  of  a  political 
accident ;  and  the  policy  pursued  in  the  early  stages  by  the 
French  authorities  demonstrated  clearly  their  lack  both  of 
colonial  experience  and  of  a  definite,  enlightened  colonial 


216     INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

program.  In  the  treaty  of  December  28,  1801,  with  Al- 
giers, the  French  representatives  secured  promises  that 
French  subjects  would  no  longer  be  enslaved ;  their  prop- 
erty already  seized  by  the  Algerian  Government  would 
be  restored  and  thereafter  protected ;  and  their  financial 
claims  properly  adjusted.  The  Dey  of  Algiers  and  France 
were  to  exchange  consular  agents ;  and  the  representative 
of  the  latter  country  was  to  be  accorded  a  position  of  honor 
and  to  enjoy  a  complete  supervision  over  all  French  sub- 
jects in  Algeria. 

The  memory  of  a  Barbary  monarch,  however,  was  as 
short  and  his  word  as  fickle  as  his  character  was  unstable. 
In  a  few  years  the  terms  of  the  treaty  were  forgotten  or 
ignored  and  the  French  found  it  practically  impossible  to 
secure  the  fulfillment  of  Algerian  financial  obligations. 
Little  respect  was  paid  to  their  authority  or  to  the  rights 
of  French  subjects,  and  the  protests  of  their  consul  were 
unheeded.  At  length,  in  1827,  when  the  French  agent 
attempted  to  press  the  claims  of  his  Government  against 
two  Algerian  Jews,  he  was  deliberately  and  publicly  in- 
sulted by  the  Dey  Hussein  himself.  No  adequate  apol- 
ogy or  reparation  being  offered  by  the  Algerian  ruler,  the 
French  navy  blockaded  his  seaport  capital  for  three  years 
without  results.  Finally,  exasperated  into  drastic  action, 
the  French  Government  sent  out  an  expedition  of  40,000 
men  from  Toulon,  which  landed  successfully  on  June  14 
and  took  the  city  of  Algiers  on  July  4,  1830. 

Wellington,  then  British  Premier,  tried  to  extract  a 
promise  from  the  French  authorities  that  this  occupation 
would  not  be  permanent.  Polignac,  however,  declined  to 
commit  his  Government  to  any  definite  policy,  for  Charles  X 
was  hoping  to  brace  up  his  tottering  throne  by  popular 
military  successes  in  northern  Africa.  Thus  it  came  about 
that  the  French  occupation  was  from  the  outset  purely  a 


ALGERIA,  ORAN  AND  CONSTANTINE  217 

military  affair,  and  their  first  North  African  possession  a 
military  colony.  They  deposed  the  Dey  and  proceeded  to 
take  control  of  his  possessions  by  force  of  arms,  without 
making  any  serious  effort  to  win  the  confidence  of  his 
people  or  to  conciliate  their  chosen  leaders.  But  weary 
years  elapsed  and  much  blood  was  shed  before  their  ambi- 
tions were  realized  and  ere  they  saw  the  enormity  of  their 
mistake. 

In  1830,  the  regency  of  Algeria  was  not  very  extensive. 
It  included  the  port  and  adjoining  district  of  Algiers,  the 
three  districts  of  Titeri  immediately  to  the  south,  the  prov- 
ince of  Oran  to  the  west,  and  that  of  Constantine  to  the 
east  —  roughly  estimated  at  60,000  square  miles.  The  Beys 
of  Oran  and  Constantine  and  the  chiefs  of  Titeri  were 
under  the  suzerainty  of  the  Dey  of  Algiers,  but  enjoyed  a 
large  amount  of  independence  in  the  administration  of  their 
own  lands.  The  capture  of  the  city  of  Algiers  and  the  seiz- 
ure of  its  Dey,  therefore,  by  no  means  implied  the  sub- 
jugation of  the  whole  regency.  The  subsequent  submission 
of  some  of  the  chiefs  of  Titeri  and  the  occupation  of  the 
ports  of  Bougie,  Mostaganem,  and  Oran  within  the  next 
three  years  failed  to  improve  the  position  of  the  French 
materially.  For  their  control  remained  limited  to  the  sea- 
coast,  and  the  French  authorities  became  involved  in  a 
contest  with  the  chieftains  and  tribes  of  the  hinterland 
which  lasted  seventeen  years  before  the  whole  country  was 
subdued,  and  forty  years  ere  it  was  completely  pacified  and 
ready  for  a  civil  regime. 

At  the  start,  the  advantage  lay  with  the  French,  as  the 
Arab  leaders  were  scattered,  disunited,  and  unprepared, 
but  political  intrigues  at  home  and  the  lack  of  a  definite 
colonial  policy  by  those  in  authority  (who  found  it  difficult 
to  obtain  any  substantial  support  for  the  occupation  of 
territory  in  northern  Africa)  prevented  them  from  making 


1218     INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 


LongltndeTYesl 


SCALE  OF  MILES 

0             50            100           150 
4  *    Longitude  East  from  Greenwich    g  * 


FRENCH  EXPANSION  IN  ALGERIA 

HBhsSO;1837  HllMl8S8<:.1848  ^§2 1.848- 1  87O  £SS>|l  870-1  895  LlilJil  1  896-.1 900 

use  of  this  favorable  circumstance.  Meanwhile,  the  French 
forces  carried  on  a  few  half-hearted  campaigns,  and  the 
land  was  given  over  to  anarchy  and  desolation,  for  numbers 
of  the  local  mountain  chieftains  took  advantage  of  the 
situation  to  prey  upon  the  French  outposts  and  on  the 
helpless  inhabitants.  The  successes  of  the  French  on 
the  coast  and  their  tentative  attempts  to  push  into  the 


ALGERIA,  ORAN  AND  CONSTANTINE       9.19 

interior  aroused  the  rulers  of  the  hinterland  to  concerted 
action,  at  length,  through  the  fear  of  losing  their  own  in- 
dependence. After  appealing  for  aid  in  vain  to  the  Sultan 
of  Morocco  and  Mehi-ed-Deen,  a  noted  sage  and  chief  of 
Oran,  they  elected  as  their  leader  and  Dey  of  Algiers  Abd- 
el-Kader,  the  gifted  son  of  Mehi-ed-Deen,  on  November  21, 
1832  ;  and  thereafter  the  contest  was  conducted  with  energy 
and  skill.  For  the  new  Dey  was  a  man  of  intelligence, 
of  force,  and  of  decision,  who,  though  preferring  a  life  of 
retirement  and  religion,  soon  gave  evidence  of  possessing 
military  abilities  of  a  high  order. 

In  a  short  time  the  French  were  compelled  to  recognize 
his  genius  and  were  glad  to  conclude  a  truce  in  1834,1 
which  confirmed  their  right  to  maintain  French  governors 
in  the  ports  of  Oran,  Mostaganem,  and  Arzeu,  and  admit- 
ted a  French  agent  into  Mascara,  the  old  capital  of  Oran, 
where  Abd-el-Kader  had  taken  up  his  headquarters.  Un- 
fortunately this  peace  was  of  brief  duration ;  but,  after 
several  reverses,  the  French  agreed  to  a  partition  of  the 
country  in  the  treaty  of  Tafna2  on  May  30,  1837.  They 
received  in  Oran  the  littoral  districts  of  Mostaganem, 
Mazagran,  Oran,  and  Arzeu  and  a  strip  between  the  river 
Nakta,  Lake  Oued-Maleh,  and  the  sea,  and  in  Algeria,  the 
Sahl  and  the  plain  of  Metijda  to  Oued  Kaddera,  the  Chiffa 
and  the  bend  of  Mozaf  ren,  and  thence  to  the  sea.  The  Dey 
was  to  have  the  administration  of  the  interior  regions  of 
Oran  and  Algeria,  including  the  Titeri  districts,  Tlemcen, 
Rachgoun,  and  the  Mechourar.  Commerce  and  immigration 
were  to  be  free,  and  protection  was  to  be  afforded  to  persons 
and  property.  French  consuls  were  to  be  admitted  into  the 

1  E.  Ronard  de  Card,  Traitis  de  la  France  avec  les  pays  de  VAfrique  du 
nard,  1907,  p.  89. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  92. 


220    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

chief  cities,  and  no  part  of  the  coast  was  ever  to  be  ceded 
to  any  third  power. 

The  French  then  turned  their  attention  to  the  Bey  of 
Constantino,  who  the  previous  year  had  successfully  re- 
pulsed the  attempt  of  Marshal  Clauzel  to  take  his  pictur- 
esque capital.  The  Due  de  Nemours  and  General  Damre- 
mont  led  a  large  and  well-equipped  army  into  his  province 
in  1837,  and,  after  a  severe  struggle,  captured  Constantino 
by  assault,  in  spite  of  its  almost  impregnable  position  and 
excellent  fortifications  and  the  death  of  General  Darnre1- 
mont  during  the  attack.  The  Bey  was  deposed  and  a  rela- 
tive of  the  Bey  of  Tunis  was  installed  in  his  place.  The 
rest  of  the  province  was  gradually  occupied  as  far  as  the 
frontier  of  Tunis ;  and,  between  1841  and  1843,  the  country 
was  pacified  and  numbers  of  French  and  other  colonists 
introduced. 

The  French  were  far  from  being  satisfied  with  the  situa- 
tion in  Algeria  ;  and,  as  time  went  on,  the  Government  of 
Louis  Philippe  felt  the  need  of  further  victories  and  expan- 
sion in  North  Africa  to  strengthen  its  waning  prestige.  In 
December,  1840,  Marshal  Bugeaud  was  appointed  Gover- 
nor-General of  Algeria,  and  the  following  year  he  under- 
took the  conquest  of  the  whole  country  with  a  force  of  forty 
to  one  hundred  thousand  men.  Abd-el-Kader  called  out 
all  his  forces  and  resisted  the  advance  of  the  French  step 
by  step ;  and  when  his  losses  were  apparently  irreparable, 
he  recruited  his  armies  with  fresh  levies  from  the  hinter- 
land of  his  own  possessions,  Morocco  and  Constantine.  All 
in  vain.  The  genius  of  Bugeaud  and  the  Due  d'Aumale, 
his  chief  aide  and  successor  as  Governor  in  September, 
1847,  was  too  much  for  him.  They  defeated  him  again  and 
again,  beginning  with  the  victory  of  the  Due  d'Aumale 
at  Smalah  in  May,  1843,  until  he  fell  back  on  Morocco 
as  a  base  of  supplies  and  operations.  In  1844,  the  French 


ALGERIA,  ORAN  AND  CONSTANTINE  221 

troops  crossed  the  frontier  of  this  neighboring  but  un- 
friendly state,  and  inflicted  a  decisive  defeat  upon  its  sultan 
Isly  on  August  19,  while  their  fleet  under  the  command  of 
Prince  Joinville  was  blockading  the  port  of  Mogador. 
And,  finally,  the  Prince  of  Morocco  was  induced,  on  March 
18, 1845,  to  sign  a  treaty  l  defining  the  boundaries  between 
his  own  country  and  Algeria  and  depriving  Abd-el-Kader 
of  any  further  assistance  from  his  country  or  his  resources. 

Meanwhile,  in  1843-44,  French  forces  were  occupying 
Dellys  (the  last  open  port  of  the  Bey  of  Algiers),  the  high 
plateaus  in  the  interior  of  Algeria  and  Constantine,  and 
were  pushing  over  the  mountains  to  Batna  and  Biskra  to 
the  south.  In  this  way,  Abd-el-Kader  was  cut  off  gradually 
from  all  outside  help  and  hemmed  in  in  the  mountains  of 
Oran.  Yet  he  struggled  on  for  two  years  longer  until,  com- 
pletely surrounded  and  unable  to  continue  the  contest,  he 
surrendered  to  General  Lamoriciere  in  December,  1847. 
Notwithstanding  the  assurances  of  his  captor  that  he 
would  be  exiled  to  Alexandria,  the  mighty  warrior  was 
transported  as  a  prisoner  to  France  and  kept  in  confine- 
ment till  freed  by  Louis  Napoleon  in  1852.  During  the  en- 
suing year,  an  expedition  was  sent  against  the  great  Kaby- 
les,  who  had  not  yet  submitted,  and  the  remaining  interior 
districts  of  Algeria  were  successfully  occupied.  The  con- 
quest of  the  country  may,  therefore,  be  said  to  have  been 
complete  by  August,  1848. 

The  occupation  of  Algiers,  Oran,  and  Constantine,  al- 
though it  was  considered  a  military  triumph,  did  not  add 
greatly  to  the  glory  or  the  resources  of  the  French  nation. 
On  the  contrary,  it  burdened  their  Government  with  the 
administration  of  an  undeveloped  colony  of  doubtful  value 
and  uncertain  extent,  whose  Arab  inhabitants  were  impov- 

1  E.  Rouard  de  Card,  Traitts  de  la  France  avec  les  pays  de  I  'Afrique  du 
nord,  p.  334. 


222    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

erished  and  embittered  by  the  long  conflict  and  whose  hill 
and  desert  peoples  had  still  to  be  pacified.  It  is  true  that 
France  made  her  name  respected  in  North  Africa  and 
earned  a  reputation  for  valor  and  firmness  in  the  Mussul- 
man world.  This,  together  with  her  interference  in  Syria 
in  behalf  of  the  Druses  and  Maronites,  and  her  attempt  to 
assist  Mehemet  Ali  of  Egypt  in  the  crisis  of  1840,  secured 
for  her  an  influence  in  Mohammedan  circles  unequaled  by 
any  other  European  power  for  some  years.  And,  by  the 
middle  of  the  century,  we  find  the  representatives  of  all  the 
leading  Mussulman  states  gathered  at  Paris,  such  as  Sidi- 
ben-Achache,  Minister  of  Morocco,  Ibrahim  Pasha,  son  of 
Mehemet  Ali,  the  Bey  of  Tunis,  and  diplomatic  agents 
from  Turkey  and  Persia.  Yet  in  spite  of  all,  and  notwith- 
standing the  fact  that  the  French  had  procured  greater 
protection  and  security  for  the  Christians  in  Syria  and 
Turkey  and  for  their  own  trade  and  citizens  in  northern 
Africa,  the  position  of  the  French  Government  was  exceed- 
ingly precarious.  Their  hold  over  the  Arabs  of  Algeria 
was  uncertain  and  only  skin-deep,  for  it  was  based  solely 
upon  military  power ;  and  their  influence  in  the  Moham- 
medan world  ephemeral  —  likely  to  vanish  in  a  night  with 
any  sudden,  overwhelming  blow  to  the  prowess  of  French 
arms  or  diplomacy. 

Algeria  was  acquired  at  the  cost  of  150,000  lives,  and 
the  expenditure  of  $600,000,000 ;  and  for  over  a  quarter 
of  a  century  afterwards,  it  remained  of  little  value,  but  was 
a  constant  source  of  trouble  and  expense.  This  was  due 
chiefly  to  three  things  —  probably  impossible  for  the  French 
to  have  avoided  entirely  at  that  time :  a  mistaken  colonial 
policy,  an  ignorance  of  the  fundamental  requirements  for 
organizing  and  developing  a  colony  successfully  in  north- 
ern Africa,  and  the  confused  and  uncertain  state  of  French 
home  affairs  during  the  whole  period.  Of  her  colonial 


ALGERIA,  ORAN  AND  CONSTANTINE  223 

dealings,  which  had  neither  perspective,  nor  continuity, 
nor  background  enough  to  deserve  the  name  of  "  policy," 
Thiers  wrote :  "  It  is  not  colonization ;  it  is  not  occupation 
on  a  large  scale ;  it  is  not  occupation  on  a  small  scale ;  it  is 
not  war ;  but  war  badly  made."  From  the  days  of  Louis 
XVIII  to  the  establishment  of  the  Third  Kepublic  in  1871, 
there  was  constant  party  strife  and  contention  for  power  in 
France,  to  such  an  extent  that  every  government  was  com- 
pelled to  devote  much  of  its  energy  to  the  work  of  main- 
taining itself  in  office  or  of  conciliating  contending  factions. 
The  conflict  between  the  forces  of  monarchy  and  constitu- 
tionalism was  incessant  and  uncompromising.  And  condi- 
tions were  so  uncertain,  so  irritating,  and  so  difficult  to 
control  that  any  progressive  internal  development  was  well- 
nigh  impossible.  The  execution  of  any  continuous  and 
thoroughgoing  foreign  policy  was  an  equally  hopeless  task ; 
and  it  is  no  wonder  that  the  French  statesmen  failed  to 
evolve  any  enlightened  and  progressive  colonial  program 
until  the  Third  Republic  had  been  in  operation  for  ten 
years. 

There  is,  however,  little  excuse  for  the  many  blunders 
of  the  French  authorities  in  Algerian  affairs  during  this 
long  transition  period.  Life  and  property  within  the  limits 
of  their  North  African  possessions  were  fairly  safe,  and 
their  government  cannot  be  accused  of  cruelty  or  injustice. 
But  they  neither  won  the  confidence  or  respect  of  the  in- 
habitants, nor  succeeded  in  establishing  the  colony  upon  a 
sound  basis,  either  politically  or  economically.  To  be  sure, 
the  French  greatly  extended  and  consolidated  their  hold- 
ings between  1849  and  1871.  The  oasis  of  Zaatcha  was 
occupied  in  1849  ;  those  of  Laghouat  and  Touggourt  in 
1852  and  1854 ;  the  remainder  of  the  Kabyle  and  Berber 
districts  were  subdued  in  1856-57 ;  some  rebellions  were 
put  down ;  and  all  the  strategic  and  important  places  in 


224    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

the  immediate  hinterland  of  high  plateaus  and  desert  to 
the  south  were  placed  under  French  control.  So  that  the 
French  possessions  in  Algeria  finally  reached  a  total  of 
some  184,000  square  miles  of  territory,  with  a  population 
estimated  at  a  little  over  2,000,000 ;  but  the  colony  re- 
mained a  mere  military  protectorate.  Little  improvement 
took  place  in  the  condition  of  the  masses  and  no  material 
progress  was  noticeable  in  the  internal  development  of  the 
country.  The  chief  causes  of  this  unfortunate  situation  were 
to  be  found  in  the  failure  of  the  French  to  study  the  whole 
problem  scientifically  and  their  ingenious  attempt  to  adapt 
French  legal  and  economic  systems  to  African  conditions 
and  to  graft  European  methods  upon  Mohammedan  cus- 
toms. 

Nowhere  do  we  find  a  better  example  of  their  numerous 
blunders  than  in  the  policy  pursued  by  the  Home  Govern- 
ment in  the  matter  of  land  titles.  In  order  to  provide  a 
legal  basis  for  the  sale  of  lands  and  to  encourage  French 
and  other  European  colonization  in  Algeria,  the  French 
authorities  adopted  a  system  of  land  tenure  based  on  Eu- 
ropean practice,  which  was  in  force  till  1892,  and  the  main 
feature  of  which  was  an  attempt  to  change  all  the  tribal 
holdings  into  state  or  individual  titles,  and  to  make  all  land 
alienable.  This  was  a  terrible  mistake  in  a  country  where 
the  individual  farmer  or  landsman  has  been  unable  to  pur- 
chase land  and  unused  to  ownership.  Its  consequences  were 
disastrous ;  its  effect  upon  the  masses  pitiful ;  and  most  of 
the  land  passed  into  the  hands  of  Jews,  capitalists,  and 
speculators.  "  The  land  legislation  of  Algiers,"  writes  M. 
Piquet,  "...  immortal  in  its  errors  and  omissions,  terri- 
ble in  its  consequences,  and  which  after  sixty  years  of 
effort  and  summersaults  has  ended  by  avowing  its  impo- 
tence, this  legislation  will  remain  as  the  most  characteristic 
monument  of  this  policy  of  wild  groping,  which  was  the 


ALGERIA,  ORAN  AND  CONSTANTINE  225 

achievement  of  the  Europeans  when  two  different  civiliza- 
tions came  in  contact  on  the  soil  of  Africa."1 

After  the  acquisition  of  Tunis  in  the  early  eighties,  the 
policy  of  the  French  in  Algeria  entirely  changed.  The  col- 
ony was  made  a  part  of  the  mother  country,  although  re- 
taining its  own  administration  under  the  Foreign  Office  in 
local  affairs,  save  certain  general  legislation  which  must 
have  the  sanction  of  the  French  Chambers.  A  transforma- 
tion in  the  attitude  of  the  home  officials  toward  the  terri- 
tory, its  needs,  its  people,  and  its  prospects  was  soon  no- 
ticeable and  accompanied  by  an  earnest  and  able  effort  to 
study  and  comprehend  the  whole  problem.  At  the  same 
time  a  new  energy  and  a  new  life  permeated  the  whole  co- 
lonial department  of  the  French  Republic,  and,  for  the  first 
time  in  the  recent  history  of  her  colonies  a  definite,  pro- 
gressive, and  enlightened  colonial  program  was  established, 
embracing  all  the  French  activities  in  North,  West,  and 
Central  Africa.  Its  effect  was  quickly  apparent  in  Algeria, 
where  conditions  rapidly  improved  along  all  lines.  The 
whole  country  was  divided  into  administrative  divisions, 
which  were  subdivided  into  districts  and  subdistricts,  under 
trained  and  capable  French  officials  whose  success  in  pro- 
moting public  order,  public  improvements,  and  the  general 
welfare  has  been  remarkable.  Fortunately  the  French  Gov- 
ernment has  been  most  liberal  in  all  financial  and  economic 
matters  and  the  native  taxes  have  been  light.  The  cities 
and  towns  have  been  greatly  improved  by  sanitation,  paved 
and  well-lighted  streets,  public  edifices,  and  other  modern 
improvements.  Railways  have  been  constructed  across  the 
country,  from  Oran  and  the  Moroccan  frontier,  to  Tunis 
and  south  to  Figuig  and  Biskra  —  something  over  two 
thousand  miles  in  all  —  and  a  splendid  network  of  over  eight- 
een hundred  miles  of  macadamized  national  roads  built, 

1  V.  Piquet,  Colonisation  Franraise  dans  PAfrique  du  nord,  1912,  p.  176. 


220    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

like  all  the  other  public  improvements,  at  the  expense  of 
the  Home  Government.  It  has  been  estimated  that  the  total 
expenditure  of  the  French  authorities  in  Algeria  reached 
4,000,000,000  francs  in  1912. 

The  government  of  the  country  is  now  concentrated  in 
the  hands  of  the  Prefet,  or  Governor-General,  who  controls 
the  North  through  a  civil  administration  and  the  South 
by  means  of  a  military  regime.  He  prepares  the  annual 
budget  and  supervises  the  work  of  the  departments  of 
State,  except  those  of  Justice,  Worship,  Public  Instruc- 
tion, and  the  Treasury,  which  are  non-Mussulman  and  under 
competent  ministers.  He  is  assisted  by  an  executive  and  an 
appointive  council ;  and  all  new  imposts  and  the  annual 
budgets  have  to  be  approved  by  the  Superior  Council  — 
partly  elected  and  partly  appointed  —  and  by  the  Delega- 
tions. Of  the  last  there  are  three  —  one  to  represent  the 
French  colonists,  one  those  taxpayers  not  colonists,  and  one 
the  natives  —  all  elected  to  advise  and  express  the  approval 
of  their  respective  constituencies  on  all  matters  of  taxation. 
Northern  Algeria  is  divided  into  seventeen  arrondissements 
and  two  hundred  and  sixty-two  communes  with  French  offi- 
cials scattered  throughout  the  country  to  assist  and  advise 
in  all  matters  of  local  government ;  and  extremely  well  they 
perform  their  duties,  in  most  instances.1  The  southern  divi- 
sion is  composed  of  the  four  territories  of  Ain  Sefra,  Ghar- 
daia,  Touggourt,  and  the  Sahara  Oases,  as  organized  by  the 
decree  of  August  14,  1905,  which  are  ruled  by  military 
officers.  The  whole  colony  is  policed  in  a  regular  manner, 
the  natives  being  employed  wherever  practicable.  In  the 
mountainous  districts  and  the  Sahara,  the  assistance  of  na- 
tive chieftains,  the  camel  patrol,  and  the  army  are  enlisted. 

1  For  detailed  description  of  this  colony,  see  A.  Ramband,  La  France  colo- 
niale,  1895,  L'Algerie,  pp.  55-127;  O.  Re"clus,  La  France,  Algerie  et  set 
colonies,  1889,  2  vols. ;  M.  Bentham-Ed  wards,  In  French  Africa,  1912. 


ALGERIA,  ORAN  AND  CONSTANTINE  227 

The  last-named  force,  in  addition  to  some  eleven  regiments 
of  French  regulars,  consists  in  times  of  peace  of  two  regi- 
ments of  the  Foreign  Legion  (officered  by  the  French  but 
containing  soldiers  of  all  nationalities),  four  of  native  Alge- 
rian Tirailleurs  and  four  of  Spahis  (Arab  cavalry).  In 
1912,  the  total  enrollment  approximated  56,000  men. 

The  administration  of  justice  is  well  and  equitably  con- 
ducted. All  minor  native  cases  are  adjudicated  by  the  Kadis 
in  courts  of  the  first  instance.  Appeal  is  allowed  to  the 
French  courts,  of  which  there  is  one  in  each  arrondisse- 
ment.  There  are  also  criminal  courts  for  Europeans,  com- 
mercial and  other  tribunals  with  special  and  extensive 
powers.  The  finances  of  the  state  are  well  managed ;  and 
since  1901  Algeria  has  had  a  separate  budget  and  all  the 
receipts  of  its  own  revenues,  the  military  and  naval  ex- 
penses and  the  interest  on  the  railway  loans  being  borne 
by  France.  In  1904,  the  full  control  of  the  railroads,  with 
a  participation  in  the  profits  and  a  subvention  of  18,000,000 
francs,  was  turned  over  to  the  colonial  administration.  The 
trade  of  the  country  has  risen  rapidly,  while  considerable 
work  has  been  done  to  improve  agricultural  conditions 
and  to  induce  European  and  French  colonization.  The 
imports,  which  reached  £9,600,000  in  1892,  approximated 
£28,734,000  in  1912  —  twenty  years  later,  while  the  ex- 
ports rose  from  £9,128,800  to  £24,846,000  in  the  same 
period ;  and  France  has  had  her  reward,  for  her  share  in 
this  notable  development  has  never  been  less  than  three 
fourths  of  the  annual  trade. 

Meanwhile,  a  movement  was  set  on  foot  to  secure  the 
southern  frontier  of  the  colony,  and  to  open  a  direct  con- 
nection between  it  and  the  French  possessions  in  Senegal 
and  the  Sudan.  This  was  necessitated  by  the  constant  bor- 
der troubles  arising  from  the  movements  of  the  uncon- 
trolled desert  peoples  and  the  attacks  of  the  Touaregs  upon 


228    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

the  caravans  and  French  exploring  expeditions.  After  the 
massacre  of  the  unfortunate  Flatters  mission  in  1881,  the 
French  forces  began  to  occupy  the  oases  and  strategic 
points  in  the  Sahara  to  the  south  of  their  North  African 
possessions,  beginning  with  the  five  villages  of  the  M'Zab 
in  1882.  Then  came  the  advance  to  A  in  Sefra  and  Toug- 
gourt,  the  occupation  of  Touat  in  1892,  and  the  work  of 
the  final  mission,  which  crossed  the  Sahara  and  joined 
hands  with  the  other  French  missions  from  Senegal  and 
the  French  Congo  near  Lake  Chad  in  1900.1  The  result  of 
this  movement  was  the  acquisition  and  organization  of  the 
Territory  of  the  South,  amounting  to  nearly  140,000  square 
miles,  which  since  1901  has  been  united  with  Algeria,  whose 
total  area  is  now  about  343,500  square  miles,  and  whose 
population  exceeds  5,560,000. 

Of  this  extensive  and  remarkable  country,  approximately 
one  third  larger  than  Texas,  only  some  3,500,000  hectares 
lying  in  a  number  of  fertile  valleys  and  plains  are  at  pres- 
ent cultivated.  About  eight  tenths  of  this  acreage  in  use 
is  devoted  to  grain,  such  as  wheat,  barley,  and  oats.  The 
greater  part  of  the  northern  country  is  mountainous  with 
high  arid  plateaus  and  desert  stretches,  more  suitable  for 
grazing  and  forestry  than  for  agriculture,  while  the  south- 
ern portion  is  nearly  all  desert  except  for  a  few  fertile  and 
valuable  oases.  The  chief  exports  are  wine,  wheat,  sheep, 
fruit,  tobacco,  oats,  and  iron  ore,  in  the  order  named,  the 
first  three  being  far  in  excess  of  the  others.  Iron,  zinc,  lead, 
and  copper  ore  of  considerable  value  have  been  discovered 
and  are  being  worked,  the  entire  output  in  1909  reaching 
21,634,043  francs.  The  possibilities  of  future  development 
are  excellent;  and,  since  the  frontier  question  has  been 
definitely  and  finally  settled  with  the  acquisition  of  Mo- 
rocco in  1911,  the  position  of  Algeria  is  assured  and  her 

i  See  chapter  vi,  ante. 


ALGERIA,  ORAN  AND  CONSTANTINE  229 

material  progress  made  certain.  The  colony  is,  and  will 
continue  to  be,  of  undoubted  value  to  France  —  particu- 
larly as  a  trade  center  and  as  an  outlet  for  her  own  products. 
Yet,  in  spite  of  its  remarkable  development  and  the  liber- 
ality of  the  Home  Government,  it  should  not  be  forgotten 
that,  as  a  financial  proposition,  Algeria  does  not  pay.  The 
debt  of  the  northern  district,  or  the  colony  proper,  in  1906 
amounted  to  over  53,300,000  francs  in  capital  and  nearly 
108,000,000  in  interest  and  annuities ;  and  its  annual  ex- 
penditures still  exceed  its  revenues  by  75,000,000  francs, 
inclusive  of  military  and  extraordinary  disbursements. 


CHAPTER  X 

THE  REOCCUPATION  OF  NORTHERN  AFRICA 
TUNISIA 

As  early  as  1824,  France  had  secured  by  treaty  a  recog- 
nized position  for  her  nationals  in  Tunis  and  a  favorable 
commercial  agreement.  In  1830,  she  persuaded  the  Bey  to 
renounce  privateering  and  to  admit  foreign  consuls  into  his 
capital.  After  the  occupation  of  Algiers  and  Constantino 
by  the  French,  the  boundaries  of  their  colonial  possessions 
in  northern  Africa  were  contiguous  with  those  of  Tunis ; 
and  it  became  necessary  for  the  French  authorities  to  pro- 
tect the  frontier  of  their  new  colony  and  its  trade,  as  well 
as  their  own  interests  in  the  regency  of  Tunis  itself.  By 
right  of  concessions  secured  from  the  Bey  Mohammed-es- 
Sadok,  through  the  instrumentality  of  their  able  and  astute 
agent  in  Tunis,  Le'on  Roches,  in  1859  and  1861,  the  French 
built  two  telegraph  lines,  one  from  the  city  of  Tunis  to  the 
frontier  of  Algeria  and  the  other  from  the  same  center  to 
Sousse  and  Sfax,  and  connected  them  with  her  own  Alge- 
rian system.  She  was  further  given  permission  to  join  any 
part  of  the  Tunisian  system  with  European  cables,  although 
the  Bey  reserved  the  right  to  make  a  similar  grant  to  any 
other  government. 

During  the  next  ten  years  the  pacification  of  Algeria, 
accompanied  as  it  was  by  frequent  insurrections,  occupied 
completely  the  attention  of  the  French.  Then  came  the 
Franco-Prussian  War  and  the  troubles  and  disorders  ac- 
companying the  establishment  of  the  Third  Republic,  which 
precluded  any  further  colonial  expansion  for  the  moment. 


TUNISIA  231 

During  the  seventies,  however,  a  constant  intercourse  be- 
tween Algeria  and  Tunis  was  maintained,  trade  was  en- 
couraged, the  railway  system  of  Algeria  was  extended  into 
the  neighboring  state,  and  French  influence  there  was  ma- 
terially strengthened.  In  1874,  M.  Roustan,  a  diplomat  of 
exceptional  abilities  and  energy,  was  installed  as  French 
consular  agent  in  the  city  of  Tunis.  He  gradually  won  the 
confidence  of  the  Bey,  while  preserving  friendly  relations 
with  the  other  consuls,  and  within  six  years  greatly  increased 
the  prestige  of  France. 

Meanwhile,  conditions  on  the  Algerian  frontier  began  to 
create  trouble  and  cause  complaint.  The  boundary  line  had 
never  been  definitely  fixed  and  no  extradition  treaty  existed 
between  the  two  countries.  Murderers,  brigands,  and  other 
criminals  avoided  arrest  and  punishment  by  crossing  the 
frontier.  Robberies,  the  destruction  of  property,  and  the 
burning  of  forests  were  common  occurrences.  Tribal  con- 
flicts were  frequent,  for  these  restless  and  warlike  peoples, 
who  preferred  a  nomad  existence  and  a  bandit  career,  wan- 
dered from  one  side  of  the  border  to  the  other  with  im- 
punity, and  a  constant  state  of  disorder  and  friction  pre- 
vailed. By  1880,  the  situation  had  become  intolerable  ;  and 
in  February,  1881,  the  French  consul  reported  that  claims 
had  been  entered  with  the  Tunisian  Government  for  the 
extradition  of  24  criminals,  for  6170  head  of  cattle  and  100 
other  animals  stolen,  and  for  300,000  francs  to  cover  losses 
from  robberies,  murders,  fires,  etc.  In  the  same  month, 
word  reached  Paris  that  300  Khroumirs,  a  wild  and  war- 
like people  living  in  the  northwest  corner  of  Tunisia,  near 
the  sea  and  Algeria,  had  crossed  the  frontier  again  and 
were  attacking  Algerian  tribes  and  villages. 

The  weakness  and  inefficiency  of  the  Tunisian  Govern- 
ment were  notorious.  The  ruler,  a  sort  of  feudal  monarch, 
possessed  little  real  control  outside  of  the  coast  cities.  His 


232     INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

methods  of  administration  were  antiquated  and  his  efforts 
to  preserve  order  often  futile,  as  the  more  powerful  chief- 
tains of  the  interior  had  little  respect  for  his  authority. 
From  1859  to  1867,  the  country  had  been  systematically 
exploited  and  robbed,  through  the  work  and  advice  of  Mus- 
tapha  Kasnadar,  a  former  Greek  slave  and  minister  of  the 
Beys  from  1837  to  1873,  who  encouraged  the  rulers  in  their 
extravagant  tastes  and  personal  indulgence.  The  land  was 
now  overburdened  with  taxes,  impoverished  and  rebellious  ; 
the  treasury  empty  and  the  financial  disorder  acute.  And 
the  Beys  had  only  been  saved  from  bankruptcy  by  the  work 
of  an  International  Commission  of  Finance  which,  through 
the  prompt  introduction  of  reforms  and  businesslike 
methods  between  1869  and  1875,  reduced  the  national  debt 
by  35,000,000  francs  and  the  annual  interest  by  nearly 
14,000,000  francs. 

The  position  of  the  Bey  was,  indeed,  critical;  and,  just  at 
this  time,  a  controversy  arose  between  the  French  and  Ital- 
ians,1 which  completed  his  embarrassment  and  brought 
matters  to  a  crisis.  For  some  time  the  Italians  had  been 
looking  upon  Tunis  as  a  legitimate  basis  for  their  trade 
and  commercial  expansion.  In  the  spring  of  1880,  a  skill- 
ful attempt  was  made  to  secure  certain  concessions  for  a 
railway  and  telegraph  to  the  capital  city  and  to  head  off 
the  growing  influence  of  France  in  Tunisian  affairs.  The 
Italian  consul,  M.  Maccio,  and  the  British  agents,  Mr. 
Wood  and  later  Mr.  Thomas  F.  Reade,  laboring  zealously 
in  the  interests  of  their  own  states,  convinced  the  Bey  that 
the  French  were  harboring  designs  of  intervention  with  the 
object  of  acquiring  control  of  his  country.  Accordingly, 
he  ceased  his  friendly  attitude  toward  the  French  author- 
ities and  became  suspicious  of  their  moves.  And  for  a 
whole  year  the  French  tried  in  vain  to  secure  an  indemnity 
1  Arch.  Dip.,  1882-83,  vol.  n,  pt.  n,  pp.  179-331. 


TUNISIA  233 

for  the  losses  of  their  subjects  along  the  Algerian  frontier, 
to  get  permission  to  cross  the  frontier  in  order  to  punish 
some  of  the  most  offending  tribes  (although  they  offered  to 
cooperate  with  the  Bey's  troops),  to  obtain  a  proper  dispo- 
sition of  the  Khereddine  property  purchased  from  Turkey 
by  French  subjects,  or  a  guaranty  that  their  special  com- 
mercial monopolies  would  be  respected. 

It  was  at  this  opportune  moment  that  the  border  difficul- 
ties again  became  acute  and  the  invasion  of  the  Khrou- 
mirs,  referred  to  above,  took  place.  At  the  Congress  of 
Vienna  in  1878,  Lord  Salisbury  had  assured  the  French 
representatives  that  Great  Britain  fully  understood  their 
need  of  controlling  Tunis  and  would  take  no  steps  to  oppose 
it.1  The  French  Government  now  decided  to  act  promptly 
and  decisively  in  the  interests  of  their  trade  and  North 
African  possessions.  Finding  that  no  serious  opposition  was 
likely  to  be  encountered,  either  from  any  of  the  powers  or 
from  Turkey,  which  was  loudly  claiming  a  suzerainty  over 
Tunis,  the  French  authorities  gave  orders  for  a  military 
expedition.  And  on  May  9,  1881,2  M.  Barthelemy  Saint- 
Hilaire,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  issued  a  circular  letter 
to  the  French  representatives  at  European  capitals,  ex- 
plaining the  reasons  for  this  appeal  to  force.  After  de- 
scribing at  length  the  increasing  disorders  and  troubles  on 
the  Algerian-Tunisian  frontier,  he  showed  how  impossible 
it  was  to  expect  any  longer  that  a  definite  and  satisfactory 
settlement  could  be  secured  through  diplomacy  alone.  The 
French  policy  was  dictated  solely  by  a  desire  to  safeguard 
the  welfare  and  safety  of  Algeria ;  but  lately,  he  added, 
*'  a  war  has  been  waged  upon  all  French  enterprises  in 
Tunis,  and  we  must  have  a  neighbor  who  will  have  the  sin- 

1  Arch.  Dip.,  1884,  vol.  i,  pt.  i,  pp.  214-16.  Correspondence  between  M. 
Waddington  and  the  Marquis  of  Harcourt. 

2  Ibid.,  1882-83,  vol.  n,  pt.  i,  p.  357^ 


234    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

cere  good  will  for  us  that  we  have  for  him,  and  who  will  not 
yield  to  foreign  suggestions  for  our  injury."  He  felt,  more- 
over, that  there  was  no  good  reason  why  France  should  not 
do  for  Tunis  what  she  was  doing  for  Algeria  and  what 
Great  Britain  was  doing  for  India.  "  For  it  is  a  sacred  duty," 
argued  Saint-Hilaire,  "which  a  superior  civilization  con- 
tracts toward  less  advanced  peoples." 

Already,  early  in  April,  the  French  had  approached  the 
Government  of  the  Bey  on  the  matter  of  the  frontier  trou- 
bles ;  and  throughout  that  month  a  lively  exchange  of  notes 
took  place  without  result.  The  Bey  sought  to  prevent  the 
French  forces  from  entering  Tunisia  by  every  means  in  his 
power  except  the  giving  of  adequate  guaranties  that  the 
French  demands  would  be  satisfactorily  adjusted  and  their 
claims  met.  He  tried  to  postpone  their  action  by  assurances 
that  he  had  sent  letters  to  the  chiefs  and  ordered  his  own 
forces  to  the  border  to  preserve  order.  Finding  the  French 
firm,  Mohammed-es-Sadok  Bey  appealed  to  Turkey  for  as- 
sistance, and  finally,  on  May  4,  to  the  European  powers.1 
But  in  vain.  The  French  Government,  acting  upon  the  ad- 
vice of  M.  Grevy,  Governor-General  of  Algeria  and  com- 
mander-in-chief  of  their  North  African  forces,  who  claimed 
that  it  was  imperative  to  chastise  the  Khroumirs  at  once 
with  or  without  the  consent  of  the  Bey  of  Tunis,  had  already 
given  the  orders  for  the  advance. 

An  Algerian  army,  under  the  command  of  General  For- 
gemol  de  Bestquenerd,  and  numbering  24,000  men,  which 
had  been  concentrated  on  the  frontier  since  March  30, 
entered  Tunisia  without  opposition,  on  April  24  to  26,  in  three 
divisions  led  by  Generals  Logerot,  Japy,  and  Delabecque. 
They  defeated  the  rebellious  tribes  promptly,  restored  order 
in  western  Tunisia,  and  occupied  Khroumiria.  Meanwhile, 
the  French  fleet  appeared  off  Tarbarka  and  Bizerte,  and, 

1  Arch.  Dip.,  1884,  vol.  i,  p.  159^ ;  ibid.,  1882-83,  vol.  n,  pt.  i, 


TUNISIA  235 

on  May  1,  a  fourth  army  of  8000  men  under  General 
Bre'art  was  landed  without  difficulty  at  the  latter  port.  The 
forces  of  General  Bre'art  left  Bizerte  on  May  8,  and  his 
advanced  column  reached  Fondouk  on  the  9th,  and  Man- 
ouba,  about  two  kilometers  from  the  city  of  Tunis,  on  the 
12th,  without  meeting  serious  resistance.  The  Bey  was 
greatly  alarmed  and  most  anxious,  not  only  to  prevent  the 
entry  of  the  French  into  his  capital,  but  also  to  preserve  in 
the  eyes  of  his  subjects  and  of  the  world  his  own  prestige 
and  dignity.  He,  therefore,  readily  consented  to  an  inter- 
view with  General  Bre'art,  which  was  arranged  through  M. 
Roustan  for  four  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  of  May  12.  The 
French  general  brought  with  him  a  special  agreement  exe- 
cuted earlier  by  his  Government,  and  demanded  its  signa- 
ture at  once.  Mohammed-es-Sadok  at  first  refused;  but, 
knowing  that  M.  Roustan  had  ready  another  royal  candi- 
date in  the  person  of  Taieb  Bey,  after  considerable  hesita- 
tion, at  six  in  the  evening,  he  signed  the  document  known 
as  the  Treaty  of  Kasr-es-Said,1  placing  his  country  definitely 
and  irrevocably  under  the  protection  of  France. 

The  French  authorities  had  hoped  to  achieve  this  diplo- 
matic triumph  without  the  expense,  difficulties,  and  dangers 
of  an  extended  military  conquest  and  occupation.  Their 
plans  were  skillfully  laid  and  executed  with  promptness  and 
decision,  while  the  greatest  care  was  taken  not  to  arouse 
the  suspicion  and  hostility  of  the  inhabitants  or  to  estrange 
the  Tunisian  tribal  leaders.  And  their  success  was  remark- 
able. Only  one  serious  uprising  occurred.  This  was  led  by 
Ali-ben-Khalifa,  a  prominent  chieftain  of  the  south,  who 
seized  the  city  of  Sfax  and  attempted  to  arouse  the  tribes  of 
that  region  to  arms.  Sfax,  however,  was  promptly  bom- 

1  Rouard  de  Card,  Trait&s  de  la  France  avec  les  pays  de  I'Afrique  du 
nord,  pp.  232-34.  For  a  British  summary  of  the  events  leading  up  to  this 
treaty,  see  Brit,  and  For.  St.  Papers,  vol.  73,  p.  437^. 


336    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

barded  on  July  15  by  Admiral  Garnault  and  successfully 
occupied  on  the  16th  and  17th.  AH  fled  south  toward  Trip- 
oli. The  French  followed  and  took  possession  of  Gabes, 
the  island  of  Djerba,  and  the  country  between  Gabes  and 
the  Tripolitan  border  without  difficulty.  Meanwhile,  Gen- 
erals Forgemol,  Logerot,  and  Etienne  were  advancing  into 
the  interior  of  the  regency ;  and,  on  October  27-30,  their 
columns  met  and  took  without  resistance  the  old  and  sacred 
capital  of  the  country,  Kairouan.  Thus,  by  the  end  of  the 
year,  the  whole  of  Tunisia  had  been  quietly  and  expe- 
ditiously  occupied  without  encountering  any  serious  ob- 
stacle. 

The  terms  of  the  treaty  of  guaranty,  signed  on  May  12, 
1881,  were  very  definite  in  regard  to  the  new  French  protec- 
torate. The  French  officers  were  to  occupy  such  places  on 
the  seaboard  and  frontier  as  were  essential  for  the  establish- 
ment of  order  and  security,  but  their  forces  were  to  be 
withdrawn  as  soon  as  the  local  authorities  were  in  a  posi- 
tion to  administer  the  affairs  of  their  districts  satisfactorily. 
The  French  agreed  to  protect  the  person,  the  dynasty,  and 
the  state  of  the  Bey  from  danger,  and  guaranteed  all  his 
treaties  with  European  powers.  In  order  that  these  new 
duties  might  be  properly  fulfilled,  the  Tunisian  monarch 
acquiesced  in  the  appointment  of  a  French  Resident-Minis- 
ter with  power  to  see  to  the  execution  of  the  new  treaty 
and  to  act  as  an  intermediary  between  the  Bey  and  all  for- 
eign states.  The  French  diplomatic  and  consular  agents 
were,  thereafter,  to  have  the  charge  and  protection  of  Tunis- 
ian interests  abroad ;  and,  in  return,  the  rulers  of  Tunis 
were  not  to  enter  into  any  international  arrangements  with- 
out previous  consultation  and  agreement  with  the  French 
Government.  A  financial  reorganization  was  promised:  a 
military  tribute  for  the  insurgent  tribes  agreed  upon ;  and 
the  importation  of  arms  and  munitions  of  war  through  the 


TUNISIA  237 

isle  of  Djerba,  Gabes,  or  any  southern  Tunisian  port,  for- 
bidden, with  the  announced  purpose  of  preventing  con- 
traband in  Algeria. 

On  May  13,  the  day  following  the  establishment  of  the 
French  protectorate  in  Tunisia,  Saint-Hilaire  sent  a  circu- 
lar letter  to  the  powers.  While  giving  assurance  that  all 
European  treaties  with  the  Bey  would  be  safeguarded,  he 
explained  the  necessity  for  this  extreme  step  on  the  ground 
that,  in  addition  to  rendering  further  depredations  upon 
Algerian  lands  impossible,  a  prompt  and  firm  settlement 
was  imperative  by  reason  of  the  dangerous  fomentation,  ac- 
companied by  unforeseen  complications,  arising  within  the 
country  and  caused  by  the  work  of  hostile  influences  at  the 
court  of  the  Bey.  On  June  8,  M.  Koustan  was  raised  to 
the  rank  of  Minister  Plenipotentiary  and  entrusted  with 
powers  of  an  intermediary  between  the  Bey  and  the  repre- 
sentatives of  foreign  powers.  He  was  followed  by  Paul 
Carnbon  as  Resident-General  of  Tunisia  in  February,  1882, 
whose  appointment  preceded  by  eight  months  the  death  of 
Mohammed-es-Sadok  and  the  accession  of  his  brother,  Ali 
Bey,  on  October  28. 

Already,  on  November  20, 1881,  Gambetta,  then  French 
Premier,  and  Jules  Ferry,  influenced  by  the  opinions  of 
Baron  de  Courcel  and  Saint-Hilaire,  had  determined  upon 
the  establishment  of  a  thorough-going  French  rule  in  Tu- 
nisia, the  first  move  toward  which  was  the  appointment  of 
Paul  Cambon.  On  March  27,  1883,1  a  law  was  authorized 
by  Ali  Bey  establishing  a  system  of  French  courts  in  the 
leading  cities,  the  details  of  which  were  provided  in  the  later 
decrees  of  April  14, 1883,2  and  July  9, 1884.  This  was  fol- 
lowed by  an  ordinance  dated  May  5,  giving  these  courts 
jurisdiction  over  all  foreigners  who  gave  up  their  extra- 
territoriality. Thereupon,  Great  Britain  in  December,  1883, 
1  Brit,  and  For.  St.  Papers,  vol.  74,  p.  144.  2  Ibid.,  vol.  75,  p.  472. 


238    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

and  Italy,  Austria-Hungary,  Germany,  and  the  Nether- 
lands in  1884,  issued  orders  abolishing,  respectively,  their 
consular  jurisdictions  in  Tunisia.  Conditions  remained  far 
from  satisfactory;  and  it  was  evident  that  the  proper  adjust- 
ments would  not  take  place  or  the  introduction  of  reforms 
essential  to  the  development  and  progress  of  the  country 
be  possible  under  the  existing  regime.  The  French,  there- 
fore, decided  to  strengthen  their  position  and  secure  the 
necessary  powers  to  inaugurate  a  comprehensive  reform 
plan. 

On  June  8,  1883,  Paul  Cambon  secured  a  new  treaty 
from  the  Bey,  known  as  the  Convention  of  Marsa,1  in 
which  All  agreed  to  permit  such  administrative,  judicial, 
and  financial  reforms  as  the  French  deemed  advisable,  and 
the  French  promised  to  guarantee  loans  of  120,000,000 
francs  on  the  Consolidated  Debt  and  17,550,000  francs  on 
the  Floating  Debt  of  Tunisia.  The  interest  charge  on  these 
loans  was  to  be  a  first  lien  on  the  revenues  of  the  regency, 
after  which  were  to  come  the  funds  for  the  civil  service 
and  the  expenses  of  the  Tunisian  administration  and  of 
the  protectorate.  Thus  was  accomplished  the  final  step  in 
the  creation  of  a  French  protectorate  over  the  dominions 
of  the  Bey  of  Tunis.  Gambetta's  saying  that  the  configura- 
tion of  the  French  coasts  and  the  establishment  of  French 
rule  in  Algeria  had  made  the  Mediterranean,  and  the  west- 
ern Mediterranean  especially,  their  "  scene  of  action,"  was 
at  last  realized.  The  lines  of  French  expansion  in  North 
Africa  had  been  definitely  determined,  and  the  security 
of  the  French  position  in  Algeria  assured  by  the  acquisi- 
tion of  Tunisia.  It  was  a  costly  affair,  however,  the  French 
exchequer  being  drawn  upon  for  over  $12,600,000  in  the 
years  1881  and  1882  alone. 

i  Rouard  de  Card,  Trait&s  de  la  France  avec  les  pays  de  VAfrigue  du  nord, 
pp.  236-36 ;  Brit,  and  For.  St.  Papers,  vol.  74,  p.  743. 


TUNISIA  239 

Before  the  French  could  feel  secure  in  their  North  Afri- 
can possessions,  however,  much  remained  to  be  done  within 
Tunisia  itself.  They  had  learned  a  great  lesson  in  Algeria ; 
and,  instead  of  attempting  to  impose  any  French  system 
of  law  or  government  upon  the  country,  the  French  au- 
thorities worked  out  the  necessary  reforms  in  finance,  jus- 
tice, and  administration  with  the  local  customs,  methods, 
and  institutions  as  a  basis.  A  system  of  French  supervision, 
similar  in  theory  to  that  of  the  British  in  Egypt,  was  im- 
posed quietly  but  effectively  upon  every  branch  of  the 
state  and  local  public  service.  So  far-reaching  and  minute  is 
this  oversight  that  nothing  can  escape  their  notice,  no  law 
be  enacted  or  public  act  performed  without  their  knowledge. 

By  the  decrees  of  April  22,  1882,  November  10,  1884, 
and  June  23, 1885,  the  position  and  powers  of  the  Resident- 
General  were  definitely  determined.  While  responsible  di- 
rectly to  the  French  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  he  was 
entrusted  with  an  extensive  discretionary  authority  and  a 
wide  freedom  of  action.  He  has  command  of  all  the  naval 
and  military  forces  of  Tunisia,  approves  all  general  legisla- 
tion and  that  affecting  French  colonists,  and  presides  over 
the  cabinet  of  the  Bey,  whom  he  serves  as  Minister  of  For- 
eign Affairs  and  whom  he  counsels  on  all  financial,  admin- 

O  7 

istrative,  or  other  reforms.  On  February  4,  1885,  the  office 
of  Secretary- General  was  created  to  relieve  the  Resident- 
General  of  a  constantly  increasing  mass  of  detail  work. 
The  French  incumbent  of  this  new  position  passes  on  all 
the  correspondence  of  the  Premier,  directs  the  details  of  the 
whole  administration  in  his  name,  publishes  the  laws  and 
keeps  the  public  records.  The  ministry  consists  of  nine  di- 
rectors, seven  French  and  two  native,  holding  the  usual 
portfolios  of  finance,  justice,  interior  public  works,  foreign 
affairs,  instruction,  etc.  The  country  has  been  gradually 
divided  into  adminstrative  districts,  totaling  thirteen  by 


240    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

1899,  over  each  of  which  is  a  French  civil  controller  who 
speaks  Arabic,  and,  while  acting  as  intermediary  between 
the  government  and  the  local  rulers  (Kaids  and  Sheiks) 
and  keeping  himself  in  the  background,  superintends  all  the 
acts  of  the  chiefs  of  his  district,  reads  their  correspond- 
ence, and  gives  advice  on  all  matters.1 

The  old  local  subdivisions  were  retained  as  far  as  possi- 
ble, but  some  readjustments  were  necessary.  There  are  now 
thirty-eight  instead  of  eighty  "  Kaidats."  The  civil  func- 
tions in  these  subdistricts  are  divided  between  the  Kaids, 
who  represent  the  central  government  and  administer  the 
political,  judicial,  and  financial  affairs,  and  the  Sheiks, 
who  are  elected  by  the  tribes  and  have  charge  of  the  col- 
lection of  the  taxes  and  the  maintenance  of  public  order. 
In  the  south  and  on  the  frontier  of  Tripoli,  the  French 
military  commanders  have  special  authority  over  the  Sheiks 
and  natives.  An  important  feature  of  the  new  regime,  since 
1907,  has  been  the  "Conference  Consultative,"  composed  of 
twelve  members  each  from  the  commercial,  financial,  and 
other  French  organizations  in  Tunis,  and  of  sixteen  na- 
tives (including  one  Jew)  appointed  by  the  Government, 
which  discusses  questions  of  national  importance  and  the 
annual  budget.  In  1910  a  "  Conseil  supdrieur  du  Gouverne- 
ment"  was  established,  consisting  of  the  members  of  the 
ministry,  the  heads  of  the  public  service,  and  three  repre- 
sentatives from  each  section  of  the  "  Conference,"  the  na- 
tive and  French  members  of  which  have  sat  separately 
since  April  27,  1910. 

The  reform  of  the  finances  was  undertaken  promptly. 
Trained  French  financiers  were  loaned  to  the  Bey ;  a  regu- 
lar national  budget  formed ;  much  useless  expenditure  elim- 
inated ;  and  the  entire  public  debt  refunded  into  one  loan 
in  1884  and  guaranteed  by  France.  The  annual  govern- 
1  Arch.  Dip.,  1890,  voL  n,  pt.  iv,  p.  323^! 


TUNISIA  211 

mental  receipts  were  raised  from  5,500,000  francs  in  1885 
to  8,000,000  in  1899,  and  approximately  to  49,275,000  in 
1911,  while  the  expenses  were  gradually  adjusted  and  re- 
duced till  they  came  well  within  the  income  of  the  state, 
being  only  45,749,000  francs  in  1911.  The  taxes,  also,  were 
revised  to  meet  the  conditions  and  resources  of  the  people 
and  the  country ;  many  irritating  abuses  and  inconven- 
iences removed  ;  and  the  methods  of  collection  reorganized 
and  freed  from  graft  and  severity  —  all  without  any  great 
loss  to  the  annual  revenues.  The  conditions  of  land  tenure 
were  greatly  improved  by  the  law  of  1885  affecting  titles 
to  all  the  land  in  Tunisia  and  removing  many  causes  of 
complaint  and  obstacles  to  the  development  of  the  country. 
Public  order  and  security  were  established  throughout 
the  land,  and  the  prosperity  of  the  whole  protectorate  has 
been  remarkable.  Over  a  hundred  thousand  people  fled 
into  Tripoli  at  the  time  of  the  French  invasion,  but  within 
a  few  years  all  except  some  three  hundred  had  returned. 
Numerous  public  improvements  have  been  introduced,  in- 
cluding telegraphs,  telephones,  posts,  government  build- 
ings, schools,  hospitals,  over  2500  miles  of  splendid  national 
roads  and  949  miles  of  railway.  The  substantial  progress  of 
Tunisia  is  shown  nowhere  better  than  in  the  development 
of  its  trade.  In  1885,  the  total  of  its  exports  and  imports 
amounted  only  to  about  $9,200,000;  but  twenty-five  years 
later  —  in  1910  —  this  total  had  multiplied  approximately 
fivefold,  reaching  $45,179,000.  About  one  half  of  the  im- 
ports in  this  year  came  from,  France,  one  eighth  from 
Algeria  and  Great  Britain,  and  one  twentieth  from  Italy.  Of 
the  exports,  France  again  received  about  one  half,  but  Italy 
was  favored  with  nearly  one  fifth,  while  one  tenth  went  to 
England  and  one  twentieth  to  Algeria.  The  chief  exports 
are  grain,  phosphates,  and  a  goodly  product  of  cattle, 
esparto  grass,  olive  oil,  and  lead,  iron,  and  zinc  ore.  The 


242    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

leading  imports  include  cotton  goods,  iron,  hardware,  flour, 
and  machinery.  While  the  French  attempts  at  coloniza- 
tion and  irrigation  have  not  yielded  as  yet  any  noteworthy 
results,  —  only  about  1,000,000  hectares  being  cultivated 
at  present  out  of  a  possible  12,000,000,  —  a  good  deal 
of  French  and  Italian  capital  has  been  invested  in  the 
country  to  the  great  improvement  of  trade  and  other  con- 
ditions generally.  The  chief  credit  for  all  this  striking 
transformation  and  progress  must  be  attributed  to  the  skill 
and  tact  of  the  French  officials  and  to  the  adaptability  of 
the  new  administration.  M.  Piquet  expressed  what  is  ap- 
parent to  every  intelligent  traveler  in  North  Africa  to-day, 
when  he  wrote  :  "  It  is  impossible  not  to  be  struck  with  the 
happy  results  of  the  marvelous  suppleness  of  the  Tunisian 
administrative  system." 

Since  1881,  France  has  reorganized  her  administration 
in  Algeria  until  it  is  as  progressive  and  enlightened  as  in 
Tunisia.  Just  at  present  she  is  busily  engaged  applying  the 
general  principles  of  her  Tunisian  system  to  her  new  protec- 
torate of  Morocco.  And,  when  this  work  is  finished,  the 
French  Kepublic  will  possess  a  splendid  colonial  empire  in 
North  Africa,  organized  upon  a  sane  and  progressive  basis, 
and  ruled  as  well  as  any  European  protectorate  or  colony 
in  the  world.  The  area  of  Tunisia  is  about  46,000  square 
miles ;  and,  with  Algeria,  the  French  territory  amounts  to 
389,500  —  a  little  less  than  the  400,000  square  miles  con- 
trolled by  Great  Britain  in  Egypt  and  the  406,000  owned 
by  Italy  in  Tripoli.  Yet  this  is  not  very  far  from  twice  the 
size  of  the  French  Republic  or  the  German  Empire.  With 
Morocco,  the  French  will  possess  a  grand  total  of  608,500 
square  miles  (a  little  less  than  the  kingdom  of  Persia)  — 
about  one  half  greater  in  area  than  the  regions  adminis- 
tered by  the  other  two  European  powers  with  whom  she 
now  shares  the  control  of  the  North  African  littoral. 


CHAPTER  XI 

THE  REOCCUPATION  OF  NORTHERN  AFRICA 
MOROCCO 

"THE  devil  ships  of  the  Nazarene  nations  came  again 
and  again  to  the  bay  of  Tanjah  to  see  if  the  Prince  of  the 
Faithful  were  indeed  dead,  as  rumor  so  often  stated." 

A  Moorish  tradition  relates  that  Allah,  when  He  created 
the  world,  called  all  the  nations  of  the  earth  together  and 
gave  unto  each  the  choice  of  one  good  thing  for  its  king- 
dom. Some  selected  fertile  lands  ;  some  delightful  climate ; 
others  beautiful  scenery ;  but  the  English  alone  asked  for 
good  government.  The  failure  of  Mohammedan  states  to 
solve  the  problem  of  self-rule  has  become  a  proverb;  and 
Morocco  is  no  exception  to  the  rule.  Indeed,  the  misgov- 
ernment,  the  corruption,  and  the  lack  of  security  and  pub- 
lic order  in  this  African  state,  extending  through  a  long 
period  of  years,  not  only  involved  her  sultans  in  frequent 
disputes  with  their  European  neighbors,  but  also  made  the 
"  Morocco  question  "  one  of  the  chief  sources  of  European 
diplomatic  activity  during  the  past  quarter  of  a  century. 

Morocco,  or  Moghreb-el-Aksa,  —  the  Key  of  the  West, 
—  is,  by  reason  of  its  fertility,  its  natural  resources,  and  its 
geographical  position,  the  most  desirable  of  the  North  Af- 
rican countries.  It  is  slightly  larger  than  France,  being 
equal  in  area  to  the  State  of  Pennsylvania  plus  Cuba,  and 
has  a  population  of  about  5,000,000.  The  country  is  pro- 
tected by  the  Atlas  ranges  from  the  winds,  storms,  and 
heat  of  the  desert.  The  climate  is  delightful  and  the  soil 
of  the  valleys  and  plains  exceedingly  rich.  Agriculture  is 


244    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

now  one  of  the  chief  occupations  of  the  inhabitants ;  and 
there  is  no  reason  why  Morocco  cannot  become  a  great 
grain-producing  region.  Every  known  variety  of  vegetable 
and  grain  can  be  raised  there,  and  it  could  easily  supply 
all  the  markets  of  Europe  with  early  spring  vegetables. 

The  mountain  pastures  are  among  the  finest  grazing  dis- 
tricts of  the  world  and  the  sheep  industry  is  already  exten- 
sive. In  1911, 11,178,225  worth  of  wool  and  $1,594,150 
worth  of  hides  and  skins  were  exported  under  unfavorable 
conditions.1  With  proper  methods  for  the  development  of 
these  industries,  with  adequate  protection  for  life  and  prop- 
erty, and  with  suitable  transportation  facilities,  the  trade 
of  Morocco  could  easily  be  trebled  or  quadrupled  within  a 
few  years.  Regular  steamer  service  has  been  established  by 
English,  French,  and  German  companies  during  the  past 
ten  years ;  and  the  total  trade  of  Morocco,  which  remained 
practically  stationary  in  the  decade  prior  to  1896,  rose  from 
$13,000,000  in  that  year  to  over  $23,600,000  in  1906-07.2 

In  the  last  quarter  of  the  nineteenth  century,  Great  Brit- 
ain controlled  the  larger  share  of  this  commerce  —  about 
40  per  cent  —  while  France  came  next  with  20  per  cent,  and 
Germany  third  with  9  per  cent.  In  recent  years  Germany 
has  made  determined  efforts  to  increase  her  trade,  and  has 
underbid  the  English  and  Spanish,  whose  percentages  have 
fallen,  while  her  own  rose  to  12  per  cent  in  1906.3  Great 
quantities  of  cheap  goods  and  utensils  have  been  imported 
by  Germany,  sometimes  even  stamped  with  the  names  of 
English  mercantile  or  manufacturing  centers. 

1  The  exportation  of  these  commodities  was  nearly  equal  to  the  figures 
for  1911,  before  the  ciril  war  in  Morocco  during  1907-08,  and  the  subsequent 
troubles,  occurred. 

2  By  1909,  this  total  had  reached  $29,572,000,  in  spite  of  the  civil  war ; 
and  $43,597,000  by  1911,  notwithstanding  the  still  unsettled  condition  of  the 
country,  while  the  report  for  1912  shows  a  further  increase  of  27.5  per  cent. 

8  It  was  only  9.5  per  cent  again  in  1909. 


MOROCCO  245 

Ou  the  other  hand,  France,  with  skillful  generalship  and 
persistent,  enlightened  effort,  has  outdistanced  all  competi- 
tors. Her  share  of  the  entire  trade  in  1906  was  over  41  per 
cent,  while  England  retained  32  per  cent,1  and  Spain  4.8 
per  cent.  Through  her  superior  position  in  Algeria,  the 
Sahara,  and  Senegal,  France  possesses  unrivalled  advan- 
tages for  trade  with  Morocco ;  and  she  is  destined  to  secure 
more  and  more  of  it  as  time  passes.  Her  citizens  have  al- 
ready invested  above  30,000,000  francs  there,  and  these 
claims  must  be  cared  for  and  protected. 

The  topography  of  the  country  has  exerted  a  great  in- 
fluence upon  the  history  and  government  of  Morocco.  The 
state  is  crossed  by  a  number  of  mountain  chains  which  have 
effectively  divided  it  into  several  distinct  provinces,  and 
prevented,  thus  far,  all  efforts  to  promote  a  real  unity. 
Tribal  independence,  local  jealousies,  and  personal  rival- 
ries have  been  encouraged  and  perpetuated.  These  natural 
divisions  gave  rise  to  the  two  capitals  of  Marrakesh  and 
Fez,  and  the  minor  principalities  of  Sus,  Tafilet,  and  the 
Riff.  This  separateness  has  been  further  accentuated  by 
the  lack  of  good  roads  and  of  modern  means  of  transpor- 
tation and  communication. 

Over  various  parts  of  the  empire,  the  control  of  the  Sul- 
tan has  been  uncertain  and  often  merely  nominal.  The 
more  powerful  rulers  have  succeeded  in  maintaining  a  real 
supremacy  over  the  strong  tribal  chieftains,  frequently  call- 
ing them  to  account  with  a  ruthless  hand.  The  weaker  sul- 
tans have,  however,  sometimes  gone  for  years  without  hav- 
ing been  able  to  collect  the  customary  tribute.  In  recent 
times,  foreigners  and  natives  have  been  afforded  a  preca- 
rious protection  when  in  districts  under  the  immediate 
supervision  of  the  imperial  authority.  But  elsewhere  life 

1  In  1911,  the  proportion  was :  France  40  per  cent,  Great  Britain  26.4  per 
cent,  and  Spain  13.77  per  cent. 


5246     INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

and  property  have  had  no  security,  and  the  natives  have 
been  compelled  to  buy  protection,  as  in  mediaeval  times, 
from  powerful  chieftains  or  from  influential  government 
officials,  or  to  put  themselves  in  some  way  under  the  mantle 


NORTHWEST    AFRICA 

•  —  —  Spanish  zones  according  to  the  Treaty  of  1912 
BBI  Tangier  neutral  zone  p  H  French  territory 
Wir-ft  Spanish  territory  FW3  Morocco 

of  foreign  powers.  In  many  cases  it  has  been  practically 
impossible  for  the  sovereigns  to  enforce  their  decrees  or  in- 
troduce reforms ;  and  Mulai-el-Hasan,  father  of  the  present 
sultan,  lost  his  life  marching  to  Tafilet  to  put  down  a 
rebellion  in  1894. 

Besides  the  strength  of  the  local  authorities,  favored  by 
the  natural  features  of  the  country  and  the  tribal  condi- 


MOROCCO  247 

tions,  the  peculiar  position  of  the  Shareefian  or  royal  family 
and  the  method  of  government  contributed  materially  to 
the  weakness  of  the  empire. 

There  are  three  Shareefian  families,  but  the  right  of  suc- 
cession is  restricted  to  one  —  the  Filali  Shareef  s  of  Tafilet. 
No  regular  law  or  custom  of  succession  exists,  but  the  new 
Sultan  must  be  a  relative  of  the  old.  Usually  the  old  sovereign 
designates  some  member  of  his  family  whom  he  considers 
the  best  qualified ;  but  the  office  is  elective,  and  no  succes- 
sion is  legal  without  the  consent  and  vote  of  the  family 
council  and  of  the  Ulemas  —  the  legal  representatives  of 
the  religious  orders  at  Fez.  The  other  branches  of  the  royal 
family  —  the  Idrees  Shareefs  of  Fez  and  of  Wazzan  — 
have  a  vote.  They  cannot  rule,  but  no  one  can  ascend  the 
throne  without  their  approval.  Their  social  and  political 
position  is  one  of  great  importance ;  and  they  are  really 
more  respected  by  the  masses  than  the  sultans  themselves. 
At  present  they  are  under  the  protection  of  France  —  the 
Idrees  Shareefs  of  Wazzan  being  particularly  friendly  with 
the  French ;  and  their  position  cannot  be  interfered  with 
by  the  reigning  family.  On  the  contrary,  they  have  had  to 
be  constantly  conciliated  by  the  Filali  Shareefs  and  have 
been,  therefore,  often  a  hindrance  rather  than  an  aid  to 
good  government. 

The  government  of  Morocco  was  absolute  in  theory  till 
1912,  there  being  no  fundamental  laws  or  constitution  to 
hold  the  sovereign  in  check ;  but  the  Sultan  was  far  from 
being  a  despot.  The  free  exercise  of  his  powers  was  ham- 
pered on  all  sides  by  custom  and  restrictions.  Not  only  was 
he  unable  to  enforce  his  will  against  the  great  Shareefian 
families  and  the  powerful  tribal  chieftains,  but  he  was  also 
continually  at  the  mercy  of  his  Vizier  or  Prime  Minister, 
who  in  wealth  and  influence  has  often  been  superior  to  the 
ruler  himself.  The  Government  was  administered  through 


248     INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

a  group  of  six  ministers  of  whom  the  Grand  Vizier  was  the 
chief.  If  these  administrators  were  corrupt  —  which  has 
happened  often  in  the  past  —  it  was  possible  to  remove 
them  only  by  a  cabinet  crisis,  which  involved  intrigue  and 
a  display  of  force,  resulting  in  the  imprisonment  and  death 
of  the  ministers  and  the  sequestration  of  their  property. 

A  systematic  plan  for  the  administration  of  public  affairs 
had  never  been  evolved  ;  nor  did  the  methods  employed  in 
the  management  of  matters  of  state  attain  any  high  degree 
of  efficiency  or  intelligence.  The  court  of  the  Sultan  had 
always  been  a  center  of  great  corruption  and  the  ruler  him- 
self a  legitimate  object  of  prey  for  the  unscrupulous. 
Nothing  could  be  accomplished  without  a  resort  to  intrigue 
and  bribery,  or  to  an  occasional  display  of  force  in  the  shape 
of  cruel  and  inhuman  punishments  of  rebellious  Kaids,  or 
of  other  officials  who  had  betrayed  or  defied  or  disobeyed  the 
monarch.  Every  public  service  had  its  price  or  its  financial 
reward,  and  the  most  trusted  officials  of  the  empire  did  not 
hesitate  to  rob  their  master  shamelessly  on  every  hand,  as 
in  the  case  of  Abd-el-Aziz,  and  in  the  end  to  betray  him 
when  nothing  more  was  to  be  gained  by  serving  him.  The 
sultans  for  the  most  part  were  as  skillful  in  the  methods 
of  deceit  and  intrigue  as  their  subjects.  For  thirty  years  — 
1880  to  1910 — they  successfully  evaded  all  the  efforts  of  the 
European  states  to  induce  them  to  introduce  effective  gov- 
ernmental reforms,  to  abolish  cruel  customs  and  punishments, 
and  to  provide  some  adequate  system  of  protection  for  life 
and  property.  So  corruption  in  private  and  public  life, 
slavery  and  the  slave  trade,  oppression  and  tyranny  in  high 
places  and  in  the  tribal  communities,  went  on  unabated. 

The  Sultan  is  the  religious  head  —  the  Defender  of  the 
Faithful  —  as  well  as  the  political  sovereign  of  the  empire. 
This  places  him  in  a  unique  position,  but  at  the  same  time 
it  increases  his  responsibilities  and  hampers  his  freedom 


MOROCCO  249 

of  action.  The  Mohammedan  peoples  of  northern  Africa  are 
held  together  by  a  common  religion,  and  also  by  a  number 
of  powerful  secret  fraternities:  The  Senoussi  of  Algeria 
and  Tripoli  and  the  Derkaoua  are  intensely  anti-European, 
while  the  Tedjinia  and  the  Moulay  Taieb  of  Morocco  and 
the  northern  Sahara  are  friendly  to  the  English  and  French. 
The  influence  of  these  societies  is  so  great  and  far-reach- 
ing that  no  sultan  would  dare  to  ignore  them  for  long ;  and 
when  one  or  more  of  them  is  once  aroused  to  demand  a 
religious  war  or  an  anti-foreign  crusade,  the  rulers  are 
practically  helpless  before  them.  The  French  rule  the  largest 
portion  of  Mohammedan  Africa,  and  so  they  cannot  permit 
any  one  section,  like  Morocco,  to  remain  free  from  their 
control  and  a  hotbed  of  Mohammedan  conspiracies.  Eng- 
land, threatened  by  similar  outbreaks,  such  as  the  Mahdi 
uprising  in  the  Sudan  in  the  eighties,  has  gladly  joined 
hands  with  France  to  hold  in  check  these  restless  religious 
peoples,  who  chafe  naturally  under  foreign  control  and  a 
restricted  freedom. 

The  possession  of  Morocco  is,  for  other  reasons,  a  vital 
necessity  for  the  success  of  colonial  enterprise  of  France  in 
Africa.  It  is  the  keystone  of  her  arch.  Without  it,  she 
cannot  hope  to  solidify  her  extensive  domains,  or  to  control 
the  trade  routes  and  commerce  of  northern  Africa  and  the 
Sahara.  Without  it,  there  is  little  chance  of  her  coping 
with  those  endless  border  difficulties  and  desert  robberies 
which  have  hampered  the  trade  of  the  entire  region  since  the 
French-Moroccan  treaty  of  1845.  Patiently  and  thoroughly 
France  has  studied  the  problem  for  years,  and  has  woven 
a  network  of  influences  within  and  without  the  country 
so  powerful  that  neither  the  Sultan  nor  any  outside  power 
can  hope  now  to  shake  off  her  hold.  This  prolonged 
effort  to  secure  the  suzerainty  of  Morocco  was  not  ac- 
complished without  encountering  many  and  serious  difficul- 


250     INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

ties,  not  the  least  of  which  were  the  intrigues  of  competing 
European  states.  But  it  has  contributed  materially  to  the 
development  of  an  equitable  balance  of  power  in  Europe 
and  to  the  establishment  of  an  enlightened  cooperation  of 
the  powers  in  the  partition  and  administration  of  the  Dark 
Continent. 

It  has  been  shown  above  (chapters  vi,  ix,  and  x)  how 
France  secured  control  over  Algeria  and  Tunisia,  the  Sa- 
hara and  Senegal,  so  that  her  possessions  extended  from 
the  Atlantic  to  the  Mediterranean  in  the  rear  of  Morocco, 
and  how  she  fortified  her  position  by  treaties  with  Great 
Britain  in  1882,  1889,  1898,  and  1899,  and  with  the  Ger- 
man Empire  in  1894  and  1896.  But  this  was  not  sufficient 
to  insure  the  complete  success  of  the  French  colonial  em- 
pire and  the  permanent  establishment  of  good  order  and 
security  in  northern  Africa.  Three  things  remained  to  be 
accomplished  :  the  completion  of  a  definite  understanding 
with  Great  Britain  as  to  the  administration  of  affairs  in 
North  Africa,  the  development  of  a  system  of  alliances  that 
would  give  France  a  position  of  security  in  European  circles, 
and  the  placing  of  Morocco  under  French  protection.  Ac- 
cordingly, M.  Delcasse,  who  had  been  so  successful  in  con- 
ducting French  colonial  politics,  turned  his  attention  to  the 
field  of  continental  diplomacy. 

In  1891,  the  first  and  basal  of  all  the  treaties  —  that  be- 
tween France  and  Russia  —  was  arranged  ;  but  it  did  not 
become  the  present  complete  and  harmonious  alliance  until 
1898.  This  was  followed  by  the  Italian-French  "Rapproche- 
ment" which  began  with  treaties  of  commerce  and  navi- 
gation in  1896-98  and  was  consummated  through  defi- 
nite understandings  concerning  Tunis  and  Tripoli  in  1899, 
1900,  and  1902.  And  since  1900  the  relations  of  France 
and  Italy  have  been  most  friendly  and  cordial.  Then  came 
the  "Entente  Cordiale"  with  Great  Britain,  which  com- 


MOROCCO  251 

menced  with  the  visit  of  King  Edward  to  Paris  in  1903 
and  the  return  trip  of  President  Loubet  to  London,  and 
was  concluded  in  the  remarkable  treaties  of  1904,1  which 
concerned  not  only  all  the  French  and  British  possessions 
in  northern  Africa,  but  also  embraced  their  interests  in 
Siam,  Gambia,  Nigeria,  Madagascar,  the  New  Hebrides, 
and  Newfoundland.  Here  the  agreement  was  reached  that 
England,  on  the  one  hand,  should  be  unhampered  in  her 
administration  of  the  finances  and  government  of  Egypt 
as  long  as  the  French  bondholders  were  protected,  and  that 
France,  on  the  other  hand,  should  be  free  to  assist  the  Sul- 
tan of  Morocco  in  "improving  the  administrative,  eco- 
nomic, financial,  and  military  condition  of  his  country," 
provided  that  the  integrity  of  the  Sultan's  domains  was 
preserved,  the  commercial  interests  of  Great  Britain  safe- 
guarded, and  the  special  rights  of  Spain  in  northern 
Morocco  recognized. 

The  friendship  of  Spain  was  cultivated  by  the  mediation 
of  France  in  the  negotiations  which  closed  the  Spanish- 
American  War,  and  by  cooperative  arrangements  between 
the  two  neighbors  for  the  economic  development  of  north- 
ern Spain  in  August,  1904,  and  February,  1905.  The  King 
of  Spain  visited  Paris  and  London,  and  in  1906  married 
the  niece  of  King  Edward.  Spain  gave  her  adhesion  to  the 
Franco-British  treaty  of  April,  1904,  in  an  agreement  with 
France  concerning  Morocco  in  October  of  the  same  year,2 
and  the  whole  series  of  alliances  and  treaties  was  success- 
fully capped  in  1907  by  a  three-cornered  arrangement 
between  France,  Spain,  and  England,  guaranteeing  the 
perpetuation  of  the  status  quo  in  North  Africa.3 

1  Arch.  Dip.,  1904,  vol.  i,  p.  413 ;  and  letters  of  Lansdowne  and  Delcasse*, 
ibid.,  pp.  557  and  771. 

2  Ibid.,  1905,  pp.  677-78. 

8  Ibid.,  1907,  vol.  ii,  pp.  49-53. 


252    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

Meanwhile,  the  French  were  taking  definite  steps  to  put 
an  end  to  the  disorders  on  the  Algerian-Morocco  frontier, 
and  to  bring  about  the  much-needed  reforms  within  Mo- 
rocco itself.  They  occupied  the  Touat  Oasis  —  south  of 
Algeria  and  southeast  of  Morocco  —  and,  through  the  ef- 
forts of  M.  Re  veil,  Governor-General  of  Algiers,  a  definite 
arrangement  was  reached  with  the  Sultan  on  July  20, 1901, 
concerning  the  regulation  of  trade  and  the  police  on  the 
Algerian-Morocco  frontier,  France  agreeing  to  assist  with 
troops  in  restoring  order  and  establishing  the  imperial  au- 
thority in  east  and  southeast  Morocco.  In  June,  1903,  the 
French  occupied  Zanagra  and  aided  the  Moroccan  forces 
in  suppressing  brigandage  in  the  region  of  Figuig.  In  Au- 
gust, the  French  and  Shareefian  troops  occupied  the  dis- 
trict of  Oudjda  in  eastern  Morocco ;  and  the  French  were 
permitted  to  establish  military  posts  there  to  preserve 
order.1 

When  the  Franco-British  treaty  of  April,  1904,  had  been 
arranged,  France  made  every  effort  to  procure  the  consent 
of  the  Sultan  to  the  general  terms  of  this  agreement  and  to 
the  acceptance  of  her  aid  in  the  maintenance  of  order,  the 
establishment  of  the  royal  authority,  and  the  reorganiza- 
tion of  the  finances  and  government  of  the  realm.  Abd-el- 
Aziz  and  his  advisers,  although  friendly  to  the  French 
Republic  in  a  general  way,  hesitated  to  give  any  foreign 
power  a  large  share  in  the  direction  of  the  local  affairs  of 
the  kingdom.  They  understood  full  well  the  advantages ; 
but  they  realized,  on  the  other  hand,  the  unpopularity  of 
such  a  move  with  the  majority  of  the  inhabitants  of  Mo- 
rocco. And  they  foresaw  the  probable  effect  on  their  own 
position  if  the  scheme  were  attempted  at  that  time.  At  this 
critical  moment,  Germany  suddenly  broke  into  the  field  of 

1  French   Yellow  Book  or  Documents  diplomatiques,  Affaires  du  Maroc, 
1901-05,  nos.  83-84. 


MOROCCO  253 

Moroccan  diplomacy  with  a  stroke  so  powerful  and  skillful 
that  the  perplexed  mind  of  the  Sultan  took  hope  afresh ; 
and  for  a  time  the  beautiful  fabric  which  the  French  had 
been  so  carefully  constructing  threatened  to  fall  to  pieces 
at  the  moment  of  its  completion. 

Germany  had  not  been  consulted  in  the  arrangement  of 
the  Franco-British-Spanish  treaties  concerning  northern 
Africa,  and  she  felt  that  these  agreements  did  not  contain 
a  sufficient  guaranty  that  the  commercial  rights  of  her  citi- 
zens in  Morocco  would  be  respected.  On  March  31,  1905, 
while  engaged  in  a  Mediterranean  cruise,  Kaiser  Wilhelm 
suddenly  appeared  off  Tangier  and  sent  a  message  of 
friendship  to  the  Sultan  at  Fez,  through  his  uncle  Moulai 
Abd-el-Malek,  in  which  he  assured  Abd-el-Aziz  of  his  sup- 
port and  announced  that  he  would  do  all  in  his  power  to 
safeguard  the  interests  of  Germany  in  Morocco.1 

Through  the  influence  of  the  German  minister  to  Mo- 
rocco, the  Sultan  was  led  to  demand,  in  May,  that  the  ques- 
tion of  reforms  in  his  domains  should  be  submitted  to  a 
conference  of  those  states  which  had  participated  in  the 
treaty  of  Madrid  in  1880,  by  which  the  policy  of  the  "  Open 
Door"  had  been  introduced  into  Moroccan  commercial 
affairs.  This  was  in  direct  opposition  to  the  plan  of  France 
and  a  blow  at  the  Franco-British  entente  of  1904.  M.  Del- 
cass6  refused  to  admit  that  any  other  power,  except  Spain 
and  the  French  Republic,  had  a  right  to  participate  in  the 
proposed  interference  in  Morocco ;  and  a  spirited  corre- 
spondence ensued  between  the  Foreign  Offices  of  Berlin 
and  Paris.  At  length,  Germany,  putting  the  matter  in  the 
form  of  an  ultimatum,  demanded  either  the  resignation  of 
M.  Delcasse  and  the  appeal  to  a  general  conference  or  war. 
France,  which  had  maintained  a  dignified  attitude  through- 

1  French  Yellow  Book,  Affaires  du  Maroc,  1905-06,  pt.  n,  no.  234 ;  Ger- 
man Weiss  Buch,  1905-06,  Morocco  Correspondence. 


254     INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

out  the  controversy,  agreed  on  July  8  to  the  dismissal  of 
Delcasse*  and  the  calling  of  a  European  congress,  on  con- 
dition that  the  French  and  German  representatives  at  Fez 
should  be  withdrawn  simultaneously,  and  that  the  two 
powers  should  unite  later  in  urging  the  conclusions  of  the 
conference  upon  the  Sultan.  In  addition,  the  sovereignty  of 
the  Sultan,  the  integrity  of  his  empire,  the  freedom  of 
trade,  the  paramount  interests  of  France  in  Morocco,  and 
the  introduction  of  reforms  through  a  court  established  by 
the  European  powers  were  fundamental  principles  agreed 
to  by  both  parties.1 

Thus  came  about  the  famous  Algeciras  Conference  of 
1906,  the  Sultan  agreeing  to  its  being  held  at  Algeciras, 
in  southern  Spain,  and  issuing  the  formal  invitations  to  the 
European  states.  In  the  negotiations  which  followed,  the 
United  States  played  the  part  of  a  neutral  umpire  desir- 
ing to  see  fair  treatment  for  the  claims  of  both  litigants. 
England,  Spain,  Italy,  and  the  smaller  powers  approved 
the  French  policy ;  and  Germany,  supported  only  by  Aus- 
tria and  unable  to  secure  the  recognition  of  her  claim  for 
the  establishment  of  a  general  international  committee  of 
reform,  acquiesced  in  entrusting  to  France  and  Spain  the 
introduction  of  financial  and  military  reforms  into  Mo- 
rocco.2 The  German  Emperor's  real  motive  in  forcing  this 
meeting  of  the  powers,  in  addition  to  a  desire  for  the  par- 
ticipation of  Germany  in  the  final  settlement  of  the  Moroc- 
can question,  does  not  appear  to  have  been  the  humiliation 
of  the  French  Republic.  It  was  rather  a  move  to  test  the 
Franco-British  entente  and  to  force  the  diplomatic  isola- 
tion of  France,3  Russia  being  then  occupied  with  the  Rus- 

1  Arch.  Dip.,  1905,  Affaires  du  Maroc,  vols.  m-rv,  pp.  559-746. 

2  Act  published  in  Arch.  Dip.,  1907,  vol.  II,  pp.  5-49,  and  in  the  Yellow 
Book,  1906,  Affaires  du  Maroc,  pt.  n. 

3  Compare  article  on  "  Morocco  and  the  Powers "  by  Edwin  Maxey  in 
Arch.  Dip.,  1908,  pt  n,  pp.  280-86. 


MOROCCO  255 

sian-Japanese  War.  The  results  of  the  Algeciras  Confer- 
ence were  exactly  opposite  to  these  expectations.  The  bonds 
between  France  and  her  new  friends  —  England,  Spain, 
and  Italy  —  were  materially  strengthened.  Germany  was 
shown  to  be  no  longer  dominant  in  European  politics,  and 
the  diplomatic  isolation  of  the  German  Empire  itself  was 
hastened. 

But,  before  France  and  Spain  were  able  to  put  into  exe- 
cution the  Algeciras  program,  troubles  arose  within  Mo- 
rocco which  threatened  to  nullify  all  the  good  intentions 
of  the  European  states.  In  May,  1906,  M.  Charbonnier, 
an  employee  of  the  French- Algerian  steamboat  company, 
was  murdered  in  Tangier  and  serious  anti-foreign  demon- 
strations occurred  in  Sud-Oranais,  Tafilet,  and  Mogador. 
In  February,  1907,  Ben  Mansour,  an  Arabian  Sheik  of 
pro-French  sympathies,  was  assassinated  in  Tangier;  and 
the  killing  of  Dr.  Mauchamp,  a  French  surgeon,  by  a  mob 
in  Marrakesh  on  March  23,  was  followed  by  a  terrific  out- 
break in  Casa  Blanca  on  March  31,  in  which  a  large  part 
of  the  town  was  demolished  and  nine  Europeans  slain. 
Similar  uprisings  took  place  in  various  parts  of  the  coun- 
try, and  all  the  foreigners  in  the  interior  fled  to  the  sea- 
ports, as  rapidly  and  as  secretly  as  possible,  most  of  them 
suffering  great  hardships.  Raissuli,  the  most  powerful  and 
intrepid  of  the  sheiks  now  rising  in  rebellion  throughout 
the  land,  carried  off  Kaid  McLean,  the  Scotch  commander 
of  the  Sultan's  bodyguard,  on  July  3  ;  and  by  the  middle 
of  the  summer  Morocco  was  in  the  throes  of  civil  war.1 

Abd-el-Aziz,  who,  since  the  death  of  the  Grand  Vizier, 
Sidi  Akhmed,  in  1900,  had  been  ruling  in  person,  was  now 
thirty  years  of  age  and  a  man  of  European  training,  con- 
siderable culture,  and  good  intentions.  But  he  was  lacking 
in  energy,  in  will  power,  and  in  political  experience ;  and 
1  French  Yellow  Book,  Affaires  du  Maroc,  1906-07,  pt.  m. 


256    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

he  was  rapidly  losing  popularity  on  all  sides  because  of  his 
extravagance  and  his  predilection  for  Europeans,  a  large 
number  of  whom  —  particularly  Englishmen  —  he  had 
drawn  into  his  service.  His  country  was  practically  bank- 
rupt through  a  lax  financial  system,  and  through  his  grati- 
fication of  a  costly  taste  in  jewels  and  modern  toys,  such 
as  Krupp  guns.  He  not  only  made  treaties  with  the  hated 
Nazarenes  and  borrowed  money  from  them,  but  he  took 
delight  in  their  latest  inventions,  such  as  automobiles, 
cameras,  phonographs,  billiard-tables,  and  even  clothes! 
Surely,  he  could  no  longer  be  a  true  Mussulman !  It  was 
even  rumored  that  Abd-el-Aziz  had  sold  himself  and  his 
country  to  the  foreigner  —  or  to  the  devil ;  and  the  anti- 
foreign  party  was  not  long  in  securing  a  formidable  fol- 
lowing. 

In  May,  1907,  his  brother,  Mulai-el-Hafid,  who  had  been 
governor  of  a  portion  of  western  Morocco  for  several  years 
and  had  lived  in  comparative  poverty  in  Marrakesh,  was 
induced  to  head  the  rebellious  forces.  He  was  joined  by 
the  Glowi,  Kaid  of  the  Atlas  (whose  daughter  he  had  mar- 
ried), and  Si  Aissa  ben  Omar,  Kaid  of  Abda,  whom  he 
later  created  Grand  Vizier ;  and  he  was  hailed  as  Sultan 
in  Marrakesh  on  August  25.  The  example  of  the  two  most 
powerful  Raids  of  the  country  was  speedily  followed  by 
other  chieftains  and  tribal  leaders;  and  in  a  short  time 
Mulai-el-Hafid  had  a  formidable  "Mehalla"at  his  com- 
mand. He  defeated  the  forces  of  Abd-el-Aziz,  who  re- 
treated to  Rabat,  where  he  remained  inactive  and  was 
deserted  steadily  by  his  followers,  while  Mulai-el-Hafid 
was  officially  proclaimed  Sultan  by  the  Ulemas  on  January 
11,  1908,  and  warmly  welcomed  by  the  people  in  Fez  in 
February.  After  firmly  establishing  his  control  at  the  capi- 
tal, the  new  ruler  was  able  to  send  out  a  strong  military 
expedition,  or  Mehalla,  in  March,  under  the  Glowi  to  es- 


MOROCCO  257 

tablish  his  authority  in  those  districts  still  faithful  to  Abd- 
el-Aziz  and  to  complete  the  subjugation  of  his  brother's 
forces.  In  a  short  campaign  lasting  until  early  in  Septem- 
ber, the  Glowi  successfully  subdued  the  followers  of  Abd- 
el-Aziz  and  completely  defeated  that  prince  himself  near 
Marrakesh  on  August  22.  This  royal  potentate  had  marched 
out  from  Rabat  bravely,  but  leisurely,  to  meet  the  enemy. 
His  army  was  increased  gradually,  as  he  proceeded,  by  vari- 
ous chieftains  and  their  followers  who,  together  with  a  large 
portion  of  his  Mehalla,  deserted  him,  however,  on  the  field 
of  battle  when  it  was  seen  that  he  had  little  chance  of 
success. 

Abd-el-Aziz  luckily  escaped  capture  through  the  assist- 
ance of  a  few  French  and  British  officers  in  his  service, 
while  the  enemy  stopped  to  loot  his  camp,  and  fled  to  Set- 
tat,  where  he  was  under  French  protection  and  where  he 
abdicated. 

Meanwhile,  France  and  Spain  had  not  been  idle.  From 
November,  1906,  to  July,  1907,  they  were  busy  introduc- 
ing the  new  police  regime  into  the  port  towns  of  Morocco. 
When  the  anti-Christian  riots  occurred,  they  hurried  war- 
ships to  Tangier,  Mogador,  and  Casa  Blanca,  to  protect 
Europeans  and  to  restore  order.  In  March,  1907,  the 
French  troops  occupied  Oudjda,  near  the  Algerian  frontier ; 
and  in  August,  the  French  and  Spanish  landed  at  Casa 
Blanca,  the  former  under  General  Drude,  and  took  posses- 
sion of  the  surrounding  district.  The  troubles  continuing, 
the  French  deemed  it  expedient  to  advance  into  the  in- 
terior for  the  purpose  of  preserving  order  and  protecting 
the  trade  of  southwestern  Morocco.  Accordingly,  General 
D'Amade  occupied  the  whole  of  the  Chaouia,1  a  large  re- 
gion lying  immediately  south  and  east  of  Casa  Blanca, 

1  French  Yellow  Book,  1908,  Affaires  du  Maroc;  R.  Rankin,  In  Morocco 
with  General  D'Amade,  Longmans,  1908. 


258    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

between  January  and  March,  1908,  and  held  it  in  trust  for 
the  Sultan  until  the  affairs  of  the  kingdom  could  be  satis- 
factorily adjusted.  France  refused  to  take  sides  in  any  way 
during  the  civil  struggle  between  the  royal  brothers,  or  to 
permit  either  claimant  to  make  use  of  the  Chaouia  or  of 
Oudjda;  and  she  maintained  a  strictly  impartial  attitude 
throughout  the  entire  conflict.  The  French  were  fully  con- 
versant with  the  whole  situation,  being  as  fully  aware  of 
the  poverty,  the  weakness,  and  the  indecision  of  Abd-el- 
Aziz  as  they  were  familiar  with  Mulai-el-Hafid's  lack  of 
funds  and  of  adequate  popular  support.  They  declined  to 
take  any  steps  toward  the  recognition  of  Mulai-el-Hafid 
until  he  had  demonstrated  his  ability  to  rally  the  country 
to  his  support  and  to  strike  a  blow  that  would  render  all 
resistance  by  Abd-el-Aziz  practically  impossible. 

On  August  23,  1908,  immediately  following  the  defeat 
of  his  brother  near  Marrakesh,  Mulai-el-Hafid  was  pro- 
claimed Sultan  at  Tangier ;  and  one  after  the  other  the  coast 
towns  recognized  him  until  Mogador  finally  tendered  its 
allegiance  on  September  11.  During  the  entire  summer  the 
new  ruler  had  been  hoping  that  the  European  powers  would 
recognize  him,  and  he  had  chafed  under  the  delay,  not  com- 
prehending its  real  significance.  At  length,  he  entered  ac- 
tively upon  the  task  of  procuring  the  official  European  con- 
firmation of  his  position  and  powers,  by  appealing  first  to 
that  state  which  had  the  least  at  stake  within  Morocco  itself, 
and  which  seemed  the  most  likely  to  be  conciliatory,  i.e., 
Germany.  Emperor  William  hastened  to  welcome  the  new 
monarch,  ordering  Dr.  Vassel  —  the  German  representa- 
tive at  Tangier  —  to  proceed  to  Fez.  He  then  sent  a  note 
to  the  powers  on  September  2,  announcing  his  intention  of 
recognizing  Mulai-el-Hafid  officially,  and  urging  the  other 
states  to  do  the  same.  This  was  a  grave  error,  for  it  was 
contrary  to  the  spirit  of  the  agreement  of  1906,  and  it  led 


MOROCCO  259 

to  a  loss  of  German  prestige  in  Morocco.  Dr.  Vassel,  who 
left  Tangier  on  August  31,  and  who  was  received  in  numer- 
ous audiences  by  the  Sultan,  was  a  fine  gentleman,  of  a  re- 
tiring disposition,  but  not  qualified  for  a  delicate  and  diffi- 
cult task  of  this  nature.  He  soon  fell  into  disfavor,  because 
Mulai-el-Hafid,  with  native  shrewdness,  quickly  perceived 
that  Germany  did  not  intend  to  stand  by  him  in  his  move 
for  recognition,  or  to  support  him  in  his  endeavors  to 
thwart  the  aggressive  policy  of  France  and  Spain.  Ben 
Gebritt,  the  French  agent,  who  arrived  at  Fez  shortly  after 
Dr.  Vassel,  was  an  astute  and  capable  official  with  seven- 
teen years  of  experience  in  Moroccan  politics  and  had  the 
advantage  of  being  a  Mussulman  and  of  speaking  Arabic 
fluently.  At  first,  he  was  rebuffed  and  almost  ignored  by 
Mulai-el-Hafid ;  but  eventually  he  gained  his  confidence 
and  succeeded  in  the  mission  on  which  he  had  been  sent. 

It  was  this  move  of  Emperor  William,  it  will  be  remem- 
bered, that  brought  upon  his  foreign  policy  the  bitter  attack 
of  Herr  Bassermann  in  the  Reichstag  and  the  criticism 
of  the  German  press  in  the  fall  of  1908.  The  Frankfurter 
Zeitung,  on  September  3,  after  inquiring  whether  Germany 
was  acting  in  accord  with  the  European  powers  and  asking 
whether  the  Emperor  was  prepared  to  recognize  Mulai  offi- 
cially and  independently  and  to  assume  all  the  risks  of  Euro- 
pean war  it  might  involve,  exclaimed  :  "  We  would  prefer 
to  assume  that  the  action  of  the  German  Government  rep- 
resents another  of  those  sudden  impulses  of  German  policy, 
which  make  a  terrific  noise,  but  afterwards  vanish,  leaving 
not  a  wrack  behind.  The  only  harm  they  do  is  that  German 
policy  has  once  more  shown  itself  to  be  incalculable,  un- 
trustworthy, and,  therefore,  disturbing.  But  this,  unfortu- 
nately, is  harm  enough."  By  way  of  reply  to  the  German 
demand  for  immediate  recognition,  M.  Reveil  explained  in 
a  speech  before  the  French  Chamber,  on  September  2,  that 


260    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

France  and  Spain  were  willing  to  recognize  Mulai-el-Hafid, 
and  that  they  had  been  busy  since  August  25  preparing  a 
joint  agreement  on  the  subject  which  would  be  submitted 
shortly  to  the  powers.  The  two  Governments,  however,  felt  it 
was  necessary  to  proceed  with  caution,  as  the  internal  situa- 
tion of  Morocco  still  contained  many  uncertainties.  The  posi- 
tion of  the  European  states  must  be  carefully  defined;  and 
it  was  imperative  that  they  should  agree  upon  certain  guar- 
anties which  must  be  obtained  from  Mulai-el-Hafid  in  order 
to  protect  adequately  European  interests  in  Morocco,  and 
to  secure  the  enforcement  of  the  Act  of  Algeciras. 

On  September  14,  1908,  France  and  Spain  sent  a  joint 
note  *  to  the  powers  recommending  the  combined  recognition 
of  the  new  Sultan,  provided  he  confirmed  the  Act  of  Alge- 
ciras and  all  the  executive  measures  already  adopted  for 
its  application,  recognized  all  the  other  existing  treaties 
between  Morocco  and  the  European  states,  accepted  the 
work  of  the  Casa  Blanca  Indemnity  Commission,  resumed 
the  responsibility  for  Abd-el-Aziz's  debts  up  to  the  mo- 
ment of  his  abdication,  and  made  an  official  disavowal  of 
the  Holy  War  proclaimed  against  Europeans.  In  addition, 
Mulai-el-Hafid  was  to  be  asked  to  accord  honorable  treat- 
ment to  his  brother,  Abd-el-Aziz,  and  to  settle  promptly 
and  individually  with  those  states  which  had  special  inter- 
ests in,  or  claims  against,  Morocco.  The  same  day  a  note 
from  the  Sultan  to  the  powers  arrived  in  Paris,  in  which  he 
begged  for  recognition  on  the  ground  that,  without  it,  it 
was  impossible  for  him  to  exercise  sovereignty,  afford  pro- 
tection to  his  subjects  and  to  foreigners,  and  to  fulfill  his 
obligations  to  European  countries ;  and  he  offered  to  recog- 
nize all  the  treaties  of  his  predecessors  with  the  powers  — 
particularly  the  Treaty  of  Algeciras.  In  closing,  he  hoped 
that  the  European  states  would  cooperate  with  him  "on 

1  Supplement  to  Amer.  Jour,  of  Internal.  Law,  vol.  m  (1907),  p.  101. 


MOROCCO  261 

equal  terms  in  the  deliberations  with  regard  to  these  re- 
forms (proposed  in  the  Act  of  Algeciras)  and  in  their  exe- 
cution." 

In  this  last  statement,  one  notes  Mulai-el-Hafid's  dread 
of  being  left  to  the  mercy  of  France  in  the  negotiations, 
the  sincerity  of  whose  motives  and  policy  he  seems  to  have 
doubted.  In  view  of  this  situation,  and  in  deference  to  some 
suggestions  of  the  German  Government,  France  and  Spain 
drew  up  a  second  note  which  they  agreed  to  present  to  the 
Sultan  through  the  doyen,  or  chairman,  of  the  whole  diplo- 
matic corps  at  Tangier.  The  only  vital  change  in  the  word- 
ing of  the  notes  was  in  the  omission  of  the  article  on  the 
Holy  War,  which,  it  was  felt,  would  impose  an  unnecessary 
hardship  and  humiliation  on  a  sovereign  whose  position 
was  still  exceedingly  precarious.  Instead,  he  was  asked  to 
announce  to  his  people  his  willingness  to  maintain,  with 
all  the  countries  and  their  "  nationals,"  relations  in  con- 
formity with  international  law.  This  note  was  approved  by 
all  the  powers  by  November  3,  and  delivered  by  Count  de 
Buisseret,  Belgian  Minister  and  doyen  at  Tangier,  to  the 
representative  of  Mulai-el-Hafid  on  November  19,  addressed 
"  To  the  august,  victorious,  enlightened  and  exalted  Sharee- 
fian  Prince,  Mulai-el-Hafid,  proclaimed  Sultan  by  the  en- 
tire population  of  Morocco."  The  plenipotentiaries  of  this 
ruler,  who  had  been  in  residence  at  Paris  for  some  time, 
were  received  by  M.  Pichon  on  November  11 ;  and  on 
December  5  the  representative  of  the  Prince  of  Morocco  at 
Tangier  handed  the  doyen  the  official  acceptance  of  the 
terms  of  the  joint  note  by  his  sovereign.  In  a  note  of  De- 
cember 17,  the  powers  announced  officially  their  recogni- 
tion of  Mulai-el-Hafid  as  Sultan  of  Morocco. 

The  first  stage  in  the  reconstruction  of  the  Shareefian 
Empire  was  thus  safely  accomplished.  Abd-el-Aziz  was 
permitted  to  retain  private  property  left  him  by  his  father, 


26*     INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

given  a  pension  of  $35,000  a  year,  and  assigned  a  residence 
in  Tangier,  where  he  has  lived  in  peace  and  retirement  since 
December  10,  1908.  The  French  suppressed  an  uprising  of 
Berbers  on  the  Oudjda- Algerian  frontier,  sent  a  commis- 
sion to  Fez  in  December,  1908,  to  secure  an  agreement  con- 
cerning the  Algerian-Morocco  boundary  on  the  basis  of 
the  treaties  between  France  and  the  sultanate  in  1901  and 
1902,  and  opened  negotiations  with  the  new  ruler  in  regard 
to  the  Casa  Blanca  indemnities  and  the  reforms  of  the  Treaty 
of  Algeciras.  They  did  not,  however,  withdraw  all  of  their 
troops  from  the  Chaouia  or  Oudjda,  because  they  were 
not  yet  sure  that  Mulai-el-Hafid  would  pay  the  war  indem- 
nities or  keep  his  promises  concerning  the  treaties. 

The  German  Foreign  Office  professed  to  see  in  this  an 
evidence  of  France's  ulterior  design  of  annexing  all  or  a 
large  portion  of  Morocco,  and  it  raised  frequent  queries  as 
to  the  correctness  and  sincerity  of  the  French  motives  and 
policy.  Finally,  however,  by  January,  1909,1  the  French 
were  able  to  convince  Emperor  William  of  their  pacific  in- 
tentions, and  on  February  9,  the  two  countries  reached  a 
complete  understanding.  Germany  agreed  to  give  France 
and  Spain  a  free  hand  in  the  settlement  of  the  Morocco 
question ;  and  France  promised  to  respect  the  integrity  of 
the  Sultan's  domain,  to  preserve  the  freedom  of  trade,  and 
to  place  no  obstacle  in  the  way  of  the  commercial  and  eco- 
nomic interests  of  the  German  Empire  within  the  Sultan's 
domains.2  The  French  policy  throughout  the  entire  period 
of  this  Moroccan  controversy,  from  1904  to  1908,  was  as 
straightforward  and  honest  as  their  diplomacy  was  consist- 

1  By  the  end  of  December,  1908,  France  had  reduced  her  forces  in  Ondjda 
from  7000  to  3500,  and  in  the  Chaonia  from  15,000  to  8000.  Her  expenses, 
regular  and  special,  in  connection  with  the  operations  at  Gasa  Elanca  and 
the   Algerian  -  Moroccan  frontiers  in   1907   and   1908  amounted   to   over 
$9,600,000. 

2  Arch.  Dip.,  1910,  p.  83. 


MOROCCO  263 

ent  and  skillful ;  and  there  is  every  reason  to  believe  that 
the  French  authorities  tried  to  safeguard  the  interests  of 
all  the  Continental  states,  as  well  as  their  own  and  those 
of  Spain.  "In  the  examination  and  defense  of  her  interests 
and  her  rights,  France  has  not  separated  her  own  cause 
from  that  of  Europe,"  said  M.  Pichon  in  a  speech  at  Poligny 
on  September  20, 1908.  "She  has  remembered  that  it  was 
her  duty  to  aid  the  march  of  civilization.  She  acted  in  a 
spirit  of  elevated  patriotism  —  European  patriotism.  For, 
if  it  is  true  that  the  peace  of  Europe  has  not  been  dis- 
turbed for  a  long  time,  and  if  it  is  true  that  this  is  due  to 
the  influence  of  universal  public  opinion  and  to  the  efforts 
of  the  various  governments,  we  are  entitled  to  say  that  the 
services  rendered  in  this  respect  by  the  Republic  are  second 
to  none.  Is  it  not  a  fundamental  principle  of  the  Re- 
public and  characteristic  of  her  destiny  that  she  should 
defend  and  propagate  ideas  of  peace,  justice,  and  brother- 
hood?" 

France  had  now,  apparently,  a  clear  field  for  the  cut- 
ting of  the  "Gordian  knot"  in  the  little  "Kingdom  of  the 
West."  Mulai-el-Hafid  must  deal  with  her  alone  and  with- 
out hope  of  assistance  from  without.  Till  1904,  the  sultans 
had  skillfully  evaded  their  obligations  to  foreign  states, 
postponed  reform,  and  held  off  the  French  by  various  sub- 
terfuges and  by  appeals  to  England  or  to  the  powers. 
Since  then,  they  had  leaned  for  support  chiefly  on  Ger- 
many, as  we  have  seen ;  but  now  Europe  presented  a  united 
front  and  France  could  no  longer  be  betrayed  in  the  rear. 
M.  Regnault  was,  accordingly,  sent  immediately  to  Fez  on 
a  special  mission  to  the  new  sovereign  for  the  purpose  of 
securing  his  agreement  to  a  plan  for  carrying  out  the  terms 
of  the  French-Spanish  note  and  for  the  reorganization  of 
the  Moroccan  government.  A  prolonged  diplomatic  strug- 
gle, however,  ensued  between  Mulai-el-Hafid  and  the  French 


264    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

Foreign  Office,  lasting  over  a  year,  the  former  demanding 
the  immediate  withdrawal  of  the  French  forces  from  the 
realms  and  the  latter  consistently  refusing  to  do  so  until 
the  Sultan  had  consented  to  some  definite  plan  for  enforc- 
ing the  regulations  of  Algeciras  and  of  the  French-Spanish 
note,  and  promised  to  pay  an  indemnity  to  cover  the  cost 
of  the  French  and  Spanish  military  expenditure  during  the 
recent  disturbances  in  Morocco.  The  situation  of  Mulai-el- 
Hafid  was  indeed  difficult.  He  had  no  special  love  for  Eu- 
ropeans or  European  methods.  He  had  secured  his  crown 
and  his  present  powers  chiefly  through  the  support  and 
assistance  of  the  anti-foreign  party,  and  was  bound,  there- 
fore, not  to  concede  too  much  to  the  French  or  other  out- 
siders. On  the  other  hand,  there  were  powerful  interests  in 
his  state  favoring  the  French,  and  he  himself  was  consider- 
ably indebted  to  them  for  their  policy  of  non-intervention 
during  the  recent  revolution.  Then,  the  many  necessary 
reforms  —  commercial,  economic,  educational,  and  hygienic 
—  could  only  be  introduced  with  the  aid  of  European  capi- 
tal ;  and  the  Sultan  could  not  hope  to  maintain  order  on 
his  frontiers  or  provide  protection  for  the  lives  and  property 
of  his  subjects  throughout  the  kingdom  without  French 
assistance.  Mulai-el-Hafid,  therefore,  shrewdly  allowed 
matters  to  drag  on  for  an  indefinite  time,  in  order  to  give 
his  followers  and  supporters  the  impression  that  he  was 
acceding  to  the  demands  of  the  Christian  nations  —  and 
particularly  of  France  —  only  after  great  pressure  and  in 
the  last  extremity. 

The  negotiations  were  considerably  impeded  by  the  out- 
break of  hostilities  in  July,  1909,  between  the  chieftains 
of  the  Riff  country  (in  northern  Morocco  opposite  Spain), 
over  whom  the  sultans  exercised  an  uncertain  control,  and 
the  Spaniards  who  had  some  military  posts  and  mining 
concessions  there.  A  severe  conflict  ensued,  lasting  several 


MOROCCO  265 

months  and  proving  most  costly  to  Spain  in  men  and 
money.1  Ultimately,  in  December,  1909,  the  leading  Kaids 
were  induced  to  make  their  submission  and  the  main  ques- 
tions at  issue  were  satisfactorily  adjusted.  Thus  another 
of  the  serious  obstacles  to  the  complete  pacification  of  Mo- 
rocco was  removed. 

Meanwhile,  the  French  were  pressing  Mulai-el-Hafid  to 
accept  their  assistance  in  restoring  order  and  in  setting  up 
an  efficient  administration  in  his  country.  On  August  14, 

1909,  they  submitted  to  the  Sultan's  representatives  in  Paris 
a  definite  plan 2  providing  for  the  evacuation  of  Chaouia 
and  Casa  Blanca  by  the  French  forces,  the  creation  of 
frontier  police  and  settlement  of  certain  frontier  questions, 
the  liquidation  of  the  Moroccan  debt,  and  the  payment  of 
the  military  expenses  of  France  incurred  in  Morocco.  This 
was  supplemented  and  modified  in   subsequent  notes  be- 
tween the  French  Foreign  Office  and  the  representatives 
of  the  Sultan,  dated  December  15,  21,  and  25  ;  3  but  Mulai- 
el-Hafid  successfully  evaded  for  some  time  any  definite  an- 
swer or  acceptance  of  its  terms.   At  length,  the  French, 
becoming  exasperated  at  this  evasion,  and  feeling  that  the 
needs  of  the  country  called  for  immediate  action,  sent  an 
ultimatum  to  him  through  M.  Regnault  on  February  19, 

1910,  giving  His  Highness  forty-eight  hours  in   which 
to  accept  the  proposed  "  Franco-Moroccan  Accord."    The 
Sultan  is  reported  to  have  flown  into  a  terrible  rage,  but 
he  cooled  down  sufficiently  to  give  his  adhesion  to  the 
French  proposal  on  February  21,4  and  on  March  4,  his  rep- 
resentatives—  duly  authorized — signed  the  formal  treaty. 

1  Ashmead-Bartlett,  The  Passing  of  the  Shareefian  Empire,  1910,  chaps. 
XXVH-XXXIV :  a  good  description  of  the  chief  Spanish  campaigns  by  an  eye- 
witness. 

2  French  Yellow  Book,  1910,  Morocco,  vol.  v,  pp.  196-200. 
8  Ibid.,  pp.  290,  297-99. 

4  Ibid. ;  correspondence  between  Pichon  and  Regnault,  pp.  319-29,334-35. 


266     INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

By  the  terms  of  this  agreement  the  French  promised  to 
evacuate  the  Chaouia  and  Oudjda  as  soon  as  the  Moroccan 
Government  was  able  to  place  in  these  regions  its  own 
forces,  —  amounting  to  1500  and  2000  men  respectively,  — 
which  should  be  organized  and  trained  under  the  direction 
of  the  French  military  mission.  The  Sultan  was  to  nominate 
a  Shareefian  High  Commissioner  with  full  powers  to  coop- 
erate with  a  French  High  Commissioner  in  adjusting  the 
Algerian  frontier  difficulties ;  but  the  French  were  to  retain 
the  "  territory  of  the  Doui-Menia  and  the  Oulad-Djerir,  who 
have  accepted  the  jurisdiction  of  the  general  government 
of  Algeria,"  and  the  post  named  Berguent,  since  they  are 
necessary  to  the  protection  of  the  Algerian  frontier.  In  ad- 
dition the  French  Government  offered  to  assist  the  Moroc- 
can Government  in  securing  funds  to  take  care  of  its  national 
debt  and  to  insure  an  annual  income,  sufficient  to  enable  the 
Sultan  to  organize  a  well-equipped  and  reliable  army  and 
police,  to  maintain  an  efficient  administration,  and  to  place 
his  affairs  generally  on  a  stable  basis.  With  exceptional 
generosity,  the  French  offered  to  postpone  for  five  years 
the  payment  of  their  own  indemnity  for  the  expenses  of 
their  military  occupation  of  the  Chaouia  and  Oudjda.1  On 
November  16, 1910,  the  Spanish  Government  negotiated  a 
similar  agreement  with  the  Shareefian  representatives  con- 
cerning the  affairs,  the  finances,2  and  administration  of  their 
sphere  of  influence  in  the  Riff  country  and  the  Ceuta  dis- 
trict, which  was  officially  approved  by  Mulai-el-Hafid  on 
December  23.3  The  signing  of  these  "  Accords  "  naturally 
placed  the  sovereign  of  Morocco  more  than  ever  under  the 
supervision  of  the  French  and  Spanish  authorities.  For  it 

1  French  Yellow  Book,  1910,  Morocco,  vol.  v,  p.  343 ;  2,740,000  francs  a 
year  for  seventy-five  years. 

2  Spanish  claims  for  indemnity  for  military  occupation  amounted  to 
65,000,000  pesetas,  to  be  paid  at  the  rate  of  2,545,000  pesetas  a  year. 

8  Supplement  to  Amer.  Jour,  of  Internal ,  Law,  January  1912,  p.  54. 


MOROCCO  267 

was  practically  impossible  to  rid  his  state  of  the  enormous 
public  debt,  amounting  to  approximately  150,000,000  francs, 
except  through  the  reorganization  of  the  finances  and  in- 
ternal administration  of  his  realm,  which  could  be  accom- 
plished only  with  outside  assistance. 

Before  the  movement  to  carry  out  these  agreements  was 
under  way,  difficulties  arose  once  more  between  several  of 
the  chieftains  and  the  Sultan's  Government,  owing  to  the 
re-imposition  of  certain  taxes  that  Mulai-el-Hafid  had  prom- 
ised on  his  accession  not  to  levy,  and  to  the  tyranny  of  his 
Prime  Minister.  On  January  14,  1911,  Lieutenant  Mar- 
chand  and  several  comrades  were  slain  by  the  Zaer  tribesmen 
near  Rabat ;  and  soon  several  tribes  were  in  open  revolt. 
The  movement  spread.  A  brother  of  Mulai-el-Hafid  was 
proclaimed  as  a  rival  sultan,  and  in  a  few  weeks  a  great 
portion  of  the  country  was  in  arms.  The  warring  factions 
converged  on  the  capital,  defeated  the  Sultan's  forces,  and 
finally  besieged  him  in  Fez.  On  May  21,  1911,  the  French 
relieving  column,  composed  mainly  of  local  levies,  reached 
the  beleaguered  sovereign,  and  the  revolting  tribesmen  were 
dispersed  without  difficulty.  A  number  of  chieftains,  whose 
grievances  were  real  and  whose  complaints  were  fully  justi- 
fiable, were  won  over  by  conciliatory  measures  and  friendly 
treatment.  The  offending  Vizier  was  dismissed  from  office, 
and  the  French  entered  energetically  upon  the  task  of  re- 
storing order  and  security  in  the  country. 

Just  at  this  critical  moment,  the  German  Government 
decided  to  send  the  warship  —  Panther  —  to  Agadir.  Their 
ostensible  and  publicly  announced  purpose  was  to  afford 
protection  to  certain  German  traders  and  German  commer- 
cial interests  in  that  neighborhood.  Their  real  object  was 
something  quite  different.  The  French  Government  had 
taken  great  care  to  keep  all  the  powers  posted  concerning 
their  movements  in  Morocco  and  their  advance  to  Fez,  and 


268     INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

to  see  that  each  step  in  their  program  was  in  strict  con- 
formity with  the  stipulations  of  the  Treaty  of  Algeciras. 
There  were  no  serious  grounds  for  complaint  on  the  part 
of  any  of  the  European  states ;  but  it  was  evident  that  the 
establishment  of  a  French  protectorate  over  Morocco  had 
become  inevitable.  Every  one  —  the  Germans  included  — 
felt  that  this  was  the  only  possible  solution  of  the  problem. 
"  France  was  the  only  power  which  could  restore  order  in 
Morocco,"  said  Herr  von  Bethmann-Hollweg  in  his  opening 
speech  to  the  Reichstag  on  this  question  on  November  9, 
1911.  "  The  greater  the  freedom  given  to  France,  the  greater 
the  security  and  the  responsibility  for  order."  But  the  Ger- 
man leaders  were  of  the  opinion  that,  for  two  reasons,  it 
should  not  be  permitted  to  take  place  without  an  official 
protest  on  their  part.  In  the  first  place,  it  would  be  a  re- 
flection on  their  diplomatic  acumen  and  a  blow  to  their 
national  pride,  if  a  matter  of  such  great  importance  to  the 
European  states  was  finally  adjusted  without  their  coopera- 
tion or  without  their  advice  having  been  sought.  In  the 
second  place,  by  making  the  protest,  they  would  be  in  a 
position  to  take  advantage  in  the  shape  of  increased  com- 
mercial rights  and  privileges,  or  even  territorial  gains,  in 
Morocco,  or  elsewhere  in  Africa. 

In  the  early  stages  of  the  French  advance  to  Fez,  the 
German  Foreign  Office  had  called  the  attention  of  the 
French  Government  to  the  fact  that  such  action  would  re- 
sult in  the  establishment  of  a  protectorate  in  Morocco.  The 
French,  on  the  other  hand,  in  their  communications  to  Ger- 
many,1 in  their  general  circulars  to  the  powers,2  and  in 
their  instructions  to  General  Moinier,  emphasized  clearly 
the  great  necessity  for  the  expedition  —  to  protect  the  lives 

1  French  Yellow  Book,  1912,  Affaires  du  Maroc,  vol.  VI,  pp.  179,  189-93, 
221  239  247  289 
*  Ibid.,  pp.'  181,  219,  235,  261,  288,  303,  342-43. 


MOROCCO  269 

of  resident  foreigners  and  European  consuls,  and  to  pre- 
serve the  Shareefian  Government  —  and  stated  that  the 
occupation  of  Fez  was  to  be  only  temporary.  The  Germans, 
however,  reserved  the  right  to  resume  complete  liberty  of 
action  as  soon  as  the  French  forces  were  established  at  the 
capital. 

Meanwhile,  difficulties  had  arisen  with  regard  to  the  ap- 
plication of  the  commercial  and  economic  provisions  of  the 
Franco-German  agreement  of  1909.  The  French  Republic 
wished  to  interpret  them  in  accordance  with  its  general 
policy  of  free  trade  —  adopted  under  pressure  from  Eng- 
land and  Spain  in  1904  and  of  the  powers  at  Algeciras ; 
but  Germany  was  inclined  to  insist  on  a  narrower  principle 
of  economic  monopoly  of  individual  sections  —  divided  pro- 
portionally to  the  existing  spheres  of  influence.  In  this  con- 
nection, there  arose  the  question  of  "  compensations  "  — 
economic  or  commercial  —  for  the  Germans,  in  case  the 
French  assumed  political  and  territorial  advantages.  It  is 
not  known  with  whom  the  idea  first  originated,  but  it  came 
out  in  the  conversations  between  M.  Cambon  and  Herr  von 
Kiderlen-Waechter  held  in  Berlin  on  June  II,1  and  at  Kis- 
sengen  on  June  20  and  21.  "  If  we  only  talk  of  Morocco," 
said  Kiderlen-Waechter,  "  we  cannot  succeed."  "  You  are 
right,"  replied  Cambon.  "  If  you  desire  to  have  some  por- 
tion of  Morocco,  the  conversation  had  better  not  begin. 
The  French  opinion  would  never  allow  it  on  this  land.  One 
might  seek  elsewhere  —  "  The  idea  of  "  compensation  " 
was,  however,  new  to  the  French  Ambassador,  who  had  no 
instructions  along  this  line ;  but  he  agreed  to  bring  the 
matter  to  the  attention  of  his  Government.  On  June  22, 
M.  Cambon  wrote  to  Paris,  describing  the  whole  interview 
in  detail  and  asking  for  instructions,  but  added  :  "  It  is  no 
longer  open  to  us  to  draw  back,  and  we  must  now  decide 

1  French  Yellow  Book,  1912,  Affaires  du  Maroc,  vol.  vi,  pp.  349-50. 


270    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

what  elements  are  to  form  the  basis  of  further  conversa- 
tions." 1 

It  is  well  known  that  as  early  as  May,  1910,  France  and 
Germany  had  opened  conversations  with  a  view  to  securing 
cooperation  in  trade  and  transport  facilities  in  the  Camer- 
oons  and  the  Congo;  but  no  agreement  was  reached,  al- 
though a  tentative  arrangement  had  been  worked  out  just 
before  the  fall  of  the  Briand-Pichon  Cabinet  in  February, 
1911.  M.  Caillaux — Minister  of  Finance  in  the  new  cabi- 
net— opened  some  secret  negotiations  with  the  German 
Foreign  Office,  which  led  them  to  infer  at  least  that  he  and 
his  friends  were  willing  to  concede  some  "  compensations  " 
in  the  French  Congo,  or  elsewhere,  to  secure  a  final  settle- 
ment of  the  Moroccan  question.  M.  Caillaux  became  Prime 
Minister  on  June  28,  1911 ;  and  the  Panther  was  sent  to 
Agadir  on  July  1,  to  give  Germany  a  good  "  handle  "  to 
use  in  the  negotiations  which  were  sure  to  follow. 

As  soon  as  the  news  of  the  German  move  on  Agadir 
officially  reached  the  French  Cabinet,  the  French  Foreign 
Office  approached  the  British  Government  to  learn  its  atti- 
tude in  the  matter.  Finding  that  their  views  practically 
coincided,  and  being  assured  of  a  cordial  and  firm  support 
by  Great  Britain,  the  French  Government  consented  to 
open  negotiations  with  Germany.  Secret  informal  discus- 
sions—  technically  known  as  "conversations"  —  on  the 
Moroccan  question  ensued,  lasting  —  with  but  one  serious 
interruption  —  from  the  middle  of  July  till  November  4. 
The  diplomats  of  Wilhelmstrasse  began  by  claiming  that 
Germany  was  entitled  either  to  an  "  economic  condominium  " 
with  France  in  Morocco,  which  would  insure  to  her  an  equal 
share  with  the  French  in  the  commercial  and  economic  de- 

1  French  Yellow  Book,  1912,  Affaires  du  Maroc,  vol.  vi,  pp.  372-74 ;  see 
also  M.  de  Selves's  speech  in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  on  December  14, 
1911;  London  Times,  December  15,  1911. 


MOROCCO  271 

velopment  of  the  land,  or  to  "compensation"  elsewhere, 
which  she  intimated  might  properly  take  the  form  of  the 
cession  of  the  whole  of  the  Gaboon  district  and  that  portion 
of  the  French  Congo  lying  between  the  ocean  and  the  Sanga 
River.  In  the  event  that  the  latter  alternative  alone  was 
to  be  considered,  Germany  was  prepared  to  turn  over  Togo- 
land  and  a  portion  of  the  Cameroons  to  France  in  order 
to  facilitate  matters  and  equalize  the  larger  transfer  by 
France.  The  German  contention  for  a  position  of  special 
privilege  in  Morocco,  and  the  claim  by  the  press  of  the 
Fatherland  that  their  country  was  "fighting  the  battle  of 
the  world,"  seem  not  to  have  been  well  taken.  By  the  Con- 
ference of  Algeciras  and  her  own  promises,  France  was 
irrevocably  committed  to  an  "  open-door  "  policy  of  com- 
mercial freedom  in  Morocco ;  and  Great  Britain  and  France 
were  enjoying  over  sixty-six  per  cent  of  the  trade  of  that 
country,  while  Germany's  share  had  not  yet  reached  thir- 
teen per  cent. 

France  stood  firm,  refusing  to  admit  that  Germany  pos- 
sessed any  special  position  of  privilege  in  Morocco  or  was 
entitled  ~by  right  to  any  "  compensation  "  for  giving  France 
a  clear  field  there,  and  insisting  that  the  status  quo  of  the 
Shareefian  Empire  must  first  be  clearly  and  firmly  estab- 
lished before  any  question  of  reward  or  "  compensation  " 
could  be  raised.  Mr.  Asquith  and  Mr.  Lloyd-George  in 
England  made  forceful  speeches,  declaring  Great  Britain's 
determination  not  to  permit  any  encroachment  upon  her 
rights  and  interests  in  northern  and  western  Africa.  This 
firm  attitude,  combined  with  a  financial  depression  in  Ger- 
many, which,  on  September  9,  almost  resulted  in  a  panic 
on  the  Berlin  Bourse,  forced  the  Imperial  Government  to 
change  front.  The  French  financiers  came  generously  and 
promptly  forward  with  offers  of  assistance  through  the 
Swiss  banks,  and  the  day  was  saved.  The  French  point  of 


272     INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

view  was  accepted  as  a  basis ;  and,  thereafter,  the  nego- 
tiations were  conducted  in  a  conciliatory,  straightforward, 
and  businesslike  manner  on  both  sides. 

The  program  of  France  included  three  main  points : 
First,  France  was  to  have  a  free  hand  in  Morocco,  in  order 
that  she  might  successfully  establish  order  and  security, 
create  an  efficient  and  responsible  government,  and  pro- 
mote the  economic,  political,  and  moral  development  of  the 
country.  But  her  position  must  be  thoroughly  safeguarded 
with  absolute  guaranties,  so  that  there  would  be  no  fur- 
ther disrupting  interference  by  any  of  the  European  states. 
Secondly,  the  commercial  position  of  all  the  European 
powers  must  be  explicitly  defined  and  their  respective  rights 
carefully  and  fully  protected,  and  a  definite  understanding 
reached  concerning  the  new  methods  of  administering  jus- 
tice to  both  natives  and  foreign  residents,  and  of  affording 
protection  for  the  lives,  property,  and  financial  or  commer- 
cial interests  of  all  concerned.  And,  in  the  third  place,  if 
it  were  possible  to  reach  a  joint  agreement  to  all  these 
points,  France  would  then  be  willing  to  give  certain  economic 
guaranties  that  would  assure  the  powers  equal  commercial 
protection  in  the  Shareefian  realm,  and  to  consider  the 
question  of  territorial  "compensation."  But  the  French 
Government  let  it  be  understood  that,  in  case  they  did  de- 
cide to  make  a  gift  of  territory  to  Germany,  it  was  not  be- 
cause of  any  unusual  pressure  of  any  right,  —  recognized 
or  fancied,  —  but  simply  because  of  their  desire  to  be  con- 
ciliatory and  to  see  the  Moroccan  question  —  so  vital  to 
them  —  settled  once  and  for  all  time. 

On  this  basis  the  discussions  were  renewed  and  continued 
till  October  15,  when  it  was  announced  that  an  agreement 
had  been  reached  and  initialed  on  the  first  two  headings. 
The  diplomats  of  the  two  countries  entered  on  October  16 
upon  a  "  conversation  "  on  the  question  of  a  land  cession 


MOROCCO  273 

in  the  French  Congo.  Germany  began  by  asking  for  an 
extensive  area  of  some  16,000,000  hectares  of  land  lying 
south  and  east  of  the  Cameroons,  bordering  on  the  Ubangi 
and  Congo  Kivers  and  possessing  a  seaboard  outlet.  This 
would  have  given  the  Emperor  a  fine  piece  of  the  Congo 
country,  brought  him  to  the  banks  of  the  greatest  waterway 
of  Central  Africa,  and  put  him  in  close  touch  with  the 
great  Belgian  Congo  trade  —  a  long-cherished  ambition. 
Unfortunately  this  would  cut  in  two  the  French  Congo, 
isolating  the  northern  portion  and  making  a  great  break 
in  that  magnificent  stretch  of  French  territory  reaching 
from  the  Mediterranean  to  the  southwestern  coast,  of  which 
the  French  nation  is  justly  proud.  Then,  too,  this  region 
embraced  some  of  the  best-developed  sections  of  the  French 
Congo  where  some  fifteen  chartered  companies  had  invested 
over  $5,000,000,  of  which  the  Ngoko-Sanga  Development 
Company  is  the  chief,  and  were  taking  out  approximately 
$1,250,000  worth  of  rubber  yearly.  So  the  French  Govern- 
ment could  not  afford  to  make  so  large  a  concession,  par- 
ticularly as  that  portion  of  the  "  duck's  beak  "  of  the  Camer- 
oons, offered  by  Germany  in  exchange,  was  in  no  way  a 
counterpoise  to  this,  and  since  the  French  people  remained 
steadily  and  unanimously  opposed  to  any  vital  transfer  of 
land  in  their  Congo  possessions. 

In  the  course  of  several  conferences,  the  problem  was 
reduced  to  practically  these  limits :  Germany  needs  an  out- 
let on  the  Ubangi-Congo  waters ;  how  can  this  be  best 
accomplished  in  a  fair  and  equitable  manner  without  do- 
ing any  vital  injury  to  French  interests  ?  After  a  careful 
study  of  the  situation  and  an  extended  discussion  of  all  the 
points  at  issue,  the  representatives  of  the  two  Governments 
reached  a  satisfactory  agreement  which  was  made  public 
on  November  4,  1911.  This  Franco-German  treaty 1  con- 
1  French  Yellow  Book,  1912,  Affaires  du  Maroc,  vol.  vi,  pp.  622-35. 


274     INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

sisted  of  four  documents :  the  first  concerned  the  future 
status  of  Morocco ;  the  second  described  the  proposed  ter- 
ritorial adjustments  in  Equatorial  Africa;  the  third  in- 
cluded two  "  notes"  relating  to  the  delimitation  of  the  new 
frontier  and  the  terms  of  lease  of  certain  lands  to  France  in 
Equatorial  Africa ;  and  the  fourth  comprised  four  "  explan- 
atory letters"  exchanged  between  the  German  Foreign 
Secretary  and  the  French  Ambassador.  It  took  the  form 
of  an  expansion  of  the  earlier  agreement  of  1909  between 
the  two  signatory  powers.  By  the  first  part,  France  is 
to  enjoy  complete  freedom  of  action  in  the  introduction 
of  reforms  and  in  the  supervision  of  the  internal  affairs  of 
Morocco,  after  an  agreement  with  the  Shareefian  Govern- 
ment. She  shall  be  free  to  employ  her  police  or  military 
forces,  to  extend  her  control  or  define  her  authority  more 
clearly,  and  to  take  whatever  administrative  or  financial 
measures  are  necessary  for  the  establishment  of  good  gov- 
ernment, the  revival  of  national  credit,  and  the  develop- 
ment of  the  resources  and  trade  of  the  country.  The  con- 
duct of  the  foreign  affairs  of  the  Shareefian  Empire  is  to  be 
in  the  hands  of  the  French,  who  will  represent  the  Sultan 
in  his  dealings  with  foreign  powers,  and  look  after  the  in- 
terests of  his  subjects  abroad.  On  the  other  hand,  France 
gives  adequate  promises  concerning  protection  and  equal- 
ity of  treatment  in  the  trade  and  commerce  of  the  sultanate 
under  her  protection.  There  shall  be  no  differential  cus- 
toms, dues,  or  other  tariffs,  or  any  partiality  shown  in  the 
levying  of  mining  or  industrial  taxation.  The  construction 
and  management  of  the  new  railways  is  to  be  under  French 
control,  but  other  powers  are  to  participate  on  an  equitable 
basis  in  the  letting  of  the  contracts.  The  present  system  of 
consular  courts  is  to  be  abolished  as  soon  as  a  satisfactory 
judicial  system  can  be  worked  out;  but  in  the  meanwhile, 
a  provisional  plan  of  settling  all  civil  suits — particularly 


MOROCCO  275 

those  in  which  a  foreign  nation  is  a  party  —  by  arbitration 
under  French  supervision  has  been  adopted. 

In  the  second  portion,  or  territorial  treaty,  the  question 
of  land  cessions  was  restricted  entirely  to  the  Congo  coun- 
try. Here  the  French  agreed  to  transfer  to  Germany  a  por- 
tion of  the  French  Congo,  lying  directly  east  and  south  of 
the  Cameroons  and  consisting  of  some  107,000  square 
miles  of  territory  —  about  the  area  of  the  State  of  Nevada 
—  with  a  population  of  1,000,000.  The  value  of  the  dis- 
trict is  unknown  and  the  greater  part  of  it  is  still  unoccu- 
pied by  Europeans  and  undeveloped.  It  varies  in  character 
from  unhealthy  swamps  and  arid  plateaus  to  promising  hill 
country  and  extensive  rubber  forests,  in  which  the  Com- 
pagnie  Coloniale  du  Congo  Francais  and  the  Uame  Nana 
Compagnie  have  monopolies  guaranteed  until  1930.  The 
new  line  of  the  Cameroons  is  to  run  from  Massoti  on  Co- 
risco  Bay  eastward  to  Wesso  on  the  Sanga  River,  where, 
leaving  Wesso  to  France,  it  turns  south  as  far  as  the  junc- 
tion of  the  Sanga  and  Congo  Rivers.  Then  it  proceeds  di- 
rectly north  to  Bera  Ndjoko  and  thence  along  the  Lubai  to 
Mongumbo  on  the  Ubangi  River.  After  following  this 
stream  for  a  few  kilometers  —  the  German  rights  both 
here  and  on  the  Congo  being  limited  to  between  six  and 
twelve  kilometers  —  the  boundary  turns  northwest  and 
proceeds  till  it  strikes  the  Logone"  River,  along  whose  banks 
it  goes  northward  until  the  junction  with  the  Shari  is 
reached.  The  small  region,  with  an  area  of  6450  square 
miles,  lying  between  the  Shari  and  the  Logone*  Rivers  and 
lat.  10°  N.,  is  transferred  to  France.  The  Republic  is  to 
secure  a  trade  route  from  her  Shari  River  lands  to  north- 
ern Nigeria  by  way  of  the  Benue"  River,  which  will  be  a 
great  commercial  advantage  in  the  development  of  the 
Upper  Congo  and  Lake  Chad  trade.  Each  state  is  to  have 
the  right  to  free  passage  across  the  territory  of  the  other, 


276    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

and  to  construct  railways  and  telegraph  lines  across,  if 
necessary  to  maintain  direct  communication ;  but  the  French 
are  to  retain  control  of  the  whole  telegraph  line  along  the 
Ubangi. 

One  of  the  most  interesting  of  these  agreements  was  the 
decision  to  submit  to  arbitration  all  disagreements  that  may 
arise  in  the  future  working  out  of  the  various  articles  of 
these  treaties.  This  last  point  was  carefully  elaborated  in 
one  of  the  "  explanatory  letters  "  annexed  to  the  main  arti- 
cles of  the  treaty.  In  the  other  letter,  Germany  urges  that 
the  Tangier-Fez  Railway  be  constructed  before  any  of  the 
other  projected  lines,  and  demands  that  she  be  assigned  a 
fixed  share  in  the  construction,  which  should  include  the 
connecting  of  the  mining  regions  with  the  main  line  as  far 
as  possible. 

The  arrangements  outlined  above  will  not  have  any  seri- 
ous effect  upon  the  French  position  on  the  Congo,  so  long 
as  the  Ubangi-Congo  waters  remain  an  international  stream 
open  freely  to  the  trade  of  the  world.  Germany  will,  doubt- 
less, on  the  other  hand,  be  greatly  benefited  in  time  by 
access  to  the  Congo  and  the  Ubangi,  and  by  the  establish- 
ment in  this  way  of  a  direct  connection  between  the  Camer- 
oons  and  the  great  Congo  Basin.  In  addition,  she  will  be 
afforded  an  outlet  for  the  produce  and  commerce  of  the 
eastern  Cameroons,  which  will  prove  in  all  probability 
cheaper  and  more  expeditious  than  any  route  to  the  coast 
they  now  possess.  The  general  outcome  of  the  long  months 
of  diplomatic  maneuvers  and  discussions  by  France  and 
Germany  was,  therefore,  the  creation  of  a  French  protec- 
torate over  Morocco  and  the  substantial  expansion  of  the 
German  Cameroons  with  outlets  on  the  Ubangi  and  Congo 
waters  and  on  the  seacoast.  These  agreements  could  not  go 
into  effect,  however,  until  they  had  been  approved  by  the 
French  Senate  and  Chamber  of  Deputies,  and  by  the  Ger- 


MOROCCO  277 

man  Bundesrath,  all  of  whom  must  be  consulted  when  ces- 
sions of  territory  are  under  consideration. 

The  reception  of  Herr  von  Bethmann-Hollweg's  explana- 
tion of  the  German  "  case  "  by  the  Reichstag  on  November 
9,  1911,  was  chilly  in  the  extreme.  No  government  action 
in  recent  years  had  been  received  by  the  popular  assembly 
with  such  a  lack  of  enthusiasm.  This  was  due,  not  so  much 
to  any  deep-seated  opposition  to  the  treaties  per  se,  as  to 
the  desire  of  many  representatives  to  make  political  capital 
of  them  in  the  approaching  elections,  and  to  the  feeling  — 
particularly  among  the  ranks  of  the  opposition  —  that  the 
Government  had  allowed  itself  to  be  browbeaten  by  Eng- 
land. The  resignation  at  this  time  of  Herr  von  Lindequist, 
Imperial  Colonial  Secretary,  and  of  Herr  von  Dankelmann, 
chief  of  the  Colonial  Office,  due  very  largely  to  the  fact 
that  these  officials  declined  to  assume  the  responsibility  for 
the  agreements  and  to  explain  them  to  the  Reichstag, 
caused  considerable  comment  and  complicated  matters 
somewhat.  The  onerous  duty  of  defending  the  Moroccan 
policy  of  the  German  Government  fell  entirely  upon  the 
shoulders  of  the  Chancellor,  Herr  von  Bethmann-Hollweg, 
and  the  Secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs,  Herr  von  Kiderlen- 
Waechter.  The  efforts  of  these  statesmen,  however,  were 
successful,  the  treaties  being  speedily  approved  by  the 
Bundesrath,  upon  the  favorable  report  of  the  Committee 
on  Foreign  Affairs. 

In  France,  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  took  up  the  matter 
promptly ;  and,  after  the  Foreign  Affairs  Committee  had 
expressed  its  opinion  and  a  spirited  debate  lasting  three 
weeks  had  ensued,  approved  the  treaties  by  a  vote  of  393 
to  36  on  December  20.1  Some  150  delegates  from  the  east- 
ern provinces  refrained  from  voting  out  of  sympathy  with 
Alsace-Lorraine ;  and  a  large  portion  of  those  who  cast 

1  London  Times,  December  21, 1911. 


278    INTERVENTION  AND   COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

their  ballots  for  the  agreements  did  so  with  "  la  mort  dans 
1'ame  "  —  so  strong  is  the  feeling  in  France  against  the 
cession  of  any  territory,  once  French  soil,  to  foreign  na- 
tions, and  particularly  to  Germany.  The  Senate  then  began 
its  consideration  of  the  proposition ;  and,  on  December  20, 
appointed  a  committee  of  twenty l  able  and  experienced 
statesmen  —  including  such  well-known  and  skillful  diplo- 
mats as  MM.  Pichon,  Clemenceau,  Poincare*,  and  Bourgeois 
—  to  investigate  thoroughly  the  whole  affair  from  its  incep- 
tion. In  the  course  of  the  proceedings  of  this  committee,  it 
came  out  that,  while  the  French  Foreign  Office  was  regu- 
larly engaged  in  the  discussion  of  the  Moroccan  question 
with  Germany,  private  negotiations  were  carried  on  by  a 
member  or  members  of  the  French  Government  with  influ- 
ential persons  in  the  German  service,  in  such  a  way  as  to 
convey  to  the  German  authorities  the  impression  that 
France  was  ready  and  willing  to  make  "  compensations  " 
to  Germany.  On  January  9, 1912,  when  forced  to  the  wall 
in  the  committee,  M.  de  Selves,  French  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  refused  to  deny  these  allegations.  The  following 
day  he  resigned  his  portfolio ;  and,  after  trying  vainly  for 
two  days  to  reconstruct  his  cabinet,  M.  Caillaur —  the 
Prime  Minister — was  compelled  to  withdraw  from  office. 
M.  Raymond  Poincare",  a  man  of  splendid  abilities  who  en- 
joyed the  respect  and  confidence  of  all  parties,  was  ap- 
pointed Premier  on  January  13  and  formed  the  strongest 
and  most  capable  cabinet  that  France  has  had  for  some 
years.  On  January  24,  the  committee  brought  in  a  favor- 
able report ;  and,  after  an  extended  and  lively  debate,  the 
Senate  showed  its  confidence  in  M.  Poincare'  by  approving 
the  treaties,  on  February  10,  by  212  votes  to  42.2  Thus 
was  closed  one  of  the  most  remarkable  diplomatic  episodes 
of  recent  times. 
1  London  Times,  December  25  and  27,  1911.  2  Ibid.,  February  12,  1912. 


MOROCCO  279 

The  attitude  of  the  German  press  and  of  many  of  her 
prominent  men,  during  the  extended  negotiations  resulting 
from  the  Agadir  incident,  is  not  above  criticism.  Bitter 
attacks  on  Great  Britain  were  indulged  in,  for  reasons 
wholly  without  adequate  foundation.  Threats  of  war  were 
current  and  a  great  deal  of  unnecessary  bluster  was  re- 
sorted to,  with  the  hope  of  intimidating  France  or  England. 
And,  during  a  great  part  of  the  period,  the  German  Gov- 
ernment had  to  conduct  the  negotiations  without  the  aid 
of  any  sustained  or  widespread  popular  support  or  sympa- 
thy. Under  all  the  circumstances,  it  is  undeniable  that 
considerable  credit  must  be  given  to  the  imperial  officials 
that  their  country  issued  from  the  controversy  with  dig- 
nity and  with  some  substantial  reward  for  their  efforts.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  French  conducted  themselves  well,  dis- 
playing a  most  commendable  spirit  of  conciliation,  mingled 
with  dignity  and  poise.  There  was  no  commotion,  no  waste 
of  energy,  no  frantic  scrambling  for  rights  and  privileges. 
The  work  of  her  statesmen  and  diplomats  —  particularly 
of  M.  Jules  Cambon  —  is  deserving  of  high  praise  ;  while 
the  Government  and  people  stood  together  in  mutual  con- 
fidence and  serenity  of  purpose — more  united  than  at  any 
other  period  in  recent  years.  "  The  mingled  dignity  and 
conciliatoriness  with  which  the  French  Government  and  the 
great  mass  of  the  French  opinion  have  treated  these  serious 
and  difficult  negotiations  throughout,"  said  the  London 
Times  editorially  on  September  12,  1911,  "  have  done  not 
a  little  to  confirm  the  credit  which  their  country  has  ac- 
quired in  Europe  by  the  conduct  of  former  discussions." 
France  has  thus  placed  herself  in  the  forefront  of  the  re- 
markable movement  for  universal  peace,  which  has  assumed 
such  significant  proportions  during  the  past  quarter  of  a 
century.  She  has  demonstrated  how  it  is  possible,  in  the 
face  of  threats  of  war  and  of  the  most  intricate  and  delicate 


280    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

of  situations  and  at  a  time  of  great  national  crisis  and  ex- 
citement, to  hold  successfully  in  check  two  heated  nations 
and  to  carry  through  to  an  ultimate  and  reasonable  con- 
clusion political  and  commercial  negotiations  of  the  highest 
importance,  not  only  to  her  neighbor  and  herself,  but  to 
Europe  as  well.  And  she  has  thus  given  to  the  world  a 
splendid  example  of  the  higher  and  newer  type  of  twen- 
tieth-century diplomacy  —  the  diplomacy  of  the  New  Inter- 
nationalism. 

Nothing  remained,  after  the  ratifications  of  the  treaties 
had  been  exchanged  on  March  12,  1912,  to  insure  the  val- 
idity of  the  agreements,  but  to  secure  the  approval  of  the 
states  which  had  signed  the  Algeciras  treaty,  the  coopera- 
tion of  Spain,  and  the  consent  of  the  Shareefian  Govern- 
ment. The  first  of  these  acts  was  speedily  effected ;  but  the 
last  two  were  consummated  only  at  the  expense  of  con- 
siderable time,  patience,  and  tact.  The  special  interests 
and  rights  of  Spain  in  Morocco  1  had  been  recognized  and 
protected  by  France  in  treaties  with  Spain  in  1902, 1904, 
1905,  and  in  1906,  and  France  had  kept  her  ally  in- 
formed of  the  progress  of  the  late  negotiations  with  Ger- 
many. At  length,  after  a  detailed  conference  with  England 
during  most  of  November  upon  the  future  status  of  Tangier 
and  the  precise  lines  of  delimitation  for  the  French  and 
Spanish  territorial  claims  in  Morocco,  the  French  engaged 
the  Spanish  authorities,  on  December  7,  in  a  series  of  con- 
fidential negotiations  on  the  question,  at  which  the  British 
Minister  to  Spain  was  present.  A  great  many  intricate 
and  delicate  problems  were  involved ;  but  they  were  cen- 
tered about  three  main  issues:  the  nature  and  extent  of 

1  Spain  had  marked  out  three  zones  in  northern  Morocco  —  the  Riff  and  its 
Hinterland  -with  headquarters  at  Melilla,  the  district  of  Tetuan  with  the 
harbor  of  Ceuta,  and  the  Spanish  Gharb  -with  the  city  of  Alcazar  and  port 
of  Larache ;  and  she  had  spent  approximately  $40,000,000  since  1900  to 
secure  these  holdings. 


MOROCCO  281 

the  Sultan's  control  over  the  Spanish  sphere  of  the  em- 
pire ;  the  construction  and  control  of  the  proposed  railway 
from  Tangier  to  Fez  (part  of  which  would  have  to  pass 
through  the  Spanish  zone)  ;  and  the  collection  of  customs 
and  control  of  the  public  debt  belonging  to  that  portion 
of  the  Sultan's  dominions  under  Spanish  protection.  The 
"  conversations  "  were  prolonged  to  an  unexpected  and  ex- 
traordinary degree,  owing  to  the  varied  character  of  the 
questions  at  issue  and  peculiar  difficulties  that  arose  in  the 
path  of  the  negotiators  ;  and  the  definite  agreements  were 
not  reached  until  October  25,  1912.1  In  these,  it  was  pro- 
vided that  Spain,  while  retaining  the  control  of  the  cus- 
toms within  its  zone,  should  pay  an  annual  sum  approxi- 
mating $100,000  toward  the  interest  and  amortization 
of  the  Moroccan  debt ;  that  the  boundary  question  should 
be  settled  by  certain  minor  transfers  of  land  —  for  a  por- 
tion of  the  Riff  country,  Spain  being  given  a  good-sized 
piece  of  territory  adjoining  her  colony  of  Rio  de  Oro  on 
the  north  —  and  by  a  commission  of  delimitation  to  mark 
the  precise  frontiers ;  that  the  international  position  of 
Tangier  should  be  settled  by  a  special  commission ;  that 
the  Spanish  zone  should  be  administered  by  a  Spanish 
High  Commission,  assisted  by  a  Khalifa  Resident  at  Tetuan 
and  appointed  by  the  Sultan  from  two  persons  nominated 
by  Spain ;  and  that  the  Tangier-Fez  Railway  should  be 
built  by  a  single  company,  of  whose  capital  stock  the 
French  shall  have  fifty-six  per  cent,  the  Spanish  thirty-six 
per  cent,  and  other  countries,  if  they  desire,  eight  per  cent.2 
The  attainment  of  this  happy  solution  was  received  with 
great  satisfaction  by  the  leading  statesmen  and  people  of 

1  Signed  at  Madrid  on  November  27  and  approved  by  the  Spanish  Cortes 
on  December  17,  by  216  votes  to  22.    London  Times,  November  28  and 
December  18. 

2  London  Times  for  November  27  and  30, 1912.  It  consists  of  twenty-nine 
articles  and  a  protocol  on  the  Tangier-Fez  Railway. 


282    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

the  two  interested  nations,  and  with  considerable  relief 
by  the  European  states,  some  of  whom  had  feared  an  open 
rupture  more  than  once  during  the  negotiations.  The  credit 
for  their  successful  termination  is  due  to  the  tact  and 
breadth  of  view  displayed  by  M.  Geoffray,  the  French 
Minister  to  Spain,  and  to  the  sincerity  and  conciliatoriness 
of  Senor  Canalejas,  the  Spanish  Premier.1 

Meanwhile,  the  French  were  taking  active  steps  to  set 
up  a  protectorate  over  Morocco.  On  November  9,  1911, 
Mulai-el-Hafid  was  induced  to  give  his  consent  to  the 
Franco-German  treaty  of  November  4 ;  and  on  January  18, 
1912,  a  committee  with  M.  Regnault  as  chairman  was  ap- 
pointed to  investigate  the  question,  and  to  draw  up  a  plan 
for  the  organization  of  stable  government  in  the  Shareefian 
Empire.  This  committee  made  its  report  on  January  28, 
urging  that  a  French  Resident-General  be  appointed  and 
that  a  pacific  and  temporary  military  occupation  of  Morocco 
be  undertaken  at  once.  And  it  recommended  the  use  of  the 
local  Shareefian  administrative  system  and  officials  wher- 
ever possible,  with  the  remark  that  the  French  Resident- 
General  and  counselors  will  give  the  necessary  "  impulse 
and  direction  to  the  services  of  justice,  finance,  public 
works,  and  domestic  administration." 

M.  Regnault,  French  Minister  at  Tangier,  who  was  well 
qualified  by  training  and  experience  for  the  mission,  was 
appointed  at  the  head  of  a  special  commission  to  visit 
Mulai-el-Hafid  at  Fez  and  secure  his  consent  to  the  estab- 
lishment of  the  proposed  protectorate.  M.  Regnault  left 
Paris  on  March  1,  reached  Fez  on  March  24,  and  obtained 
the  signature  of  the  Sultan  to  the  protectorate  treaty  on 
March  30,  1912.  Unfortunately  his  visit  was  marred  by  the 

1  It  was  most  fortunate  that  Sefior  Canalejaa  lived  until  the  terms  of 
this  treaty  were  completed.  He  was  assassinated  by  a  fanatical  Socialist  on 
November  19, 1912,  while  the  agreement  was  concluded  on  October  25. 


MOROCCO  283 

insistent  demands  of  Hafid  to  be  permitted  to  resign,  and 
the  serious  mutiny  of  the  Shareefian  troops,  which  broke 
out  in  Fez  on  April  17,  but  was  easily  put  down  by  Gen- 
eral Moinier  in  three  days'  time.  Early  in  May,  General 
Lyautey  was  appointed  Resident-General  with  the  approval 
of  the  Sultan,  who  telegraphed  his  satisfaction  and  promises 
of  cooperation  on  May  2  ;  but  the  general  did  not  reach  the 
capital  of  Morocco  till  the  24th.  Two  days  later  a  serious 
rising  of  the  tribes  occurred,  Fez  being  immediately  at- 
tacked and  besieged  until  June  5,  when  it  was  successfully 
relieved  by  French  forces.  A  widespread  opposition  to 
French  rule  manifested  itself  throughout  the  country,  which 
was  fomented  and  strengthened  by  the  efforts  of  two  pre- 
tenders to  the  throne.  For  four  months  the  situation  was 
uncertain  and  exceedingly  precarious.  But  the  French  acted 
promptly  and  had  no  difficulty  in  disposing  of  El  Roghi, 
the  pretender  of  the  North,  and  in  driving  Sidi  Mohammed 
Hiba  of  Tiznit  in  Sus,  who  had  entered  Marrakesh  on  Au- 
gust 18,  back  into  the  desert.  General  Lyautey,  by  firm- 
ness and  conciliation,  won  the  respect  and  confidence  of  all 
the  chiefs  and  leaders  with  whom  he  came  in  contact,  and 
restored  peace  and  order  within  a  comparatively  short  time. 
Meanwhile,  Mulai-el-Hafid,  as  soon  as  the  siege  of  the 
capital  had  been  raised,  left  Fez  under  guard  of  several 
regiments,  and  reached  Rabat  on  June  13.  His  younger 
brother  —  Mulai  Yusef —  was  left  as  Viceroy  at  Fez.  After 
consideration,  it  was  decided  to  carry  out  an  agreement, 
made  the  previous  October  with  the  Sultan,  at  his  special 
request,  that  he  be  permitted  to  resign  when  a  French  pro- 
tectorate was  set  up.  It  was  a  necessary  accompaniment  of 
the  establishment  of  French  control  in  the  country,  because 
of  the  personal  unpopularity,  instability,  and  viciousness 
of  the  Shareefian  ruler,  and  on  account  of  the  fact  that  he 
had  secured  the  throne  as  the  proclaimed  leader  of  the  anti- 


284    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

foreign  party.  Accordingly,  Mulai-el-Hafid  abdicated  on 
August  11,  being  promised  the  sum  of  $80,000  down  and 
an  annual  income  of  $70,000 ;  and  on  August  13,  his  brother 
Yusef,  who  is  described  as  a  man  of  moderation  and  piety, 
enjoying  considerable  prestige  in  the  Mohammedan  world, 
was  proclaimed  Sultan,  after  being  elected  by  the  Ulemas 
in  accordance  with  the  customs  of  the  country. 

The  French  Chamber  approved  the  protectorate  treaty 
on  July  1,  by  a  vote  of  360  to  79.  On  July  19,  the  Berne 
Conference  between  France  and  Germany  to  arrange  for 
the  transfer  of  the  Congo  lands  and  the  delimitation  of  the 
new  boundaries,  finished  its  sittings ;  and  a  definite  agree- 
ment, fixing  the  precise  boundaries  of  the  German  and 
French  possessions  in  Southwest  Africa,  was  signed  by  their 
respective  representatives  in  Paris  on  September  28, 1912. 
Thus  the  terms  of  the  treaties  of  November  4,  1911,  were 
worked  out  to  the  satisfaction,  and  to  the  promotion  of  the 
interests,  of  all  the  parties  concerned. 

The  protectorate  treaty1  shows  clearly  the  nature  and 
the  extent  of  the  future  French  control  in  Morocco.  A  new 
regime  is  to  be  instituted,  "  admitting  of  administrative, 
judicial,  educational,  economic,  financial,  and  military  re- 
forms," through  the  assistance  of  the  French  and  by  means 
of  a  reorganized  Shareefian  Government.  The  exercise  of 
the  Mohammedan  religion  and  the  preservation  of  the  re- 
ligious institutions,  together  with  the  traditional  position 
and  prestige  of  the  Sultan,  are  guaranteed.  The  French 
Government  is  pledged,  moreover,  to  protect  the  person  and 
throne  of  His  Shareefian  Majesty.  To  insure  this  end,  and 
to  provide  for  the  maintenance  of  good  order  and  public 
security  throughout  the  country,  until  the  new  regime  shall 
be  in  full  running  order,  France,  after  consultation  with 
the  Sultan,  was  to  undertake  such  military  occupation  and 

1  Supplement  to  Amer.  Jour,  of  Internal.  Law,  July,  1912,  pp.  207-09. 


MOROCCO  285 

police  supervision  as  should  be  deemed  necessary.  This 
the  French  proceeded  to  do  at  once,  raising  their  forces  in 
Morocco  to  32,000  during  the  summer,  and  setting  up  a 
military  regime  throughout  the  country  on  the  basis  of  a 
plan  prepared  by  General  Lyautey  before  he  left  Paris. 
Morocco  was  divided  into  five  military  districts,  —  Fez, 
Meknes,  Rabat,  the  Chaouia,  and  Marrakesh,  —  over  each 
of  which  was  placed  a  superior  officer  and  staff  with  the 
power  of  enforcing  order,  maintaining  intelligence  offices, 
and  controlling  posts,  circles,  and  stations.  The  work  of 
reorganization  is  proceeding  slowly  but  surely,  the  French 
not  attempting  any  general  subjugation  of  the  whole  coun- 
try, but  remaining  content  with  keeping  the  main  trade 
routes  open  and  maintaining  order.  The  military  and  police 
forces  of  the  Sultan  are  being  reorganized  on  the  French 
model,  with  the  object  of  utilizing  as  many  of  the  natives 
as  possible  in  this  branch  of  the  public  service,  where  they 
can  rise  to  the  rank  of  lieutenant  —  it  not  being  considered 
safe  or  wise  to  admit  them  to  the  higher  positions  at  present. 
While  the  promulgation  of  all  decrees  and  the  new  re- 
form measures  must  be  done  in  the  name  of  the  Sultan  and 
with  his  consent,  it  is  evident  that  the  real  ruler  is  to  be 
the  French  Resident-  or  Commissioner-General  to  whom  is 
entrusted  the  power  of  approving  all  decrees  of  the  Gov- 
ernment, of  acting  as  an  intermediary  between  the  Sultan 
and  all  foreign  powers,  and  of  handling  all  "  matters  relat- 
ing to  foreigners  in  the  Shareefian  Empire."  He  is  of  neces- 
sity a  military  officer ;  and  it  is  the  intention  of  the  French 
that,  owing  to  the  critical  state  of  affairs  prevalent  through- 
out the  land  and  the  pressing  need  of  a  firm  but  judicious 
hand  at  the  helm,  Morocco  should  remain  for  a  time  under 
military  rule.  But,  no  doubt,  this  will  be  replaced,  as  soon 
as  it  is  practicable  and  advisable,  by  a  well-organized  civil 
administration  —  as  was  done  in  Tunis.  In  any  case,  it  is 


286    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

expected  that  the  little  "  Kingdom  of  the  West "  will  here- 
after constitute  a  part  of  French  territory  —  an  adjunct  of 
the  Republic  preserving  its  own  integrity  and  institutions 
and  a  fair  amount  of  local  autonomy.  The  diplomatic  and 
consular  agents  of  France  will  undertake  the  protection  of 
Moroccan  subjects  and  the  representation  of  their  interests 
abroad ;  and  the  Sultan  can  conclude  no  international  act, 
or  make  any  public  or  private  loan,  or  concession,  without 
the  approval  of  France.  The  French  Government  is  irrevo- 
cably committed,  by  their  treaties  and  their  promises  to  the 
Moroccan  Government,  and  by  the  public  assurances  of  their 
leading  officials,  to  a  policy  of  justice  and  equity  and  polit- 
ical integrity.  They  have  agreed  to  stop  all  reported  abuses 
in  connection  with  the  sale  and  occupation  of  land  by  for- 
eigners in  Morocco,  to  protect  the  rights  and  customs  of 
the  natives,  to  encourage  the  loyal  cooperation  of  the  Mo- 
roccan people  by  every  legitimate  means,  and  to  employ 
their  chiefs  and  leaders  as  far  as  possible  in  the  adminis- 
tration of  local  affairs.  "  France  must  make  herself  loved 
as  well  as  respected,"  said  M.  Poincare  in  his  explanatory 
speech  in  support  of  the  protectorate  treaty  on  July  1, 
1912.  General  Lyautey,  the  first  Resident-General,  is  an 
administrator  of  ability,  accustomed  to  handling  men  and 
thoroughly  conversant  with  the  conditions  and  needs  of 
the  country ;  and  in  the  first  eighteen  months  of  his  incum- 
bency,1 he  has  been  remarkably  successful  in  restoring 
peace  and  order,  and  in  winning  the  respect  and  confidence 
of  all  with  whom  he  has  come  in  contact.  The  work  entailed 
in  introducing  the  new  administration  is  enormous  and  the 
difficulties  numerous.  Everything  in  the  country  had  to 
be  reorganized ;  but  the  highest  authorities  in  France  on 
finance,  land  tenure,  Mohammedan  law,  education,  and 

1  Summary  of  his  work  piven  in  the  London  Times  for  Novemher  9  and 
December  6,  1912 ;  and  subsequent  reports  at  intervals  since  that  time. 


MOROCCO  287 

politics  had  been  busy  for  months  preparing  the  way  and 
working  out  plans  for  the  regeneration  of  this  country, 
which  the  French  officials  are  now  following  with  the 
assistance  and  cooperation  of  the  natives. 

In  spite  of  the  permission  given  France  and  Spain  at  the 
Algeciras  Conference,  they  had  been  unable  to  introduce 
any  permanent  order  or  system  of  policing  in  the  country 
outside  of  such  districts  as  Chaouia,  Oudjda,  and  Melilla, 
where  it  was  necessary  to  set  up  a  temporary  military  oc- 
cupation. Here  a  fairly  satisfactory  and  efficient  system  of 
rule  has  been  established.  In  other  portions  where  the 
French  had  attempted  to  interfere,  —  such  as  the  regions 
of  Fez,  Tangier,  and  the  Gharb,  —  serious  mistakes  had 
been  made,  the  effects  of  which  it  will  take  considerable 
time  to  eradicate  from  the  popular  mind.  General  Lyautey 
has  already  removed  the  worst  abuses  and  modified  the 
existing  conditions  in  northern  Morocco ;  and  he  has  reor- 
ganized the  government  of  Marrakesh  and  the  southern 
portion  promptly  and  effectively,  appointing  to  all  the  im- 
portant posts  the  most  trustworthy  and  capable  chieftains 
of  the  region.  Thus  a  good  beginning  has  been  made  in  the 
work  of  reform  and  reorganization ;  but  the  task  of  estab- 
lishing French  control  over  the  whole  Shareefian  Empire 
is  a  most  difficult  and  delicate  affair,  requiring  great  pa- 
tience, careful  planning,  and  a  rare  combination  of  dip- 
lomatic tact  and  administrative  skill.  It  must  be  accom- 
panied by  the  immediate  construction  of  certain  important 
public  works,  such  as  railways  from  Tangier  to  Fez  and 
from  Casa  Blanca  to  Marrakesh  (together  with  a  harbor  at 
Casa  Blanca),  good  roads  throughout  the  country,  public 
schools,  hospitals,  post-offices,  irrigation  systems,  and  other 
agencies  of  civilization  and  self-help.  And  General  Lyau- 
tey's  request  for  a  loan  of  $60,000,000,  with  which  to  effect 
this  very  work,  has  been  recently  granted. 


5288    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

To  win  over  a  stubborn,  superstitious,  and  ignorant  popu- 
lation to  the  acceptance  of  a  form  of  government  they  dis- 
like, the  presence  of  foreigners  they  distrust  and  detest, 
and  of  customs  and  methods  which  they  do  not  understand, 
is  an  exceedingly  delicate  and  arduous  task.  As  one  of  the 
Moorish  statesmen  said :  "  This  country  is  not  like  the 
land  of  the  Nazarenes  and  cannot  be  made  like  it  in 
haste."  The  "  blind  prejudices  of  ignorance  and  supersti- 
tion "  are  still  holding  the  land  in  their  clutches  and  imped- 
ing its  development  at  every  step.  The  French,  therefore, 
must  go  slowly  and  seek  earnestly  to  win  the  confidence  of 
Mulai  Yusef  and  his  people.  They  must  prove  to  the  in- 
habitants that  they  are  not  coming  to  take  their  land  and 
property  away,  but  that  they  are  honestly  desirous  of  assist- 
ing in  the  material  development  of  the  country  and  in  pro- 
curing for  the  citizens  the  protection  for  life  and  property 
so  sorely  needed.  It  must  be  "  Morocco  for  the  Moroccans  " 
as  far  as  possible ;  and  the  bitter  and  unreasoning  hatred 
of  foreigners  and  foreign  ideas  must  be  surmounted  by 
fair  treatment,  an  honest  and  straightforward  diplomacy, 
and  a  friendly,  unselfish  spirit.  Europeans  should  be  al- 
lowed to  penetrate  only  gradually  into  the  interior  under 
careful  governmental  supervision,  and  no  colonization  by 
French  or  Spaniards  should  be  permitted  for  some  time  to 
come.  No  interference  with  the  religious  or  private  life  of 
the  people  should  be  attempted,  and  native  institutions, 
customs,  and  methods  ought  to  be  utilized  and  developed 
wherever  possible.  When  necessary,  force  may  be  employed 
with  discretion ;  but  it  must  always  be  used  with  a  firm 
and  just  hand  through  the  recognized  government.  The 
people  should  be  made  to  feel  that  it  is  the  Prince  of  the 
Faithful  who  compels  his  subjects  to  accept  the  inevitable, 
and  not  the  foreigner.  In  ten  or  fifteen  years'  time,  with 
patience  and  forbearance,  the  French  will  be  ruling  a  new 


MOROCCO  289 

and  reorganized  Morocco;  but  it  will  be  under  a  veiled 
suzerainty,  as  she  is  now  managing  Tunis,  or  as  Great 
Britain  controls  Egypt.  And  the  Moorish  proverb,  "  He 
who  stands  long  enough  at  the  door  is  sure  to  enter  at  last," 
will  once  more  have  been  fulfilled. 


CHAPTER  XII 

THE  REOCCUPATION  OF  NORTHERN  AFRICA 
TEIPOLITANIA 

TRIPOLITANIA,  the  chief  gateway  to  the  Sahara,  has 
been  the  last  province  of  the  North  African  littoral  to  be 
taken  under  the  control  of  the  European  powers.  It  is  large 
in  area,  but  small  in  natural  resources.  While  it  contains 
some  406,000  square  miles  of  territory,  or  about  the  same 
as  Egypt  (leaving  out  the  Sudan),  its  population  hardly 
exceeds  525,000  souls,  and  neither  of  its  two  chief  cities  — 
Tripoli  and  Ben  Ghasi  —  has  over  35,000  inhabitants. 
There  are  few  fertile  agricultural  districts,  like  the  Djebel 
Gharian,  which  furnishes  the  grain  and  other  produce  for 
most  of  the  cities  and  towns.  The  desert  approaches  too 
near  the  sea  to  permit  of  much  cultivation,  and  there  are 
no  rivers  like  the  Nile  to  furnish  water  for  irrigation.  The 
Atlas  range  does  not  run  far  enough  to  the  east  to  afford 
Tripoli  any  protection  from  the  winds  and  heat  of  the 
Sahara;  and  what  few  mountains  and  hills  the  country 
possesses,  outside  of  the  Barca  district,  are  so  insignificant 
and  so  scattered  that  they  are  of  little  value  as  bulwarks 
against  the  ever-encroaching  desert.  The  chief  exports  of 
the  region  are  ostrich  feathers,  ivory,  oil,  and  esparto  grass, 
the  two  former  of  which  have  been  brought  from  Lake 
Chad  and  Central  Africa  for  years  over  the  famous  cara- 
van route  via  Murzuk,  Ghat,  and  Ghadames.  Since  the 
occupation  of  the  Niger  country  and  the  Sudan  by  the 
British  and  French  and  the  opening  of  direct  connection 
by  rail  and  water  between  the  West  Coast  and  Central 


TK  I    POM   TAXI  A 


ItalTan    possessions .  ....       Undefined  boundary 

DonmitaU    boundary     between  TrlpolTtanl.  and  ttie  British  sphere  of  Influence 
"    *'    Drench      "       «•         •• 


292    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

Africa,  the  greater  part  of  this  trade  is  going  to  Europe 
via  the  Niger  and  Senegal  Rivers.  Thus  the  dangers  and 
delays  of  a  thousand-mile  caravan  route  are  avoided ;  but 
the  traders  and  merchants  of  Tripoli  are  being  compelled 
to  procure  their  goods  more  and  more  from  the  distant 
eastern  oases  of  Tibesti,  Borku,  and  Kanem  in  the  Wadai 
country,  under  French  control. 

In  1714,  the  Arabs  of  Tripolitania,  which,  with  the  rest 
of  northern  Africa,  had  fallen  under  the  domination  of  the 
Ottoman  Empire  during  the  fifteenth  and  sixteenth  cen- 
turies, secured  their  independence  and  maintained  it  suc- 
cessfully for  over  a  hundred  years.  In  1835,  the  Turks 
seized  the  port  of  Tripoli  and  put  an  end  to  the  Arab 
regime,  but  it  took  thirty-five  years  before  they  were  able 
to  extend  their  administration  over  the  entire  province. 
Since  then,  what  had  they  done  to  promote  the  welfare  of 
the  country  ?  Very  little.  In  the  past  thirty  years,  remark- 
able progress  had  been  made  in  Egypt,  in  Algiers,  and  in 
Tunis,  by  Great  Britain  and  France,  in  the  establishment 
of  efficient  governments,  in  the  development  of  natural  re- 
sources and  commerce,  in  the  construction  of  public  edifices 
and  improvements,  and  in  the  promotion  of  the  public 
health  and  welfare.  But  Tripoli  was  still  marking  time. 
Her  trade  had  remained  stationary  during  the  same  period 
at  the  nominal  annual  figure  of  $3,850,000.  The  Turks 
spent  comparatively  little  on  the  country  and  reaped  an  in- 
significant profit  from  their  investment,  the  annual  income 
from  taxes  and  internal  revenue  dues  never  exceeding  the 
sum  of  $540,000,  out  of  which  all  the  expenses  of  the  pro- 
vincial government  and  military  protection  had  to  be  paid. 

The  governors  were  most  invariably  easy-going,  unpro- 
gressive,  and  incompetent.  During  the  administration  of 
Marshal  Redjet  Pasha,  Minister  of  War  under  the  Young 
Turk  regime  from  1898  to  1908,  some  progress  was  made. 


TRIPOLITANIA  293 

But,  with  the  exception  of  sanitary  reforms  in  the  seaports 
and  improvements  in  the  methods  of  taxation,  his  efforts 
were  mainly  directed  to  the  reorganization  of  the  military 
forces.  Being  suspicious  of  the  growing  interests  of  Italy 
in  Tripoli,  he  increased  the  Turkish  garrison  to  some 
20,000  men,  constructed  forts  at  Ghadames,  Ghat,  and 
Murzuk,  and  attempted  to  raise  some  12,000  native  troops 
by  compulsory  military  service.  But  in  spite  of  all  these 
efforts,  the  Turkish  military  contingent  never  passed  be- 
yond the  stage  of  service  represented  by  the  protection  of 
caravans  and  the  collection  of  tribute.  This  policy  was 
continued  by  Ibrahim  Pasha,  who  ruled  the  country  two 
years  from  the  middle  of  1910,  and  who  substituted  enlist- 
ment by  lot  for  compulsory  military  service.  In  addition, 
he  united  the  various  native  elements  and  rallied  them  to 
his  support  by  a  firm  administration  and  the  organization 
of  a  system  of  public  relief  during  the  famine  of  the  year 
1911. 

Ever  since  the  occupation  of  Egypt  by  England,  and 
that  of  Tunis  by  France  in  1881,  Italy  had  kept  an  anxious 
eye  upon  Tripoli.  While  other  powers  were  marking  out 
vast  colonial  empires  for  themselves  in  Africa,  she  had  to 
content  herself  with  the  two  insignificant  and  barren  tracts 
of  Eritrea  and  Somaliland.  At  length  nothing  remained 
unoccupied,  outside  of  Abyssinia  and  Liberia,  whose  in- 
tegrity is  guaranteed  by  the  powers,  except  Morocco  and 
Tripoli ;  while  the  events  of  1910-11  indicated  clearly  that 
Morocco  would  soon  pass  under  the  direct  control  of  France. 
As  a  Mediterranean  and  a  naval  power,  it  is  a  matter  of 
considerable  economic  importance  and  genuine  national 
pride  that  Italy  should  share  in  the  partition  of  the  African 
littoral  and  in  the  material  development  of  North  and  Cen- 
tral Africa.  In  1881,  when  France  signed  its  treaty  with 
Tunis,  and  again  in  1899,  when  France  and  Great  Britain 


294    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

determined  the  boundaries  of  Wadai  and  the  "  hinterland  " 
of  the  Vilayet  of  Tripoli,  the  French  Government  was  care- 
ful to  inform  Italy  that  she  had  no  intention  of  molesting 
the  integrity  of  Tripolitania.  There  were  good  reasons  for 
her  modesty  in  this  instance.  She  did  not  think  the  coun- 
try valuable  enough  to  repay  the  expense  of  annexation  in 
the  first  place ;  and,  in  the  second,  she  already  possessed 
more  promising  interests  elsewhere  in  northern  Africa.  In 
December,  1900,  and  November,  1902,  France  made  secret 
agreements  with  the  Italian  Government,  promising  not  to 
interfere  with  the  extension  of  Italian  influence  in  Tripoli, 
provided  Italy  made  no  resistance  to  the  French  advance 
in  Morocco.1  The  seizure  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  by 
Austria,  which  was  supported  diplomatically  by  Germany, 
was  a  sign  that  the  Triple  Alliance  would  raise  no  obsta- 
cle to  an  Italian  invasion  of  Tripoli.  The  agreements  of 
Great  Britain  with  France  and  Spain  in  1904,  and  again 
in  1907,  concerning  the  maintenance  and  preservation  of 
their  respective  spheres  of  influence  in  northern  Africa, 
were  further  indications  that  these  powers  would  hardly 
oppose  the  entrance  of  another  European  state  upon  the 
stage,  whose  presence  would  be  an  additional  guarantee  of 
the  preservation  of  the  status  quo  and  the  maintenance  of 
European  control  over  the  numerous  Mohammedan  peoples 
of  Africa. 

During  the  first  ten  years  of  the  twentieth  century,  the 
Italians  were  trying  quietly  to  get  an  economic  foothold  in 
Tripolitania,  and  were  anxious  to  see  the  country  develop 
like  its  neighbors.  They  would  willingly  have  furnished 
the  necessary  money  and  means  of  bringing  this  about  if 
Turkey  had  been  favorable  to  such  progress  and  had 
afforded  the  necessary  facilities  and  protection.  But  Tur- 

1  Rouard  de  Card,  La  Politique  de  la  France  d,  Vigard  de  la  Tripolitaine, 
1906. 


TRIPOLITANIA  995 

key,  naturally  suspicious  of  Italy  and  jealous  of  its  own 
rights,  feared  that  economic  and  political  infiltration  would 
soon  lead  to  administrative  control  and  ownership.  She 
declined  to  grant  Italy  any  position  of  special  privilege, 
and  only  grudgingly  admitted  her  merchants  and  citizens 
within  the  country.  As  time  went  on,  the  feeling  between 
the  two  nationalities  became  more  hostile  and  more  sus- 
picious. The  Turkish  officials,  past  masters  in  the  arts  of 
procrastination,  deceit,  and  intrigue,  hindered  the  Italian 
movements  at  every  step.  The  Home  Government  at  Con- 
stantinople maintained  a  conciliatory  attitude  on  the  whole, 
but  the  local  officers  used  every  possible  means  to  keep 
the  Italians  out  of  the  vilayet.  It  made  no  difference 
whether  the  Banco  de  Roma  was  trying  to  procure  laud 
or  business  privileges,  or  private  citizens  were  seeking  to 
establish  mills  or  oil  factories,  or  learned  scholars  wishing 
to  embark  on  archaeological  missions,  innumerable  and  ex- 
asperating obstacles  were  constantly  placed  in  the  pathway. 
Every  legitimate  effort  of  Italy  to  develop  trade  in  the 
country  was  opposed,  either  openly  or  secretly ;  and  the 
Marsad,  the  Turkish  paper  of  Tripoli,  contained  frequent 
and  bitter  attacks  upon  the  resident  Italians  and  on  the 
policy  of  their  Government.  Matters  came  to  such  a  pass, 
at  length,  that  two  Italians  were  slain  —  the  murder  of 
Father  Giustino,  of  Derna,  being  particularly  inexcus- 
able ;  and  the  Italian  Government  had  to  threaten  the  coast 
with  a  naval  demonstration  before  the  Turkish  cabinet 
would  recall  the  unscrupulous  and  incompetent  ruler  of 
Derna. 

But  the  Italians  cannot  be  exempted  entirely  from  blame. 
There  is  no  doubt  that  their  own  aggressiveness  and  jeal- 
ousy of  foreign  concessions,  combined  with  the  attacks  of 
the  Italian  press,  which  established  regular  correspondents 
at  the  port  of  Tripoli  in  1910,  brought  a  good  deal  of  trouble 


296     INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

upon  them  that  might  possibly  have  been  avoided.  Yet,  if 
Turkey  had  been  willing  to  render  some  real  satisfaction 
for  the  numerous  insults  to  Italian  dignity  and  honor,  Italy 
would  have  refrained  from  any  forcible  invasion  of  the 
country.  Her  ministers  were  very  patient  and  anxious  to 
avoid  serious  conflicts ;  but  they  could  not  close  their  eyes 
to  the  insults  to  Italian  citizens  and  their  national  flag  in 
Tripolitania,  on  the  Red  Sea,  and  in  Asia  Minor,  which 
were  increasing  year  by  year.  Italian  trading  vessels  and 
the  native  Eritreau  feluccas  were  frequently  boarded  in  the 
Red  Sea  and  the  money  and  valuables  of  the  crews  and 
portions  of  the  cargoes  seized  by  the  Turkish  officials,  on 
the  ground  that  they  were  engaging  in  a  contraband  trade 
with  Turkish  ports.  In  Asia  Minor  numerous  difficulties 
arose  concerning  Italian  laborers  employed  on  the  railways 
under  construction ;  and,  among  other  troubles,  came  the 
report  that  the  daughter  of  an  Italian  laborer  had  been  ab- 
ducted and  forcibly  converted  to  Mohammedanism.  Turkey 
talked  in  a  conciliatory  manner,  but  never  settled  any  of 
these  vexing  questions  to  the  satisfaction  of  Italy.  Matters 
became  more  and  more  strained.  The  Italian  Government 
was  impressed  daily  with  the  necessity  of  reaching  some 
definite  solution  of  the  situation  which  was  fast  becoming 
unbearable.  Their  cup  was  full.  It  was  no  longer  possible 
to  endure  in  patience  and  meekness  the  insults  to  their  na- 
tional pride  and  honor,  which  they  felt  Turkey  would  never 
have  dared  to  permit  if  she  had  had  a  wholesome  respect 
for  Italy  as  a  military  power.  Knowing  full  well  the  repu- 
tation of  the  Turks  for  procrastination  and  evasion,  they 
realized  that  a  satisfactory  and  permanent  solution  of  the 
problem  could  only  be  attained  through  some  form  of  prompt 
and  decisive  action  backed  by  a  display  of  force. 

After  a  careful  study  of  the  whole  situation,  the  Italian 
cabinet  decided  upon  a  bold  and  ingenious  course.  Turkey 


TRIPOLITANIA  297 

was  to  be  submitted  to  a  severe  test ;  and,  if  this  failed, 
Tripolitania  was  to  be  occupied  by  force.  Realizing  com- 
pletely the  difficulties  and  dangers  of  such  a  plan,  the  Ital- 
ian leaders  took  every  precaution  to  have  each  detail  of 
their  scheme  thoroughly  worked  out  and  to  avoid  all  out- 
side complications.  The  most  serious  difficulty  in  the  exe- 
cution of  such  a  plan  lay  in  the  fact  that  any  attack  upon 
any  one  of  the  outlying  provinces  of  Turkey  was  likely  to 
be  followed  by  the  dissolution  of  the  Sultan's  empire  and  a 
general  European  war,  owing  to  the  weakness  of  the  Young 
Turk,  or  Constitutional  Reform  party,  then  in  control  of 
the  Government  of  the  Sublime  Porte,  and  to  the  unsettled 
situation  in  the  Balkans.  The  Italian  Government  was  very 
far  from  desiring  anything  of  this  sort  and  they  made  every 
effort  to  eliminate  any  such  possibility.  In  the  first  place, 
they  delayed  action  until  the  last  uprising  in  the  Balkans 
—  that  of  the  Malissori  —  had  been  brought  to  an  end  and 
matters  had,  for  the  time  being  at  least,  been  satisfactorily 
adjusted  between  the  Albanians  and  the  Turks.  Then,  at 
the  moment  when  orders  were  being  issued  for  the  occupa- 
tion of  Tripoli,  they  sent  a  special  message  to  all  their  min- 
isters and  consuls  in  the  Balkan  States  to  assure  the  rulers 
and  people  there  that  Italy  desired  to  maintain  the  integrity 
of  the  Turkish  Empire,  and  that  she  had  no  intention  of 
waging  war  generally  against  the  Sultan,  or  of  invading 
his  domains  in  Europe  or  Asia  Minor. 

Another  difficulty  in  the  way  of  the  successful  execution 
of  their  plan  was  the  problem  of  secrecy.  It  was  absolutely 
essential  to  the  success  of  their  enterprise  that  they  should 
be  able  at  a  moment's  notice  to  seize  control  of  the  eastern 
Mediterranean,  in  order  to  protect  the  fleet  and  army  of 
occupation  from  interruption  or  attack.  The  required  se- 
crecy was  obtained  by  exercising  a  stringent  censorship  of 
the  Italian  press  for  some  time  previous  to  the  execution 


298    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

of  their  design  and  during  the  initial  moves.  This  was  the 
reason  why  the  press  and  the  world  at  large  were  com- 
pletely surprised  at  the  suddenness  of  the  event,  and  at  a 
loss  to  explain  its  significance. 

On  September  28,  1911,  after  making  the  most  careful 
military  and  naval  preparations,  the  Italian  Government 
sent  the  Sublime  Porte  an  ultimatum  demanding,  within 
twenty-four  hours,  a  satisfactory  guaranty  that  substantial 
reforms  would  be  introduced  in  the  government  of  Tripoli 
and  full  protection  afforded  Italian  citizens  and  trade  within 
the  vilayet,  under  the  threat  of  an  immediate  military  oc- 
cupation of  Tripoli  and  Cirenaica.1  In  this  document  the 
disorders  and  troubles  due  to  the  inefficiency  and  neglect 
of  the  Turkish  officials,  the  great  need  of  enlightened  eco-. 
nomic  development  similar  to  that  provided  in  the  neighbor- 
ing countries  of  Egypt  and  Tunis,  the  paramount  interests 
of  Italy  in  the  district,  and  the  systematic  opposition  to  all 
her  enterprises  and  efforts  to  develop  trade  there,  and  the 
dangerous  situation  of  the  Italians  and  foreigners  because 
of  the  present  agitation,  were  all  carefully  recited.  The 
Turkish  cabinet  replied  in  a  conciliatory  spirit,  offering  to 
give  the  required  protection  to  Italian  interests  and  to  make 
all  reasonable  commercial  and  economic  concessions  that 
did  not  infringe  upon  the  rights  of  the  empire  and  those 
guaranteed  by  treaty  to  foreign  powers,  but  asking  what 
were  the  guaranties  sought  by  Italy.  This  was  not  consid- 
ered a  satisfactory  answer  by  the  Italian  authorities ;  and 
so  the  conflict  commenced. 

Nothing  short  of  a  position  of  special  privilege  in  eco- 
nomic matters  and  a  share  in  the  administration  of  the 
province  would  have  halted  the  Italians  at  this  point.  They 
were  determined  to  take  no  chances  concerning  the  future 

1  Supplement  to  Amer.  Jour,  of  Internal.  Law,  January  1912,  vol.  vi, 
pp.  11,  12. 


TRIPOLITANIA  299 

of  Tripoli.  The  old  corrupt  regime  must  go  and  at  once. 
The  welfare  both  of  the  native  inhabitants  and  of  the  for- 
eign residents  must  be  assured  and  a  new  field  for  Italian 
commercial  expansion  opened.  The  last  stand  of  the  inte- 
rior slave  trade  must  be  done  away  with  and  the  most  radi- 
cal of  the  Mohammedan  secret  orders,  such  as  the  Se- 
noussi,  deprived  of  their  last  stronghold  in  northern  Africa. 
Thus,  in  the  main,  the  Italian  policy  seems  to  be  justified. 
Yet,  in  justice  to  the  Turks,  it  ought  to  be  said  that  the 
new  Constitutional  Reform  party  has  had  its  hands  too  full 
with  the  innumerable  difficulties  of  a  complete  reorganiza- 
tion of  the  internal  government  of  the  empire  to  give  the 
proper  attention  to  the  Tripolitan  situation.  And,  while 
the  inhabitants  of  Tripolitania  have  lacked  opportunities 
and  facilities  for  development  and  have  probably  suffered 
some  from  excessive  taxation,  it  has  not  yet  been  proved 
that  they  had  been  particularly  oppressed  or  abused  by  the 
Turkish  Government. 

The  Turkish  Vilayet  of  Tripoli  was  composed  of  the  two 
large  seaboard  districts  of  Tripolis  with  its  port  cities 
of  Tripoli  and  Horns  (or  Lebda),  and  Cirenaica  with  the 
adjacent  plateau  of  Barca  possessing  two  ports  of  entry  — 
Ben  Ghasi  and  Derna.  Between  these  two  administrative 
regions  lay  a  long  stretch  of  desert  coast  line  without  har- 
bors of  any  importance,  while  behind  all  were  the  great 
Sahara  and  Libyan  .Deserts,  extending  far  to  the  south, 
and  dotted  here  and  there  with  fertile  oases,  the  chief  of 
which  were  Ghadames,  Ghat,  Socna,  Murzuk,  Sella,  and 
Andjila.  The  problem  of  the  Italians  was  therefore  three- 
fold :  to  prevent  the  Turks  from  throwing  any  military 
forces  or  supplies  into  the  country ;  to  seize  promptly  all 
the  seaports ;  and,  finally,  to  occupy  the  hinterland.  The 
first  two  of  these  moves  were  carried  out  with  energy  and 
precision.  A  number  of  Italian  warships  were  sent  into  the 


300    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

eastern  Mediterranean  to  head  off  any  attempt  of  the  Otto- 
mans to  interrupt  their  maneuvers  from  Asia  Minor,  while 
the  greater  part  of  their  naval  forces  were  employed  in 
escorting  a  huge  fleet  of  transports  bearing  their  army  to 
the  coasts  of  Tripolitania ;  and  within  six  weeks  practically 
all  the  seaport  towns  had  been  occupied  without  great 
difficulty,  and  some  35,000  troops  safely  landed  in  the 
country. 

Meanwhile,  the  Turks  had  not  been  idle.  They  managed 
to  smuggle  a  considerable  quantity  of  arms  and  ammuni- 
tion into  the  vilayet  with  some  of  their  best  military  lead- 
ers, —  such  as  Enver  Bey  (now  Enver  Pasha  and  Turkish 
Minister  of  War),  Fethi  Bey,1  and  Aziz  Ali  Bey  el  Masri,2 
—  before  the  Italians  could  establish  an  effective  blockade 
of  the  coast,  and  France  and  Egypt  set  up  a  stringent 
watch  on  their  frontiers.  The  Arabs  and  Berbers  of  the 
mountains  and  interior  were  aroused  to  action  by  the  ac- 
tivities of  Ferhat  Bey  and  Suleiman  el  Barouni,  former 
deputies  in  the  Ottoman  Parliament  from  the  Tripolitan 
districts  of  Zavia  and  Gebel.  And  the  support  of  Sidi 
Achmed  el-Sherif-el-Senoussi  and  his  brother,  Sidi  Hellal, 
was  secured,  the  former  of  whom  is  the  head  of  the  Se- 
noussi,  the  most  powerful  Mohammedan  organization  in 
northern  Africa  with  branches  in  Syria,  Arabia,  and  Asia 
Minor.  He  has  had  his  headquarters  for  some  time  at  the 
oasis  of  Kufra,  in  the  Libyan  Desert  and  technically  out- 
side of  the  boundary  of  any  state ;  but  he  has  been  for 
several  years  in  close  and  friendly  touch  with  the  authori- 
ties at  Constantinople.  In  this  way  quite  an  extensive  mili- 
tary force  was  organized  and  a  determined  resistance  made 

1  Fethi  Bey  became  a  military  airman  and  was  killed  in  March,  1914, 
trying  to  fly  from  Asia  Minor  to  Cairo. 

2  Aziz  Ali  succeeded  Enver  Bey  as  leader  in  Tripolitania,  and  was  recently 
tried  and  acquitted  of  charges  of  incompetency  and  corruption  while  in 
control  of  Turkish  forces  in  Tripoli. 


TRIPOLITANIA  SOI 

to  the  advance  of  the  Italians  into  the  interior.  So  stub- 
born and  effective  was  this  defense  that  over  a  year  elapsed 
before  the  European  invaders  were  able  to  occupy  perma- 
nently any  important  section  of  the  hinterland.  In  justice 
to  the  Italian  soldiers  it  ought  to  be  added,  however,  that 
a  part  of  this  delay  was  due  to  unfavorable  climatic  con- 
ditions and  to  the  peculiar  and  exceptional  difficulties  of 
desert  warfare. 

Meanwhile,  both  the  Italian  Government  and  the  Euro- 
pean powers  were  taking  steps  to  end  the  conflict.  On 
January  27, 1912,  Russia  issued  a  circular  to  the  European 
courts  urging  joint  action  in  the  interests  of  peace.  On 
March  25,  Emperor  William  and  King  Vittorio  Emanuele 
III  met  at  Venice  to  discuss  the  same  problem ;  and  from 
April  15  to  23,  the  representatives  of  the  European  states 
at  Constantinople,  led  by  the  Russian  Ambassador,  pressed 
their  offers  of  mediation  upon  the  Sultan.  All  in  vain. 
The  Ottoman  Government  steadily  refused  to  consider 
terms  of  peace  until  the  Italian  troops  were  withdrawn 
from  Tripolitania.  This  was  a  condition  which  the  Italians 
could  no  longer  be  expected  to  consider  seriously,  for  a 
royal  decree  had  already  been  issued  on  November  5,  an- 
nexing the  newly  occupied  country  to  the  Italian  king- 
dom. This  had  been  done,  partly  with  the  hope  of  coercing 
Turkey  to  accept  the  inevitable,  and  partly  for  the  pur- 
pose of  creating  a  legal  basis  for  the  introduction  of  a  new 
administration,  and  for  the  inauguration  of  a  carefully  pre- 
pared scheme  to  promote  the  economic  development  of  the 
province. 

At  length  the  Italian  authorities  realized  that,  as  long 
as  their  operations  were  confined  solely  to  Tripolitania,  the 
contest  was  likely  to  be  interminable.  The  Turkish  officials, 
gifted  with  extraordinary  powers  of  patience  and  procras- 
tination, were  finding  the  situation  much  to  their  liking. 


802    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

The  contest  in  Tripolitania  was  costing  them  compara- 
tively little  in  men  and  money.  No  special  burdens,  either 
in  taxes  or  in  the  recruitment  of  new  regiments,  had  been 
laid  upon  their  people :  nor  were  the  losses  and  inconven- 
iences to  business  and  trade  within  the  Ottoman  Empire 
of  sufficient  moment  thus  far  to  arouse  the  people  to  an  in- 
sistent demand  for  peace.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Italians 
were  spending  thousands  of  dollars  every  day  on  military 
operations  and  suffering  enormous  commercial  losses  on 
account  of  the  Turkish  boycott  upon  their  goods  and  ships, 
while  the  prospects  for  a  speedy  occupation  of  the  hin- 
terland of  Tripolitania  were  not  very  promising.  Accord- 
ingly, the  Italian  authorities  devised  a  new  method  of  co- 
ercion, which  ultimately  induced  the  Turks  to  change  their 
attitude  somewhat,  but  which  might  have  failed  in  its 
chief  object  had  not  war  broken  out  suddenly  in  the 
Balkans. 

On  February  22, 1912,  Signer  Giolitti,  Italian  Premier, 
introduced  into  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  a  bill  providing 
for  the  extension  of  Italian  sovereignty  to  Tripolitania  and 
for  the  creation  of  a  special  government  for  the  new  colony. 
The  next  day,  the  Chamber  adopted  the  bill  by  a  vote  of 
423  to  9 ; l  and  shortly  afterwards  it  was  passed  unani- 
mously by  the  Senate.  Thus  the  Italian  nation  expressed 
in  no  uncertain  tone  its  fixed  determination  to  possess  the 
old  Turkish  vilayet,  so  favorably  situated  with  regard  to 
their  own  kingdom.  Already,  in  January  and  February, 
the  Italian  fleet  had  been  blockading  the  Turkish  coast  in 
the  Red  Sea.  On  February  24,  Beirut  was  bombarded,  and 
the  blockade  was  extended  to  the  Syrian  coast  in  March. 
Finally,  this  was  followed  by  a  naval  demonstration  at  the 
mouth  of  the  Dardanelles,  April  16-19,  when  the  cables 
between  the  mainland  and  some  of  the  islands  were  cut, 
1  London  Times,  February  23  and  24, 1912. 


TRIPOLITANIA  SOS 

which  culminated  in  the  seizure  of  the  island  of  Ehodes 
and  a  number  of  other  Sporades  off  the  coast  of  Asia 
Minor. 

Thus  was  the  matter  brought  home  to  Turkey ;  and,  after 
considerable  hesitation,  informal  discussions  began  early  in 
June  at  Caux  in  Switzerland  between  Naby  Bey,  formerly 
Ottoman  Minister  at  Athens,  and  Signer  Modiano,  a  Solonika 
lawyer.  These  men  were  joined  soon  by  other  representatives 
from  both  states  and  the  official "  pourparlers  "  were  trans- 
ferred to  Ouchy  and  Lausanne.  July,  August,  and  September 
passed  without  any  material  progress  being  made  toward  a 
final  settlement,  save  that  the  position  of  each  party  was 
clearly  defined  and  certain  general  concessions  were  offered 
on  both  sides.  In  October,  the  situation  in  the  Balkans  be- 
came critical.  War  was  imminent ;  and  Turkey,  in  order  to 
have  her  hands  and  resources  free  for  a  new  encounter,  sud- 
denly became  more  conciliatory.  Instead  of  insisting  on  the 
retention  of  the  port  of  Tobruk  and  the  control  of  the  hin- 
terland of  Tripolitania,  the  Ottoman  Government  was  now 
ready  to  withdraw  from  the  whole  country.  The  Italian  au- 
thorities, grasping  quickly  the  significance  of  the  change, 
met  them  in  a  friendly  and  generous  spirit,  and  an  agree- 
ment was  soon  reached.  At  six  o'clock  on  October  15,  the 
terms  of  peace  were  agreed  upon  at  Ouchy  and  the  definite 
treaty  was  signed  at  Lausanne  at  three  o'clock  on  October  18, 
1912.1  There  were  eleven  articles  in  the  treaty  which  con- 
tained the  usual  provisions  for  an  immediate  cessation  of 
hostilities,  exchange  of  prisoners,  and  the  resumption  of 
commercial  and  other  relations  between  the  two  countries, 
and  the  evacuation  of  territories  occupied  by  the  two  com- 
batants. In  regard  to  the  last-mentioned  stipulation,  it  was 
provided  that  the  withdrawal  of  the  Italian  forces  from  the 
islands  of  the  -5Dgean  "  will  take  place  immediately  after 

1  London  Times,  October  16  and  19, 1912. 


304     INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

the  evacuation  of  Tripoli  and  Cirenaica  by  the  Ottoman 
officers,  troops,  and  civil  functionaries." 

No  mention  was  made  of  the  transference  of  Tripolitania 
to  Italy  or  of  the  establishment  of  Italian  sovereignty  in 
that  country.  By  the  Ottoman  law  the  Sultan  is  prohibited 
from  disposing  of  lands  belonging  to  the  empire.  In  this 
case,  therefore,  the  territory  was  tacitly  understood  to  have 
passed  into  other  hands,  in  spite  of  the  will  or  the  wish  of 
the  Ottoman  ruler.  Italy  agreed  to  the  conclusion  of  a  new 
commercial  agreement  between  the  two  states,  which  would 
permit  a  slight  raise  in  the  Turkish  tariff  rates,  and  to  aid 
the  Ottoman  authorities  in  abolishing  the  foreign  post-offices 
and  other  features  of  the  capitulary  regime  in  Turkey.  And 
the  Italian  Government  was  to  pay  yearly  2,000,000  lire  out 
of  the  revenues  of  Tripolitania  into  the  Administration  of  the 
Public  Debt  of  the  Ottoman  Empire. 

It  was  understood  that  the  Italians  would  do  nothing  to 
interfere  with  the  spiritual  authority  of  the  Sultan  as  Kha- 
lif ,  or  head  of  the  Mohammedan  Church,  in  Tripolitania.  To 
make  secure  his  position  in  this  regard,  and  to  preserve  the 
confidence  of  the  faithful  in  the  integrity  and  good  inten- 
tions of  Ottoman  authorities,  the  Turkish  monarch  issued 
an  imperial  firman  to  the  people  of  the  old  vilayet  on  Octo- 
ber 18  —  the  same  day  on  which  the  treaty  of  Lausanne  was 
signed.  "  Since  my  Government,"  wrote  the  Sultan,  "  de- 
sires, on  the  one  hand,  to  aid  you  effectively  in  the  necessary 
defense  of  your  country,  but  realizes  the  impossibility  of 
doing  so,  and  since,  on  the  other  hand,  it  regards  your  pres- 
ent and  future  prosperity,  it  wishes  to  terminate  a  war  ruin- 
ous to  you  and  to  your  families  and  disastrous  to  the  state. 
Hoping  to  restore  peace  and  prosperity  to  your  country, 
We,  basing  Our  action  on  Our  sovereign  right,  hereby 
grant  you  full  autonomy"1  In  this  way,  the  suzerain  handed 
1  London  Times,  October  19,  1912. 


TRIPOLITANIA  305 

back  the  country  to  its  inhabitants,  instead  of  to  the  Ital- 
ians, and  shifted  all  the  responsibility  and  sovereignty  on  to 
the  shoulders  of  the  people,  whom  he  left  to  make  the  best 
terms  they  could  with  the  Italian  authorities. 

The  Sultan  then  proceeded  to  appoint  Shems-ed-Din  as 
his  official  representative  in  spiritual  matters  for  five  years 
with  the  title  of  "  Naib-es-Sultan,"  and  to  authorize  the  ap- 
pointment of  a  "Kadi"  and  several  aids  (Naibs)  who  should 
assist  the  Naib-es-Sultan  in  the  enforcement  of  the  law  of 
the  Sheriat  and  in  the  regulation  of  religious  affairs.  The 
Kadi  was  to  be  paid  by  Turkey,  but  the  Naib-es-Sultan  and 
the  assistants  out  of  the  religious  revenues  of  the  coun- 
try. And  the  religious  supremacy  of  the  Sultan  is  still 
maintained,  though  his  prestige  has  diminished  materially 
by  reason  of  this  unfortunate  Tripolitau  episode  and  the 
defeats  of  his  armies  in  the  Balkans. 

Early  in  January,  1913,  the  Italians  resumed  their  for- 
ward movement  for  the  occupation  ef  the  interior  of  Tri- 
politania.  Without  great  difficulty,  though  at  the  cost  of 
great  hardships  to  the  troops,  the  Italian  forces  pushed 
their  way  through  Zintan,  Fessato,  and  Nalut  to  the  Tuni- 
sian border  and  south  to  Ghadames,  which  was  entered  by 
Captain  Pavone  on  April  27.  At  the  same  time  other  columns 
were  pressing  south  through  Misna  and  Socna  to  the  Fez- 
zan  and  Murzuk  which  was  occupied  in  the  fall  of  the  same 
year.  And  practically  all  of  Tripolitania  proper  has  now 
passed  under  Italian  control.  In  Cirenaica  and  Marmarica, 
however,  the  situation  is  quite  different.  The  immediate 
hinterland  of  Ben  Ghasi  and  Derna  was  taken  over  without 
much  trouble ;  but  the  Italians  are  having  a  serious  time 
subduing  the  peoples  of  the  mountains  and  the  plateau  of 
Barca  in  the  rear.  The  Arabs  of  the  Green  Mountains  are 
more  warlike  and  independent  than  those  of  Tripolitania 
proper,  and  the  hold  of  the  Turks  over  this  region  had 


306    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

never  been  very  effective.  So  the  contest  is  still  on,  and  it 
is  likely  to  be  some  time  before  the  entire  country  will  be 
subdued  and  entirely  reconciled  to  the  Italian  rule. 

When  this  is  accomplished,  a  new  era  will  dawn  for 
Tripolitania  and  its  people.  Order  and  security  for  life  and 
property  will  be  established,  and  no  expense  will  be  spared 
to  insure  the  future  development  and  prosperity  of  the 
country.  If  the  Italian  Government  carries  out  its  policy, 
as  outlined  in  its  message  to  Turkey  and  in  its  proclamations 
to  the  people  of  its  new  colony,  honestly,  intelligently,  and 
unselfishly,  all  will  be  well.  Already  they  have  made  an 
admirable  beginning.  The  seaports  have  been  cleaned  up, 
supplied  with  proper  lighting  and  sewage  systems,  and  pro- 
vided with  an  efficient  and  progressive  government.  Large 
sums  are  being  spent  on  public  improvements  and  proper 
methods  for  opening  the  country  and  developing  its  trade. 
The  administration  of  the  new  colony  is  still  on  a  military 
basis,  but  the  young  officers  and  soldiers  are  creating  an 
excellent  impression  and  performing  a  fine  service,  as  ad- 
visers and  local  administrators.  French  methods  are  being 
followed  in  the  preservation  of  local  customs  and  in  the  use 
of  native  officials,  such  as  the  Maimakams  and  Sheiks,  un- 
der Italian  Residents  and  supervisors.  The  work  of  the 
physicians  and  teachers  is  splendid,  and  goes  also  a  long 
way  toward  winning  the  confidence  of  the  masses. 

While  the  energies  of  the  Italians  at  present  are  largely 
devoted  to  exploration  and  to  providing  cheap,  safe,  and 
rapid  means  of  communication  throughout  the  country,  a 
multitude  of  things  remain  to  be  done  before  Tripolitania 
can  be  set  upon  its  feet  and  turned  into  a  self-supporting 
and  prosperous  colony.  It  will  be  a  long  and  painful  proc- 
ess. The  difficulties  will  be  great  and  the  rewards  few. 
For,  "  until  the  prosperity  of  the  native  population  is  soundly 
established  upon  the  basis  of  agriculture  and,  in  certain 


TRIPOLITANIA  307 

districts,  stock-raising,"  writes  a  competent  observer  who 
has  visited  the  country  since  the  Italian  occupation,  "  or 
until  minerals  are  found  in  paying  quantities,  there  can 
be  no  great  development  of  the  Tripoli  market.  A  few  for- 
tunate and  far-seeing  business  men  will  probably  make 
large  sums,  for  the  Government  is  bound  to  be  a  good  cus- 
tomer for  a  considerable  period  of  years,  but  much  capital 
will  have  to  be  expended  and  many  unproductive  years 
must  pass  before  a  paying  commerce  is  built  up." 1 

1  London  Times,  special  correspondent,  September  4,  5,  6,  1913.  For  fur- 
ther details  concerning  the  Italian  occupation  of  Tripolitania,  see  Thomas 
Barclay,  Turco-Italian  War  and  its  Problems,  1912 ;  Tullio  Irace,  With  the 
Italians  in  Tripoli,  1912.  For  conditions  before  the  war,  see  Edmond  Bernet, 
En  Tripolitaine ;  Voyage  a  Ghadames,  1912.  An  excellent  account  of  the  Ital- 
ian experiences  in  colonizing  Eritrea  and  Somaliland  will  be  found  in  Captain 
Pellenc's  Les  Italiens  en  Afrique,  1880-96,  published  in  1897. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

THE  REOCCUPATION  OF  NORTHERN  AFRICA 
EGYPT 

NEVER,  since  its  foundation  by  Mehemet  Ali  in  the  early 
years  of  the  nineteenth  century,  had  the  Albanian  dynasty 
been  an  unqualified  success  at  the  head  of  Egyptian  affairs. 
It  possessed  some  elements  of  strength,  of  stability,  and  of 
progress ;  but  it  contained  too  much  of  selfishness,  of  in- 
equality, and  of  injustice  to  retain  a  permanent  supremacy 
in  a  land  so  peculiar,  so  poor,  and  so  much  in  the  public 
eye  of  Europe  as  Egypt.  For  nearly  seventy  years  Mehemet 
Ali  and  his  successors  maintained  an  independent  adminis- 
tration, completely  untrammeled  by  outside  influences  or 
internal  checks ;  but  this  was  due  rather  to  the  strength  of 
the  reigning  family  and  the  poverty  and  weakness  of  the 
governed  than  to  any  great  genius  for  government  on  the 
part  of  the  Khedives.  These  rulers  cared  more  for  the  out- 
ward show  and  emoluments  of  power,  office,  and  conquest 
than  for  the  welfare  of  the  people.  They  preferred  to  start 
at  the  top  of  the  ladder  with  those  improvements  that  ap- 
peal so  strongly  to  the  popular  imagination,  such  as  public 
edifices,  railways,  and  palaces.  The  more  prosaic  reforms, 
that  call  for  real  effort  and  unselfish  devotion  to  the  com- 
mon welfare,  and  which  are  essential  foundation  stones  to 
the  establishment  of  any  successful  and  beneficent  govern- 
ment, did  not  attract  them.  Nor  were  any  of  the  members 
of  this  family  trained  in  the  science  of  government,  or  well 
equipped  for  the  work  of  a  sovereign.  Some,  like  Mehemet 
Ali,  were  gifted  with  a  rough  genius  for  organization  ;  and 


EGYPT  309 

others,  like  Ibrahim  Pasha,  with  marked  native  military 
ability ;  but  one  and  all  were  as  unsystematic  and  incompe- 
tent in  public  affairs  as  they  were  ambitious  and  impro- 
vident. They  increased  the  governmental  expenses  and 
expanded  their  territorial  possessions,  —  even  to  distant 
Dar-Fur  and  the  Bahr-el-Ghazal,  with  the  aid  of  Baker 
and  Gordon,  —  but  gave  little  attention  to  increasing  the 
material  wealth  and  productiveness  of  their  realm.  Expan- 
sion they  understood,  but  "conservation"  was  a  term  un- 
known to  their  vocabulary. 

Said  Pasha  loaded  an  already  heavily  burdened  country 
with  an  immense  debt  in  connection  with  the  launching  of 
the  Suez  Canal  project ;  but  the  spendthrift  of  the  family 
was  Ismail  Pasha,  who  ruled  from  1863  to  1879.  He  spent 
enormous  sums  on  wars  with  Abyssinia,  conquests  in  the 
Sudan,  and  unproductive  public  works  such  as  railways, 
administration  buildings,  and  schools,  which  were  of  little 
real  advantage  to  the  country  because  of  their  expensive 
upkeep  and  the  poverty  of  the  Government.  His  reforms 
were  too  rapid  and  too  ill-advised  to  reap  at  once  the  suc- 
cess they  would  otherwise  have  deserved,  and  the  well-in- 
tentioned efforts  of  the  Khedive  were  too  often  thwarted 
through  the  incapacity  and  corruption  of  his  agents.  Hon- 
est and  able  administrators  were  almost  impossible  to  find, 
and  the  whole  public  service,  including  the  courts,  was 
tainted  with  graft,  due  to  the  small  salaries  and  the  uncer- 
tainty of  the  tenure  of  office.  In  fact,  the  entire  state  ma- 
chinery was  suffering  from  "  ignorance,  dishonesty,  waste, 
extravagance,  and  corruption  " ;  and,  as  Romola  Gessi  wrote 
to  Gordon,  "the  whole  strength  of  the  Government  is  turned 
on  amassing  money,  on  outward  forms  of  state,  and  on  ruin- 
ing the  country  by  taxes  and  burdensome  charges." 

At  length  the  day  of  reckoning  came ;  and  Ismail  Pasha, 
under  whose  wizard  touch  the  public  debt  had  risen  be- 


310    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

tween  1863  and  1874  from  £E4,000,000  to  over  XE70,- 
000,000,  was  compelled  in  1875  to  ask  Great  Britain  for 
assistance  in  reorganizing  the  Egyptian  finances.  Stephen 
Cave  —  "Her  Majesty's  Paymaster"  —  was  sent  out  in 
December,  1875,  and  returned  in  March,  1876,  with  an 
exhaustive  report,1  which  demonstrated  conclusively  the 
ability  of  Egypt,  with  careful  and  expert  management,  to 
carry  the  interest  on  her  debts,  at  a  reasonable  rate.  But  it 
was  no  longer  possible  for  her  to  go  on  renewing  her  float- 
ing indebtedness  of  XE18,000,000  at  twenty-five  per  cent 
and  raising  new  loans.  He  advised  the  appointment  of  a 
British  agent  at  the  head  of  a  department  of  finance  with 
power  to  supervise  the  laying  and  the  collection  of  the 
taxes,  and  the  employment  of  trained  Europeans  in  the 
civil  service. 

In  March,  Mr.  Rivers  Wilson  reached  Cairo  to  act  as 
financial  adviser  to  the  Khedive,  but  a  whole  year  elapsed 
before  any  real  progress  was  made,  owing  to  the  difficulties 
experienced  by  the  British  and  Egyptian  Governments  in 
agreeing  upon  a  plan  for  financial  control  and  reform. 
Meanwhile,  the  public  debt  rose  within  three  years  from 
££77,000,000  to  over  £E91,000,000,  a  great  shrinkage 
occurred  in  the  annual  tax  returns,  and  the  credit  of  the 
Khedive  disappeared  altogether.  He  was  therefore  com- 
pelled to  accede,  on  January  27,  1878,  to  the  British  de- 
mand for  the  appointment  of  a  High  Committee  of  Inquiry 
numbering  seven  —  six  Europeans  and  one  Egyptian  —  to 
control  the  state  revenues  and  expenditures,  and  to  super- 
vise the  collection  of  taxes  and  the  funding  of  the  public 
debt.  But  this  committee  was  not  actually  established  until 
March  30,  and  then  only  through  the  pressure  exerted  by 
France  and  England.  They  had  reached  an  agreement  be- 

1  Brit.  Parl.  Papers,  1877,  Egypt,  vol.  76,  pp.  99-118,  British  Museum 
File. 


EGYPT  311 

tween  February  4  and  9  to  cooperate  in  solving  the  prob- 
lem of  Egyptian  finance  —  such  action  being  officially  de- 
clared not  to  be  "inconsistent  with  the  Khedive's  inde- 
pendent administration  of  the  finances." 

In  spite  of  an  excellent  report  on  the  necessary  financial 
and  economic  reforms,  made  by  the  Committee  of  Inquiry 
on  August  19,  and  the  creation  of  a  new  cabinet  under 
Nubar  Pasha,  including  Rivers  Wilson  as  Minister  of  Fi- 
nance and  M.  de  Blignidres  as  Minister  of  Public  Works 
in  December,1  nothing  of  value  was  accomplished  that 
year ;  nor,  indeed,  in  the  following  twelve  months.  Mean- 
while, political  intrigues  increased  and  the  feeling  of  hos- 
tility toward  the  employment  of  foreigners  in  the  high 
offices,  which  had  early  manifested  itself  in  various  quar- 
ters, now  assumed  alarming  proportions.  In  February,  1879, 
anti-European  riots  broke  out  in  Cairo  and  attempts  were 
made  on  the  lives  of  Rivers  Wilson  and  Nubar  Pasha,  the 
latter  of  whom  was  compelled  to  resign  his  portfolio  on 
February  19,  through  the  pressure  and  accusations  of  the 
enemies  of  foreign  control.  Notwithstanding  the  nomination 
of  his  son,  Prince  Tewfik,  to  the  presidency  of  the  Council 
of  State  on  March  12,  the  Khedive  remained  dissatisfied 
with  the  drift  of  affairs  and  opposed  all  reforms  not  in 
strict  accord  with  his  own  ideas  and  plans.  He  rejected 
the  financial  schemes  of  Mr.  Wilson,  formulating  some 
of  his  own  and  installing  a  new  ministry  under  Cherif 
Pasha  on  April  7-10.  The  Committee  of  Inquiry  resigned ; 
Rivers  Wilson  was  recalled  on  April  24 ;  and  on  the  25th, 
Lord  Salisbury  warned  the  Egyptian  ruler  that  his  course 
was  likely  to  bring  upon  him  the  retaliation  of  the  Euro- 
pean powers.  He  assured  him,  at  the  same  time,  that  Great 
Britain  had  "  no  other  policy  than  that  of  developing  the 
resources  and  of  securing  the  good  government  of  the 
1  Brit.  Parl.  Papers,  1878,  Egypt,  vol.  78,  pp.  524-26. 


812    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

country.  They  had  hitherto  considered  the  independence 
of  the  Khedive  and  the  maintenance  of  his  dynasty  an  im- 
portant condition  for  the  attainment  of  these  ends." 

Ismail  Pasha,  however,  persisted  in  the  attempt  to  rule 
in  his  own  way;  but,  with  bankruptcy  staring  him  in  the 
face  and  cut  off  from  all  European  assistance,  his  position 
soon  became  intolerable.  All  the  great  powers  protested 
vigorously  against  his  decree  of  April  22,  declaring  that 
all  debts  and  claims  of  creditors  were  subject  to  the  au- 
thority of  the  Khedive,  without  appeal  to  the  mixed  courts. 
No  help  was  forthcoming  from  any  British  or  French 
scource ;  and  on  June  26,  1879,  the  perplexed  ruler,  acting 
on  the  advice  of  the  English  Government,  resigned  in  favor 
of  Mohammed  Tewfik  Pasha,  who  was  duly  confirmed 
khedive  by  the  Sultan  of  Turkey  in  a  firman. 

Cherif  Pasha  again  formed  a  cabinet ;  and  the  new  ruler, 
who  had  the  welfare  of  his  people  at  heart  as  well  as  a  gen- 
uine sympathy  with  the  reform  measures,  promptly  started 
in  to  set  up  an  efficient  government  along  the  lines  sug- 
gested by  Great  Britain  and  France.  These  two  powers, 
because  of  their  special  interests  in  the  country  and  their 
conviction  that  some  form  of  political  supervision  had  be- 
come a  necessity,  began  in  September,  1879,  to  exercise  a 
sort  of  dual  control  over  the  affairs  of  Egypt.  Both  agreed 
that  the  united  action  of  two  interested  and  well-informed 
states  possessing  a  common  program,  had  decided  advan- 
tages over  the  joint  supervision  of  all  the  European  states. 
"  However  great  the  progress  Egypt  has  made  in  the  last 
half  century,"  wrote  Barthe*lemy  Saint-Hilaire  to  M.  Sien- 
kiewicz  —  French  agent  at  Cairo,  —  "  it  is  quite  clear  that 
for  self-government  she  will  still  need  for  a  long  time  the 
guardianship  of  England  and  France.  By  herself  alone  she 
could  not  overcome  the  difficulties  of  all  kinds  which  stand 
in  the  way  of  her  regeneration.  .  .  .  The  work  of  reform 


EGYPT  313 

will  be  long  and  toilsome ;  but,  if  anything  can  hasten  its 
progress  and  guarantee  its  success,  it  is  assuredly  the  in- 
tervention of  two  well-enlightened  nations." 1 

Great  Britain,  however,  had  her  own  reasons.  "  The  ac- 
tion of  England,  though  her  interests  are  largely  commer- 
cial, is  dictated  in  the  main  by  exclusively  political  consid- 
erations," said  Salisbury  to  Count  Karolyi.  "Egypt  has, 
in  that  point  of  view,  an  importance  for  England  which  it 
has  for  no  other  country  in  the  world,  and  we  are  unable 
either  to  forego  our  own  claims  to  influence  in  that  country 
or  to  accede  to  an  arrangement  of  which  confusion  would 
be  the  necessary  result.  An  international  government  of 
Egypt  is,  I  think,  quite  impossible."  2  Yet  England  had 
no  intention  at  first  of  dictating  in  public  affairs,  preferring 
rather  the  part  of  a  friendly  adviser.  The  British  Govern- 
ment "  desires  no  partisan  ministry  in  Egypt,"  wrote  Gran- 
ville  to  Sir  Edward  Malet  on  November  4,  1881.  "In  the 
opinion  of  Her  Majesty's  Government,  a  partisan  ministry 
founded  on  the  support  of  a  foreign  power,  or  upon  the 
personal  influence  of  a  foreign  diplomatic  agent,  is  neither 
calculated  to  be  of  service  to  the  country  it  administers, 
nor  to  that  in  whose  interest  it  is  supposed  to  be  maintained. 
It  can  only  tend  to  alienate  the  population  from  their  true 
allegiance  to  their  sovereign,  and  to  give  rise  to  counter 
intrigues  which  are  detrimental  to  the  welfare  of  the 
State."  3 

The  English  authorities  wished,  indeed,  to  have  the  nec- 
essary reforms  in  finance,  justice,  and  administration  car- 
ried out  through  the  agency  of  the  Khedive  and  his  minis- 
ters ;  and  France  concurred  with  them  fully  in  this  policy. 
They  failed  to  see,  however,  that,  in  the  mind  of  the  native 
politicians  and  leaders,  there  was  little  difference  between 

1  Brit.  Parl.  Papers,  1881,  Egypt,  vol.  82,  pp.  110-13. 

2  Ibid.,  vol.  79,  pp.  136-37.  «  Ibid.,  vol.  82,  pp.  2-3. 


314    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

the  rule  of  a  "  partisan  ministry  founded  on  the  support  of 
a  foreign  power  "  and  the  government  of  a  native  ministry 
supported  by  outside  influences.  For  the  fact  remained  that 
Tewfik  Pasha  and  the  men  he  chose  for  his  ministers  were 
regarded  quite  generally  as  the  puppets  of  Great  Britain 
and  France,  who  were  suspected  by  many  influential  persons 
of  harboring,  behind  their  philanthropic  designs,  a  secret 
plan  for  securing  possession  of  Egypt. 

During  the  next  three  years  little  real  progress  in  finan- 
cial reform  was  accomplished,  in  spite  of  the  good  inten- 
tions of  the  Khedive,  who  issued  a  decree  on  August  10, 
1879,  establishing  a  Committee  of  Control  ("  Cadastre 
Ge'ne'ral ")  for  the  finances  consisting  of  a  director-general 
and  a  commission  under  the  Finance  Minister,  and  orders 
on  November  15, 1879,  and  April  5, 1880,  creating  a  "Caisse 
speciale  de  la  Dette  Publique"  and  a  "Commission  of 
Liquidation,"  comprised  of  seven  European  experts,  with 
power  to  supervise  the  financial  reorganization.  An  annual 
budget  was  created;  an  excellent  system  for  consolida- 
tion and  redemption  of  the  public  debt,  and  for  control  of 
the  revenues,  was  devised  and  promulgated  in  the  Law  of 
Liquidation  of  July  17, 1880 ;  and  Mr.  Rivers  Wilson  —  now 
president  of  the  Commission  of  Liquidation — was  enabled 
in  August  to  make  an  able  report  on  the  condition  of  the 
finances  and  the  plans  for  reorganization.  No  definite  steps 
were  taken,  however,  to  reorganize  the  courts  of  justice, 
the  methods  of  taxation,  or  the  administrative  system.  In- 
trigues were  rife  on  all  sides.  The  opposition  to  foreign 
interference  was  as  great  as  ever,  causing  innumerable  dif- 
ficulties to  the  new  government.  Cabinet  after  cabinet  tried 
its  hand  and  failed,  until  seven  ministries  had  held  office 
without  materially  improving  the  situation.  It  was  practi- 
cally impossible  to  get  a  group  of  able  and  patriotic  men  to- 
gether who  could  agree  upon  an  enlightened  and  progres- 


EGYPT  315 

sive  policy  and  firmly  adhere  to  it  until  something  worth 
while  had  been  accomplished.  The  chief  difficulty  in  the 
way  of  reform  lay  in  the  great  lack  of  experienced  and 
trained  men  in  the  native  official  circles.  Another  equally 
serious  handicap  was  that  the  Government  of  Tewfik  Pasha 
never  actually  held  all  the  reins  of  power  in  its  hands  at  any 
one  time.  And  in  attempting  to  secure  its  position  by  the 
aid  of  foreign  experts  and  outside  assistance,  it  lost  the  sup- 
port of  some  of  the  most  influential  native  elements. 

But  the  new  administration,  busy  with  many  pressing 
affairs  and  reforms,  committed  one  tremendous  and  unpar- 
donable blunder  when  it  overlooked  the  serious  and  restless 
condition  of  the  military  forces  and  failed  to  provide  for 
the  immediate  reorganization  of  the  army  —  the  one  body 
really  dangerous  to  the  establishment  of  public  order  and 
the  success  of  the  new  regime.  As  early  as  February,  1881, 
the  signs  of  a  military  revolt  were  visible  in  the  disagree- 
ments which  arose  between  the  ministry  and  the  younger 
officers  on  the  questions  of  pay  and  of  an  increase  in  the 
forces.  It  came  to  a  head  on  September  9,  1881,  when 
Colonel  Ahmed  Arabi  and  some  other  officers,  who  feared 
punishment  unless  they  could  coerce  the  Government  and 
keep  control  over  the  Ministry  of  War,  led  the  Arab  regi- 
ments in  a  demonstration  before  the  palace  of  the  Khedive. 
As  a  result,  Mahmoud  Samy  Pasha  —  representing  the 
military  party  —  became  Minister  of  War,  and  the  de- 
mands of  the  insurgents  received  a  full  hearing. 

Meanwhile,  another  controversy  arose  over  the  control 
of  the  finances  between  the  ministry  and  the  National 
Chamber,  which  began  its  sittings  on  December  26,  1880. 
The  leaders  of  the  Assembly  claimed  the  right  of  approv- 
ing all  taxation  and  of  inspecting  all  the  public  expenses, 
but  they  raised  no  objection  to  an  official  budget  or  to  the 
employment  of  foreign  experts.  The  ministers,  however, 


316     INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

would  admit  of  no  restriction  on  the  right  of  the  Khedive 
to  control  the  finances ;  and  after  striving  in  vain  for  two 
months  to  enforce  the  will  of  the  sovereign,  Cherif  Pasha 
was  forced  to  resign  in  February,  1882.  The  victorious 
Assembly  then  compelled  the  Khedive  to  nominate  a  new 
cabinet  with  Mahmoud  Samy  Pasha  as  Grand  Vizier  and 
Arabi  Bey  as  Minister  of  War  and  Marine. 

From  that  time  until  June,  the  Government  was  practi- 
cally under  the  thumb  of  the  military,  or  "  National  Party," 
as  they  preferred  to  call  themselves.  The  new  combination 
proved  little  more  successful  than  the  earlier  cabinets  — 
chiefly  because  it  had  no  definite  program  of  reform  or 
government,  but  preferred  to  use  its  energies  in  strength- 
ening its  hold  upon  the  reins  of  power  and  in  promoting 
anti-foreign  demonstrations.  The  Khedive  finally  broke 
with  this  radical  ministry  and  dissolved  it  on  March  28 ; 
and  its  successor  fell  likewise  in  May,  owing  to  the  discov- 
ery of  plots  against  the  life  of  the  ruler.  Arabi  alone  re- 
mained at  his  post,  as  the  Khedive  postponed  the  nomina- 
tion of  a  new  cabinet. 

It  was  now  evident  to  Great  Britain  and  France,  who 
had  followed  closely  the  course  of  events  and  supported 
stoutly  the  Egyptian  sovereign  through  their  representa- 
tives in  Cairo,  that  serious  complications  were  impending. 
It  was  imperative  that  these  powers  should  reach  a  definite 
understanding  and  be  prepared  for  any  emergency.  Ac- 
cordingly a  lively  correspondence  ensued  between  Earl 
Granville  and  Gambetta  —  then  Prime  Minister  of  France ; 
and  it  was  agreed  to  give  the  Khedive  their  moral  support 
and  diplomatic  aid  in  the  event  that  anything  occurred  — 
either  within  or  without  the  state  —  to  threaten  the  exist- 
ing state  of  things.  They  reserved,  however,  freedom  of 
action  with  regard  to  future  developments,  and  were  care- 
ful not  to  promise  material  assistance  or  intervention. 


EGYPT  317 

Meanwhile,  it  was  becoming  clearer  day  by  day  that  ere 
long  it  would  be  impossible  to  avoid  some  form  of  force- 
ful interference  in  the  affairs  of  Egypt.  Both  the  British 
and  French  Governments  were,  however,  undecided  as  to 
what  form  this  should  take.  "  Armed  intervention  will  be- 
come a  necessity,"  wrote  Malet  on  January  20,  1882,  "  if 
we  adhere  to  the  refusal  to  allow  the  budget  to  be  voted  by 
the  Chamber,  and  we  cannot  do  otherwise,  as  it  forms  only 
a  part  of  a  complete  scheme  of  revolution.  .  .  .  The  united 
powers  will  be  listened  to,  but  not  England  and  France 
alone,  because  they  think  we  are  actuated  by  selfish  mo- 
tives, and  that  the  other  powers  will  not  allow  us  to  deal 
with  the  Egyptian  question  alone."1  The  same  day  the 
Vizier  of  Egypt  was  notified  that  England  and  France 
would  not  consent  to  the  Chamber  voting  on  the  budget, 
as  this  would  be  an  infringement  upon  the  international 
agreements  concerning  the  control  of  the  finances.  The 
situation  became  acute ;  and  Granville  declared  in  favor  of 
intervention  by  Turkey,  provided  it  was  arranged  and  su- 
pervised by  his  own  Government  and  that  of  France.  By 
February  he  had  changed  his  mind  and  on  the  sixth  noti- 
fied Lord  Lyons  —  British  Ambassador  at  Paris  —  that 
Her  Majesty's  Government  desired  that  any  intervention 
in  Egypt  should  represent  "  the  united  action  of  the  powers 
of  which  Turkey  should  be  a  party."  France  at  first  agreed, 
but  two  days  later  M.  Freycinet,  who  had  succeeded  Gam- 
betta  as  Premier,  expressed  his  disapproval  of  all  measures 
requiring  the  use  of  force.  Granville  insisted,  however,  on 
sending  a  general  circular  letter  to  all  the  powers,  dated 
February  11,  in  which  he  reiterated  England's  wish  for 
the  "  united  action  of  Europe  "  in  case  intervention  should 
prove  unavoidable. 

After  the  complete  failure  of  the  Khedival  Government 
1  Brit.  Parl.  Papers,  1882,  Egypt,  vol.  82,  p.  154. 


318    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

to  make  any  headway  with  its  reform  program  and  after 
the  temporary  triumph  of  the  military  party,  Freycinet 
suggested,  on  May  11,  that  a  naval  demonstration  might 
strengthen  the  position  of  the  Khedive  and  enable  him  to 
proceed  with  the  reorganization  of  the  government.  Gran- 
ville  approved  on  the  13th,  though  he  thought  it  was  a 
mistake  not  to  ask  the  rest  of  the  powers ;  and  on  the  20th 
the  combined  fleet  of  three  vessels  under  the  command  of 
Admiral  Seymour  arrived  off  Alexandria.  The  Cairo  repre- 
sentatives of  the  two  powers  announced  that  the  ships  had 
come  to  aid  the  Khedive  in  maintaining  his  lawful  author- 
ity and  in  setting  up  a  ministry  of  his  own  choosing  under 
Cherif  Pasha.  No  arrests,  persecutions,  or  sequestrations 
of  property  would  be  permitted,  but  it  was  hinted  that  it 
would  be  well  for  Arabi  and  his  friends  to  leave  the  coun- 
try temporarily,  after  the  establishment  of  the  new  cabinet. 
The  military  party  paid  no  attention  to  these  suggestions, 
but  forced  a  new  ministry  under  Ragheb  Pasha  upon  the 
Khedive  on  June  16,  Arabi  retaining  the  portfolio  of  war. 
The  good  offices  of  a  Turkish  commissioner,  Dervish  Pasha, 
who  came  from  the  Sultan  on  June  7  at  the  personal  solici- 
tation of  the  Khedive,  and  the  combined  efforts  of  the 
British  and  French  agents,  were  unable  to  bring  about  any 
adjustment  or  compromise. 

On  June  11,  a  serious  riot  broke  out  in  Alexandria,  dur- 
ing which  six  Europeans  were  killed  and  others  wounded. 
Military  preparations  were  begun  by  the  leaders  of  the 
national  party,  and  an  attempt  made  to  fortify  the  harbor 
of  Alexandria  —  in  spite  of  the  warnings  of  Admiral  Sey- 
mour. The  Ragheb  ministry  continuing  reactionary  and  in- 
efficient, and  the  disorders  increasing  steadily  throughout 
the  country,  Granville  was  forced  to  admit,  on  July  10, 
that  the  naval  demonstration  was  a  failure.  "  Her  Majes- 
ty's Government  now  sees  no  alternative,"  he  wrote,  "  but 


EGYPT  319 

a  recourse  to  force  to  put  an  end  to  a  state  of  affairs  which 
has  become  intolerable."  He  still  favored,  however,  a  joint 
action  of  the  powers,  and  added :  "  Her  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment has  no  interests  or  objects  which  are  inconsistent  with 
those  of  Europe  in  general,  nor  any  interests  which  are  in- 
consistent with  those  of  the  Egyptian  people." 

M.  Freycinet,  when  approached  on  July  11,  declined  to 
join  in  any  military  invasion,  as  this  would  be  an  act  of 
war  permissible  to  the  French  Government  only  through  a 
vote  of  the  Chamber  of  Deputies.  The  situation  was  still 
further  complicated  the  same  day,  when  Admiral  Seymour 
opened  fire  upon  the  forts  at  Alexandria,  after  having  ex- 
hausted all  peaceful  measures  to  prevent  the  fortification 
of  the  harbor.  After  appealing  in  vain  to  Italy  and  Turkey 
to  cooperate  with  her,  Great  Britain  decided  on  July  20  to 
send  a  military  expedition  to  the  support  of  the  Khedive 
on  her  own  responsibility ;  and  General  Sir  Garnet  Wolse- 
ley  with  25,000  men  was  ordered  to  proceed  to  Egypt  im- 
mediately. On  August  18,  he  left  Alexandria  and  occupied 
the  following  day  without  opposition  Port  Said,  El  Kan- 
tara,  and  Ismailia,  to  protect  the  Suez  Canal  in  accordance 
with  England's  promise  to  the  powers.  The  advance  on 
Cairo  was  then  begun,  which  culminated  in  an  overwhelm- 
ing victory  over  the  forces  of  Arabi  Pasha  at  Tel-el-Kebir 
on  September  13  and  a  triumphal  entry  into  the  capital  on 
the  15th.  The  same  day  Arabi  and  the  other  military  lead- 
ers were  captured,  and  though  condemned  to  death  in  De- 
cember, 1882,  after  a  long  trial,  were  finally  banished. 

Meanwhile  the  Khedive  and  a  new  ministry  formed  by 
Cherif  Pasha  on  August  28  were  duly  installed  at  the  head 
of  affairs,  the  British  announcing  officially  that  they  had 
intervened  solely  to  "  restore  the  power  of  the  Khedive." 
Now  that  this  was  done,  it  was  only  necessary  for  them  to 
remain  long  enough  to  "  reestablish  on  a  firm  basis  the 


320    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

authority  of  the  Khedive  and  to  make  provision  for  the 
future  well-being  of  all  classes  of  the  Egyptian  people." 
In  a  note  to  the  powers,  dated  January  3,  1883,  Granville 
explained  the  reforms  contemplated  and  added,  "  Her  Ma- 
jesty's Government  are  desirous  of  withdrawing  it  [the 
army]  as  soon  as  the  state  of  the  country  and  the  organi- 
zation of  the  Khedival  authority  will  permit  of  it."  1 

The  British  prestige  in  Egypt  had  been  immensely 
strengthened  by  their  successes ;  and  they  were  quick  to 
see  that  this  intricate  problem  could  be  more  easily  and 
more  skillfully  handled  by  one  state  alone.  Out  of  courtesy, 
however,  they  offered  France  a  minor  participation  in  the 
reforms ;  but  the  authorities  of  that  country  declined  any- 
thing short  of  an  equal  control  over  the  finances.  This 
Great  Britain  considered  no  longer  necessary  or  wise.  The 
British  member  of  the  Board  of  Control  resigned ;  and, 
with  the  consent  of  the  Sultan,  the  Khedive  issued  an  order 
abolishing  the  Dual  Control  on  January  18, 1883.  On  Feb- 
ruary 4,  Sir  A.  Colvin,  with  the  approval  of  England,  was 
appointed  "  Financial  Councillor  "  to  the  ruler.  He  might 
sit  with  the  ministers,  if  requested,  but  his  powers  were 
advisory  only  and  his  position  depended  upon  the  will  of 
the  sovereign. 

In  September,  1882,  Lord  Dufferin,  one  of  the  ablest  and 
most  experienced  of  British  statesmen  and  diplomatists, 
had  been  sent  out  to  draw  up  a  practical  and  comprehen- 
sive plan  for  the  reorganization  of  the  Egyptian  Govern- 
ment. His  report  was  submitted  on  February  6,  1883,2 
approved  by  the  Home  Government,  and  issued  as  the 
Organic  Law  by  the  Khedive  on  May  1,  1883.  The  new 
government,  known  as  the  "  Institutions,"  consisted  of  the 
usual  cabinet  departments  of  Foreign  Affairs,  Interior, 

1  Brit.  Parl.  Papers,  1883,  Egypt,  vol.  83,  pp.  544-46. 
3  Ibid.,  pp.  87-130. 


EGYPT  321 

Finance,  Army,  Justice,  Education  and  Public  Works, 
and  two  Assemblies.  The  Legislative  Council  numbering 
thirty  was  composed  of  sixteen  deputies  elected  by  the  pro- 
vincial assemblies  and  fourteen  nominated  by  the  Khedive. 
The  General  Assembly  of  eighty-two  members  embraced 
the  whole  of  the  Legislative  Council,  the  six  ministers,  and 
forty-six  elective  deputies  —  two  chosen  by  each  provincial 
assembly  and  two  by  each  town  government.  Candidates 
for  membership  in  the  General  Assembly  must  be  at  least 
thirty  years  old,  be  able  to  read  and  write,  and  pay  direct 
taxes  yearly  of  not  less  than  XE30.  The  Legislative  Coun- 
cil, whose  members  were  to  serve  a  long  term  of  years  or 
for  life,  met  once  a  month  to  discuss  the  budget  and  all 
prospective  legislation,  but  it  had  no  power  to  initiate  or 
to  veto  measures.  The  General  Assembly  had  to  be  sum- 
moned at  least  once  in  two  years  and  no  new  taxes  could 
be  imposed  without  its  consent.  But  it  possessed  no  initia- 
tive, for  all  the  reins  of  power  lay  in  the  hands  of  the 
Khedive  and  his  ministers.  Each  province  had  its  own 
elective  assembly  varying  in  number  from  four  to  eight 
members  chosen  by  the  custodians  of  the  communes,  one  of 
whom  was  elected  in  each  important  village. 

New  criminal  and  civil  codes  were  completed  by  a  com- 
mission on  April  24,  and  a  system  of  mixed  courts,  with 
both  Egyptian  and  foreign  jurists,  was  provided  under  in- 
ternational agreements,  known  as  the  "  Capitulations," 
which  gave  to  the  consuls  of  European  states  the  right  of 
jurisdiction  over  all  cases  in  which  their  own  nationals  were 
a  party.  Then  Lord  Dufferin  brought  over  the  ablest  men 
from  the  Indian  service  to  organize  the  work  of  irrigation 
in  Egypt,  and  began  the  reconstruction  of  the  army  upon 
a  strictly  Egyptian  basis,  and  the  complete  reformation  of 
the  administrative  system. 

It  was  not  advisable,  in  his  opinion,  to  turn  Egypt  into 


322    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

a  British  protectorate  under  a  Resident,  even  though  this 
form  of  government  offered  more  immediate  and  certain 
prospects  of  success.  The  Gladstone  cabinet  would  never 
have  consented  in  any  event ;  and  it  was  opposed  to  his  own 
desire  not  to  hold  the  Egyptian  people  "  in  any  irritating 
tutelage."  He  preferred  rather  that  they  "  should  lead  their 
own  lives  and  administer  their  own  government  unimpeded 
by  any  external  anxieties  and  preoccupations."  To  secure 
stability  and  efficiency  in  the  systems,  while  preserving  all 
outward  control  in  the  hands  of  the  Egyptian  officials, 
Lord  Dufferin,  therefore,  provided  European  advisers  in 
every  branch  of  the  administration,  but  left  all  the  public 
positions  to  be  filled  by  Egyptians.  The  position  of  these 
advisers  was  extra-legal  and  they  -were  subject  to  the  con- 
trol of,  and  in  close  touch  with,  the  British  Consul-General 
at  Cairo ;  but  the  scheme  has  worked  admirably  ever  since. 
Their  duty  was  to  furnish  "sympathetic  advice  and  as- 
sistance " ;  and,  in  the  words  of  Lord  Dufferin  some  years 
later,  the  reformation  of  Egypt  was  accomplished  "  not  by 
what  we  did,  but  by  what  we  did  not  do." 

The  author  of  the  "  Institutions  "  was  firmly  convinced 
that  time  was  essential  to  the  proper  development  of  his 
system,  that  the  people  should  be  afforded  every  chance 
to  learn  the  elements  of  self-government,  and  that  Great 
Britain  ought  to  remain  in  the  country  until  the  new  regime 
was  on  its  feet  and  the  people  able  to  take  care  of  them- 
selves. He  was  undoubtedly  right.  "Unless  they  [the 
Egyptians]  are  convinced  that  we  intend  to  shield  and  fos- 
ter the  system  we  have  established,  it  will  be  in  vain  to  ex- 
pect the  timid  politicians  of  the  East  to  identify  themselves 
with  its  existence.  But  even  this  will  not  be  enough.  We 
must  also  provide  that  the  tasks  entrusted  to  the  new  po- 
litical apparatus  do  not  overtax  its  untried  strength.  .  .  . 
We  can  hardly  consider  the  work  of  reorganization  complete, 


EGYPT  823 

or  the  responsibilities  imposed  upon  us  by  circumstances  ade- 
quately discharged,  until  we  have  seen  Egypt  shake  herself 
free  from  the  initial  embarrassments  "  of  bankruptcy  and 
agricultural  depression.  The  Khedive  and  Lord  Dufferin 
were  anxious  that  Sir  Edward  Malet,  who,  as  British  Agent 
at  Cairo,  had  rendered  valuable  assistance  in  the  formation 
of  the  reform  laws,  should  remain  to  see  them  carried  out. 
However,  the  Home  Government  ruled  otherwise.  Mr. 
Malet  was  sent  to  Brussels ;  and,  on  September  11,  1883, 
Sir  E.  Baring  (since  1892,  Lord  Cromer)  arrived  in 
Egypt  to  assume  the  position  and  duties  of  the  British  Con- 
sul-General.  How  successfully  he  did  his  work  is  too  well 
known  to  be  recorded  in  detail  here.  The  story  may  be  read 
at  length  in  his  own  interesting  book  on  Modern  Egypt, 
or  in  Sir  Auckland  Colvin's  The  Making  of  Modern  Egypt. 
The  progress  of  reform  was  slow  but  steady,  and  in  pro- 
portion to  the  increase  in  the  revenues  of  the  state.  Out 
of  the  theoretical  scheme  of  Lord  Dufferin,  Lord  Cromer 
gradually  evolved  a  system  of  government  which  gave  pros- 
perity, peace,  and  security  to  the  country  and  protection  to 
all  classes,  though  it  may  have  savored  at  times  of  abso- 
lutism. During  an  administration  of  twenty-five  years,  there 
was  much  to  praise  and  little  to  criticize.  In  the  first  five 
years  the  finances  were  completely  reorganized,  annual 
budgets  formed,  and  the  credit  of  the  state  established  on 
a  firm  basis,  without  any  substantial  increase  in  the  taxes. 
The  corve'e  was  abolished ;  and  the  taxpayers  freed  from 
an  oppressive  and  vicious  system  of  extortionate  and 
corrupt  tax-farming.  In  the  next  twenty  years,  some 
<£E193,000,000  were  raised  easily  by  the  reconstructed 
revenues,  of  which  some  <£E73,000,000  were  expended  on 
public  improvements  and  other  measures  affecting  the  ma- 
terial condition  and  interests  of  the  masses.  The  "  fella- 
heen," or  common  peasant  inhabitants  of  the  country, 


324     INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

were  protected,  given  an  opportunity  to  acquire  land,  and 
aided  to  get  ahead  as  never  before.  In  addition,  some 
XE12,000,000  were  devoted  to  irrigation,  the  Assuan  Dam 
and  the  Assiut  Barrage  built,  and  over  500,000  acres  re- 
claimed for  farming  in  Middle  Egypt. 

"  He  must  be  blind,"  wrote  an  unbiased  and  competent 
Egyptian  authority  in  1906,  "  who  sees  not  what  the  Eng- 
lish have  wrought  in  Egypt :  the  gates  of  justice  stand  open 
to  the  poor ;  the  streams  flow  through  the  land  and  are  not 
stopped  at  the  order  of  the  strong  ;  the  poor  man  is  lifted 
up  and  the  rich  man  pulled  down ;  the  hand  of  the  op- 
pressor and  briber  is  struck  when  outstretched  to  do  evil. 
Our  eyes  see  these  things,  and  we  know  from  whom  they 
come.  .  .  .  And  very  many  of  us  ...  are  thankful.  But 
thanks  lie  on  the  surface  of  the  heart  and  beneath  is  a  deep 
well."  In  this  "  deep  well "  there  has  always  remained  a 
spirit  of  unrest  and  of  suspicion,  which  has  manifested  itself 
occasionally  at  the  call  of  Pan-Islamism,  of  the  Caliph  who 
sits  at  Constantinople,  and  of  false  prophets.  For  it  is 
difficult  for  the  European  and  the  Oriental  to  attain  the 
highest  sympathy  and  cooperation  in  the  joint  rule  of  any 
country  —  no  matter  how  great  their  respect  for,  and  obli- 
gation to,  one  another  may  be.  In  Egypt  the  call  of  Islam 
is  superior  to  all  sentiments  of  loyalty  to  England,  or  even 
to  the  Khedive ;  and  the  volatile  nature  of  the  Egyptian 
makes  him  an  easy  victim  of  the  political  demagogue.  It 
is,  therefore,  remarkable  that,  in  thirty  years,  no  far-reach- 
ing movement  against  the  existing  government  has  been 
successfully  launched.  The  agitation  caused  by  such  skill- 
ful leaders  of  the  so-called  "  National  Party  "  as  Mustapha 
Pasha  Kamel  (who  died  February  10,  1908)  and  the  ex- 
citement created  by  the  unhappy  "  Denishwei  Affair  "  in 
June,  1906,  have  in  no  way  vitally  impeded  the  develop- 
ment and  progress  of  the  country  or  weakened  the  position 


EGYPT  325 

of  England.  The  chief  reason  for  this  is  to  be  found  in  the 
fact  that  the  National  Party,  though  led  by  able  men  who 
would  naturally  prefer  to  see  their  country  ruled  by  its  own 
citizens,  has  never  produced  an  enlightened,  constructive, 
and  progressive  platform.  Its  leaders  have  been  too  ideal- 
istic, bombastic,  and  impractical  to  attract  the  thinkers ; 
and  the  masses  have  been  too  well  satisfied  with  existing 
conditions  to  follow  them. 

There  are  many  keen  and  gifted  men,  like  Said  Zagloul 
Pasha  and  the  late  Sheik  Mohammed  Abdou,  who  wished 
to  reform  Moslem  institutions  without  affecting  the  general 
faith  in  the  religion  of  the  Prophet,  and  to  bring  about  the 
political  regeneration  of  Egypt  in  the  proper  time  and  way, 
with  the  cooperation  of  Europeans.  The  real  hope  of  the 
nation  lies  in  this  steadily  increasing  class  of  men.  For  no 
one  can  expect  to  work  a  rapid  transformation  in  political 
ideals,  or  create  democratic  institutions  offhand,  in  a  coun- 
try where,  at  the  end  of  the  nineteenth  century,  only  9.5 
per  cent  of  the  men  and  .3  of  one  per  cent  of  the  women 
could  read  and  write.  Yet  the  British  authorities  have  kept 
steadily  in  mind  the  wise  suggestion  of  Lord  Dufferin  — 
that,  in  the  fullness  of  time,  representative  institutions 
should  be  given  to  Egypt.  In  the  spring  of  1913,  Lord 
Kitchener  took  up  this  matter  again  seriously  and  made  an 
excellent  report,  recommending  certain  important  changes 
in  the  electoral  laws  and  in  the  existing  form  of  popular 
representation.  His  suggestions  were  taken  up  by  Parlia- 
ment and  embodied  in  the  Electoral  and  Organic  Law  of 
July  21,  1913.1 

The  old  "  General  Assembly  "  has  been  abolished  under 
the  new  law,  and  all  popular  authority  concentrated  in  the 
Legislative  Assembly  which  has  become  a  real  representa- 
tive body.  The  number  of  deputies  is  increased  to  eighty  - 
1  Brit.  Parl  Papers,  1913,  Egypt  No.  3,  cd.  6875. 


326    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

nine,  including  six  ministers,  sixty-six  elected  members, 
and  seventeen  appointed  to  represent  minorities  and  in- 
terests not  otherwise  provided  for.  Although  the  rep- 
resentation is  indirect,  the  method  is  simple  and  well 
adapted  to  present  conditions.  Every  male  Egyptian,  who  is 
twenty  years  of  age  and  has  his  name  registered  in  the 
electoral  list  of  his  town  or  village,  is  entitled  to  vote,  ex- 
cept soldiers,  criminals,  bankrupts,  and  disbarred  lawyers. 
Every  fifty  voters  choose  an  elector-delegate  for  a  term  of 
six  years,  who  must  be  thirty  years  of  age  and  a  registered 
voter.  He  is  to  act  for  them  in  electing  deputies  to  the  pro- 
vincial assemblies  and  to  the  national  chamber.  The  pro- 
portion in  the  latter  is  intended  to  be  about  one  member 
to  every  200,000  of  the  population.  One  third  of  this  as- 
sembly will  be  renewed  every  two  years  ;  and  the  term  of 
office  is  six  years.  Deputies  must  be  thirty-five  years  of 
age,  registered  voters  of  three  years'  standing,  able  to  read 
and  write,  and  must  have  paid  at  least  two  annual  tax  as- 
sessments of  XE50  on  land,  or  XE20  if  on  a  house.  Hold- 
ers of  educational  diplomas  are  required  to  pay  only  two 
fifths  of  these  taxes,  or  <£E20  or  XE8  as  the  case  may  be. 

The  ministry  may  dissolve  the  Legislative  Assembly  at 
any  time,  but  a  new  election  must  be  held  within  three 
months.  A  bill  has  to  be  sent  three  times  to  the  Chamber, 
however,  for  public  discussion,  and,  in  case  of  disagreement, 
one  private  conference  must  be  held  with  the  Government 
before  a  dissolution  can  be  ordered.  Laws  relative  to  inte- 
rior affairs,  the  organization  of  the  powers  of  state,  the  civil 
and  political  rights  of  the  people,  and  the  public  adminis- 
tration, cannot  be  promulgated  without  the  advice  of  the 
Assembly ;  and  all  statutes  must  be  countersigned  by  the 
President  of  the  Council  and  the  proper  minister.  No  new 
tax  —  direct,  personal,  or  land  —  can  be  established  without 
the  vote  of  this  legislative  body,  which  will  sit  yearly  from 


UEGYPT  827 

November  1  to  May  1.  Its  advice  must  be  obtained  on  all 
public  loans  and  on  canal,  drainage,  or  railway  projects 
affecting  more  than  one  province ;  and  the  annual  budget 
has  to  be  submitted  for  its  scrutiny  forty  days  before  the 
end  of  the  fiscal  year.  The  Assembly  may  even  initiate 
legislation,  provided  it  does  not  pertain  to  constitutional 
matters,  receive  private  members'  bills,  and  question  the 
ministers  after  due  notice. 

The  provincial  assemblies  which  are  composed  of  two 
representatives  from  each  subdistrict,  elected  for  four  years, 
possess  a  large  amount  of  control  over  local  affairs  and  the 
introduction  of  public  improvements,  being  permitted  to 
vote  five  per  cent  of  the  annual  land  taxes  without  further 
approval  and  to  supervise  the  (elementary)  agricultural, 
industrial,  and  commercial  education. 

To  insure  better  public  morals,  all  elections  are  to  be 
declared  void  where  any  trace  of  fraud,  violation  of  elec- 
toral laws,  or  irregularities  by  candidates  or  their  agents  is 
found.  And  all  corruption,  intimidation,  and  impersonation 
are  punishable  by  heavy  fines  and  imprisonment.  To  fit  the 
masses  for  the  proper  use  of  the  ballot  and  for  greater  self- 
dependence,  great  attention  is  being  paid  to  the  educational 
system.  There  are  now  some  1003  elementary  public,  3951 
elementary  private  ("  Kuttabs  "),  and  203  higher,  schools 
in  the  country,  including  nearly  30  industrial,  agricultural, 
and  commercial  institutes,  with  a  total  attendance  of  over 
321,300.  Since  the  Ministry  of  Education,  led  by  Ma- 
hommed  Ali  Pasha,  began  its  systematic  work  in  1897-98, 
the  public  expenditure  for  education  has  risen  from  <£E3,000 
to  £E64,000  in  1910. 

What  Egypt  now  needs  is  a  continued  era  of  peace  and 
internal  tranquillity,  in  order  to  increase  her  material  pros- 
perity and  to  facilitate  the  growth  of  education,  of  moral 
strength,  and  of  political  institutions.  Parties  and  political 


328    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

agitation  can  avail  little  at  this  time.  "  We  are  in  no  need 
of  parties,"  commented  a  prominent  Egyptian  writer  upon 
the  attempt  of  the  "Al-Moayad"  to  revive  the  National 
Party  recently.  "We  have  had  enough  of  them.  All  we 
need  is  to  develop  in  our  young  men  a  desire  for  hard  work 
in  their  spheres  of  action,  more  education,  internal  security, 
and  good  crops.  Parties  will  not  be  of  any  use  to  us,  as  ex- 
perience has  amply  shown."  This  feeling  has  become  quite 
general ;  and  the  old  days  are  past  when  a  party  could  be 
launched  in  a  night  around  the  tables  of  an  old  cafe\ 

"  There  has  been  a  marked  diminution  of  party  feeling 
and  party  strife,"  writes  Lord  Kitchener  in  his  report  for 
1913 ; l  "  and  I  notice  indications  for  a  greater  confidence 
in  the  Government,  particularly  among  the  silent  mass  of 
the  people.  I  hope  I  am  not  too  optimistic  in  considering 
these  to  be  signs  that  in  the  near  future  the  population  will 
be  again  closely  united,  and,  while  placing  personal  inter- 
ests aside,  will  endeavor  to  work  loyally  for  the  common 
good  and  to  further  the  real  interests  of  their  country." 
There  are,  indeed,  a  goodly  number  of  gifted  and  well- 
trained  natives  now  filling  positions  of  the  highest  trust 
and  importance  in  a  highly  creditable  manner.  Said  Zagloul 
Pasha,  who  resigned  from  the  Ministry  of  Justice  in  1913, 
had  rendered  excellent  service  on  the  Native  Court  of  Ap- 
peals and  as  Minister  of  Education  from  1906  to  1910.  He 
introduced  and  was  responsible  for  many  valuable  reforms 
in  both  departments.  Ahmed  Hilmi  Pasha,  recently  made 
Minister  of  Finance,  was  a  most  successful  administrator 
as  the  Mudir  of  Menufia.  Yusuf  Wahla  Pasha,  a  Copt  and 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  since  1912-13,  was  the  ablest 
member  of  the  Mixed  Court  of  Appeals  and  has  achieved 
a  great  reputation  as  an  efficient  public  official. 

"The  Government  authorities,"  says  Lord  Kitchener, 
1  Brit.  Par/.  Papers,  1913,  Egypt  No.  1,  cd.  6682. 


EGYPT  329 

"  are  doing  all  in  their  power  to  improve  the  condition  of 
the  people  and  help  them  forward  on  sound  lines,  both  as 
regards  their  material  and  political  progress  "  ;  and  there 
is  ample  testimony  on  all  sides  to  prove  his  contention. 
The  success  of  their  efforts  depends  very  largely,  he  claims, 
upon  a  steady  and  healthy  financial  and  economic  progress. 
Among  other  things,  the  importance  of  the  cotton  crop  and 
the  maintenance  of  the  price  of  this  staple  export  cannot 
be  overstated.  The  country  has  now  recovered  from  the 
fall  in  prices  of  1895  to  1900  and  the  speculation  which 
followed  the  rise  of  prices  in  1907.  The  fellaheen  are  at 
length  protected  from  the  usurers  and  their  own  tendency 
to  extravagance  and  mismanagement  by  the  Five  Feddan 
Law  of  1912,  which  forbids  the  alienation  of  small  farms 
for  debt  and  provides  government  assistance  in  many  dis- 
tricts on  an  easy  loan  plan. 

Thus  the  country  has  been  set  on  a  fair  way,  under  full 
sail,  toward  a  prosperous  and  successful  future.  And  Great 
Britain  has  most  happily  demonstrated  how  an  enlightened 
European  state  can  free  an  oppressed  and  impoverished 
people  from  the  rule  of  a  corrupt  and  selfish  oligarchy, 
furnish  them  with  an  efficient  administration,  equal  justice 
and  protection  for  all,  and  a  sound  economic  and  financial 
system,  and  set  them  on  the  highroad  of  peace  and  happi- 
ness, without  taking  possession  of  their  land  or  submitting 
them  to  an  "  irritating  tutelage."  And  this  without  a  cent 
of  return,  save  what  comes  through  the  legitimate  channels 
of  trade ! 


CHAPTER  XIV 

THE  REOCCUPATION    OF  NORTHERN  AFRICA 
THE   SUDAN 

AFTER  the  intricate  and  difficult  problem  of  reorganiz- 
ing the  Egyptian  finances,  no  more  important  or  perplex- 
ing task  lay  before  the  new  Government  of  Egypt  than 
the  settlement  of  the  Sudan  question.  Ever  since  its  con- 
quest by  Mehemet  Ali,  that  country  had  been  a  source  of 
trouble  and  expense  to  the  Egyptian  rulers,  although  it 
only  embraced  then  the  region  between  Wadi  Haifa  and 
Khartoum.  Ismail  Pasha,  ambitious  and  well  intentioned, 
with  the  help  of  European  officials  whom  he  faithfully 
supported,  subjugated  all  of  the  vast  region  extending 
from  Khartoum  south  to  the  sources  of  the  Nile  and  from 
the  ancient  kingdom  of  Dar-Fur  to  the  Red  Sea. 

From  1869  to  1873,  Sir  Samuel  Baker  was  busy  annex- 
ing the  equatorial  region  of  the  Nile  Basin  and  fighting 
the  slave  traders  of  Unyoro  and  Gondokoro,  yet  thwarted 
many  times  by  the  corrupt  and  inefficient  Egyptian  offi- 
cials above  him  and  the  Governor-General  at  Khartoum. 
General  Charles  George  Gordon  succeeded  him  as  gov- 
ernor of  Equatorial  Africa.  He  surveyed  the  Nile  from 
Gondokoro  to  Albert  Nyanza,  penetrated  into  the  Bahr-el- 
Ghazal  and  Dar-Fur,  stopped  the  slave  raids,  collected  the 
taxes,  and  improved  conditions  generally,  at  the  expense 
of  his  health  and  amid  great  physical  exertions  and  dis- 
comforts. In  spite  of  the  assistance  of  an  able  staff  of 
officers  including  Romola  Gessi,  Watson,  Chippendale,  and 
Enser,  he  too  resigned  his  position  in  disgust,  on  account 


THE  SUDAN  331 

of  the  lack  of  support  from  the  Egyptian  Government  and 
of  the  intrigues  of  the  Governor-General  at  Khartoum, 
and  returned  to  London  in  1876. 

In  1877,  he  came  back  to  Egypt  at  the  special  solicita- 
tion of  Ismail  Pasha,  who  appointed  him  Governor-General 
of  the  Sudan  and  the  Equatorial  Provinces.  For  two  years 
he  labored  under  great  difficulties  (being  always  in  great 
straits  to  get  money,  officers,  and  troops  sufficient  to  exe- 
cute his  plans)  to  maintain  order  and  security  in  the  coun- 
try, so  that  the  natives  might  live  in  peace  and  raise  their 
crops.  Conditions  of  life  in  the  Sudan  in  those  days  were 
hard  and  the  situation  of  the  people  pitiful.  During  the 
years  1875-79,  Gordon  reports  that  the  loss  of  life  from 
famine,  disease,  and  wars  exceeded  81,000  in  Dar-Fur  and 
18,000  in  Bahr-el-Ghazal,  to  which  must  be  added  a  fur- 
ther decrease  of  eighty  to  one  hundred  thousand  caused 
by  the  innumerable  slave  raids. 

Every  effort  was  made  to  stamp  out  the  practice  of 
slave  hunting  and  trading,  the  slave  traders  being  driven 
in  large  numbers  out  of  all  the  towns  and  the  slave  bands 
freed  at  every  opportunity.  Zubeir  Pasha,  the  Sultan  of 
Dar-Fur  and  the  chief  of  the  Arab  slave  rulers,  was  cap- 
tured and  sent  into  exile  at  Cairo.  His  son,  Suleiman, 
united  all  the  chiefs  of  Dar-Fur  and  Bahr-el-Ghazal  in  an 
attempt  to  stop  the  progress  of  reform  and  to  secure  free- 
dom from  Egyptian  domination.  But  the  indomitable 
Gessi,  after  a  terrific  struggle  lasting  nearly  two  years, 
completely  defeated  and  scattered  the  forces  of  the  slavers 
in  July,  1879.  All  the  leaders,  save  Rabah,  who  escaped  to 
Wadai  and  appeared  later  in  Nigeria,1  were  captured ;  and, 
after  being  tried  by  court  martial  for  treachery  and  the 
murder  of  Egyptians,  eleven  chieftains,  including  Sulei- 
man, were  condemned  and  shot.  The  country  then  settled 
1  See  p.  143,  ante. 


832    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

down  to  a  period  of  peace,  security,  and  progress;  and,  under 
the  skillful  hand  of  Gessi,  the  Bahr-el-Ghazal  became  a 
garden,  the  confidence  of  all  the  headmen  was  secured,  and 
the  trade  of  the  region  was  revived  on  a  firm  basis.  Equally 
creditable  progress  was  being  made  at  the  same  time  by 
Gordon's  other  lieutenants,  including  Rudolph  Slatin  Bey 
in  Dar-Fur  and  Kordofan  and  Edward  Schnitzler  (Emin 
Effendi  Hakim)  Bey,  in  the  Equatorial  Province  which 
extended  from  Lado  and  Rejaf  on  the  Nile  to  Lake 
Albert. 

After  the  abdication  of  Ismail  Pasha  in  1879,  Gordon, 
realizing  that  substantial  governmental  support  would  no 
longer  be  forthcoming,  resigned  at  the  end  of  the  year. 
Gessi  resigned  also  in  1881,  after  receiving  no  supplies  or 
steamers  from  Khartoum  for  eight  months,  and  having  the 
pay  of  his  military  and  civil  officials  reduced  by  two  years' 
time  by  the  incompetent  and  corrupt  Raouf  Pasha,  who 
succeeded  Gordon  as  Governor-General.  He  was  followed 
in  the  Bahr-el-Ghazal  as  governor  by  Lupton  Bey.  Civil 
and  military  centers  were  maintained  also  by  the  Egyptian 
Government  at  El  Obeid  in  Kordofan,  Sennar,  Kassala, 
Suakim  on  the  Red  Sea,  and  at  Berber  and  Dongola  on 
the  Nile. 

Conditions  generally  went  from  bad  to  worse  under  the 
Egyptian  officials,  who  cared  more  for  money  and  gain 
than  for  real  progress  and  an  honest  rule.  Finally,  in  Au- 
gust, 1881,  Egypt  and  Europe  were  aroused  by  the  appear- 
ance in  Dar-Fur  of  one  Mohammed  Ahmed,  who  pro- 
claimed himself  as  the  Mahdi,  or  successor  of  the  Prophet, 
and  as  a  savior  of  the  Sudanese  from  the  oppression  and 
rule  of  foreigners  and  Egyptians.  The  Egyptian  Govern- 
ment paid  little  attention  to  the  movement  at  first,  which 
spread  rapidly  until  at  length  the  Mahdi  was  able  to  take 
the  field  in  person.  After  two  or  three  slight  successes,  he 


THE  SUDAN 


333 


ANGLO-EGYPTIAN  SUDAN  in  1899 

Regions  In  rebellion  whin  General  Gordon  reached  Khartoum  In  1884 


overran  Kordofan  and  after  a  siege  took  El  Obeid,  its 
capital,  on  February  18,  1883,  and  made  it  his  headquar- 
ters. Meanwhile,  his  emissaries  were  intriguing  with  the 
local  chiefs  and  stirring  up  a  rebellion  in  all  parts  of  the  Su- 
dan. Serious  uprisings  broke  out  in  the  vicinity  of  Sennar 


834     INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

and  Kassala,  cutting  off  direct  communication  between  those 
places  and  Khartoum. 

The  Cairo  authorities,  finally  aroused  to  action,  engaged 
General  Hicks,  a  British  officer  of  considerable  experience 
in  India,  to  put  down  the  revolt.  He  reached  Khartoum 
in  March,  1883,  and  in  September,  after  vain  attempts  to 
secure  an  adequate  equipment,  set  out  with  an  undisci- 
plined force  of  12,000  men  (most  of  whom  were  unreliable 
Egyptian  soldiers),  10  mountain  guns,  6  Nordenfelts,  5500 
camels  and  500  horses,  to  march  over  the  desert  from  the 
Nile  to  El  Obeid.  Failing  to  take  proper  precautions  to  in- 
sure a  sufficient  supply  of  food  and  water  and  the  safety 
of  his  column,  he  was  misled  by  his  guides  and  his  army 
totally  destroyed ;  but  the  news  of  the  disaster  did  not 
reach  Cairo  until  November  5.  General  Valentine  Baker 
tried  in  December  to  relieve  the  garrisons  at  Tokar  and 
Sinkat  from  Suakim,  but  was  driven  back  with  a  loss  of 
2400  men  out  of  approximately  3800.  Sennar  was  com- 
pletely invested ;  Suakim  in  a  panic ;  Khartoum  threatened ; 
and  the  revolt  of  Hadendowa  in  the  east  (Kassala),  as  well 
as  that  of  the  Mahdi  in  the  west,  given  great  encourage- 
ment. 

At  this  moment,  Great  Britain,  acting  upon  the  advice 
of  Sir  Evelyn  Baring,  British  Agent  at  Cairo,  and  the 
reports  of  Generals  Wood,  Stephenson,  and  Baker,  who 
claimed  that  Egypt  could  no  longer  hold  her  southern 
provinces  or  hope  to  regain  control  of  the  rebellious  dis- 
tricts, urged  the  Khedive  to  withdraw  from  the  Sudan  al- 
together. This  the  Egyptian  authorities  were  loath  to  do, 
fearing  the  necessity  of  abandoning  their  own  garrisons  in 
distant  Equatoria  and  Bahr-el-Ghazal  and  unwilling  to 
sacrifice  valuable  territories.  Tewfik  Pasha  wished  to  hold, 
at  least,  the  Khartoum-Suakim  line  to  insure  the  protec- 
tion of  Upper  Egypt,  while  Cherif  Pasha  was  opposed  to  any 


THE  SUDAN  335 

withdrawal.  Finally,  after  considerable  pressure  had  been 
brought  to  bear,  Tewfik  acceded  to  the  British  demand  and 
Cherif  Pusha  resigned  in  favor  of  Nubar  Pasha  on  Janu- 
ary 3,  1884.  The  Egyptian  authorities  and  Cairo  leaders 
were  greatly  excited;  and  every  one  was  rilled  with  un- 
certainty and  apprehension.  And,  although  the  British 
plan  was  adopted,  it  was  understood  that  the  Egyptian 
garrisons  would  be  brought  out  and  that  Great  Britain 
would  recommend  a  man  to  assist  in  their  rescue.  Accord- 
ingly, on  January  18,  General  Gordon  was  nominated.  His 
appointment  was  approved  by  the  Khedive  and  he  reached 
Cairo  on  January  24. 

General  Gordon  was  instructed  by  Earl  Granville  to  re- 
port upon  the  general  situation  in  the  Sudan,  the  best  mode 
of  effecting  the  evacuation,  and  the  probable  effect  upon 
the  slave  trade  of  the  withdrawal  of  the  Egyptian  forces. 
By  the  Khedive  and  Baring  he  was  especially  charged  to 
use  every  possible  means  to  insure  the  safe  retreat  of  the 
Egyptian  people  and  garrisons  in  the  Sudan,  including  the 
civil  population  of  Khartoum.  There  was  evidently  consider- 
able uncertainty  concerning  the  exact  details  of  his  mission. 
Was  he  to  extricate  the  garrisons  at  once,  or  was  he  merely 
to  report  conditions  and  act  later  upon  the  receipt  of  other 
instruction  ?  There  is  no  doubt  that  Gordon  was  in  entire 
sympathy  with  the  British  policy  of  giving  up  the  Sudan 
when  he  left  for  Khartoum.  "  I  will  carry  out  the  evacua- 
tion as  far  as  possible  according  to  their  [Her  Majesty's 
Government]  wish,"  he  wrote  Granville  in  a  memorandum 
written  on  shipboard  and  received  in  London  on  February 
1,  "  to  the  best  of  my  ability,  and  with  avoidance  as  far  as 
possible  of  all  fighting.  I  would,  however,  hope  that  H.  M. 
Government  will  give  me  their  support  and  consideration 
should  I  be  unable  to  fulfill  all  their  expectations."  1 
1  Brit.  Part.  Papers,  1884,  Egypt,  vol.  88,  pp.  252-53. 


336    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

Gordon  thought  at  first  that  it  would  be  possible  to  secure 
the  withdrawal  of  the  Egyptian  garrisons  and  people, 
through  the  cooperation  of  the  native  Sudanese  chieftains, 
to  whom  he  proposed  to  turn  over  the  government  of  the 
country.  On  February  5,  the  Khedive  appointed  him  Gov- 
ernor-General of  the  Sudan  with  full  power;  and  there- 
after the  work  of  protecting  and  escorting  the  Egyptians  in 
safety  out  of  the  country  became  for  him  a  sacred  duty. 
After  reaching  Khartoum,  he  issued  a  proclamation  promis- 
ing protection  and  assistance  to  all  Egyptians  and  Sudan- 
ese who  would  support  him  and  urging  all  the  chiefs  to  op- 
pose the  Mahdi.  He  then  sent  down  a  large  number  of  sick 
men,  women,  and  children  to  Dongola,  opened  communica- 
tions with  the  beleaguered  garrisons  as  far  as  possible,  and 
tried  to  get  a  thorough  grasp  of  the  whole  situation.  The 
magnitude  of  the  task  before  him  was  soon  apparent.  The 
difficulties  in  the  way  of  a  successful  retreat  from  the  Sudan 
proved  much  greater  than  any  one  had  anticipated.  For  the 
rebellion  was  so  widespread  and  the  agents  of  the  Mahdi 
so  powerful  that,  without  some  military  backing,  his  own 
personal  influence  and  efforts  could  accomplish  little.  In 
fact,  it  was  no  longer  possible  to  extricate  safely  the  inte- 
rior forces  located  at  Sennar,  Kassala,  and  in  Equatoria, 
without  the  use  of  troops. 

On  February  4,  General  Gordon  outlined  his  general 
plan  as  follows :  to  replace  the  Egyptian  by  native  Sudan- 
ese officials  under  himself,  open  the  road  between  Suakim 
and  Berber  and  between  Suakim  and  Kassala,  relieve  Sen- 
nar, send  steamers  up  the  Nile  for  the  garrisons  in  Equa- 
toria and  Bahr-el-Ghazal,  and  arrange  for  a  general  exodus 
of  Egyptians  via  Dongola ;  and  he  asked  for  English  officers 
and  men  to  assist  him.  Finding  the  British  authorities  in- 
disposed to  furnish  any  military  assistance,  he  wired  Bar- 
ing on  February  18,  urging,  as  the  only  reliable  plan  of 


THE  SUDAN  337 

evacuation  and  one  which  would  afford  proper  protection 
to  the  natives  and  the  interests  of  Egypt,  the  establishment 
of  a  local  government  under  some  native  chieftain  strong 
enough  to  withstand  the  Mahdi  and  to  give  an  efficient  ad- 
ministration to  the  Sudan.  A  general  withdrawal  at  once, 
even  if  it  were  possible,  "  would  be  the  signal  for  general 
anarchy  throughout  the  country."  He  begged  that  Zubeir 
Pasha,  whom  he  considered  the  only  man  equal  to  the  task, 
be  sent  from  Cairo  to  undertake  the  work.  For  the  present, 
Gordon  thought  he  should  be  supported  by  the  British  and 
Egyptian  Governments,  and  given  a  pension  of  X500  a 
year  —  the  last  conditional,  however,  on  his  promising  to 
stay  out  of  the  Equatorial  Provinces,  to  remain  at  peace 
with  Abyssinia,  to  levy  only  five  per  cent  duties,  and  to 
maintain  the  usual  height  of  the  Nile  at  Cairo. 

Colonel  Stewart,  Gordon's  chief  aide  at  Khartoum,  and 
Baring  also  strongly  favored  this  plan ;  but  Gladstone  and 
Granville,  influenced  by  their  personal  antipathy  to  any 
form  of  intervention  and  by  the  demands  of  the  anti-slavery 
leaders  in  England,  who  knew  little  of  the  real  situation  in 
the  Sudan,  questioned  the  policy,  though  they  hesitated  to 
formulate  any  of  their  own.  "  How  can  you  reconcile  the 
appointment  of  Zubeir  with  the  prevention  of  the  slave 
trade  and  the  policy  of  complete  evacuation  ?  "  wired  Earl 
Granville  to  Baring  on  March  5 ;  and  from  February  27 
to  March  9  an  extended  exchange  of  telegrams  on  the  sub- 
ject took  place.  Granville  feared  Zubeir  would  join  the 
Mahdi,  restore  slavery  and  slave  trading,  and  be  a  personal 
danger  to  General  Gordon.  The  general  defended  his 
policy  earnestly  but  respectfully.  He  was  willing  to  take  all 
personal  risks,  and  believed  Zubeir  the  only  person,  power- 
ful, popular,  and  skillful  enough  to  handle  the  situation 
successfully  and  to  extricate  the  garrisons  in  safety.  There 
was  little  danger  of  his  going  over  to  the  Mahdi,  for 


338    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

he  would  soon  be  the  stronger  of  the  two.  As  to  slavery, 
"  even  if  we  held  the  Sudan,  we  could  never  interfere  with 
it,"  wrote  the  man  who  had  spent  several  of  the  best  years 
of  his  life  fighting  the  slave  raiders  and  who  knew  that 
country  as  few  Englishmen  or  Europeans  in  those  days 
could  know  it.  Zubeir  would  be  too  busy  to  indulge  in  slave 
raids,  he  was  sure ;  but,  in  any  event,  the  former  Sultan 
could  be  held  in  check  by  means  of  the  annual  subsidy  and 
English  troops  at  Suakim. 

Baring  believed  that  the  proposed  plan  was  in  "harmony 
with  the  policy  of  evacuation,"  and  that  the  question  of 
slavery  could  not  seriously  affect  the  issue  one  way  or  an- 
other, for  no  middle  course  was  possible.  Either  they  must 
"annex  the  country,  which  was  out  of  the  question,"  or 
they  must  accept  the  consequences  of  its  abandonment. 
"  It  is  for  Her  Majesty's  Government  to  judge  of  the  im- 
portance of  public  opinion  in  England,"  he  wrote,  "  but  I 
venture  to  think  that  any  attempt  to  settle  Egyptian  ques- 
tions in  the  light  of  English  popular  feeling  is  sure  to  be 
productive  of  harm,  and  in  this,  as  in  other  cases,  it  will 
be  preferable  to  follow  the  advice  of  the  responsible  author- 
ity on  the  spot."  1 

Gordon,  although  extremely  desirous  of  executing  the  plan 
of  evacuation,  could  not  carry  it  out  without  troops  unless 
he  deserted  the  garrisons  and  most  of  the  Egyptian  popu- 
lation of  Khartoum.  He  kept  hoping  that  the  British  Gov- 
ernment would  send  some  forces  as  far  as  Dongola  and 
Berber  to  aid  in  the  withdrawal  from  the  country,  or,  at 
least,  would  permit  Zubeir  to  come  to  his  aid.  He  was,  how- 
ever, resigned  to  the  will  of  his  superiors.  The  Government 
could  refuse  Zubeir,  he  wrote  Baring,  but  it  was  the  "  only 
chance.  I  will  do  my  best  to  carry  out  my  instructions,  but  I 
feel  I  shall  be  caught  in  Khartoum."  And  Colonel  Stewart 
1  Brit.  Parl.  Papers,  1884,  Egypt,  vol.  88,  pp.  520-21. 


THE  SUDAN  339 

wrote  on  March  4,  "  I  assure  you  none  are  more  anxious  to 
leave  this  country  than  Gordon  and  myself  and  none  more 
heartily  approve  the  Government's  policy  of  evacuation. 
Unless  Zobeir  [Zubeir]  is  sent,  I  see  little  probability  of  this 
policy  being  carried  out.  Every  day  we  remain  finds  us  more 
firm  in  the  country  and  causes  us  to  incur  responsibili- 
ties toward  the  people,  which  it  is  impossible  for  us  to 
overlook." 

Each  day  and  each  week  brought  fresh  difficulties  in  the 
way  of  the  complete  abandonment  of  the  country  without 
the  employment  of  military  forces,  raised  stronger  barriers 
to  the  rescue  of  the  interior  garrisons,  and  saw  the  lines 
drawn  tighter  and  tighter  about  the  city  of  Khartoum.  On 
March  3,  General  Gordon  wired  Baring :  "  In  the  present 
state  of  affairs,  it  is  impossible  to  withdraw  the  Cairo  em- 
ployees from  Khartoum  without  it  falling  into  the  hands  of 
the  Mahdi's  emissaries,  and  if  this  took  place,  then  of  course 
all  hope  of  saving  the  garrisons  of  Equatoria  and  Bahr-el- 
Ghazal  fails.  ...  I  am  strongly  against  any  permanent 
retention  of  the  Sudan.  I  am  quite  averse  to  it ;  but  I  think 
we  ought  to  leave  it  with  decency.  .  .  .  You  must  see  that 
you  could  not  recall  me,  nor  could  I  possibly  obey  until 
all  the  Cairo  employees  get  out  of  all  the  places.  .  .  .  How 
could  I  look  the  world  in  the  face,  if  I  abandoned  them  and 
fled?  As  a  gentleman  could  you  advise  this  course  ?  It  may 
have  been  a  mistake  to  send  me  up  here,  but  this  hav- 
ing been  done,  I  have  no  option  but  to  see  the  evacuation 
through,  for  even  if  I  were  mean  enough  to  escape,  I  have 
no  power  to  do  so." 1 

He  was  still  awaiting  the  decision  of  the  British  authori- 
ties at  home.  If  ordered  to  withdraw  and  no  troops  could 
be  sent,  the  only  thing  he  could  do  would  be  to  resign  his 
commission  and  try  to  get  out  by  way  of  the  Equatorial 
1  Brit.  Parl.  Papers,  1884,  Egypt,  vol.  88,  p.  562. 


340    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

and  Bahr-el-Ghazal  Provinces,  which  might  be  turned  over 
to  the  Congo  Government  temporarily.  On  March  13,  the 
Foreign  Office  wired  Baring  that  the  Government  could 
not  accept  the  proposals  of  Gordon.  If  unable  to  help  mat- 
ters by  remaining  longer,  he  was  to  retreat  as  soon  as  pos- 
sible to  Berber  and  save  the  garrison  of  Khartoum.  They 
did  not  wish  him  to  resign  his  commission.  But,  appar- 
ently, this  telegram  was  never  received  by  General  Gordon, 
as  Khartoum  was  surrounded  and  cut  off  from  all  commu- 
nication on  March  15  and  Mr.  Baring  reported  that  it  was 
impossible  to  reach  him  by  wire  after  March  10.  From 
that  time  till  the  middle  of  May,  ineffectual  efforts  were 
made  to  get  letters  into  Khartoum  through  special  messen- 
gers. And,  finally,  on  May  15-16,  the  home  authorities 
wired  the  sum  of  X450  to  pay  expert  envoys,  secured 
through  Zubeir,  to  take  a  message  to  Gordon ;  but  even 
they  failed  to  reach  him. 

Meanwhile,  the  followers  of  the  Mahdi  extended  their 
operations  northward,  until  Berber  fell  into  their  hands  on 
May  21,  and  nearly  all  of  the  Middle  and  North  Sudan 
was  in  their  control.  The  British  Government  was  at  last 
forced  to  consider  seriously  the  question  of  sending  troops 
to  the  relief  of  Khartoum ;  but  time  dragged  on  and  August 
came  in,  before  Gladstone,  impelled  by  the  pressure  of  pub- 
lic opinion,  rose  in  Parliament  to  ask  for  a  vote  of  funds 
to  finance  an  expedition  to  the  Sudan.  Another  delay  en- 
sued before  a  plan  of  operations  could  be  agreed  upon. 
General  Wolseley  was  chosen  to  lead  the  forces ;  but  he 
did  not  reach  Cairo  until  September  10,  and  the  campaign 
was  not  actually  inaugurated  until  October  5, 1884.  There 
were  two  routes  that  might  be  followed :  one  across  the 
Nubian  Desert  from  the  port  of  Suakim  to  Berber,  and  the 
other  up  the  Nile  to  Wadi  Haifa  and  over  the  desert  to 
the  same  destination.  It  was  ultimately  decided  to  take  the 


THE  SUDAN  1  341 

latter ;  and  the  late  John  M.  Cook,  of  the  Egyptian  branch 
of  the  firm  of  Thomas  Cook  &  Son,  furnished  the  flotilla 
which  transported  the  entire  force  of  11,000  British  and 
7000  Egyptians,  together  with  130,000  tons  of  stores  and 
war  materials,  from  Assiut  to  Wadi  Haifa  —  a  distance 
of  550  miles. 

Although  animated  with  the  highest  motives  and  enthu- 
siasm, and  pushed  with  all  the  energy  and  ability  of  the 
commanding  general  and  his  assistants,  the  progress  of  the 
army  was  necessarily  slow.  The  leaders  were  compelled  to 
follow  the  Nile  from  Wadi  Haifa,  instead  of  crossing  the 
desert  to  Berber,  in  order  to  have  sufficient  water  for  so 
large  a  force.  This  increased  their  march  about  three  hun- 
dred and  fifty  miles,  during  the  latter  part  of  which  there 
was  fighting  almost  constantly.  However,  when  Wolseley 
received  word  from  Gordon,  on  November  17,  that  Khar- 
toum could  hold  out  for  forty  days  longer,  all  the  troops  had 
passed  Wadi  Haifa.  On  December  2,  the  army  reached 
Dongola  and  by  Christmas  Day  most  of  it  was  at  Korti. 
Here  the  forces  were  divided,  one  division  continuing  along 
the  river  with  a  view  of  capturing  Berber,  while  the  other 
crossed  the  desert  to  Matammeh  on  the  Nile,  where  they 
expected  to  be  met  by  Gordon's  steamers. 

As  this  latter  force  of  fifteen  hundred  men  approached  the 
wells  of  Abu  Klea,  it  was  attacked  by  some  ten  to  eleven 
thousand  Dervishes,  but  it  totally  defeated  them,  after  a  ter- 
rific struggle.  While  Colonel  Charles  Wilson  was  making 
preparations  to  take  the  town  of  Matammeh,  on  January  21, 
steamers  arrived  with  urgent  letters  from  Gordon.  Wilson 
wished  to  set  out  at  once,  but  he  was  delayed  perforce  a 
couple  of  days,  in  order  to  secure  the  position  of  his  forces, 
select  the  best  Sudanese  officers  and  men  for  the  dash  to 
Khartoum,  and  complete  his  preparations.  On  the  24th  of 
January,  he  set  out  with  two  steamers  and  twenty  British 


342    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

soldiers ;  and  four  days  later,  making  every  exertion,  he 
reached  Tuti  Island,  only  to  find  himself  facing  the  guns 
of  Omdurman  and  Khartoum.  Executing  a  rapid  movement 
downstream  till  out  of  range  of  the  forts,  he  sent  scouts 
ashore  and  received  indisputable  evidence  that  the  expedi- 
tion was  three  days  too  late.  Khartoum  had  fallen,  through 
treachery,  on  January  25.  Gordon  had  been  murdered  in 
the  garden  of  his  palace  early  in  the  morning  of  the  26th, 
and  the  city  given  over  to  pillage  and  slaughter.  Colonel 
Wilson  and  his  aides  had  hoped  that  the  victory  of  Abu 
Klea  would  relieve  the  pressure  about  the  capital,  but  it 
had  the  opposite  effect.  For  it  nerved  the  Mahdi  and  his 
followers  to  make  every  effort  to  seize  the  city,  as  a  means 
of  stopping  the  advance  of  the  British.  In  this  they  judged 
correctly,  for  the  military  expedition  withdrew  from  the 
Sudan  almost  immediately,  the  two  divisions  safely  effect- 
ing a  reunion  at  Korti  on  March  8,  leaving  the  Mahdi  su- 
preme. And  by  September,  1885,  the  whole  country  to 
Wadi  Haifa  was  in  the  hands  of  his  followers. 

The  official  reports 1  of  Colonel  Wilson  and  his  superiors 
show  that  no  blame  for  the  failure  of  the  expedition  can 
be  attached  to  the  officers  and  men  engaged  in  the  enter- 
prise. No  one,  however,  has  been  successful  in  lifting  the 
burden  of  criticism  from  the  shoulders  of  the  Gladstone 
Government.  It  has  been  justly  censured  because  it  per- 
mitted the  sending  of  the  Hicks  expedition,  dispatched  a 
man  of  Gordon's  courageous  and  upright  character  to 
Khartoum,  failed  to  grasp  the  necessity  for  the  employment 
of  Zubeir,  and  for  the  delay  in  issuing  orders  for  the  mili- 
tary mission  of  rescue.  The  crux  of  the  whole  matter  lies, 
indeed,  in  the  inability  of  Gladstone  and  his  colleagues 
to  evolve  a  broad  foreign  policy  and  to  enforce  it  with 
promptitude  and  decision.  There  was  ample  justification, 
1  Brit.  Parl.  Popart,  1885,  Egypt,  voL  96,  p.  688. 


THE  SUDAN  343 

undoubtedly,  for  a  difference  of  opinion  concerning  the 
wisdom  of  retaining  a  hold  over  the  Sudan  in  the  early 
eighties ;  and  there  were  good  and  sufficient  reasons  for 
adopting  a  policy  of  withdrawal  at  that  time.  But,  if  evac- 
uation was  necessary  and  expedient,  there  was  no  good  rea- 
son why  it  should  not  have  been  executed  promptly  and 
with  as  little  loss  of  life  and  property  as  possible.  And 
if  a  military  expedition  was  justifiable  in  October,  1884, 
could  there  have  been  any  good  grounds  for  refusing  to 
send  it  in  May  ?  The  equipment  of  a  large  force  for  the 
sole  purpose  of  saving  a  solitary  and  noble  British  subject 
besieged  in  Khartoum  —  however  laudable  in  itself  —  is  not 
a  proper  method  of  solving  a  difficult  political  and  colonial 
problem. 

Gladstone's  excuse,  that  they  had  "  no  proof  that  Gordon 
was  in  danger  and  Khartoum  was  apparently  provisioned 
for  a  long  siege,"  was  wide  of  the  mark.  For  this  is  simply 
another  instance  of  the  difficulties  and  disasters  that  are 
certain  to  follow  whenever  a  state  decides  upon  a  policy  of 
intervention,  but  is  unwilling  to  assume  the  responsibility 
for  all  the  consequences  of  such  an  action.  Great  Britain, 
although  moved  by  certain  vital  political  and  economic 
considerations  rather  than  by  any  preconceived  policy  of 
expansion,  intervened  with  force  in  Egypt.  This  assump- 
tion of  control  in  the  internal  and  external  affairs  of  the 
country  necessarily  implied  a  responsibility  for  the  direc- 
tion of  its  foreign  policy  —  particularly  in  regard  to  the 
Sudan.  This  responsibility  the  British  authorities  tried  to 
avoid  by  demanding  an  immediate  evacuation  of  all  of  the 
Khedive's  southern  territories.  It  was  no  excuse  to  say 
that  England  was  not  inaugurating  a  policy  of  expansion  ; 
that  her  intervention  in  Egypt  was  only  temporary.  She 
was  there,  and,  while  occupying  the  position  of  "  adviser," 
responsible  in  every  way  for  the  conduct  of  affairs.  And, 


344    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

as  long  as  she  remained,  it  was  her  duty  to  see  to  it  (as 
she  did  later)  that  the  interests  of  Egypt  and  its  people 
did  not  suffer  through  any  fault  of  hers.  If  the  advice  of 
Baring  and  Gordon  had  been  listened  to  in  May,  the  Su- 
dan might  have  been  evacuated  with  decency  and  dispatch, 
the  lives  of  the  garrisons  and  of  Gordon  and  Stewart 
spared,  and  the  name  of  Great  Britain  held  in  respect. 
The  expedition  of  October  was  predestined  to  failure.  Its 
result  was  not  merely  a  disaster  —  it  was  a  tragedy.  It 
shattered  the  confidence  of  the  Egyptians  in  the  integrity 
and  ability  of  the  British,  for  they  were  impressed  with  the 
idea  that  the  life  of  one  Britisher  was  of  far  more  impor- 
tance than  the  interests  of  Egypt  or  the  lives  of  thousands 
of  its  people.  It  strengthened  vastly  the  hands  of  the 
Mahdi  and  his  followers ;  it  created  a  grave  menace  to  the 
future  of  the  Egyptian  state  on  the  south ;  and  it  multi- 
plied the  dangers  and  difficulties  of  a  reoccupation  that 
was  sure  to  come. 

On  June  22,  1885,  the  Mahdi  died  suddenly.  He  was 
succeeded  by  Abd- Allah,  known  as  the  "Khalifa,"  who 
proceeded  to  subdue  all  the  country  south  of  Wadi  Haifa 
and  unite  all  sections  under  his  rule.  An  invasion  of  Egypt 
was  only  prevented  by  the  victories  of  Generals  Stephen- 
son  and  Grenfell  over  the  Dervishes,  as  the  followers  of 
the  Khalifa  were  called,  at  Koshah  and  Ginniss  in  Decem- 
ber, 1885 ;  and  Suakim  was  saved  by  English  valor  from 
the  hands  of  Osman  Digna,  the  most  skillful  Dervish 
general. 

The  Egyptian  Government,  though  employing  British 
officers  and  men  to  defend  its  frontier,  remained  for  many 
years  simply  on  the  defensive.  Meanwhile,  in  the  Sudan, 
conditions  went  from  bad  to  worse.  Under  the  reign  of  the 
Khalifa,  whose  government  was  as  inefficient  and  corrupt 
as  it  was  cruel  and  vicious,  the  country  was  speedily  re- 


THE  SUDAN  345 

duced  to  a  state  of  anarchy  and  confusion.  The  people 
were  oppressed  and  overburdened  with  taxes  and  imposts  ; 
human  life  was  of  no  consequence ;  and  the  population 
rapidly  diminished,  until  the  land  presented  a  scene  of 
desolation  and  poverty  unequaled  in  the  annals  of  Africa. 
The  terrible  conditions  prevalent  under  the  Dervish  rule 
and  the  atrocities  and  cruelties  perpetrated  by  the  leaders 
have  been  graphically  described  in  the  works  of  Slatin 
Pasha,  now  Sir  Rudolph  von  Slatin,  Inspector-General  of 
the  Sudan,  and  the  late  Father  Ohrwalder,  both  of  whom 
were  prisoners  of  the  Khalifa  at  Omdurman  during  many 
weary  years.  Europe  was  at  length  aroused,  but  it  was  the 
situation  of  Egypt  that  stirred  Great  Britain  to  action. 
Her  frontier  was  in  a  state  of  constant  unrest  and  never 
free  from  the  danger  of  invasion.  Her  trade  suffered  im- 
mensely by  the  country  being  cut  off  from  all  intercourse 
with  the  Sudan  and  the  lands  to  the  south.  And  her  peo- 
ple lived  in  daily  dread  of  famine  and  disaster,  through 
fear  lest  the  Dervishes  might  interfere  with  the  regular 
flow  of  the  Nile  waters. 

At  length,  the  British  Government  felt  it  was  impera- 
tive to  insure  the  safety  of  the  border.  The  pressure  on 
Wadi  Haifa  was,  accordingly,  relieved  by  the  victory  of 
Colonel  Wadehouse  over  the  Dervishes  at  Argin  in  July, 
and  by  the  defeat  and  destruction  of  the  army  of  Wadan 
Nagumi  by  General  Grenfell  at  Toski  on  August  3,  1889. 
Then  the  situation  about  Suakim  was  greatly  improved 
through  the  decisive  victory  of  Colonel  Holland-Smith 
over  Osman  Digna  at  Tokar  in  1891,  and  again,  in  1896, 
by  Colonel  Lloyd,  Major  Sydney,  and  Captain  Fenwick, 
who  inflicted  another  defeat  on  the  same  leader.  But  this 
was  not  sufficient.  All  traffic  with  the  interior  was  still 
closed.  The  Dervishes  retained  their  control  over  the  Up- 
per Nile,  and  Osman  Digna  continued  his  depredations 


346    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

as  formerly.  In  February,  1896,  the  Italians,  who  had  suc- 
cessfully established  a  protectorate  over  Eretria  and  Abys- 
sinia and  advanced  westward  in  the  Sudan  as  far  as  Kas- 
sala,  suffered  a  crushing  defeat  at  the  hands  of  the  King 
of  Abyssinia.  In  order  to  aid  them  by  keeping  the  Der- 
vishes so  occupied  that  they  could  not  assist  Abyssinia  or 
retake  Kassala,  the  British  authorities  ordered  an  advance 
to  Akasha  and  Dongola. 

The  English  statesmen  were  now  seeing  clearly  the  re- 
sponsibilities their  country  had  assumed  with  the  control 
of  Egypt,  and  were  realizing  the  necessity  of  maintaining 
a  firm  and  progressive  foreign,  as  well  as  internal,  policy. 
Tewfik  Pasha  died  in  1892,  and  was  succeeded  by  his  son, 
Abbas  II  Hilmy,  an  ambitious  and  visionary  youth  who 
had  been  educated  abroad,  and  who  was  not  in  close  touch 
with  the  conditions  in  Egypt.  Great  uncertainty  and  dis- 
quietude prevailed  during  the  next  half-dozen  years  ;  and 
some  unfortunate  incidents  occurred  to  mar  the  close  rela- 
tionship that  previously  had  existed  between  the  Khedive 
and  his  British  advisers.  It,  therefore,  became  imperative 
to  do  something  to  prove  that  the  English  Government 
was  in  earnest  and  intended  to  carry  out  an  enlightened 
program  with  firmness  and  vigor.  In  his  famous  dispatch 
of  February  16,  1893,  Lord  Rosebery,  after  calling  atten- 
tion to  the  important  European  interests,  the  genuine  pub- 
lic opinion,  the  work  of  reform  during  the  last  ten  years 
in  the  country,  and  the  dangers  attendant  on  a  withdrawal 
of  the  British  forces,  declared,  "  There  is  but  one  course 
to  pursue :  we  must  maintain  the  fabric  of  administration 
which  has  been  constructed  under  our  guidance,  and  must 
continue  the  progress  without  impatience,  but  without  in- 
terruption, of  an  administrative  and  judicial  system  which 
shall  afford  a  reliable  guarantee  for  the  future  welfare  of 
Egypt." 


THE  SUDAN  847 

The  next  three  years  a  decided  improvement  was  notice- 
able. In  1894,  important  reforms  in  the  administration  of 
the  country  were  effected,  and  public  security  greatly  im- 
proved. In  1896,  the  plans  for  the  Assuan  Dam  and  the 
opening  of  large  areas  to  irrigation  were  inaugurated,  and 
a  material  advance  made  in  conditions  generally.  It  was 
evident,  however,  that  any  genuine  and  vital  effort  to  pro- 
mote the  real  progress  and  "  future  welfare  of  Egypt "  must 
of  necessity  include  the  solution  of  the  Sudan  question.  In 
April,  1896,  General  Kitchener,  who  had  succeeded  Gen- 
eral Grenfell  as  Sirdar  of  the  Egyptian  army  in  1892,  or- 
dered a  general  advance  of  his  troops,  in  accordance  with 
instructions  from  the  home  authorities.  He  defeated  the 
Dervishes  decisively  at  Ferket  on  June  7,  occupied  Hafir 
on  September  19,  and  entered  Dongola  on  the  23d.  At  the 
opening  of  the  following  year,  the  British  Government  an- 
nounced a  definite  forward  policy  which  included  the  build- 
ing of  a  railway  from  Wadi  Haifa  to  Abu  Hamed  (thus 
cutting  down  the  Nile  journey  350  miles)  and  an  advance 
to  Khartoum.  It  was  apparently  now  ready  to  assume  the 
responsibilities  that  it  had  forced  the  Egyptian  Government 
to  evade  twelve  years  before. 

Kitchener  thereupon  resumed  his  march,  completing  the 
railway  as  he  progressed.  Abu  Hamed  was  taken,  and,  on 
September  6,  Berber  was  occupied.  By  November  4,  the 
railroad  had  reached  Abu  Hamed  and  was  being  rapidly 
pushed  to  Berber.  The  next  spring  operations  were  resumed 
and  a  severe  defeat  inflicted  upon  the  Dervishes  at  Atbara 
on  April  8, 1898,  where  the  Emir  Mahmoud  was  captured. 
The  followers  of  the  Khalifa  then  fell  back  on  their  capital 
at  Omdurman,  gradually  followed  by  the  Anglo-Egyptian 
army  under  General  MacDonald.  Finally,  on  September  2, 
1898,  a  terrific  conflict  took  place  before  Omdurman  in 
which  10,000  Dervishes  were  slain  and  the  forces  of  the 


848    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

Khalifa  completely  routed.  Khartoum  and  the  Khalifa's 
capital  were  occupied,  and  the  great  march  of  550  miles 
over  desert  and  barren  land,  in  the  face  of  tremendous  diffi- 
culties on  every  hand,  was  successfully  achieved.  A  memo- 
rial service  was  held  in  honor  of  General  Gordon,  the  tomb 
of  the  Mahdi  destroyed  and  his  ashes  thrown  into  the  river, 
and  the  Egyptian  and  British  flags  raised.  The  advance 
was  then  resumed  up  the  Nile ;  the  Dervish  camps  were 
destroyed ;  Fashoda  was  reached  on  the  19th,  and  the  whole 
of  the  river  basin  occupied  as  far  as  Gondokoro.  The  Kha- 
lifa had,  meanwhile,  taken  refuge  in  Kordofan,  but  he  was 
pursued  in  January  and  finally  overtaken  and  slain  on  No- 
vember 24,  1899,  the  majority  of  his  Emirs  being  taken 
prisoners.  Osman  Digna  escaped,  but  was  at  length  cap- 
tured near  Suakim  in  January,  1900,  and  sent  to  join  the 
other  leaders  in  confinement  at  Damietta. 

As  soon  as  the  country  had  been  thoroughly  pacified  and 
the  western  boundaries  adjusted  through  the  Anglo- French 
Agreement  of  1899,  the  British  authorities  were  ready  to 
consider  the  problem  of  the  future  status  of  the  Sudan.  A 
serious  situation  confronted  them.  Here  was  a  country  ap- 
proximately one  million  square  miles  in  area,  of  which  only 
about  one  third,  in  the  north,  was  cultivable  and  inhabited 
by  a  fairly  industrious  and  intelligent  people.  The  remain- 
ing two  thirds,  to  the  south,  was  a  vast  tropical  region  of 
apparently  little  value,  occupied  by  wild  warlike  tribes,  like 
the  Shillucks  and  Dinkas,  who  were  ignorant,  restless,  and 
difficult  to  manage.  Business,  trade,  and  all  intercourse 
were  at  a  standstill.  Agriculture  and  industry  languished ; 
and  there  were  no  resources  available  for  a  new  govern- 
ment. The  wealth  of  the  land  seemed  to  have  vanished 
completely  under  the  ruthless  hand  of  the  Dervishes.  It 
was  as  if  a  terrible  blight  had  fallen  upon  the  country,  for 
whole  districts  were  practically  depopulated  —  particularly 


THE  SUDAN  349 

of  men  —  and  the  entire  population  of  the  Sudan  had  fallen 
from  8,000,000  souls  to  approximately  2,000,000. 

Great  Britain  hesitated  to  assume  the  rule  of  so  great  a 
territory.  Nor  was  it  desirable  that  the  Egyptian  Govern- 
ment should  again  be  placed  in  absolute  control  of  it.  To 
extend  the  administrative  and  judicial  systems  of  that  coun- 
try with  its  "  Institutions,"  "  Mixed  Tribunals,"  "  Capitula- 
tions," and  complex  laws,  would  have  been  to  court  disaster. 
Lord  Cromer  suggested  to  Lord  Salisbury  that  Egypt  and 
Great  Britain  enter  upon  a  sort  of  partnership  for  the  oc- 
cupation and  control  of  the  Sudan.  This  solution  appealed 
to  the  British  authorities,  and  the  Anglo-Egyptian  conven- 
tion of  1899  was  the  result.  By  this  a  joint  government  was 
in  theory  established,  although  the  actual  work  of  adminis- 
tration was  left  to  the  British.  The  supreme  authority  was 
concentrated  in  a  governor-general,  appointed  by  Egypt 
with  the  approval  of  England,  and  a  cabinet  largely  of  his 
own  choosing.  Freedom  of  trade  was  permitted  to  all,  sub- 
ject, of  course,  to  the  usual  customs,  but  no  duties  were  to 
be  levied  on  goods  from  Egypt.  The  southern  boundary  of 
Egypt  was  fixed  at  lat.  22°  N.,  near  Wadi  Haifa,  which 
became  the  chief  port  of  entry,  though  a  new  one  was  ere 
long  opened  at  Port  Sudan  on  the  Red  Sea.  Mixed  tribu- 
nals were  prohibited ;  and  the  consuls,  or  agents  of  foreign 
states,  were  forbidden  entrance  without  the  consent  of  Eng- 
land. Slave  trading  was  abolished,  and  the  importation  of 
liquors  and  firearms  stringently  restricted. 

Great  Britain  showed  no  hesitation,  this  time,  in  under- 
taking the  responsibilities  incumbent  upon  any  ruler  in 
Africa.  Major-General  Sir  Reginald  Wingate  was  made 
Governor-General,  Sir  Rudolph  von  Slatin,  K.C.B.,  etc., 
Inspector-General,  and  a  corps  of  efficient  and  energetic 
British  officials  undertook  the  establishment  of  a  thorough- 
going administration.  Peace  and  security  were  given  to  the 


350    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

land ;  schools  were  opened  ;  the  people  were  assisted  to  re- 
claim their  farms  and  reopen  their  lands ;  and  the  country 
was  divided  into  thirteen  provinces,  outside  of  Dar-Fur, 
which  was  left  under  its  native  sovereign.  Lado  was  re- 
turned to  England  by  Belgium  in  1910,  upon  the  death 
of  King  Leopold,  and  the  control  of  Great  Britain  over 
the  upper  and  the  headwaters  of  the  Nile  was  now 
complete. 

Thus  entered  upon  its  labors  a  British  regime  in  Central 
Africa,  untrammeled  by  restrictions  either  from  Egypt  or 
England,  the  success  of  which  in  the  first  fifteen  years  of 
its  existence  has  been  phenomenal.  "  When  you  consider 
the  vast  extent  of  the  country,"  wrote  Lord  Cromer,  "  the 
savagery  of  a  great  portion  of  the  population,  the  enormous 
distances  of  waste  and  desert  which  separate  one  place  from 
another,  and  the  general  economic  condition  of  the  country, 
the  rapidity  with  which  the  Sudan  has  been  regenerated  is 
really  marvelous."  Nowhere  has  this  remarkable  develop- 
ment been  better  demonstrated  than  in  the  increase  in  the 
revenues  of  the  state.  These  have  risen  from  the  nominal 
sum  of  £35,000  in  1898  to  £1,423,000  in  1912.  A  railway 
from  Wadi  Haifa  to  Khartoum  was  constructed,  with  a 
branch  from  Berber  to  Port  Sudan  (Suakim),  affording 
two  outlets  for  the  trade  of  the  country.  It  has  since  been 
extended  to  Sennar,  and  finally  to  El  Obeid,  the  capital  of 
Kordofan,  in  February,  1912 ;  and  there  are  now  fifteen 
hundred  miles  in  operation.  A  scheme  is  already  on  foot  to 
connect  this  system  with  a  line  from  Sennar  to  Suakim  via 
Kassala  and  Tokar.  And  the  government  steamers  cover  a 
regular  schedule  on  the  Nile  and  its  tributaries  of  over 
twenty-five  hundred  miles. 

Of  the  funds  necessary  for  these  improvements,  Egypt 
has  furnished  material  aid  yearly  in  the  form  of  a  subsidy 
which  in  1912  amounted  to  <£E335,000.  Her  statesmen  may 


THE  SUDAN  361 

have  wondered  why  the  "  junior  partner  "  has  had  to  carry 
the  chief  burden  of  the  expense.  But  the  reason  is  evident 
when  one  realizes  how  tremendous  has  been  her  gain  in 
peace,  in  national  security,  and  in  trade,  since  the  reoccu- 
pation  of  the  Sudan.  The  subsidy  will  cease  with  the  com- 
ing year ;  but  Egypt  will  refund  to  the  Sudanese  Govern- 
ment all  duties  collected  at  its  ports  on  goods  destined  for 
the  Sudan.  Great  Britain  has  voted  a  .£3,000,000  loan  to 
assist  in  the  erection  of  a  dam  and  the  irrigation  of  some 
500,000  feddans  in  the  Gezira  district  between  the  Blue 
and  the  White  Nile,  south  of  Khartoum. 

The  trade  of  the  country  has  steadily  increased,  particu- 
larly since  the  opening  of  the  railway.  In  1908,  the  com- 
bined exports  and  imports  reached  <£E2,538,000,  and  in 
1911  they  exceeded  XE3,650,800.  The  progress  in  educa- 
tion has  been  equally  remarkable.  Immediately  after  the 
battle  of  Omdurman,  in  1898,  Lord  Kitchener  wired  influ- 
ential friends  in  London,  asking  that  funds  be  raised  for  a 
college  at  Khartoum.  The  appeal  met  with  a  ready  response, 
and  in  November,  1902,  Gordon  College  was  opened.  Dur- 
ing the  first  ten  years  of  its  existence  the  work  of  the  college 
has  been  remarkable,  both  from  an  educational  and  from 
a  scientific  standpoint,  and  its  growth  has  been  steady,  the 
attendance  now  totaling  approximately  500.  The  equip- 
ment consists,  at  present,  of  an  imposing  College  Hall,  in 
which  the  classrooms,  the  drafting  laboratory,  the  museum, 
and  the  Wellcome  Research  Laboratories  are  located ;  a 
well-equipped  workshop ;  a  fine  primary  school  building;  an 
extensive  student  dormitory ;  four  comfortable  staff -houses 
for  instructors,  and  a  small  mosque.  The  work  of  instruc- 
tion embraces  the  "Training  College,"  where  some  120 
young  Sheiks,  sons  of  the  best  families,  are  being  prepared 
for  the  public  service,  particularly  as  teachers  and  judges  in 
the  local  courts;  the  "Instructional  Workshop,"  where 


852    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

carpentry,  smith  -  work,  and  machine  -  running  are  being 
taught  to  an  intelligent  set  of  150  to  160  boys  from  the 
poorer  families ;  and  the  "  Primary  School,"  opened  only 
in  1909,  where  the  "  three  K's  "  are  being  infused  into  the 
minds  of  some  170  young  lads. 

A  School  of  Engineering  and  Surveying  has  recently 
been  organized  on  a  plan  prepared  by  Mr.  Dupuis,  adviser 
to  the  Ministry  of  Public  Works,  and  with  this  has  been 
combined  a  scheme  for  a  secondary  school,  so  much  needed 
as  a  preparatory  department  to  the  work  of  the  Training 
College.  A  military  school  numbering  forty  cadets  is  a  suc- 
cessful and  popular  adjunct  to  the  general  curriculum  of  the 
institution.  The  Sudanese  are  fine  soldiers  and  take  to  mili- 
tary service  naturally,  the  only  drawback  being  that  too 
frequently  the  parents  persist  in  looking  on  the  military 
school  as  an  institution  for  the  free  education  of  their 
children,  and,  thus  far,  the  cadets  have  been  drawn  from 
the  best  families  in  the  towns,  while  it  is  desirable  to  get 
them  from  the  country  districts  as  well. 

In  addition  to  these  important  local  labors,  Mr.  James 
Currie,  the  Director  of  the  College,  and  his  able  corps  of 
assistants  have  organized  the  educational  system  for  the 
whole  of  the  Sudan,  which  is  being  improved  and  extended 
from  year  to  year.  Two  other  technical  schools  have  been 
opened,  at  Kassala  and  at  Omdurman,  in  addition  to  the  one 
at  Khartoum,  where  258  young  men  are  learning  trades.  Six 
excellent  primary  schools  have  been  organized  in  the  leading 
towns  of  North  and  Central  Sudan,  which  have  now  an 
attendance  of  over  810  boys,  while  one  girls'  school  num- 
bering 60  exists  at  Rufala.  In  addition,  47  elementary 
schools,  or  "  Schools  of  Vernacular  Education,"  where  the 
scholars,  seated  on  mats  in  the  native  huts,  are  taught  the 
Koran  and  the  rudiments  of  knowledge  by  youthful  masters, 
have  been  opened  in  as  many  villages.  All  this  in  a  land 


THE  SUDAN  353 

where  the  masses  generally  knew  nothing  of  education 
before  1900 ! 

And  the  amount  of  organization  and  work  possible  along 
these  lines  is  limited  only  by  the  amount  of  money  at  the 
disposal  of  the  Educational  Department  of  the  Govern- 
ment, thus  far  a  comparatively  insignificant  sum,  and  by 
the  problem  of  securing  sufficient  teachers  and  trained 
assistants.  "  Go  slow,"  and  "  tell  the  truth,"  two  of  the 
favorite  mottoes  of  Lord  Cronier,  have  been  well  exempli- 
fied in  the  educational  work  here,  where  the  policy  of  the 
leaders  has  been  based  upon  certain  broad  principles  and 
carried  out  in  an  eminently  practical  manner.  In  the  first 
place,  religious  toleration  has  been  insisted  on  from  the 
first ;  and,  in  a  land  of  Mohammedans,  the  sons  and  daugh- 
ters are  being  taught  the  religion  of  their  parents  in  the 
schools,  along  with  their  regular  lessons.  Even  on  the  cam- 
pus of  Gordon  College,  there  is  a  mosque  conveniently  situ- 
ated, where  the  students  may  be  seen,  in  obedience  to  the 
commands  of  the  Prophet,  bathing  and  praying  five  times 
a  day.  Yet  Christianity  is  given  its  full  due,  the  splendid 
lives  and  examples  of  the  British  officials  and  soldiers  being 
no  mean  example  of  its  virtues ;  and  the  missionaries,  British, 
Austrian,  and  American,  are  maintaining  schools  and  per- 
forming successfully  other  valuable  works. 

The  idea  of  Mr.  Currie  and  the  Government  is  to  train 
the  Sudanese  for  the  public  service  in  such  a  manner  that 
they  will  be  able,  in  time,  to  replace  all  the  Egyptians  and 
Syrians  now  in  the  governmental  employ,  and  to  fill  satis- 
factorily all  the  under  offices  in  the  public  service,  the  courts, 
and  the  schools.  The  masses  are  being  taught  how  to  work, 
and  there  is  being  formed  gradually  a  large  and  contented 
artisan  class,  which  will  furnish  the  labor  and  industry 
necessary  for  the  successful  development  of  the  country. 

Education  will  not  be  given  the  people  faster  than  they 


854    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

have  need  for  or  can  assimilate  it,  and  the  greatest  care  is  be- 
ing taken  to  prevent  the  creation  of  an  educated  class  without 
a  proper  employment.  "  Too  rapid  progress  in  higher  educa- 
tion," wrote  General  R.  T.  Wingate,  Governor-General  of 
the  Sudan, "  as  evidenced  in  India  and  in  Egypt,  cannot  be 
too  strongly  deprecated.  The  necessity  of  forming  an  arti- 
san class,  and  the  undesirability  of  creating  a  discontented 
and  would-be  politician  class,  have  been  so  clearly  demon- 
strated in  other  Oriental  countries  which  have  adopted 
Western  educational  methods,  that  it  behooves  the  Sudan 
Government  to  take  very  careful  stock  of  the  situation  in 
this  respect." 

Every  scholar  who  is  trained  now  in  the  College  and 
schools  must  put  his  knowledge  into  practice,  and  finds 
suitable  employment  at  once  when  he  leaves  the  institu- 
tion of  learning.  Thus  far  not  a  single  student  has  tried  to 
change  his  vocation  or  avoid  the  career  laid  before  him. 
As  Mr.  Currie  has  said :  "  A  people  whose  only  ideal  of 
higher  education  for  centuries  has  consisted  in  the  study 
of  grammatical  conundrums  and  arid  theological  and  met- 
aphysical disputations  surely  needs  the  lesson  that  all  truth 
apprehended  intellectually  must  first  and  foremost  be  hon- 
ored by  use  before  it  can  benefit  the  recipient." 

Another  leading  feature  of  their  policy  has  been  the 
desire  to  study  the  country  and  its  resources  systematically 
and  carefully,  to  learn  all  its  possibilities,  and  to  direct  its 
development,  industrially  and  commercially,  through  irri- 
gation and  other  modern  means,  successfully  and  progres- 
sively. 

The  basis  of  this  work  has  been  laid  by  the  researches 
of  the  Wellcome  Research  Laboratories,  the  generous  gift 
of  Henry  S.  Wellcome,  under  the  able  direction  of  Dr. 
Andrew  Balfour.1  Several  splendid  reports  have  already 
been  published  embodying  the  results  of  the  first  eight 
1  Resigned  1914 


THE  SUDAN  355 

years  of  their  labors,  which  will  be  of  inestimable  value  to 
the  natives  and  the  country,  not  only  from  a  medical  and 
a  scientific,  but  also  from  an  economic  and  commercial 
standpoint. 

In  addition  to  the  detailed  and  scientific  studies  com- 
pleted on  the  diseases  of  natives  and  animals,  and  those  in 
the  ethnology,  religion,  and  customs  of  the  country,  a  splen- 
did work  has  been  done  in  a  careful  investigation  into  the 
character  of  the  soil,  the  forests,  the  produce,  and  the  irri- 
gation possibilities  of  the  land,  with  a  view  to  promoting 
scientifically  its  cultivation  and  development.  The  greater 
part  of  this  work  has  been  done  under  the  direction  of  Dr. 
Bean,  an  American  chemist,  trained  in  forestry  and  agri- 
cultural work.  Nowhere  have  the  results  been  more  appar- 
ent than  in  Khartoum  itself,  which  presents  an  appearance 
of  cleanliness  and  prosperity  hardly  equaled  by  any  other 
tropical  African  city.  With  its  waterworks,  hospital,  sew- 
erage system  and  refuse  destroyer,  public  gardens,  tramway 
line,  fine  public  edifices,  and  attractive  residential  streets, 
it  will  compare  favorably  with  many  of  our  modern  Euro- 
pean or  American  cities  of  its  size.  But  it  is  better  gov- 
erned than  most  of  them. 

No  attempt  has  been  made  to  transform  the  natives  into 
Europeans,  or  to  introduce  European  methods  and  ideals 
wholesale.  On  the  contrary,  every  effort  has  been  made  to 
preserve  the  customs,  the  dress,  and  the  language  of  the 
people,  to  insure  real  religious  toleration,  and  to  instill  a 
desire  for  work  and  progress  and  a  pride  in  and  love  of  their 
country  into  the  minds  of  the  people. 

Great  Britain  has  performed  a  great  service,  both  to  the 
people  of  the  Sudan  and  to  the  citizens  of  Egypt.  She  has 
freed  the  Sudan  from  oppression  and  despotism,  and  has 
given  it  an  efficient  and  enlightened  administration.  Egypt 
has  been  relieved  from  anxiety  concerning  the  flow  of  the 


356    INTERVENTION  AND  COLONIZATION  IN  AFRICA 

Nile  and  the  trade  of  the  South,  and  from  fear  of  invasion. 
A  great  country  has  been  opened  to  the  commerce  of  the 
world,  and  its  people  have  been  brought  into  touch  with 
civilization,  and  are  being  trained  in  the  schools,  in  the 
public  service,  and  on  the  lands,  to  care  for  themselves, 
their  property,  and  their  country.  There  is  peace  and  pro- 
gress everywhere,  and  the  future  of  the  land  is  assured. 
The  Anglo-Egyptian  Sudan  stands  for  all  that  is  best  in 
European  colonization  to-day,  and  it  is  a  good  example  of 
one  cardinal  principle  of  the  present  British  foreign  policy, 
i.e.,  conservation.  Within  the  past  year,  Sir  Edward  Grey 
has  pointed  out,  on  more  than  one  occasion,  that  England 
is  no  longer  in  search  of  new  possessions,  but  is  devoting 
her  energies  to  the  care  of  those  she  already  controls.  The 
other  fundamental  feature  of  the  English  foreign  policy, 
which  the  history  of  the  past  ten  years  has  amply  demon- 
strated, is  conciliation.  "The  British  Government  has  only 
one  wish,"  said  the  English  Secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs 
during  a  speech  at  London  in  1909,  "  to  live  at  peace  with 
its  neighbors.  Its  foreign  policy  is  contained  in  a  single 
word :  conciliation." 


ioys  p  A  i  N  ^Jv'  **if?  Bt^  °  /wy  d^tr 

'^ss^G^^Sm^ 


ATLANTIC          /MADEIRA  ...(p^.,       /  C^o^^C^  TL^r-T: 


AFRICA 

in    1914 


4«"'J'fRO"^rj§V          ^ifWambique      (Fl^ 


APPENDICES 


APPENDIX  I 

TOPICAL  BIBLIOGRAPHY  OF  SECONDARY 
SOURCES 

L  IMPERIALISM  — COLONIZATION  — DIPLOMACY 

*J.  A.  Hobson.  Imperialism.  Pott,  1902. 

*Harold  Bolce.  The  New  Internationalism.  Appleton,  1907. 

*Paul  S.  Eeinsch.   World  Politics.  Macmillan,  1904. 

David  Starr  Jordan.  Imperial  Democracy.  Appleton,  1899. 

Benjamin  Kidd.  The  Control  of  the  Tropics.  Macmillan,  1898. 

*Benjamin  Kidd.  Principles  of  Western  Civilization.  Macmil- 
lan, 1902. 

*Alleyne  Ireland.  Tropical  Colonization.  Macmillan,  1899. 

Achille  Loria.  The  Economic  Foundations  of  Society.  Scrib- 
ner,  1899. 

C.  P.  Lucas.  Historical  Geography  of  the  British  Colonies. 
Oxford,  1896-1906. 

*Hugh  E.  Egerton.  Origin  and  Growth  of  English  Colonies. 
Oxford,  1904. 

Hugh  E.  Egerton.  A  Short  History  of  British  Colonial  Policy. 
Methuen,  1897. 

M.  le  Dr.  A.  Bordier.  La  Colonisation  Scientiftque  et  les  Colo- 
nies Frangaises.  Reinwald,  Paris,  1884. 

*Paul  Leroy-Beaulieu.  De  la  Colonisation  chez  les  Peuples  Mod- 
ernes,  6th  Edition.  Alcan,  Paris,  1908. 

Paul  Gaffarel.  La  Politique  Coloniale  en  France  de  1789  a 
1880.  Alcan,  Paris,  1908. 

Alfred  Rambaud.  La  France  Coloniale.  Armand  Colin,  1895. 

Henry  C.  Morris.  The  History  of  Colonization.  2  vols.  Mac- 
millan, 1900. 

*Andre"  Tardieu.  France  and  the  Alliances.  Macmillan,  1908. 

Charles  Rdgismanset.  Questions  Coloniales,  1900-1912.  La- 
rose,  Paris,  1912. 

*  Indicates  recent  publications  of  most  value  to  students  and  the  general 
reader. 


360  APPENDIX  I 

*Ernest  Le*monon.  L?  Europe  et  la  Politique  Britannique  (1882- 

1909).  Felix  Alcan,  1910. 
W.  H.  Fullerton.  Problems  of  Power.  Scribner,  1913. 

H.  INDUSTRIAL  DEVELOPMENT 

*David  A.  Wells.  Recent  Economic  Changes.  Appleton,  1891. 

*Katherine  Coman.  Industrial  History  of  the  United  States. 
Macmillan,  1905. 

Davis  R.  Dewey.  Financial  History  of  the  United  States.  Long- 
mans, 1903. 

Carroll  D.  Wright.  The  Industrial  Evolution  of  the  United 
States.  Flood  &  Vincent,  1897. 

*W.  H.  Dawson.  The  Evolution  of  Modern  Germany.  Unwin, 
1908. 

*  W.  Cunningham.  The  Growth  of  English  Industry  and  Com- 

merce, 5th  ed.  3  vols.  Cambridge,  1912. 
W.  Cunningham.  Outlines  of  English  Industrial  History.  Mac- 

millan,  1902. 
J.  A.  Hobson.    The  Evolution  of  Modern  Capitalism.    Scott, 

1901. 

III.  THE  EXPLORATIONS 

Henry  M.  Stanley.  How  1  Found  Livingstone.  Scribner,  1902. 
Henry  M.  Stanley.  In  Darkest  Africa.  2  vols.  Scribner,  1890. 

*  Henry  M.  Stanley.  Autobiography.  Houghton  Mifflin  Co.,  1909. 
David  Livingstone.  Expedition  to  the  Zambesi.  Harper,  1866. 
David  Livingstone.  Missionary  Travels  and  Researches  in  South 

Africa.  Harper,  1872. 
Samuel  Baker.    The  Albert  Nyanza.  2  vols.  Macmillan,  1866 

and  1872. 
Captain  J.  H.  Speke.  Journal  of  the  Discovery  of  the  Sources 

of  the  Nile.  Harper,  1864. 

J.  A.  Grant.  A  Walk  across  Africa.  Blackwood,  London,  1864. 
Georg  Schweinf  urth.  The  Heart  of  Africa.  2  vols.  S.  Low,  1873. 
R.  F.  Burton.  The  Lake  Regions  of  Central  Africa.  2  vols. 

London,  1860. 
A.  J.  Mounteney-Jephson.   Emin  Pasha  and  the  Rebellion  at 

the  Equator.  Scribner,  1890. 
Paul  B.  Du  Chaillu.  Explorations  and  Adventures  in  Equatorial 

Africa.  Murray,  1861. 


APPENDIX  I  361 

Dr.  Henry  Barth.  Travels  and  Discoveries  in  North  and  Cen- 
tral Africa.  Longmans,  1857. 

H.  H.  Johnston.  Life  of  Livingstone.  Stokes,  1891. 
*H.  H.  Johnston.  The  Nile  Quest.  Stokes,  1903. 
A.  Henry  Savage  Landor.    Across  Widest  Africa.    Scribner, 

1907. 
Lieutenant  Boyd  Alexander.     From   the  Niger  to  the  Nile. 

Arnold,  1907. 
Lieutenant  Boyd  Alexander.  Boyd  Alexander's  Last  Journey. 

Longmans,  1912. 
Dr.  Kobert  Brown  (editor).   Story  of  Africa  and  its  Explorers. 

Cassell,  1911. 

IV.  THE  CONGO  STATE 
*Henry  M.  Stanley.    The  Congo  and  the  Founding  of  its  Free 

State.  2  vols.  Harper,  1885. 
*H.  H.  Johnston.     George  Grenfell  and  the   Congo.    2  vols. 

Appleton,  1910. 

*M.  Calmeyn.  Au  Congo  Beige.  Flammarion,  Paris,  1912. 
Dr.  H.  Erode.  Tippoo  Tib.  Arnold,  1906. 
*  Alfred  J.  Swann.    Fighting  the  Slave  Hunters  in  Central 

Africa.   Lippincott,  1910. 
Captain  S.  L.  Hinde.  The  Fall  of  the  Congo  Arabs.  Methuen, 

1897. 
A.  S.  Rappoport.   Leopold  the  Second,  King  of  the  Belgians. 

Sturgis  &  Walton,  New  York,  1910. 

V.  GERMAN  AFRICA 
Bismarck,  the  Man  and  the  Statesman.  Reflections  by  Himself 

(translated).  London,  1898. 
*Bruckner.    Jahrbuch  der  deutschen  Kolonial-Politik.    Berlin, 

1899. 

R.  Fitzner.  Deutsches  Kolonial-Handbuch.  Berlin,  1896. 
*Hans  Meyer.    Das  Deutsche  Kolonialreich.    2  vols.   Leipzig, 

1909. 

G.  Meinecke.  Koloniales  Jahrbuch.  Published  Yearly. 
Deutsche  Kolonial  Zeitung.   Published  by  the  Deutsche  Kolo- 

nial-Gesellschaft.  Berlin. 
T.  Leutwein.  Elf  Jahre  Gouverneur  in  Deutsch-Sudwestafrica. 

Mittler  &  Sohn,  Berlin,  1908. 


862  APPENDIX   I 

Karl  Peters.  New  Light  on  Dark  Africa.  Ward,  Lock  &  Co., 
London,  1891. 

VL  BRITISH  AFRICA 

A.  British  East  Africa  and  Uganda 

R.  P.  Ashe.  Two  Kings  of  Uganda.  London,  1889. 

R.  P.  Ashe.  Chronicles  of  Uganda.  London,  1894. 

*H.  H.  Johnston.  The  Uganda  Protectorate.  2  vols.  Hutchinson, 

London,  1902. 
Captain  F.  D.  Lugard.   The  Rise  of  Our  East  African  Empire. 

2  vols.  Blackwood,  1893. 
P.  L.  McDermott.   The  History  of  the  Foundation  and  Work 

of  the  Imperial  British  East  African  Company.  Chapman  & 

Hall,  1895. 
Lieutenant  Seymour  Vandeleur.    Campaigning  on  the  Upper 

Nile  and  Niger.  Methuen,  1898. 
Sir    Charles  Eliot.    The  East  Africa  Protectorate.    Arnold, 

1905. 

*Lord  Cranworth.  A  Colony  in  the  Making.  Macmillan,  1912. 
British  Empire  Series,  Vol.  II.     British  Africa.     Kegan  Paul, 

London,  1901. 

W.  J.  Ansorge.  Under  the  African  Sun  —  in  Uganda.  Long- 
mans, 1899. 

B.  British  West  Africa  and  Nigeria 

Francis  Bisset  Archer.    The  Gambia  Colony  and  Protectorate. 

London,  St.  Brides,  1910. 
*T.  J.  Alldridge.  A  Transformed  Colony.  Sierra  Leone.  Lippin- 

cott,  1910. 
Moore  and  Guggisberg.    We  Two  in  West  Africa.    Scribner, 

1909. 

*Captain  C.  W.  J.  Orr.  The  Making  of  Northern  Nigeria.   Mac- 
millan, 1911. 
E.  D.  MoreL   Nigeria :  Its  Peoples  and  its  Problems.    Smith, 

Elder  &  Co.,  1911. 
A.  J.  N.  Tremearne.    The  Niger  and  the  West  Sudan.  London, 

1911. 
*A.  F.  Mockler-Ferryman.  British  West  Africa.    Sonnenschein, 

1900. 
*A.  F.  Mockler-Ferryman.  British  Nigeria.  Cassell,  1902. 


APPENDIX  I  863 

Lady  Lugard.  A  Tropical  Dependency.  J.  Nisbet  &  Co.,  Lon- 
don, 1905. 

*Mary  Kingsley.    West  African  Studies.  Macmillan,  1899. 

Mary  Kingsley.   West  African  Sketches.  London,  1897. 

C.   British  South  Africa  and  the  Union 

G.  McCall  Theal.  History  of  South  Africa.  5  vols.  Juta  &  Co., 

Cape  Town,  1888-93. 
*Frank  R.  Cana.  South  Africa  from  the  Great  Trek  to  the  Union. 

Chapman  &  Hall,  1909. 

James  Bryce.  Impressions  of  South  Africa.  Century,  1897. 
Archibald   R.  Colquhoun.    The  Renascence  of  South  Africa. 

Hurst  &  Blackett,  1900. 
*  Archibald  R.  Colquhoun.   The  Africander  Land.   E.  P.  Button, 

1906. 
H.  Hamilton  Fyfe.  South  Africa  Today  ^including  Rhodesia). 

E.  Nash,  1911. 

*Percy  F.  Hone.  Southern  Rhodesia.  G.  Bell  &  Co.,  1909. 
Lady  Sarah  Wilson.  South  African  Memories.  Arnold,  1909. 
Sir  J.  Percy  Fitzpatrick.  The  Transvaal  from  Within.  Stokes, 

1899. 
Scoble  and  Abercrombie.    The  Rise  and  Fall  of  Krugerism. 

Stokes,  1900. 
J.  Martineau.    Life  and  Correspondence  of  the  Right  Hon.  Sir 

Bartle  Frere.  2  vols.    J.  Murray,  London,  1895. 
W.  L.  and  L.  Rees.  Life  and  Times  of  Sir  George  Grey.  2  vols. 

London,  1892. 

John  Morley.   Life  of  William  Ewart  Gladstone.   8  vols.   Mac- 
millan, 1903. 
"Vindex."   Cecil  Rhodes:  His  Political  Life  and  Speeches. 

Chapman  &  Hall,  London,  1900. 
J.  H.  Hofmeyr.  Life  of  Jan  Hendrik  Hofmeyr.     Kegan  Paul, 

London,  1914. 

J.  F.  van  Oordt.  Paul  Kruger.     J.  Dusseau  &  Co.,  1893. 
Francis  R.  Statham.   Paul  Kruger  and  his  Times.   T.  F.  Unwin, 

London,  1898. 

H.  H.  Johnston.  British  Central  Africa.   Methuen,  1897. 
*Gouldsbury  and  Sheane.    The  Great  Plateau  of  Northern  Rho- 
desia. Arnold,  1911. 
Sir  Godfrey  Lagden.  The  Basutos.  2  vols.  Appleton,  1909. 


364  APPENDIX   I 

D.   Egypt 

*Earl  of  Cromer.  Modern  Egypt.  2  vols.  Macmillan,  1908. 
*Sir  Auckland  Colvin.   The  Making  of  Modern  Egypt.  E.  P. 

Button,  1906. 

Sir  Alfred  Milner.  England  in  Egypt.  Arnold,  1892. 
Francois  Charles-Roux,  Les  Origines  de  V Expedition  d'Egypte. 

Plon-Nourrit,  Paris,  1910. 

*J.  Alexander.   The  Truth  about  Egypt.  Cassell,  1911. 
F.  C.  Penfield.  Present  Day  Egypt.   London,  1899. 
*Sidney  Low.  Egypt  in  Transition.  Smith,  Elder  &  Co.,  1914. 

E.  Anglo-Egyptian  Soudan 

George  Birbeck  Hill  (editor).  Colonel  Gordon  in  Central  Africa. 

London,  Rue  &  Co.,  1884. 
A.  Egmont  Hake   (editor).    The   Journals  of  Major-General 

C.  G.  Gordon,  at  Kartoum.  Houghton,  Mifflin  &  Co.,  1885. 
*Slatin  Pasha.  Fire  and  Sword  in  the  Sudan.  Arnold,  1896. 
*Alford   and  Sword.    The   Egyptian  Soudan:  Its  Loss  and 

Recovery.  Macmillan,  1898. 
Sir  Francis  Reginald  Wingate.    Mahdism  and  the  Egyptian 

Soudan.  Macmillan,  1891. 

D.  C.  Boulger.  Life  of  Gordon.   T.  F.  Unwjn,  1896. 
*Yacouh  Pasha  Artin.   England  in  the  Soudan.    Macmillan, 

1911. 
Edward   Fothergill.    Five    Tears    in  the  Soudan.    Appleton, 

1911. 
H.  A.  MacMichal.  The  Tribes  of  Northern  and  Central  Kordo- 

fdn.   Cambridge,  1912. 
*Sidney  Low.  Egypt  in  Transition.  Smith,  Elder  &  Co.,  1914. 

F.   British  Somaliland 
*Angus  Hamilton.  Somaliland.   Hutchinson  &  Co.,  1911. 

VIL  FRENCH  AFRICA 
A.   Senegal,  Dahomey  and  the  Congo 

Lieutenant  Hourst.    French  Enterprise  in  Africa.    [Explora- 
tion of  the  Niger.]  London,  1898. 


APPENDIX   I  365 

Le  Capitaine  Binger.  Du  Niger  au  Golfe  de  Guinee.  Hachette, 

Paris,  1892. 
Maurice  Delafosse,  Haut-Senegal-Niger.     3  vols.     E.  Larose, 

Paris,  1912. 

Felix  Dubois.    Timbuctoo  the  Mysterious.  W.  Heineman,  1897. 
M.  Mounier.   France   noire:   La   Cote  d'ivoire  et  le  Soudan. 

Paris,  1894. 

*A.  Rambaud.  La  France  coloniale.  A.  Colin,  Paris,  1895. 
*G.  Hanotaux.  Fachoda.  E.  Flammarion,  Paris,  1909. 
*Lieutenant-Colonel  E.  Ferry.    La  France  en  Africa.    Colin, 

Paris,  1905. 

F.  Challaye.  Le  Congo  Franqais.  Alcan,  Paris,  1909. 
*G.  Frangois.  Notre  Colonie  du  Dahomey.  E.  Larose,  Paris,  1906. 


B.   Northern  Africa 

O.  Re'clus.   La  France,  et  ses  colonies.  2  vols.    Hachette,  Paris, 

1889. 
P.  Gaffarel.  L'Algerie :  histoire,  conquete,  colonisation.   F.  Di- 

dot,  Paris,  1883. 
M.  Ch.  Lutaud.     Expose  de  la  Situation  Generate  de  VAlgerie. 

Heintz,  Algiers,  1912. 
* V.  Piquet.  La  Colonisation  Franchise  dans  I' Afrique  du  Nord. 

Colin,  Paris,  1912. 
*E.  Rouard  de  Card.    Traites  de  la  France  avec  les  pays  de 

V  Afrique  du  Nord.  A.  Pedone,  1906. 
E.  Rouard  de  Card.   Les  Traites  de  protectorat  conclus  par  la 

France  en  V Afrique.  Paris,  1897. 
E.  Rouard  de  Card.  Les  Traites  entre  la  France  et  Maroc. 

Paris,  1898. 
*E.  Rouard  de  Card.  Les  Relations  de  VEspagne  et  du  Maroc. 

Paris,  1905. 

M.  Bentham-Edwards.  In  French  Africa.   Paris,  1912. 
A.  M.  Broadley.  Tunis,  Past  and  Present.  London,  1882. 
A.  Pavy.  Histoire  de  la  Tunisie.  Tours,  1894. 
Graham  Petrie.   Tunis,  Kairouan  and  Carthage.  Doubleday, 

Page  &  Co.,  1908. 

V.  Be"rard,  L' Affaire  Marocaine.     A.  Colin,  Paris,  1906. 
Rapport  au  President  de  la  Republique,  sur  la  Situation  de 


366  APPENDIX  I 

la  Tunisie  en  1910.      Ministere   des   Affaires   £trangeres, 

Tunis,  1911. 

E.  Aubin.  Le  Maroc.   Colin,  Paris,  1912. 
*L.  March  Phillipps.  In  the  Desert  and  Hinterland  of  Algiers. 

Arnold,  1909. 

*Budgett  Meakin.  Life  in  Morocco.  E.  P.  Dutton,  1906. 
R.  Rankin.    In  Morocco  with  General  D'Amade.   Longmans, 

1908. 
E.  Ashmead-Bartlett.    The  Passing  of  the  Shereefian  Empire. 

Dodd,  Mead  &  Co.  1910. 
Pierre  Albin.  La  querelle  franco-attemande.  Le  "  coup  "  d'Aga- 

dir.  Paris,  F.  Alcan,  1912. 

C.   Madagascar 
Captain  S.  P.  Oliver.   Madagascar.  2  vols.   Macmillan,  1886. 

VHL  ITALIAN  AFRICA 

*Capitaine  Pellenc.   Les  Italiens  en  Afrique,  1880-1896.  Paris, 

1897. 
Thomas  Barclay.  The  Turco-Italian  War  and  its  Problems. 

Constable,  1912. 
*Tullio   Irace.    With  the  Italians  in  Tripoli,  1912.    Murray 

1912. 
Edmond  Bernet.  En  Tripolitaine,  Voyage  a  Ghadames.  Paris, 

1912. 
Charles  W.  Furlong.  The  Gateway  to  the  Sahara.  Scribner, 

1909. 
*E.  Rouard  de  Card.  La  Politique  de  la  France,  a  Vegard  de  la 

Tripolitaine.  Paris,  1906. 

IX.  PORTUGUESE  AFRICA 

J.  J.  Monteiro.  Angola  and  the  River  Congo.  2  vols.  Macmillan, 

1875. 
A.  J.  D.  D'Crsey.  Portuguese  Discoveries,  Dependencies  and 

Missions.  London,  1893. 
*R.  C.  F.  Maugham.   Portuguese  East  Africa.    E.  P.  Dutton, 

1906. 
*R.  C.  F.  Maugham.  Zambezia.  Murray,  1910. 


APPENDIX  I  367 

X.  GENERAL  WORKS 

*J.  Scott  Keltie.  The  Partition  of  Africa.  Ed.  Stanford,  1895. 
*J.  Scott  Keltie.  Statesman's  Tear-Book.  Macmillan,  yearly. 
Sir  H.  H.  Johnston.   A  History  of  the  Colonization  of  Africa 

by  Alien  Races.  Cambridge,  1899. 
Sir  Edward  Hertslet    The  Map  of  Europe  by  Treaty.   4  vols. 

London,  1875-91. 
Elizabeth  W.  Latimer.   Europe  in  Africa  in  the  Nineteenth 

Century.  A.  C.  McClurg  &  Co.,  1903. 


APPENDIX  II 


SUMMARY  OF  TERRITORIES  (IN  AFRICA) 
HELD  OR  CONTROLLED  BY  EUROPEAN 
STATES  IN  MAY,  1914 

Total 

area,  sq. 


1,384,520 


1,032,280 


909,654 


499,100 


293,400 


591,230 


Colonies  and  Pro-         Area        J^a^a 

Colonies  and  Pro- 

Area 

tectorates.            sq.  miles.       S2bfc 

tectorates. 

sq.  miles. 

FRANCE. 

Egypt 

400,000 

Algeria                      343,500 

C.-.1  .....                                      1   KA4   IWkA 

Auglo-E.  Sudan 

984,520 

Sahara                     l,otl,UUU 
Tunis                            45,779 

Morocco                    219.000 

GERMAN  EMPIRE. 

Senegal 

Togoland 

33,700 

Upper  Senegal 
and  Niger 

Caineroons 
Southwest  Africa 

291,950 
322,450 

Mauretania 

1,585,810 

East  Africa 

384,180 

Guinea 

Ivory  Coast 
Dahomey 

BELGIAN  CONGO. 

909,654 

Congo                         568,460 

Somaliland                    5,790 

PORTUGAL. 

Madagascar               226,015 

A   KOO  VKA 

Guinea 

13,940 

GREAT  BRITAIN. 
Gambia 
Sierra  Leone 
Gold  Coast 
Nigeria 

So.  African  Union 
Rhodesia 
Swaziland 
Basutoland 
Bechuanaland 
Nyasaland 
Zanzibar 
East  Africa 
Uganda 
Somaliland 


3,620 

24,900 

80,000 

335,580 

473,184 

439,575 

6,536 

11,716 

275,000 

39,801 

1,020 

250,000 

223,500 

68,000 


cipe,  St.  Thomas          360 
Angola  484,800 


Mozambique 


ITALY. 
Eritrea 
Somaliland 
Tripolitania 


293,400 


45,800 
139,430 
406,000 


2,232,432 


SPAIN. 
Rio  de  Oro, 
Guinea,  Fernando 
Po,  and  islands        85,814 


Grand  total 


85,814 
10,975,554 


The  results  of  the  intervention  of  European  states  in  Africa 
are  remarkable.    The  alien  nations  have  occupied,  or  secured 


APPENDIX   II  369 

control  over,  more  than  10,975,000  square  miles  of  territory  on 
that  continent  whose  total  area  approximates  but  11,500,000  square 
miles.  The  only  two  states  which  have  retained  their  independ- 
ence are  Abyssinia  and  Liberia  —  the  former  with  an  area  of 
432,432  square  miles  and  the  latter  with  40,000.  From  1889 
to  1896  Abyssinia  was  an  Italian  protectorate ;  but  it  resumed 
its  complete  sovereignty  in  the  latter  year  through  the  defeat  of 
General  Baratieri  and  the  signing  of  the  convention  of  Adis 
Ababa.  And,  since  1906,  its  territorial  integrity  and  independ- 
ence have  been  guaranteed  by  Great  Britain,  France  and  Italy. 
The  position  of  the  Republic  of  Liberia  is  also  secured  by  treaties 
with  the  European  powers  and  the  United  States. 

France  and  England  control  over  three  times  as  much  terri- 
tory as  their  nearest  competitors  —  Germany  and  Belgium.  Their 
possessions  are,  in  the  main,  more  fertile,  valuable  and  promising 
than  those  of  any  of  the  other  European  states  ;  and  a  large  pro- 
portion of  their  lands  lies  within  the  temperate  zone.  The  French 
Republic  heads  the  list  with  4,538,354  square  miles  —  921,000 
more  than  Great  Britain  controls  ;  but,  since  over  a  million  and  a 
half  square  miles  of  the  French  possessions  consist  of  desert,  the 
real  value  of  their  respective  holdings  is  more  nearly  equal  than 
these  figures  would  indicate.  In  fact,  although  it  is  at  present 
impossible  to  procure  reliable  figures  on  the  actual  value  of  these 
African  territories,  it  is  safe  to  say  that  the  British  —  by  reason 
of  the  enormous  mineral  wealth,  the  extensive  fertile  plateaus 
and  the  favorable  climatic  location  of  British  South  Africa  — 
hold  the  most  desirable  portion  of  the  continent.  The  value  of 
the  Spanish  and  Italian  possessions  is  still  very  questionable  ;  and, 
while  some  portions  of  the  regions  administered  by  Germany, 
Belgium  and  Portugal  are  promising,  it  is  still  uncertain  whether 
their  African  colonial  activities  will  ever  pay. 

As  a  commercial  venture,  African  expansion  is  apparently 
worth  while.  All  of  the  states  concerned  have  secured  control  of 
important  trade  centers  and  have  obtained  extensive  markets  for 
their  home  productions.  The  state  governments  have  not  them- 
selves reaped  any  great  profit,  except  perhaps  in  the  way  of  coal- 
ing stations  or  strategic  harbors  for  their  fleets  ;  but  their  mer- 
chants have  gained  enormous  advantages  in  many  ways.  Outlets 


870  APPENDIX  II 

for  the  superfluous  population  of  the  Continental  states  have  also 
been  found  ;  but  after  all  that  has  been  done  to  open  the  countries 
to  trade  and  to  improve  the  conditions  of  life  and  health,  there  re- 
mains only  a  small  portion  of  the  continent  which  is  suitable  for 
the  habitation  of  the  white  man.  And  it  is  only  in  the  temperate 
colonies  of  the  French  and  British,  and  in  the  highlands  of  a  few 
of  the  tropical  countries  like  Uganda  and  Northern  Rhodesia, 
that  the  whites  will  be  able  to  settle  in  any  large  numbers.  Nor 
is  it  particularly  desirable  that  they  should,  in  a  land  two  thirds 
of  which  lie  within  the  tropics,  which  contains  an  excessive  pro- 
portion of  desert,  arid  and  swampy  territory,  and  which  supports 
already  a  large  native  population.  It  is  impossible  to  reconcile 
these  two  racial  elements,  or  to  weld  a  country  populated  by  both 
blacks  and  whites  into  one  harmonious  nation.  The  experience  of 
South  Africa  has  amply  demonstrated  the  follies,  the  evils  and 
the  difficulties  of  such  a  movement.  It  resulted  there,  as  always, 
in  the  establishment  of  a  state  governed  for  and  by  the  whites, 
the  blacks  being  relegated  to  certain  districts  reserved  to  them 
by  the  Imperial  government.  It  has,  therefore,  become  quite 
clear  that  a  very  large  proportion  of  the  African  continent 
is  not  adapted  to  the  purposes  of  national  expansion  by  Conti- 
nental states,  or  to  European  colonization.  Africa  is  furnishing  a 
great  and  an  ever-increasing  market  for  the  products  of  Europe 
and  America  (and  openings  for  European  capital  are  numerous 
and  promising)  ;  but  none  of  the  sub-divisions  of  the  Dark  Con- 
tinent—  with  the  possible  exception  of  South  Africa  —  can  be 
regarded  as  a  national  asset. 


APPENDIX  III 


REVENUES  AND  EXPENDITURES,  IMPORTS 
AND  EXPORTS,  1887  AND  1912 

1887 


Revenue 
in  £1000 

Expenditure 
in  £1000 

Imports 
in  £1000 

Exports 
in  £1000 

Temperate  Colonies. 

3  303 

3  333 

5036 

7  719 

Natal    

817 

893 

2  264 

1  057 

2101 

14U 

8002 

2  000* 

The  Transvaal]     

668 

622 

1  637* 

9005 

9  856 

9  439 

8  344 

11  148 

Total     

14  854 

14428 

18081 

22  824 

1  814 

(1,977 

8252 

7436 

5007 

(  2,836  aid8 
5007 

1  379 

1  225 

796 

6348 

782 

492 

17964 

20  375 

28  494 

31  977 

Tropical  Colonies. 

2l» 

2l»io 

1559 

104" 

42 

71 

74 

223 

51 

79 

415 

491 

Gold  Coast    ........ 

122 

139 

364 

372 

61 

58 

308 

334 

13 

24 

81 

87 

4511 

22H 

_ 

26l 

271 

310 

392 

1,468 

1,660 

100012 

95"  « 

70» 

79" 

117 

178 

1608 

1966 

(1208 

540  ?io 

1,032 

558 

(  420  aid8 

87 

104 

Total  tropical     

850 

1,002 

2,964 

2,870 

Estimated  at  £600,000  or  1,000,000  in 

1886. 

Estimated  for  1886. 
And  much  smuggled  in. 
Estimated. 
French  and  Algerian  finances  are  not 

always  separable. 
'  Budget  estimates. 


8  Approximately. 
»  1891. 

10  No  figure  for  the  expenditure  being 

found,  the  revenue  figure  is  re- 
peated. 

11  Via  Chiromo,  1893. 

12  1889. 

11  Native  products. 


872 


APPENDIX  HI 

1912 


Revenue 
hi  £1000 

Expenditure 
in  £1000 

Imports 
in  £1000 

Exports 
in  £1000 

Temperate  Coloniet. 
Union  of  South  Africa    .... 
Rhodesia  (N.  and  8.)  •    •    •    • 

17,285 
934 
(59 

16,604 
902 

66   • 

41  524 

65  066 

/  10  aid 
162« 

123 

57 

62 

Kevnt  . 

17,213 

15244 

26,540 

35,439 

Total  British  

35,720 

33001 

68,064 

100,505 

58071  1 

5  go?1  * 

28734 

24,846 

550* 

2960 

8,048 

3,082 

Tunis    

1  971 

1  830 

6,252 

6  186 

(56«« 

76»« 

1,405* 

7508 

(  20  aid 
860 

2,250 

2,265 

1,425 

Total  temperate  

45,984 

45,924 

114,768 

136,794 

Tropical  Coloniet. 
British  East  Africa    

(729 

772 

1,330 

1,017 

(  115  aid 
(203 

382 

625 

441 

Nigeria  (N.  and  S.,  incl.  Lagos) 
Gold  Coast     

|   65  aid 
2,850 
1  231 

2,938 
1,137 

6,431 
4,023 

6,090 
4,308 

560 

524 

1  425 

1  541 

96 

81 

807 

682 

(97 

118 

291 

232 

Bomaliland      .,•.,,, 

(31  aid 
33 

75» 

267' 

2418 

(1,409 

1,758 

2,322« 

1,411* 

i     167  aid 

Total  British  ...... 

7,586 

7,785 

17  521 

15963 

German  East  Africa  

(624 
I  181  aid 
(343 

966 
623 

2,510 
1,712 

1,570 
1,165 

ToRoland  

(  117  aid 
154 

157 

571 

498 

Belgian  Congo  

1,715 

2,758 

2,155 

2  365 

French  Equatorial  Africa   .    .    . 
French  West  Africa  

737»* 
!835« 
1,343" 
328  aid 

737«« 
2,506?* 

799 
5,391 

1,157 
4,767 

13,963 

15,532 

30,659 

27,485 

i  Estimated. 

1  French  and  Algerian  finances  are  not 

always  separable. 
9  Budget  estimates. 
«  1912-13. 
*  Customs  only. 
«  1911. 


'  Deficit  met  by  previous  surplus. 

8  Zalia,  Berbera  and  Bulhar. 

•  The  sum  of  the  revenues  of  1911,  both 
general  and  the  total  for  the  sepa- 
rate colonies  (£1,343,000)  and  the 
aid  budgeted  for  1912. 


These  figures  have  heen  taken  wherever  they  could  be  found, 
but  chiefly  from  the  Statistical  Abstract  of  the  British  Colonies, 


APPENDIX  III  373 

the  Bulletin  de  Statistique  et  de  Legislation  Comparee,  and  the 
Handelsarchiv.  These  are  the  latest  figures  that  could  be  found, 
as  the  French  are  slow  in  getting  out  their  statistics.  The  con- 
ventional amounts,  20  marks,  25  francs,  40  Tunisian  piastres  of 
1887  and  10  rupees  (British  East  Africa  and  Somaliland,  1887) 
have  been  taken  to  the  pound  sterling.  (In  1887  the  rupee  had  stood 
at  Is.  7d.  for  several  years,  but  it  had  fluctuated  in  a  longer 
period  between  that  and  2s.  2d.  and  the  Statesman's  Year-Book 
converts  it  at  2s.)  The  Egyptian  pound  has  been  reckoned  at 
£1^.  "  Aid  "  means  a  subsidy  by  the  mother  country.  It  is  not 
always  separately  indicated.  1912  means  a  fiscal  year  ending  some 
time  within  the  calendar  year. 


INDEX 


INDEX 


Abbas  II  Hilmy,  346. 

Abd-Allah,  the  Khalifa,  344-48. 

Abd-el-Aziz,  248,  252-61. 

Abd-el-Kader,  219-21. 

Aberdeen,  Lord,  169. 

Aborigines  Protection  Society,  47,  51. 

Abu  Hamed,  347. 

Abu  Klea,  341,  342. 

Abyssinia,  309,  346,  369. 

Adamaua,  77,  118,  119.  137. 

Adghar,  127. 

Administration:  Algeria,  226, 228;  Brit.  E. 

Afr.,  102-04;  Congo,  35,  40-46,  53-55, 

61;  Egypt,  320,  321,  325-27;  Europe,  5, 

11;  French  W.  Afr.,  128-30;  German  E. 

Afr.,  105-06;  German  W.  Afr.,  77-80; 

Morocco,   242,  243,  247,  248,  284-87; 

Nigeria,  136, 140, 141,150-56, 158, 160; 

S.  Rhodesia,  205;  S.  Afr.  192-95,  199- 
'     200;  Tripoli,  292,  306;  Tunis,  231-32, 

239,  240;  Uganda,  96-100.    See  Land, 

and  Natives. 

Afrikander  Bond,  177,  197. 
Agadir,  267,  270.  v 

Ahmadu,  109. 

Ain  Sefra,  127,  130,  226,  228. 
Air,  124,  127. 
Ajarra  Creek,  115. 
Albert,  King,  64. 
Albert  Nyanza,  18,  105,  332. 
Alexandria,  318-19. 
Algeciras,  254,  271. 
Algeria,  chap,  ix;  map,  218.    See  Table 

of  Contents. 
Ali  Bey,  237,  238. 
Anglo-Belgian  Indiarubber  Company,  23, 

44. 

Angra  Pequena,  69-74. 
Aougerout,  127. 

Arabi,  Colonel  Ahmed,  315,  316,  318. 
Arabs,  Fall  of  the  Congo,  36-38. 
Areas,  Appendix  II. 
Armstrong,  Consul,  51,  62. 
Arnold,  Major,  114. 
Ashe,  R.  P.,  90. 
Asquitb,  H.  H.,  271. 
Assinie,  108. 
Assuan  Dam,  324,  347. 
Atbara,  347. 
Auchinard,  General,  109-11. 


Audeou,  Colonel,  125. 
Aziz  Ali  Bey  el  Masri,  300. 

Baguirmi,  118,  119, 124. 

Bahr-el-Ghazal,  38,  119-23,  309,  330-32, 
335,  339,  340. 

Baikie,  Dr.  William,  132. 

Baker,  Sir  Samuel,  18,  309,  330;  map, 
19. 

Baker,  General  Valentine,  334. 

Balfour,  Dr.  Andrew,  354. 

Ballay,  No6l.  124. 

Bamaku,  109-11,  133. 

Bantus,  30. 

Barca,  299,  305. 

Barghash,  Sultan,  81,  84,  87,  88. 

Baring,  Sir  E.,  323,  334-35,  337-38,  340, 
344;  (Lord  Cromer),  349,350. 

Barkly,  Sir  Henry,  172. 

Barth,  Dr.  Henry,  17;  map,  19. 

Bassermann,  259. 

Basutoland,  168,  177,  179,  195,  201,  202. 

Bauchi,  144,  152. 

Baud,  Captain,  112,  113. 

Bechuanaland,  179,  195,  201-03,  207. 

Beit,  Alfred,  183,  204. 

Beit-el-Mal,  156. 

Belgium,  27-30,  35,  51-64;  and  see  Leo- 
pold II. 

Bell,  Sir  H.  H.,  159. 

Ben  Ghasi,  290,  299,  305. 

Benin  River,  134. 

Benufi,  118,  119;  chap,  vn,  passim. 

Berbers,  214,  223,  262,  300,  332,  336,  340- 
41,  347,  350. 

Berlin  Conference,  27-29,  135;  General 
Act,  32-33,  43,  48. 

Bethmann-Hollweg,  von,  268,  277. 

Bibliography,  Appendix  I. 

Bida,  137,  142,  149. 

Binger,  Captain  Louis,  110,  116. 

Biskra,  124,  126,  221,  225. 

Bismarck,  Herbert,  68,  73. 

Bismarck,  Otto  von,  in  re  the  Congo,  2b, 
28;  general  attitude,  14,  16,  65,  73,  74- 
76;  German  E.  Afr.,  82,  83,  89.  See  Ger- 
many, and  chaps,  iv  and  v. 

Bizerte,  234. 

Blachford,  Lord,  8. 

Blanchet,  Paul,  126. 


INDEX 


Blondiaux,  Captain,  125. 

Bonnier,  Captain,  111. 

Borgu,  112,  114,  117,  136. 

Borku,  116,  123,291. 

Bornu,  143-45. 

Botha,  Louis,  197-99,  213. 

Boussa,  French  at.  111,  113,114, 117;  Eng- 
lish at,  131,  133,  140. 

Boyle,  A.  C.,  160. 

Brakna,  126. 

Brand,  John,  170,  182. 

Brgart,  General,  235. 

Bretennet,  Lieutenant,  113. 

British  East  Africa,  chap,  v;  map,  82. 
See  Table  of  Contents. 

British  East  Africa  Co.,  Imperial,  87-89, 
92-96. 

British  Royal  Niger  Co.,  111-13, 132-39, 
141. 

British  South  African  Co.,  179,  184,  204, 
207-09. 

Brussels  Conference  (1876),  20;  (1890), 34; 
Convention,  34,  96. 

Bugeaud,  220. 

Bukuru,  152. 

Buller,  C.,  6-7. 

Burmi,  149. 

Burton,  18,  90;  map,  19.     ; 

Cabinda,  28. 

Caillaux,  270,  278. 

Caillfi,  Renfi,  17,  19,  108. 

Cambon,  Jules,  269,  279. 

Cambon,  Paul,  123,  237,  238. 

Cameroons,  76-80,  270,  273,  275. 

Campbell-Bannermann,  Sir  Henry,  197. 

Canalejas,  282. 

Cape  Colony,  16,  163,  169-72,  174,  178, 

198,  199. 

Carnarvon,  Lord,  172,  174. 
Casa  Blanca,  255,  257,  265,  287. 
Casement,  Consul,  48,  51. 
Cetywayo,  175,  179. 
Chad,  Lake,  77,  109,  111,  112,  117,  118, 

119,  124,  134. 
Chaillu,  M.  du,  18,  19. 
Chamberlain,  Joseph,  9,  15,  187. 
Chanoine,  113,  124. 

Chaouia,  257-58,  262,  265,  266,  285,  287. 
Chelmsford,  Lord,  175. 
Cherif  Pasha,  311,  312,  316,318,  319,  334, 

335. 

Choisy,  126. 

Cirenaica,  298,  299,  304,  305. 
Clapperton,  17,  19,  131. 
Clauzel,  Marshal,  220. 
Closel,  119,  125. 
Clun,  Father  de,  49. 
Colley,  Sir  George  P.,  176. 


Colonial  Office,  Belgium,  54-55;  British,  8, 
9;  French,  12. 

Colvin,  Sir  A.,  320,  323. 

Combes,  Colonel,  110. 

Comite  d'fitudes,  21,  22. 

Commerce.  See  Trade. 

Companies:  economy  of  Chartered,  8,  9; 
inE.  Afr.  (German),  82, 83, 88;  (British), 
87,  92-96,  107;  in  Congo,  23,  40,  44,  46; 
French  Congo,  273,  275;  Nigeria,  111, 
112,  132-39;  S.  Afr.,  204-09. 

Conference.  See  Brussels,  and  West  Africa. 

Congo,  French,  118-20,  125,  270-75. 

Congo  Independent  State,  77.  See  chaps, 
ii  and  in,  Table  of  Contents;  map,  26. 
See  also  Administration,  France,  Ger- 
many, etc. 

Congo  Reform  Association,  51,  62. 

Congo  River,  18,  21,  39;  freedom  of  Com- 
merce on,  25,  27,  28,  30,  46,  61. 

Constantino,  214,  217,  220,  221. 

Cotton,  in  Nigeria,  157;  in  Uganda,  101. 

Courcel,  Baron  de,  237. 

Cromer,  Lord,  349,  350;  (Sir  E.  Baring), 
323,  334-35,  337-38,  340,  344. 

Currie,  James,  352-54. 

Dahomey,  108,  111,  112, 113, 115. 117, 129. 

Dakar,  108,  129. 

D'Amade,  General,  257. 

Dangeville,  Captain,  125. 

Dar-es-Salaam,  106. 

Dar-Fur,  123, 143, 309,  330-32,  350;  map, 

116. 

Davoust,  Lieutenant,  111. 
De  Brazza,  Savorgnan,  18,  19,  24,  109, 

118. 

Decoeur,  Captain,  112,  113. 
Delagoa  Bay,  174. 
Delamere,  Lord,  103. 
Delanghe,  Captain,  38. 
Delcasse1,  121,  250,  253-54. 
Dellys,  221. 

Denham,  17,  131;  map,  19. 
Denishwei  Affair,  324. 
Derby,  Lord,  8,  69-74. 
Derna.  299,  305. 
Dernburg,  78. 
Dervishes,  38,  120,  122.   See  Mahdi,  and 

Khalifa. 
De  Selves,  278. 
Destanave,  Captain,  110. 
De  Wet,  General,  197. 
Dhanis,  Commandant,  37. 
Diamonds,  171,  178,  210. 
Dikoa.  125,  143,  145. 
Dilke,  Sir  Charles,  47,  52. 
Dinizulu,  179,  201. 
Disraeli,  10. 


INDEX 


379 


Dodds,  General,  111. 
D'Ollone,  Lieutenant,  125. 
Domaine  Priv6,  40;  Crown,  56. 
Dongola,  120,  332,  336,  341,  346-47. 
Doorm,  Captain,  37. 
Douls,  Camille,  126. 
Drude,  General,  257. 
Dufferin,  Lord,  320-23,  328. 
Durban,  163,  178,  196. 
D"  Urban,  Sir  Benjamin,  167. 
Duveyrier,  Henri,  126. 
Duveyrier  (place),  127. 
Dybowsky,  118. 

Eaglesome,  John,  159. 

Edgerton,  Sir  W.,  159. 

Education,  in  British  E.  Air.,  102;  Congo, 
32, 57;  Egypt,  327;  French  W.  Afr.,  129; 
German  E.  Afr.,  106;  Nigeria,  156;  Su- 
dan, 351-54. 

Edward,  King,  251. 

Egypt,  65,  121,  122,  251.  See  chap,  xin, 
Table  of  Contents;  Administration,  Fi- 
nance, etc. 

El  Golea,  127. 

Eliot,  Sir  Charles,  103. 

El  Obeid,  332-33,  350. 

El  Oued,  127. 

El  Roghi,  283. 

Emigration  and  colonization,  13. 

Emin  Pasha,  37;  (Emm  Effendi  Hakim), 
332. 

Enser,  330. 

Entebbe,  97. 

Enver  Bey,  300. 

Eritrea,  vi,  293,  346. 

Everett,  Colonel  William,  117. 

Exports.  See  Appendix  III,  and  Trade. 

Fabert,  126. 

Fadr-el-Allah,  144. 

Faidherbe,  General,  108. 

Fashoda,  119-23,  348. 

Faure,  Felix,  111. 

Ferket,  347. 

Fernando  Po,  16,  17. 

Ferry,  Jules,  11,  237. 

Fethi  Bey,  300. 

Fez,  245,  283,  285. 

Figuig,  130,  225,  252;  Treaty  of,  128. 

Filali  Shareefs,  247. 

Finance:  Algeria,  222,  226,  229;  Brit.  E. 
Afr.,  104;  Congo,  22,  62;  Egypt,  310, 
323;  Europe,  2;  German  E.  Afr.,  106; 
German  W.  Afr.,  77,  79;  Nigeria,  152- 
54, 156;  Tripoli,  292;  Tunis,  232,  238, 
240,  241;  Sudan,  350,  351.  See  Appendix 
III. 

Firearms,  33,  34,  139,  141,  148,  349. 


Fisher,  Abraham,  187,  197. 

Flamaud  mission,  127. 

Flatters  mission,  126,  227. 

Forbes,  Major,  205,  206. 

Forgemol  de  Bestquenerd,  General,  234, 
236. 

Forster,  W.  E.,  8. 

Fortescue,  C.,  8. 

Foureau,  Fernand,  124,  126-27. 

France:  and  the  Congo,  24-29;  Egypt, 
310-20;  German  E.  Afr.,  84, 88;  German 
W.  Afr.,  77;  Nigeria,  144,  145;  Tripoli, 
293,  294;  chaps,  vi,  ix,  x,  xi.  See  Ad- 
ministration, Finance,  Treaties,  etc. 

Free  trade:  in  England,  5;  abandoned  in 
Germany,  16,  28;  in  Central  Africa,  28, 
30,  45-18,  61;  in  Zanzibar,  82,  87,  96; 
in  S.  Afr.,  200;  in  Nigeria,  139;  in  Mo- 
rocco, 254,  262,  265,  274.  See  Monop- 
oly. 

Frere,  Sir  Bartle,  67,  165,  173-76. 

Frey,  Colonel,  109,  111. 

Freycinet,  317-19. 

Froude,  James  A.,  172. 

Fulani,  143,  155. 

Gaboon  River,  16,  18,  108,  118. 

Gaden,  Captain,  125. 

Gallieni,  Captain,  109. 

Gambetta,  237,  238,  316. 

Gando,  112,  113,  136. 

Gautier,  E.  F.,  130. 

Gentil,  123,  143. 

German  E.  Afr.,  chap.  v.    See  Table  of 

Contents,  Administration, Finance,  etc.; 

map,  86. 

German  East  Africa  Company,  83. 
German  Southwest  Africa,  chap.  rv.  See 

Table  of  Contents,  map,  66. 
Germany,  see  chaps,  iv  and  v,  Table  of 

Contents;  16;  inre Congo,  26-28, 33, 38; 

French  W.  Afr.,    119;  Morocco,  244, 

252-54,  258,  262,  268-77,  279;  Nigeria, 

145;  Tunis,  238. 
Gesellschaft  der  Rheinischen  Missionen, 

65,  66. 

Gessi  Pasha,  Romola,  309,  330-32. 
Ghadames,  126,  290,  293,  299,  305. 
Ghardaia,  127,  130,  226. 
Ghat,  126,  290,  293,  299. 
Giolitti,  302. 

Girouard,  Sir  Percy,  151. 
Giustino,  Father,  295. 
Gladstone,  Viscount,  188,  212. 
Gladstone,  William  E.,  10,  174,  177,  322, 

338,  342,  343. 
Glenelg,  Lord,  167. 
Gold,  3,  178,  210. 
Gold  Coast,  v,  16,  115,  117,  133. 


380 


INDEX 


Goldie,  Sir  Geo.  T.,  112, 114, 132, 137, 138. 

Goldsmid,  Sir  F.,  22. 

Gondokoro,  105,  330,  348. 

Goold-Adams,  Sir  H.  J.,  193. 

Gordon,  General  Charles  George,  220, 
309,  330-44,  348. 

Gordon  College,  351-53. 

Gosselin,  Martin,  116. 

Gourara,  127. 

Gouraud,  Captain,  125. 

Gourounsi,  110,  113.  ^ 

Government.  See  Administration. 

Grand  Bassam,  108. 

Grant,  18,  19. 

Granville,  Lord,  8,  9;  tn  re  Egypt,  14,  312, 
316-20;  Congo,  24,  25,  27,  31;  S.  W. 
Afr.,  69-73;  E.  Afr.,  82-84. 

Great  Britain  (see  chaps,  vn,  vni,  xni, 
and  xi  v;  Table  of  Contents),  in  re  Con- 
go, 24-28,  38,  47-50,  63;  German  S.  W. 
Afr.,  65-74,  76-77;  E.  Afr.,  82-91,  105- 
07;  Tunis,  237;  Tripoli,  294;  Morocco, 
244,  245,  254,  270,  271,  281;  W.  Afr., 
112,  114-19, 130;  Fashoda,  119-23.  See 
Treaties. 

Great  Scarcies  River,  115,  134. 

Grenfell,  George,  23,  31,  39, 40,  43,  47,  49, 
51. 

Grenfell,  General,  344,  345,  347. 

Grevy,  234. 

Grey,  Earl,  168,  169,  210. 

Grey,  Sir  E.,  121,  356. 

Grey,  Sir  George,  169-71. 

Griquas,  Griqualand,  168,  171. 

Grogan,  103. 

Guinea,  French,  109,  117,  124.  125,  129. 

Hammond,  John  Hays,  203. 

Hannington,  Bishop,  90,  91. 

Hanotaux,  Gabriel,  116,  121. 

Hassi  Inifel,  127. 

Hatzfeldt,  26. 

Hausas,  38,  112,  136,  137,  147,  149. 

Hely-Hutchinson,  Sir  W.,  193,  195. 

Hereros,  65,  67. 

Herzog,  General,  197,  198,  213. 

Het  Volk,  191,  197. 

Hewitt,  Consul,  76,  133. 

Hicks,  General,  334,  342. 

Hinde,  Captain,  37,  47. 

Hodister,  36,  37. 

Hofmeyr,  J.  H.,  177,  187. 

Hostains,  Governor,  125. 

Hourst,  Lieutenant,  111. 

Hugo,  Victor,  15. 

Hussein  Dey,  216. 

Ibi,  134. 

Ibrahim  Pasha,  of  Egypt,  222,  309. 


Ibrahim  Pasha,  Governor  of  Tripolitania, 

293. 

Idah,  134,  139,  140. 
Igli,  127. 

Ilorin,  114,  137,  152. 
Imperial  British  East  Africa  Co.,  87-89, 

92-96. 

Imports.  See  Appendix  III,  and  Trade. 
Industrial  Revolution,  3. 
In-Salah,  127. 

Institutions  (Lord  Dufferin's),  320. 
International  African  Association,  21. 
International  Association  of  the  Congo, 

22,  23,  28,  29. 

Internationalism,  new,  102,  280. 
Isangi,  46. 
Isandlwana,  175. 
Ismail  Pasha,  309,  312,  330-32. 
Italy:  in  re  Congo,  27;  Abyssinia,  346; 

Egypt,  319;  Morocco,  254;  Tunis,  232, 

238;  Somaliland,  88,105,293.  See  chap. 

xii ;  Table  of  Contents. 
Ivory  Coast,  16,  108,  110,  117,  124,  125, 

129. 

Jackson,  92. 

Jaime,  Caron,  111. 

Jameson,  Dr.  L.  S.,  195, 197, 198, 204,  205; 
(the  Raid),  183-84;  (Sir  Starr),  209. 

Janssen,  Camille,  35. 

Jebba,  141,  152. 

Jibrella,  Mallam,  145,  149. 

Johnston,  Sir  Harry,  98,  206. 

Joinville,  Prince,  221. 

Joubert,  173,  176,  182. 

Juba  River,  85,  88,  93. 

Judiciary :  Algeria,  227;  Egypt,  321;  Ni- 
geria, 148,  154,  155;  Tunis,  237. 

Juehlke,  Carl,  82,  83. 

Kabarega,  King,  97. 

Kabyles,  214,  221,  223. 

Kaffirs,  Kaffraria,  167-69,  179. 

Kairouan,  236. 

Kano,  111,  142,  145,  147.  149,  151,  152, 

156,  159,  161. 
Karema,  91. 

Kasnadar,  Mustapha,  232. 
Kasr-es-Said,  Treaty  of,  235. 
Kassala,  332,  334,  336,  346,  352. 
Katsena,  147. 
Kayes,  129. 
Khalifa,  The,  344-48. 
Khartoum,  105, 120, 330, 334-43,  347,  348, 

350,  355. 

Khroumirs,  233,  234. 
Kiderlen-Waechter,  269,  277. 
Kilima-Njaro,  85. 
Kimberley,  Lord,  121,  172. 


INDEX 


381 


Kipini,  85,  87. 

Kirk,  John,  82-84. 

Kismayu,  85,  87. 

Kitchener,  Sir  Herbert, 84, 120-22;  (Lord), 

188,  325,  328,  347,  356. 
Konakry,  124. 

Kong,  mountains,  109;  Kingdom,  110. 
Kontagora,  142,  146. 
Kordofan,  332,  333,  348,  350. 
Korti,  341,  342. 
Kotze,  Judge,  186. 
Kruger,  Paul,  173,  176,  180-87. 
Kuka,  143. 

Lado  Enclave,  38,  39,  332,  350. 

Laghouat,  126,  223. 

Lagos,  115,  116,  139,  152,  158. 

Laing,  Major,  17,  19. 

Laird,  MacGregor,  132. 

Lambermont,  Baron,  87. 

Lamoriciere,  General,  221. 

Lamu,  81,  84,  87. 

Lamy,  Commandant,  125,  127. 

Land  tenure:  Early  English  policy,  7;  Al- 
geria, 224;  Congo,  40,  64;  Egypt,  329; 
German  S.  W.  Air.,  79;  Brit.  E.  Afr., 
101-02;  Nigeria,  140, 155;  S.  Afr.,  212. 

Lander  brothers,  17,  19,  131. 

Landor,  Henry  Savage,  50. 

Lansdowne,  Marquis,  48,  49. 

Lanyon,  Colonel  Owen,  174,  176. 

Laurier,  Sir  Wilfrid,  15. 

Lausanne,  Treaty  of,  303. 

Lavigerie,  Cardinal,  90. 

Law.   See  Judiciary. 

Lecomte,  R.,  116. 

Leopold  II;  civilizer,  14,  31;  founds  the 
Congo  state,  20-23;  sovereign,  29,  40; 
gives  the  Congo  to  Belgium,  35,  50- 
57. 

Leroy-Beaulieu,  15. 

Liberia,  293,  369. 

Liotard,  120,  122. 

Liquor.   See  Spirits. 

Livingstone,  David,  18,  19. 

Lloyd-George,  271. 

Lo  Bengula,  203-05. 

Logerot,  General,  234,  236. 

Lokoja,  112,  132,  134,  141,  145,  157. 

Lomami,  36,  39. 

Lothaire,  Major,  44. 

Loubet,  President,  251. 

Louis  Philippe,  220. 

Lourdel,  Pdre,  91. 

Lourenco  Marques,  178. 

LUderitz,  F.  A.  E.,  69-74. 

Lugard,  Sir  Frederick,  92,  107,  112,  137, 
139,  142-48,  151,  159,  160,  206. 

Lutete,  Congo,  38. 


Lyautey,  General,  283,  285-87 
Lytton,  Sir  Bulwer,  171. 

Maccio,  232. 

Macdonald,  Captain,  94,  95. 

Mackay,  Alexander,  90. 

Mackinnon,  Sir  William,  82,  87,  94. 

McLaud,  124. 

McLean,  Kaid,  255. 

Madagascar,  vi,  88,  251. 

Mafia,  84. 

Mahdi,  97,  119,  332-44,  348. 

Majuba  Hill,  176. 

Malet,  Sir  Edward,  28,  32,  317,  323. 

Mangin,  Lieutenant,  125. 

Manyanga,  29. 

Marchand,  120-23,  125. 

Marrakesh,  245,  255,  285,  287. 

Marsa,  Convention  of,  237. 

Masai,  103. 

Mashonaland,  179,  203-05. 

Matabeleland,  179,  203,  205. 

Mauretania,  125,  126,  129. 

Mazrui  Princes,  81,  98. 

Mehemet  Ali,  308. 

Mellicouri,  16,  108,  134. 

Mengo,  90-92. 

Merriman,  197. 

Milner,  Sir  Alfred,  186,  187,  190-95. 

Missions  and  missionaries,  22,  32,  55; 
Congo  opposes,  39,  46,  49,  57;  in  Ugan- 
da, 90;  L.M.S.,  206;  C.M.S.,  157.  See 
Grenfell. 

Mitchell,  Vice-Consul,  41,  46,  51. 

Mizon,  Lieutenant,  118. 

Modiano,  Signor,  303. 

Mogador,  255,  257,  258. 

Mohammed  Ahmed,  the  Mahdi,  97,  119, 
332-44,  348. 

Mohammed  Ali  Pasha,  327. 

Mohammed-es-Sadok  Bey,  230,  234-37. 

Mohammedans,  in  Uganda,  90,  91;  in 
Egypt,  324. 

Moinier,  General,  268,  283. 

Moir  brothers,  206. 

Mombasa,  81,  92,  94,  99,  100. 

Monopoly,  2,  12;  Portuguese,  24,  25; 
Congo,  45,  46,  French,  275. 

Monteil,  111. 

Morland,  Colonel,  144,  145. 

Morocco,  118,  214;  map,  246.  See  chap, 
xii,  Table  of  Contents,  and  Adminis- 
tration, Treaties,  etc. 

Mossi,  110,  113. 

Mostaganem,  217,  219. 

Mozambique,  17. 

Msidi,  36. 

Mulai-el-Hafid,  256-67,  282-84, 

Mulai  Yusef,  283,  284,  288. 


382 


INDEX 


Munster,  Count,  71. 
Mutesa,  King,  90. 
Murzuk,  290,  293,  299,  305. 
Mustapha  Pasha  Kamel,  324. 
Mwamba,  207. 
Mwanga,  King,  91-98. 

Naby  Bey,  303. 

Nachtigal,  18,  19,  76. 

Namaqualand,  65,  67,  68. 

Napier,  General,  168. 

Napoleon,  Louis,  221. 

Natal,  163,  169,  170,  177,  188,  194,  198, 
199. 

National  African  Company,  133,  134. 

Natives,  agents  of  government,  44,  45, 
100,  136,  148,  153,  158,  202,  226,  240, 
306;  oppression,  42-51,  78,  97;  welfare, 
31-33, 49, 55, 101, 102, 106-36, 170, 179, 
199,  201,  202,  211,  212;  wars  and  rebel- 
lions, 45,  65,  67,  68,  97,  167,  169,  175, 
205, 231, 295.  See  Land,  Slavery,  Trea- 
ties. 

Niger  River,  17,  27,  108-14,  118.  119; 
chap,  vii,  passim. 

Nigeria,  112,  116,  251;  chap.  vn.  See 
Table  of  Contents,  British  Royal  Niger 
Co.,  Administration,  Land,  Finance, 
etc.;  map,  151. 

Nightingale,  Consul,  44,  51. 

Nikki,  114. 

Nile,  exploration,  18,  38,  93,  95,  97,  120- 
22,  330,  345,  350;  transportation,  105, 
350 

Noki,  26,  28. 

Nubar  Pasha,  311,  335. 

Nup6,  114,  133,  137,  142. 

Nyangwe,  36,  38. 

Nyasa,  Lake,  18,  36,  163,  208. 

Nyasaland,  163,  206. 

Obock,  16,  120. 

Occupation,  effective,  27,  33,  82,  133. 

Officials,  French,  10;  Congo,  41-45,  62; 

German,  77;  British  in  E.  Afr.,  104. 
Oil  Rivers,  76,  133,  134. 
Omdurman,  120,  335,  347. 
Oppia,  88. 

Oran,  214,  217,  219,  221,  225. 
Orange  Free  State,  169, 170, 177, 178, 185, 

188, 189, 194;  (Orange  River  Colony), 

189-93,  197,  199. 
Orange  River,  69,  72,  74. 
Osman  Digna,  344,  345,  348. 
Ouargla,  126,  127. 
Oudjda,  252,  257,  258,  262,  266,  287. 

Palgrave,  67,  68. 
Panther,  the,  267,  270. 


Park,  Mungo,  17,  19,  131. 

Patrimonio,  84. 

Pavone,  Captain,  305. 

Pemba,  81,  84,  99. 

Peters,  Carl,  82,  83,  89-92. 

Pheil,  Count  J.  F.,  82. 

Phillips,  Lionel,  183. 

Pichon,  263,  278. 

Piquet,  Victor,  224,  242. 

Plessen,  Baron  von,  69,  85. 

Pobequin,  Captain,  125. 

Poincar6,  278,  286. 

Polignac,  216. 

Population:  and  colonization,  13;  Algeria, 

224,  228;  Brit.  E.  Afr.,  100;  Congo,  21, 

30;  French  W.  Afr.,  129, 275;German  E. 

Afr.,  105;  Morocco,  243;  Nigeria,  131, 

155;  Rhodesia,  205,  209;  S.  Afr.,  166; 

Tripoli,  290;  Sudan,  249;  Uganda,  93. 
Portal,  Sir  Gerald,  93-95. 
Port  Harcourt,  160. 
Porto  Novo,  108,  111,  129. 
Port  Said,  319. 
Port  Sudan.  See  Suakim. 
Portugal,  vi,  17;  and  the  Congo,  23-28, 

39;  seizes  Tungi  Bay,  85.   See  Treaties. 
Pretoria,  Convention  of,  176;  Treaty  of, 

188-90. 

Pretorius,  Andries,  168. 
Pretorius,  Mathinus,  169,  176. 
Public  Opinion,  34, 35;  British,  10, 44, 338, 

340;  French,  12. 

Quiquandon,  110. 

Rabah,  124,  125,  143-45,  331. 

Ragheb  Pasha,  318. 

Railroads:  Algeria,  225,  227;  French  W. 
Afr.,  127,  129;  German  E.  Afr.,  106; 
Morocco,  274,  276,  281,  287;  Nigeria, 
141,  151,  152,  160;  S.  Afr..  178,  208, 
211;  Sudan,  347,  350;  Tunis,  231,241; 
Uganda,  104,  105. 

Raiasuli,  225. 

Redjet  Pasha,  Marshal,  297. 

Regnault,  263,  282. 

Reveil,  252,  259. 

Rhodes,  Cecil,  183,  184,  203,  204,  208. 

Rhodesia,  163,  177,  194,  200. 

Riff,  239,  245,  264,  266. 

Rio  de  Oro,  281. 

Rio  del  Rey,  134,  136. 

Roads;  French  W.  Afr.,  129;  Morocco, 
287;  Nigeria,  151;  Tunis,  241. 

Roberts,  Lord,  188,  191. 

Robinson,  Sir  Hercules,  175,  186. 

Roches,  L6on,  230. 

Rohlfs,  Gerhard,  82,  84. 

Roosevelt,  101. 


INDEX 


Rosebery,  Lord,  346. 

Roustan,  230,  235,  237. 

Royal  Niger  Co.,  British,  111-13,  132-39, 

141. 

Rubber,  42,  45,  100,  273,  275. 
Russia,  16,  20,  27. 

Sahara,  17,  18,  109,  123-30,  226,  228. 

Said  Pasha,  309. 

Said  Sogheir,  120. 

Saint-Hilaire,  Barth61emy,  233,  234,  237, 
312. 

St.  Louis,  108,  125. 

Salesses,  Captain,  124. 

Salisbury,  Lord:  on  effective  occupation, 
82;  in  re  E.  Afr.,  85,  94,  95;  Fashoda, 
121-23;  Nigeria,  188;  Tunis,  233;  Egypt, 
311,  313. 

Samory,  109,  110,  125. 

Samy  Pasha,  Mahmoud,  315,  316. 

Sand  River  Convention,  169. 

Say,  111,  112,  117,  129,  137. 

Schellaert,  56. 

Schmidt,  84. 

Sebkha  d'Idjil,  126. 

Segu,  109,  110. 

Selborne,  Earl  of,  193,  196. 

Selim  Bey,  92. 

Senegal,  16,  17,  108-12,  128,  129. 

Sennar,  332,  333,  334,  336,  350. 

Senoussi,  118,  249,  299,  300. 

Serpa,  A.  de,  25. 

Serviere,  General,  127. 

Seymour,  Admiral,  318,  319. 

Seyyid  Said,  81. 

Sfax,  230,  235. 

Shareefs,  247. 

Shems-ed-Din,  305. 

Shepstone,  Sir  T.,  172-75. 

Sierra  Leone,  8,  16,  115,  134. 

Sikasso,  110,  125. 

Slatin  Pasha,  332;  (Sir  Rudolph  von),  345, 
349. 

Slavery  and  Slave  Trade:  suppression  a 
motive  for  colonization,  14,  20,  21,  25, 
335,  338;  Congo  Arabs,  36,  38;  suppres- 
sion, 30-34,  93-95,  133,  136,  137,  139, 
141,  144,  147,  148,  167,  206,  207,  248, 
299,  330,  331,  349. 

Smalah,  220. 

Smuts,  C.  J.,  197. 

Sobat,  121. 

Sokoto,  18,  112,  113,  133,  136,  138,  142, 
146-49. 

Soleillet,  126. 

Somaliland,  vi ;  French,  123;  Italian,  88, 
105,  293. 

Somerset,  Lord  Charles,  166. 

Sousse,  230. 


South  Africa,  Union  of,  chap.  vin.    See 

Table  of  Contents. 
Spain,  17,  251,  254,  257,  262,  264,  266, 

280-81,  287. 
Speke,  18,  19,  90. 
Spirits,  26,  32-34,  139,  141,  349. 
Stanley,  Henry  M.,  18,  21,  23,  24,  31,  90, 

95,  118. 

Starr,  Professor,  50. 
Stephenson,  General,  340,  344. 
Stewart,  Colonel,  337,  338,  344. 
Steyn,  President,  185,  197. 
Suakim,  332,  334,  336,  338,  340,  344; 

(Port  Sudan),  349,  350. 
Sudan,    Anglo-Egyptian,    119-23,    309; 

chap,  xiv,  see  Table  of  Contents;  map, 

333;  French,  17,  18,  110,  111,  113,  118, 

124,  227;  Fashoda,  119-23. 
Sud-Oranais,  255. 
Suleiman,  143. 
Sus,  245. 
Swaziland,  201,  202,  207. 

Tafilet,  245,  255. 

Tafna,  Treaty  of,  219. 

Tana  River,  85,  89,  93. 

Tanganyika,  18,  30,  36,  81.  105,  106,  203, 

206. 

Tangier,  257. 
Tanmusa,  Dan,  145,  146. 
Taxation:  Congo,  42,  53,  61;  Nigeria,  139, 

152-53;  Tunis,  241. 
Telegraph,  in  W.  Afr.,  129,  130;  Nigeria, 

150;  Tunis,  230,  241. 
Tel-el-Kebir,  319. 
Temple,  C.  L.,  160. 
Tewfik  Pasha,  Mohammed,  311-20,  334- 

36,  341. 
Thiers,  223. 
Thys,  Captain,  35. 
Tibesti,  123,  291. 
Tidikelt,  127. 

Timbuctu,  17,  108,  111.  133. 
Timminoun,  127. 
Tippoo  Tib,  36,  37. 
Titeri,  217,  219. 
Togoland,  76-80,  271. 
Touaregs,  126,  127,  214,  227. 
Touat,  127,  228,  252. 
Touggourt,  127,  130,  223,  226,  229. 
Toutee,  111,  113. 
Trade:  Appendix  III;  and  colonization,  2, 

15, 16,  21;  Algeria,  227,  228;  Congo,  62; 

French  W.  Afr.,  129;  German  E.  Afr., 

106, 107;  German  W.  Afr.,  80;  Morocco, 

244,  245;  Nigeria,  157, 161;  Sudan,  351; 

Tripoli,  290,  291;  Tunis,  241. 
Transvaal,  chap,  vm,  passim. 
Treaties:  Algcciras,  254;  Brussels,  34,  96; 


384 


INDEX 


FEntente  Cordiale,  250;  FSguig,  128; 
General  Act  of  W.  Af r.  Conference,  28, 
32,  33,  43,  48;  Madrid,  253;  Pretoria, 
188-90 ;  Sand  River,  169 ;  Triple  Alli- 
ance, 65;  Algerian,  216,  219,  221; 
Anglo-Egyptian,  349;  Anglo-French 
(W.  Afr.),  112,  114-17,  137,  (Sudan), 
123, 348;  (Morocco),  251 ;  Anglo-German 
(W.  Afr.),  74,  77,  119  ;  (E.  Afr.),  84,  88, 
89;  (Nyasaland),  206;  Anglo-Italian,  88; 
Anglo-Portuguese,  206,  207 ;  Congo, 
28,  38,  119;  Franco-German  (W.  Afr.), 
77,  79,  119,  284,  (Morocco),  262,  273- 
78;  Franco-Italian  (N.  Afr.),  250,  294; 
Franco-Spanish,  251,  280,  281 ;  Franco- 
Russian,  250;  Franco-Portuguese,  24; 
Gennano-Portuguese,  74, 77;  Italo-Turk- 
ish,  303;  Moroccan,  249,  252,  265,  266, 
282,  284;  Tunisian,  230,  235,  236,  238 
(Marsa);  Transvaal,  169, 176, 185, 188. 

Treaties  with  "the  natives":  Congo,  21; 
Cameroons,  76;  East  Africa,  83,  87,  91, 
92, 93, 98;  French  W.  Afr.,  110, 113, 124; 
Nigeria,  112, 133, 135, 148;  S.  Afr.,  167, 
168,  206,  207. 

Triple  Alliance,  65,  294. 

Tripoli,  215,  290,  291,  299. 

Tripolitania,  chap.  xn.  See  Table  of  Con- 
tents; map,  291. 

Tucker,  Bishop,  94. 

Tungi  Bay,  81,  85. 

Tunis,  214, 215;  chap.  x.  See  Table  of  Con- 
tents. 

Turkey,  27;  chap,  xn,  passim. 

Ubangi  River,  18,  29,  30,  36,  38,  39,  61, 

119,  120,  124. 
Udi,  160. 
Uganda,  38;  map,  86.  See  chap,  v,  Table 

of  Contents. 

Uitlanders,  180,  181,  184,  186. 
Umba  River,  85,  87. 
United  African  Company,  112,  132. 
United  States,  5,  22,  28,  51,  63,  215,  254. 
Unyoro,  92,  97. 


Vassel,  Dr.,  258,  259. 

Vermeesch,  Captain,  113. 

Victoria  Nyanza,  18,  81,  85,  91,  94,  11C. 

Voulet,  Lieutenant,  113,  124. 

Wadai,  123,  144. 

Wadelai,  97. 

Wadi  Haifa,  330,  340-45,  347,  349,  350. 

Wakefield,  6. 

Wallace,  Captain,  113. 

Walfish  Bay,  67,  68,  70,  74. 

Watson,  330. 

Weeks,  Rev.  J.  H.,  48,  61. 

Welle,  36,  38. 

Wellington,  216. 

West   African   Conference,   27-29,    135; 

General  Act,  28,  32-33,  43,  48. 
White  Fathers,  90,  207. 
Whitehouse,  Sir  G.,  99. 
William  II,  253.  258,  259,  301. 
Wilson,  Colonel  Charles,  341. 
Wilson,  C.  T.,  90. 
Wilson,  Rivers,  310,  311,  314. 
Wingate,  Sir  Reginald,  349,  354. 
Winton,  Sir  Francis  de,  22,  29. 
Witu,  81,  88,  89,  96. 
Woelfel,  Lieutenant,  125. 
Wolseley,  Sir  Garnet,  175,  319,  340,  341. 
Wood,  Sir  Evelyn,  176. 
Wouters,  Captain  de,  37. 

Yola,  118,  119, 136, 143. 
Young  Turks,  297. 

Zagloul  Pasha,  Said,  325,  328. 

Zambesi,  17, 18,  25, 30, 105,  203,  204,  205, 

211. 
Zanzibar  (island),  81, 84, 88,  99;  Sultan  of, 

81-86,  96. 

Zaria,  145,  146,  151,  161. 
Zinder,  111,  124,  129. 
Zouila,  126. 

Zubeir  Pasha.  143,  331,  337-42. 
Zulus  and  Zululand,  172,  175,  202. 
Zungeru,  141,  152. 


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